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ABSTRACT
This thesis presents a novel approach to part of the problem of 
the Incidental Question in the Conflict of Laws. Only cases where 
the answer to what has been called the main question depends on 
recognition of a foreign judgment (the so called incidental or 
preliminary question) are included. The problem is analysed as 
involving a conflict between two different types of conflicts 
rules i.e. choice of law rules and recognition rules.
The thesis examines whether this conflict can be satisfactorily 
solved by a global preference for either of these rules. Whilst 
many writers have considered the theoretical base for the 
conflict of laws, none has yet specifically compared the 
rationales for choice of law rules and recognition rules in order 
to determine whether as a matter of principle one type of rule 
should be preferred to the other rule. This requires a fresh 
perspective.
After rejecting the global solution, the thesis proceeds to 
examine how a result selecting approach might be applied to the 
present conflict of rules. After a brief survey of different 
result selecting approaches, it is concluded that the most 
appropriate approach in the present conflict of rules context is 
the construction of specific result orientated rules for each 
particular category of case. The desired result should be 
dictated by the policy of the forum, since in fact the conflict 
is between two conflict rules of the forum.
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A number of specific topics (including validity of remarriage and 
matrimonial property rights) concerning recognition of status 
judgments are considered in depth. The methodology adopted is as 
follows:-
a) . The particular circumstances in which the 'conflict of rules' 
problem is likely to arise in relation to the particular issue 
is explained.
b). The various possible 'choice of rule' rules which might be 
adopted for the particular issue are considered.
c) . The policy of English law in relation to the particular issue 
is ascertained and the 'choice of rule' rule which most closely 
gives effect to that policy recommended.
The thesis contributes to jurisprudence of Private International 
Law in three main ways:-
1. The understanding of conflicts between different types of 
conflict rules is of fundamental importance to the whole 
structure of Private International Law. This thesis shows that 
this problem is of more significance than previously thought.
2. Whilst writers have adopted a functional approach to the 
incidental question, none have attempted to construct a series 
of rules based on forum policy.
3. There has been no previous attempt to identify forum (here 
English) policy in relation to the particular issues chosen.
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PART I
BACKGROUND AND STRUCTURE 
OF THE THESIS
10
CHAPTER 1: PRELIMINARY ISSUES AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE THESIS
I. THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM OUTLINED
A. BASIC PRINCIPLES
According to orthodox theory, there are three separate questions 
which the Conflicts of Laws might be required to answer viz: 
jurisdiction, choice of law and recognition of foreign judgments. 
Whilst it is clear that the question of jurisdiction will arise 
together with either of the other two questions and must be 
decided first; it is less frequently recognised1 that the latter 
two questions may arise together in relation to a particular set 
of facts and that the result may differ depending on whether the 
case is determined by application of the choice of law rule or 
the recognition of judgments rule2. The Law Commission3 identify 
this problem in relation to remarriage after a foreign divorce 
or nullity decree and assert, without any real explanation, that 
the recognition rule should be favoured.
1 See, however, L. Collins et. al., Dicey and Morris, The
Conflict of Laws (1993) 12th. edn. (hereinafter Dicey and Morris) 
at p. 758; North and Fawcett, Cheshire and North's Private 
International Law (1987) 12th. edn. (hereinafter 'Cheshire and 
North') at p. 603 ; North, The Private International Law of
Matrimonial Causes in the British Isles and the Republic of 
Ireland (1977) pp. 224 - 5 and Law Com. 137 para 1.12. Gordon, 
Foreign Divorces: English Law and Practice (1988) at p. 150
refers to the conflict between recognition of marriage rules and 
recognition of divorce rules.
2 Gottlieb (1955) 33 Can. Bar. R. 523 at p. 525 refers to 
"the conflict of conflicts rules governing the incidental 
question." However, he is not referring specifically to the 
situation where there is a conflict between two different types 
of conflicts rules. A different approach may be possible where 
the conflict is, and is perceived as being, between a choice 
rule and a recognition rule.
3 Law Com. No. 137 para 6.60.
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B. DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN THE 'CONFLICT OF RULES' SITUATION AND 
THE 'PURE RECOGNITION' SITUATION
It is crucial at the outset to distinguish between
1. the 'conflict of rules' situation described above, which is 
usually regarded as part of the problem of the incidental 
question, and
2. the 'pure recognition' case,4 where the foreign judgment for 
which
recognition and/or enforcement is sought is inconsistent with the 
decision which would have been reached by an English Court on the 
same facts applying English choice of law rules.
In the former, the actual issue before the Court has not itself 
been determined by a foreign Court, although its outcome depends 
on whether a foreign judgment is recognised. The issue can be 
decided either by reference to the recognition rules of the forum 
or by reference to the law chosen by the forum's choice of law 
rules. Whereas, in the second category of case, the situation is 
not perceived or treated as one involving conflict between the 
two types of rule. The Court is required to decide whether to 
recognise the foreign judgment by reference only to the 
recognition rules. Since it is not allowed to examine the merits 
of the case, the choice of law rules are not even called into 
play.5
4 Discussed further at Section VIII A infra.
5 Goddard v Grey (1870) L.R. 6 Q.B. 139. cf. In some
jurisdictions, only those judgments which closely approximate to 
the results which would have been achieved by application of the 
forum's choice of law rules will be recognised (see Von Mehren 
v Trautman (1968) 81 Harv. L. R. 1601, 1605).
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Once this distinction is grasped, it will be appreciated that 
without further analysis there should be no assumption that 
recognition rules should prevail in the 'conflict of rules' 
situation, with which this thesis is concerned. We will consider 
below6 the significance of the preference for the recognition 
rule in the pure recognition case and recent shifts in the 
balance between the choice rules and recognition rules in 
Private International Law which might suggest that recognition 
rules should be favoured.
C. DECISIONS AFFECTING STATUS.
This thesis will concentrate on situations where there is a 
dispute between the forum and the lex causae of the issue to be 
decided as to whether a foreign decision affecting status7 is 
effective. The reason is that it is in this area in which the 
problem has been identified by the Courts and where it is 
realised that solutions are required. Although this issue can 
arise in a number of different contexts, the following four have 
been selected for in depth examination: validity of a remarriage, 
succession8, matrimonial property relations and tort liability.9
6 At Section VIII infra.
7 i.e. an adoption order; divorce decree; decree of 
presumption of death and dissolution of marriage; legal 
separation and annulment, although the latter may be purely 
declaratory. Some examples of non-status situations will be 
given.
8 Following a disputed matrimonial decree or adoption
order.
9 Between spouses where there is inter-spousal immunity and
wrongful death claims by dependant spouses, children or parents.
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There is some difficulty in determining to what extent the rules 
determining whether non-judicial changes of status should be 
recognised should be treated as recognition rules10. At first 
sight, it might seem that since we are concerned with the rules 
for recognition of judgments, the conflict of rules scenario 
cannot arise in relation to non-judicial changes of status. 
However, this approach ignores the fact that in some areas of law 
the very same rules govern the recognition of judicial and non­
judicial changes of status. For example, overseas formal extra­
judicial divorces are recognised on the same basis as judicial 
decrees and the rules in respect of informal divorces, although 
different, are contained in the same statutory section as those 
for recognition of formal decrees.11 On the other hand, in other 
areas, such as legitimation, the rules for recognition are not 
treated like recognition of judgments rules and on the contrary 
are perceived as choice of law rules12.
No doubt this apparently anomalous situation can be explained in 
practical terms. Where it is common for a particular status to 
be created or determined by judicial decree and the same or 
similar rules apply to non-judicial terminations, as with 
adoptions and divorces, the rules are treated as recognition of
10 This difficulty does not arise under the incidental
question analysis (Section IV infra ) because the concern is 
whether the incidental question should be governed by the 
conflicts rules, whether they be recognition of judgments rules 
or choice of law rules, of the forum or of the lex causae.
11 See Section III B 2 and 3 infra.
12 In the same way as the rules governing recognition of the 
validity of marriages.
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judgments rules, even though there is no judgment. In any event, 
this is the distinction that will be adopted in deciding which 
rules are 'recognition rules'.
Thus, we will treat the rules for determining the validity of 
extra-judicial dissolutions, annulments and adoptions13 as 
'recognition rules' and therefore within the scope of the 
'conflict of rules' problem. It should be pointed, however, that 
whilst other non-judicial changes of status14 will not be 
included within the thesis, the methodology adopted in Part III 
of this thesis may be appropriate in order to resolve the 
conflict which may arise between the 'recognition of status' 
rules, however they are classified, and choice of law rules.
D. NOTATION AND TERMINOLOGY
The following notation and terminology will be adopted throughout 
the thesis:-
1. Where there is a dispute between the lex causae and lex fori 
concerning the validity of a decree or resulting status, this 
will be indicated by the use of single quotation marks e.g. 
'divorce', 'spouse', 'adopter'.
2. While the spouse in relation to whom a 'divorce' or 
'annulment' was obtained may not be the first spouse, s(he) will
13 Whilst the differentiation between adoption and
legitimation may be thought unsatisfactory, the decreasing 
importance of the status of legitimacy means that recognition of 
legitimations is not of great practical significance today.
14 Although frequently the issue of recognition of a
'marriage' can be converted into a recognition of judgments 
question by obtaining a nullity decree in the jurisdiction which 
considers the marriage void.
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be referred to as the first spouse15 to distinguish him/her from 
the subsequent spouse (who will be called the second spouse) 
where there has been a remarriage following the 'divorce' or 
'annulment'.
3. For most purposes it will not matter whether the disputed 
decree is a divorce decree or a nullity decree. Thus, for 
convenience, unless stated to the contrary references to divorce 
will include annulments.
4. The rule which determines whether the choice of law rule or 
the recognition rule should prevail in a particular situation 
will be referred to as the preference rule16.
II. RECOGNITION RULES
In order to illustrate the 'conflict of rules' scenario, we need 
to understand the various recognition and choice rules which will 
produce the conflict. It will be convenient at this point to 
summarise briefly the rules for recognition of foreign judgments 
in personam and foreign matrimonial decrees.17 The relevant 
choice of law rules will be stated as and when required.
15 And the marriage will be referred to as the first 
marriage.
16 The expression 'choice of rule' rule is a more specific 
description but was felt to be too clumsy.
17 The rules for recognition of foreign adoptions will be 
discussed in Chapter 10.
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A. IN ACTIONS IN PERSONAM18
There are now four main sets of recognition rules, three of which 
are statutory. The common law rules apply to any judgments which 
are not within the scope of any of the statutes.
1. The common law rules
At common law, a judgment can only be recognised if the Court 
granting it has jurisdictional competence either on the basis 
of: -
(a) the defendant's residence19 or
(b) submission to the foreign Court.
Other connections with the foreign Court, such as nationality or 
that the law of that country is the lex causae of the issue in 
dispute, are not sufficient. In order to qualify for recognition, 
the judgment must be a for a fixed sum and must be final. A 
judgment which is prima facie entitled to recognition will not 
be recognised where the defendant successfully pleads one of the 
following defences20
(i) the foreign judgment was obtained by fraud;
(ii) the foreign judgment is contrary to public policy;
(iii) recognition would enforce directly or indirectly foreign 
revenue, penal or other public laws;
18 For detailed exposition see Cheshire and North (Chapter 
1 n.l. supra), Chapters 15 and 16.
19 Recently, the Court of Appeal has stated that mere 
presence is sufficient, Adams v Cape Industries [1990] Ch. 433.
20 This is the classification of defences adopted by 
Cheshire and North (Chapter 1, n.l supra) pp. 377 et. seq.
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(iv) the foreign judgment comes within the Protection of Trading 
Interests Act 1980;21
(v) the foreign judgment was obtained in proceedings which were 
contrary to natural justice;
(vi) the foreign judgment is on a matter previously determined 
by an English Court;22
(vii) the foreign judgment was given in proceedings brought in 
breach of an agreement for settlement of disputes;23
2. Under the Administration of Justice Act 1920
Judgments of the Commonwealth countries to whom this Act was 
extended24 can be enforced through registration in the High 
Court. Registration may not be ordered if the foreign Court acted 
without jurisdiction25 or one of a limited number of defences26 
is established by the defendant. In addition, where the Court
21 i.e. Judgments for multiple damages and specific 
judgments based on competition law.
22 This defence was established in the House of Lords
decision of Vervaeke v Smith [1983] 1 AC 145 (discussed at
Chapter 5 Section I IB infra) and applied in non-matrimonial 
cases, see E D & F Mann (Sugar) Ltd. v Yani Haryanto (No. 2) 
[1991] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 429.
23 This defence was introduced by the Civil Jurisdiction and 
Judgments Act 1982 s.32
24 Extension is by Order in Council in respect of countries
with whom Her Majesty is satisfied that reciprocal arrangements 
exist for enforcement of UK judgments.
25 There is no definition of this in the Act and therefore 
the common law rules must apply.
26 These are (i) the foreign judgment was obtained by 
fraud; (ii) the defendant was not duly served with process and 
did not appear; (iii) there is an appeal pending and (iv) the 
judgment is in respect of a cause of action which could not have 
been entertained in the registering court for public policy or 
similar reasons ( s.9(2)).
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"in all the circumstances of the case.... thinks it just and 
convenient that the judgment should not be enforced in the United 
Kingdom, it has the discretion to refuse registration. The 
judgment creditor may choose whether to register under the Act 
or to seek enforcement at common law.
3. Under the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933
This Act extended the approach of the 1920 Act to non-
Commonwealth countries27. Where the 1933 Act applies, the
judgment creditor cannot enforce at common law and the Court has 
no discretion to refuse registration where the requirements of 
the Act are satisfied.
The jurisdictional bases and defences are detailed more fully
than under the 1920 Act. Registration must be set aside on the
basis of lack of jurisdiction unless
(a) the defendant was resident28 in the foreign country;
(b) submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court29 or
(c) had an office or place of business in the foreign country 
through which the transaction which is the subject of the present 
proceedings was effected.30
Also, registration must be set aside where one of the following
27 Commonwealth countries can also join and since 1933 the 
1920 Act has not been extended to any more countries.
28 In the case of a corporation the principal place of 
business must be in the foreign country, s.4 (2) (a) (iv) .
29 s. 4(2). Submission may be by inclusion of a forum 
selection clause in a contract between the parties 
s .4 (2) (a) (iii) .
30 s.4(2) (a) (v) .
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defences can be established:-
(i) the judgment is incapable of registration (i.e. not a final 
judgment for a sum of money);
(ii) the judgment debtor did not receive sufficient notice of the 
proceedings and did not appear in them;
(iii) the judgment was obtained by fraud;
(iv) enforcement would be contrary to pubic policy or the rights 
in the judgment were not vested in the person who registered it.
(v) the foreign judgment was given in proceedings brought in 
breach of an agreement for settlement of disputes.31
4. Under the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Acts 1982 and 1991.
These Acts brought into force in England and Wales the Brussels 
and Lugano Conventions. The aim of these Conventions is to 
provide for 'free movement of judgments' throughout Europe.32 
Thus, all judgments of Contracting States, which come within the 
scope of the Conventions33 must be recognised without review of 
the merits and without review of whether the judgment granting 
Court had jurisdiction, subject to certain specific exceptions34 
There are five defences35
(i) Recognition/enforcement is contrary to requirements of
31 This defence was introduced by the Civil Jurisdiction and 
Judgments Act 1982 s.32
32 Both within the E.C. and EFTA areas.
33 see art. 1
34 See art. 28.
35 arts. 27 and 28
20
English public policy.36
(ii) The judgment was a default judgment and the defendant was 
not duly served with notice of the proceedings in time for him 
to prepare his defence.
(iii) The judgment is irreconcilable with a judgment given by an 
English court in a dispute between the same parties.
(iv) In order to arrive at the judgment, the court had decided 
a preliminary question as to status or legal capacity, 
matrimonial property, wills or succession in a way which 
conflicts with a rule of English private international law.37
(v) The judgment conflicts with an earlier judgment in a non­
member state on the same cause of action between the same parties 
and the earlier judgment is entitled to recognition/enforcement 
in England.
B. MATRIMONIAL DECREES
Recognition of divorces, annulments and legal separations 
(hereinafter referred to as divorces etc.) is now governed by the 
Family Law Act 1986 Part II, which (subject to saving provisions) 
supercedes the common law rules for recognition and the 
Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations Act 1971. It is 
possible for marriages to be terminated by law without there 
being any divorce or annulment38, in which case the common law
36 This does not apply with respect to the jurisdiction of 
the foreign Court
37 Unless the same result would be achieved under that rule. 
This defence is discussed at Section VIII A 3 infra.
38 For example, a Court order of presumption of death and
dissolution of marriage (as in Szemik v Gryla (1965) 109 S.J.
175) .
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rules would still apply.39 For the purposes of the recognition 
rules, divorces etc. are divided into three categories:
1. Divorces granted in the British Isles.
Decrees obtained in a Court of civil jurisdiction in the British
Isles are automatically recognised.40 Section 44(2) states that
"no divorce or annulment obtained in any part of the British 
Islands shall be regarded as effective in any part of the United 
Kingdom unless granted by a court of civil jurisdiction."
The predecessor to this provision41 reversed the position at
common law.42 The position in relation to trans-national
divorces is unclear and will be discussed below.
Recognition may be refused only on the basis of:-
(i) res judicata43 or
(ii) that there was no subsisting marriage at the time of the 
decree.44
39 Viswallingham v Viswallingham [1980] 1 FLR 15, where
according to the religious law, the marriage was terminated 
automatically by the conversion of one party to a different 
religion. The termination was not recognised on grounds of public 
policy
40 Family Law Act 1986 s.44(1)
41 Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973 s.16(1).
42 See e.g. Qureshi v Qureshi [1972] Fam. 173.
43 i.e. where the decree is irreconcilable with a previous
decision given or entitled to recognition in England as to the 
subsistence or validity of the marriage, Family Law Act 1986 
s.51(1) .
44 Family Law Act 1986 s.51(2). This defence is not 
available in respect of nullity decrees.
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2. Overseas divorces etc obtained by means of judicial or other
proceedings.45
Such divorces etc. will be recognised if
(a) they are effective in the country in which they are obtained 
and
(b) one of the parties is either habitually resident in, 
domiciled46 in or a national of the country in which the divorce 
is obtained.
Recognition may be refused on five grounds:-
(i) res judicata;47
(ii) lack of subsisting marriage;48
(iii) insufficient steps were taken to give notice of the 
proceedings to one of the parties, having regard to the nature 
of the proceedings and all the circumstances;49
(iv) insufficient opportunity to take part in the proceedings was 
given, having regard to the nature of the proceedings and all the 
circumstances50 or
(v) recognition would be manifestly contrary to public policy.51
45 See Family Law Act 1986 s.46(1) .
46 Either in the sense used in the foreign country or in the
English sense (Family Law Act 1986 s.46(5)).
47 See n.43 supra.
48 See n.44 supra.
49 Family Law Act 1986 s.51 (3) (a) (i) For discussion of this
provision see D v D (Recognition of Foreign Divorce) [1994] 1 FLR 
38.
50 Family Law Act 1986 s. 51 (3) (a) (ii) .
51 Family Law Act 1986 s.51 (3) (c) .
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The crucial distinction between divorces etc. which come within 
this category and those which fall within the third category is 
whether the divorce was obtained by means of judicial or other 
proceedings. There is no statutory definition of proceedings. 
There would not seem to be any problem in ascertaining whether 
there have been judicial proceedings. The difficulty arises in 
determining whether the steps involved in obtaining an extra­
judicial divorce are sufficient to constitute proceedings.
The most helpful guidance to emerge from the caselaw can be found
in the speech of Oliver LJ in Chaudhary v Chaudhary.52
In the context... of a solemn change of status,
[proceedings] must import a degree of formality and at 
least the involvement of some agency, whether lay or
religious, of or recognised by the state having a function
that is more than simply probative, although Quazi...
clearly shows that it need have no power of veto."
Applying this definition53, it is clear that a Pakistani Muslim
Family Ordinance talag54, a Jewish get55 and a Ghanian Customary
Arbitration Tribunal divorce56 are obtained by means of
proceedings; whereas classical Muslim law 'bare' talags57, other
non-judicial Muslim divorces and Thai consensual divorces are
not obtained by means of proceedings. Which category Hindu and
African and Asian customary divorces come in must be decided in
52 [1985] 3 All ER WLR 1017 at 1031.
53 Gordon (chapter 1, n.l supra) at p. 115 provides a
helpful table with suggested classification of divorces.
54 Quazi v Quazi [1980] A.C. 744.
55 See Berkovits (1980) 104 LQR 60.
56 D V D  (Recognition of Foreign Divorce) [1994] 1 FLR 38.
57 Chaudhary v Chaudhary [1984] 3 All ER 1017.
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each case depending on whether there is involvement by a state 
recognised third party, such as a recognised panchayat or tribal 
elders.
For ease of exposition, divorces obtained by means of 
proceedings, which are governed by section 46(1), will be 
referred to as formal divorces. Those obtained otherwise than by 
means of proceedings, which are governed by section 46(2), will 
be referred to as informal divorces.
3. Overseas divorces etc. obtained otherwise than by means of 
proceedings.58
Informal divorces etc. will be recognised if
(a) they are effective in the country in which they are obtained 
and
(b) they are obtained in the country of domicile of the spouses. 
Where the spouses are domiciled in separate countries, it is 
sufficient if the divorce etc. is obtained in a country where one 
is domiciled provided that it is recognised by the domicile of 
the other and
(a) neither party was habitually resident in the United Kingdom 
for one year before the divorce etc. was obtained.
The following defences are available:-
(i) res judicata;59
58 See Family Law Act 1986 s.46(2).
59 See n.43 supra.
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(ii) lack of subsisting marriage;60
(iii) absence of an official document certifying the 
effectiveness of the divorce in the country where it was obtained 
and, where appropriate, that it was recognised by the law of the 
domicile of the other spouse61 or
(iv) recognition would be manifestly contrary to public 
policy.62
Thus, it can be seen that recognition of informal divorces is 
more restrictive than that of formal divorces in three main ways. 
Firstly, there are less jurisdictional bases available.63 
Secondly, in relation to formal divorces there is no restriction 
on the connection of the parties with the U.K. Thirdly, informal 
divorces are more likely to be refused recognition on the basis 
of public policy64.
4. Transnational Divorces
Transnational divorces are those obtained by means of steps taken 
in more than one country. In R v Secretary of State for the Home
60 See n.44 supra.
61 Family Law Act 1986 s.51 (3) (b) .
62 See n.62 supra.
63 For formal divorces there are upto 8 different countries 
(in the unlikely event that each party has habitual residence, 
domicile in the English sense, domicile in the foreign sense and 
nationality in different countries) where the divorce may be 
obtained and recognised. For informal divorces there are only 
four possibilities (domicile in both senses for each party).
64 See derogatory comments of Cumming-Bruce LJ about bare
talaqs in Chaudhary v Chaudhary [1984] 3 WLR 1017 at p. 1032.
26
Department ex p. Ghulam Fatima65, the question arose whether a 
talaq obtained in accordance with the provisions of the Pakistani 
Muslim Family Law Ordinance could be recognised under the 
Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations Act 1971, where the 
talaq itself was pronounced in England and all the subsequent 
steps took place in Pakistan. The House of Lords held that the 
divorce was not an overseas divorce because the wording of the 
statute66 indicated that a divorce would only be treated as an 
overseas divorce where all proceedings took place in the same 
foreign jurisdiction. It seems, however, that the provisions of 
Family Law Act 1986 cannot be construed in this way67. Thus, 
whilst there does not appear to have been any intention to 
overrule the Fatima decision68, this is arguably the result of 
the change in the drafting.
However, it should be borne in mind that there are dicta in 
Fatima which suggest that even if the transnational talaq had 
fitted within the scheme of the 1971 Act, it would have been 
refused recognition on public policy grounds because it was 
effectively a 'mail order' extra-judicial divorce obtained in
65 [1986] AC 527
66 Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations Act 1971 
section 2.
67 See Berkovits (1988) 104 LQR 60 79-80, Pilkington (1988) 
37 ICLQ 131, 133-136 and Gordon (Chapter 1 n.l supra) p. 103. p. 
668 at n. 18.
68 The Law Commission in Rept. No. 137 at para. 6.11 treat 
Fatima as having settled the law on transnational divorces. As 
Parliament took a harsher line than the Law Commission in respect 
of extra-judicial divorces, it seems unlikely that they intended 
to take a more benevolent view of transnational divorces.
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England, which was contrary to the policy69 of what is now 
s.44 (2) Family Law Act 1986 .70 However, there is no reason why 
public policy should prevent recognition of a trans-national 
talaq where the talaq is pronounced in a third country, at least 
where the latter recognises such a divorce.
III. THE PROBLEM ILLUSTRATED
The examples given below, which are based on variations of the 
facts of decided cases, illustrate a wide range of situations 
where the conflict of rules scenario arises. In the first two 
examples, there is reference to a number of different problems 
which may arise. Thereafter, each example concentrates on one 
particular issue. Extensive reference to these problems will be 
made throughout the thesis. Whilst this will necessitate the 
reader in referring back to this section, it was decided that the 
scope of the problem could be better illustrated at this stage 
by setting out all the examples together.
Example Ml71
Alexander and Natasha are Jews who were born and brought up in 
Russia, where they married. In 1991, they left Russia to emigrate 
to Israel. Whilst in a transit camp in Vienna, they got divorced 
by means of a Jewish get issued under the auspices of the 
Rabbinical Court in Vienna. The get is not recognised in Austria 
or Russia and so would not be recognised in England. In 1992, 
Alexander and Natasha arrived and acquired a domicile in Israel, 
where the Get is recognised. Alexander has now married Bella, an 
Israeli domiciliary, in Israel where they have set up their home.
69 cf. Berkovits (1988) 104 LQR 60, 75-78.
70 Previously Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973 
s.16 (1) .
71 Based on Schwebel v Ungar (1963) 42 DLR (2d) 622
(discussed at Chapter 6 II A infra).
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The following questions may arise
(a) Is Alexander's marriage to Bella recognised in England?
(b) On Alexander's death intestate can Natasha succeed to movable 
and immovable property of Alexander's situated in England?
(c) What are Natasha's rights under the marriage settlement 
entered into between her and Alexander when they married?
In each situation if the recognition rule prevails Natasha is 
treated as still validly married to Alexander. If the choice rule 
prevails, the position will depend on which law governs the 
particular issue. Thus, in relation to issues governed by English 
law, such as succession to immovables in England, the first 
marriage is still valid. Whereas, in relation to issues governed 
by Israeli law, such as Alexander's capacity to remarry and 
intestate succession to movables, the first marriage will not be 
regarded as still subsisting.
Example M272
Pedro is a national of, domiciled and habitually resident in 
Brazil. He is married to Evita, who is a national of and 
domiciled in Argentina. When the marriage breaks down Evita 
becomes habitually resident in Mexico, where she later obtains 
a divorce from Pedro. This divorce is not recognised in Brazil 
or Argentina, but is effective under Mexican law and prima facie 
entitled to recognition under English law. Evita then marries 
Juan, an Argentinian domiciliary, in Mexico. They then return to 
live in Argentina.
(a) Is Evita's marriage to Juan recognised in England?
(b) On Evita's death intestate can Pedro succeed to property of
72 Based on Lawrence v Lawrence [1985] Fam. 106 (discussed
in Chapter 6 II B infra).
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Evita's situated in England?
(c) What are Evita's rights under the marriage settlement entered 
into between her and Pedro when they married?
If the recognition rules prevail then for all purposes Evita is 
considered as no longer married to Pedro, but instead validly 
married to Juan. If the choice rule prevails, then the marriage 
to Pedro still subsists in relation to all issues governed by 
Argentinian law and that to Juan is not recognised at all; 
whereas it does not subsist in relation to issues governed by 
Mexican or English law.
Example M3 (reverse of Ml)
Assume that the get is obtained after Alexander and Natasha have 
become domiciled and habitually resident in Israel. After a short 
period of time, Alexander returns to Russia. He resumes his 
Russian domicile and marries Bella, a Russian domiciliary. Assume 
that the Israeli get is not recognised under Russian law, but is 
recognised under English law.
If the recognition rules apply, the first marriage no longer 
subsists and the second marriage will be valid for all purposes; 
whereas if the choice rules apply, the first marriage will be 
regarded as valid in relation to all matters governed by Russian 
law.
Example M4 (reverse of M2)
Assume that Evita does not become habitually resident in Mexico, 
but obtains the Mexican divorce by proxy73 and so the divorce is 
not entitled to recognition in England. However, assume that it 
is entitled to recognition in Argentina by virtue of a bilateral 
treaty with Mexico.
See Padolecchia v Padolecchia [1969] P. 314.
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If the recognition rules apply, the first marriage will subsist 
for all purposes; whereas if the choice rules apply, the second 
marriage will be valid in relation to all issues governed by 
Argentinian law but the first marriage will subsist in relation 
to issues governed by English law.
Example M574
Maria, who is domiciled in and a national of Belgium marries 
Herbert, who is domiciled in Ontario. The marriage, which takes 
place in Ontario, is a marriage of convenience with the sole aim 
of enabling Maria, an illegal immigrant, to remain in Ontario. 
The parties have no intention of and do not in fact cohabit. The 
marriage is valid in Ontario. Later Maria obtains a nullity 
decree in Belgium on the basis that the marriage is a sham. 
Assume that this decree is entitled to recognition in England, 
but is refused recognition in Ontario on public policy grounds. 
Maria marries Andrew, a domiciliary of Ontario. Although the 
ceremony takes place in Belgium, the parties return to live in 
Ontario.
If the recognition rules are applied, the first marriage will 
have been annulled and the second will be valid for all purposes. 
If the choice of law rules are applied, then the first marriage 
still subsists in relation to all issues governed by Ontario law. 
Since the validity of the second marriage is governed by Ontario 
law75 it will accordingly be void.
This example also involves the 'pure recognition" situation 
referred to above.76 The result of the Belgium decision is 
inconsistent with that which would have been achieved in an
74 Based on Vervaeke v Smith [1981] Fam. 77 (discussed at 
Chapter 5 II B infra).
75 Either as the law of Andrew" s domicile (which would 
prevent him from marrying a married woman) or as the law of the 
intended matrimonial home.
76 Section I B supra.
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English Court, in which Ontario law, as the lex loci 
celebrationis, would have been applied to determine whether the 
sham marriage was valid. Strictly speaking, this point should not 
be relevant when recognition of the decree is sought because it 
relates to the merits. However, the Courts may well be influenced 
by the point and would either refuse recognition on the ground 
of public policy77 or else achieve the result of non-recognition 
by preferring the choice rules78.
Example M6:79
Don and Isabella are first cousins. They are both habitually 
resident and domiciled in New York, where they marry. Don is a 
U.S. national, but Isabella is a Portugese national. The marriage 
is valid by the law of New York, but not by the law of Portugal 
which forbids marriages between first cousin. A few years after 
the marriage, Don travels to Portugal where he acquires a nullity 
decree on the basis that under Portugese law capacity to marry 
is governed by the law of the nationality and that the marriage 
was void ab initio. The nullity decree is not recognised in New 
York. Don dies intestate domiciled in New York leaving movable 
property in England.
If the choice rule is applied to the question of whether Isabella
77 As in Gray v Formosa [1963] P. 259 and per obiter dicta 
in Vervaeke v Smith [1983] AC 145 (both analysed in detail at 
Chapter 5 II B infra). However, in this example, there is little 
connection with England and thus English public policy may not 
be infringed.
78 It is arguable that this is what happened in R v
Brentwood Superintendent Registrar of Marriages ex p. Arias 
[1968] 2 QB 596 (discussed at Chapter 6 II A infra) . The English 
court did not approve of the grant of a divorce decree in 
Switzerland which had the effective consequence that the wife 
could remarry and the husband could not (because the decree was 
not recognised by the law of his nationality) . The English 
Court's decision not to allow the remarriage of the husband by 
applying choice of law rules resulted in effective non­
recognition of the Swiss divorce. The difficulty with this 
approach is that the English decision continues the unfairness 
of the original Swiss decree.
79 Based on facts of Sottomeyer v De Barros (1879) 5 P.D. 
94.
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is entitled to succeed as spouse, New York law will apply and she 
will be entitled. If the recognition rule is applied, the 
Portugese decree is entitled to recognition under the Family Law 
Act 1986 by virtue of the wife's Portugese nationality. Thus, she 
would not be entitled.
Example M7
Ahmed divorces his wife Bina by bare talaq in India. At the time, 
Ahmed is domiciled in Saudi Arabia and Bina is domiciled in 
Dubai. The talaq is recognised by both countries of domicile. 
Ahmed subsequently marries Hussana in England. Bina has married 
Mohammed in India. Since neither of the parties is domiciled in 
India, where the divorce is obtained, the talaq will not be 
recognised in England. However, the remarriages are valid by the 
law of the parties' domiciles.
If the recognition rule is applied, the second marriages will not 
be valid; whereas if the choice rule is applied, they will be 
valid.
Example M8
Shimon and Talia are domiciliaries and nationals of Israel. After 
they separated, Shimon came to live in England. He instituted 
proceedings to divorce his wife by Jewish get in the Court of the 
Chief Rabbi in London. The get was handed to Talia in Haifa by 
an agent. The get is recognised in Israel. Shimon has now married 
Rina in Israel. Assume that the transnational get will not be 
recognised in England.80
If the recognition rule N prevails, Shimon is still treated as 
married to Talia and the second marriage is invalid; whereas if 
the choice rule prevails the second marriage is valid.
See II B 4 supra
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Example M981
Anthony, who is a domiciliary and national of Malta, married 
Susan, an English domiciliary and national in an English register 
office. A few years later, Anthony obtains a nullity decree in 
Malta on the basis that the marriage was not celebrated in 
Church. Anthony subsequently marries Rosa, a Maltese domiciliary 
and national, in a church ceremony in Malta. Assume that the 
Maltese nullity decree is not recognised in England on public 
policy grounds.82 Anthony dies intestate leaving property in 
England.
If the recognition rule prevails then the first marriage is still 
valid and Susan may claim as Anthony's widow. If the choice rule 
prevails then the second marriage is valid and Rosa may claim as 
Anthony's widow.
Example M.10
John and Theresa are domiciled in Puerto Rica and are nationals 
of the USA. John owns substantial assets in England. They travel 
to the Dominican Republic for the weekend, where they obtain a 
divorce. Assume that the divorce is recognised in Puerto Rica83, 
but not in England. The parties' matrimonial property is subject 
to a community regime.
If the choice rule prevails, the parties shares in the assets in 
England are calculated and may be claimed from the date of the 
divorce. If the recognition rule prevails, the parties are still 
regarded as married and the community still continues.84
81 Based on Grey v Formosa [1963] P. 259, Lepre v Lepre 
[1965] P. 52 and Papadopoulos v Papadopoulos [1930] P. 55.
82 The cases of Grey v Formosa ibid and Lepre v Lepre ibid 
(discussed at Chapter 5 II B infra) were decided under the common 
law rules. However, although they have been criticised, it seems 
likely that the same result would be achieved using the statutory 
public policy defence in Family Law Act 1986 s.51 (3) .
83 See Chapter 6 I B 2 infra.
84 See Chapter 8 1 2  (b) infra.
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Example T1
Jane and Kevin were domiciled in Florida. Jane is a U.S. citizen, 
but Kevin is a national of Haitii, although he has never had any 
real connection with that country. When their marriage broke 
down, Kevin returned to Haiti and obtained an ex parte divorce 
there. Assume that this divorce is recognised in England, but 
not in the USA. Kevin now lives in England, but on a recent trip 
to Florida, Kevin negligently injures Jane. Under the law of 
Florida, there is inter-spousal immunity in tort. Assume that 
this immunity continues after separation of the spouses until 
divorce.
The question to be answered is whether Jane is "single" or still 
married for the purposes of suing Kevin in tort. If the 
recognition rule is applied she is no longer married to Kevin and 
thus the immunity does not apply. If the choice rule applies, the 
problem is complicated by the double-barrelled nature of the 
choice rule in English law. Jane is single according to the lex 
fori and married according to the lex loci delicti. This problem 
will be discussed further in Chapter 9.
Example T285
Lily and Michael, who are domiciled in New York, obtained a 
'weekend' inter partes divorce in Haiti. Michael is subsequently 
killed in New Jersey by the negligence of Norman, who is resident 
in England. Assume that the divorce is recognised in New 
Jersey66, but not in England.
If the recognition rule is applied, Lilly is eligible for 
wrongful death compensation because she is still married to 
Michael. Again the position under the choice rule is not 
straightforward, because whilst she is entitled under the lex 
fori, she is no longer the wife under the New Jersey lex loci
85 Based on U.S. case of Meisenholder v Chicago and N.W. Ry 
213. N.W. 32 (1927) and see Harper (1959) 59 Col. L. R. 440, 456.
86 See Chapter 6 I B 2 infra.
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delicti.
Example Al87
Dorothy was at all material times before and at her death 
domiciled in Zimbabwe. In her will she made a bequest of movables 
in favour of the issue of Alistair, her son. Alistair and his 
wife, who were at all material times domiciled in Zimbabwe, 
adopted two children in South Africa. Assume that the adoption 
is not recognised by the law of Zimbabwe, but is recognised as 
an 'overseas' adoption by English law.88
If the choice rule prevails, the children will not be able to 
take under Dorothy's will. However, if the recognition rule 
prevails they can take as the children of Alistair.
Example A2 (reverse of Al)
Assume that Dorothy was at all material times and at her death 
domiciled in South Africa and that the adoptions were valid by 
the law of South Africa but are not recognised in Zimbabwe or in 
England.
If the choice rule prevails, the children can take, as the 
adoption is recognised in South Africa; whereas, if the 
recognition rule is applied, they will not succeed.
Example PI89
A painting is stolen from Winkworth's house in England. It is 
taken to Italy where it is sold in market overt to Yves - who is 
resident in Ruritania. Yves acquires good title under Italian 
law. This title is recognised under English choice of law rules. 
Suppose that in an action between Winkworth and Yves in 
Ruritania, the Ruritanian Court decides that the valuable 
painting is owned by Winkworth. This judgment is entitled to
11 Based on Re Valentine's Settlement [1965] Ch. 831.
J8 See Chapter 10 I B 4 infra.
59 Based on Winkworth v Christie, Manson and Woods Ltd.
[1980] Ch. 496.
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recognition in England90. However, Yves ignores the judgment and 
brings the painting from Italy to England, where Winkworth seeks 
return of the painting.
If the English Court applies its recognition rule, Winkworth will 
succeed; whereas if it applies its choice of law rule, Yves will 
succeed.
Example P2:
Assume the same facts as in example PI except that Yves hands the 
painting over to Winkworth in Ruritania. Winkworth then takes the 
painting back to Italy where he sells it to Zeldon. Zeldon brings 
it to England and Yves claims the painting from him. Applying 
English choice of law rules, whether Zeldon acquires good title 
is governed by the law of the situs, which is Italian law. Assume 
that under Italian law, a transferee cannot obtain better title 
than the transferor (unless he buys in market overt) and that the 
Ruritanian judgment is not recognised in Italy.
Thus, again if the English Court applies its recognition rule,
Zeldon (Winkworth's assignee) will succeed; whereas if it applies
its choice rule Yves will succeed.
Example P3: (variation of example P2)
Assume that in P2 above, the Ruritanian judgement is not entitled 
to recognition in England.
If we apply the recognition rule, then since the Ruritanian 
judgment is not recognised, Winkworth never acquires title. 
Thus, Yves who acquired good title in Italy, still owns the 
painting. Whereas, if we apply the choice of law rule Winkworth 
obtains title by virtue of the judgment of the Ruritanian
90 For a discussion of the issues which may arise in this
sort of situation where the judgment is not recognised in 
England, see Chapter 3 III B infra.
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Court91 while the painting is in Ruritania. He can therefore 
pass on good title when he sells the painting to Zeldon in 
Ruritania.
Example P4 (Variation of P3)
Suppose that Yves does not hand over the painting to Winkworth 
in accordance with the judgment, but sells it to Zeldon in 
Ruritania and Zeldon brings it to England.
If we apply the lex situs choice rule, then it appears that 
Zeldon cannot acquire good title from Yves because the effect of 
the Ruritanian judgment is to vest title in Winkworth. If we 
apply the recognition rule, Zeldon acquires good title from Yves 
because the judgment is of no effect.
IV THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TRADITIONAL ANALYSIS AND THE 
CONFLICT OF RULES ANALYSIS
A. THE TRADITIONAL ANALYSIS92
The traditional analysis of the cases involving matrimonial 
decrees has been to treat them as examples of the incidental 
question93. The question to be decided is whether the validity 
of the divorce (the incidental or preliminary question) should 
be determined by the conflicts rules of the law governing the
91 It is assumed that the Ruritanian judgment is not merely 
declaratory but actually has the effect in Ruritanian law of 
vesting title in Winkworth.
92 For a very thorough analysis of all apsects of the 
incidental question, see Gottlieb (1977) 26 ICLQ 734 and Wengler, 
International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, Vol. Ill Chapter 
7.
93 Although Levontin, "Choice of Law and Conflict of Laws"
(1976) at p. 106 maintains that there is no incidental question 
in the 'remarriage' cases.
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validity of the second marriage, the succession, matrimonial 
property relations or tort as the case may be (the main 
question)94 or by the conflicts rules of the forum.95. Thus, the 
conflict is perceived as a conflict between the recognition rules 
of the lex causae and the recognition rules of the forum.
The incidental question is, of course, much wider than the 
problem raised here because it can arise in many ways which do 
not involve the question of recognition of a foreign judgment or 
decree. For example, the validity of the second marriage may 
depend on the validity of a first marriage which has never been 
purported to be annulled96. In such cases the conflict is 
between the choice rules of the forum and the choice rules of the 
lex causae.
There is comparatively little caselaw authority97 on the 
incidental question and in some cases, the existence of the
94 This is sometimes called 'dependent application'
(Ehrenzweig and Jayme, Private International Law Vol 1 (1967) 
(hereinafter Ehrenzweig) at p. 170) or the 'wide reference' 
approach (Hartley (1967) 16 ICLQ 680 at p. 682) and those
supporting it are sometimes called 'lex causards' (Gottlieb
(1977) 26 ICLQ 734 at p. 752).
95 The corresponding terminology to that in n.94 supra is 
'independent determination'; the 'narrow reference' approach and 
'lex foristes'.
96 Although, of course, the incidental question is not 
restricted to questions of validity of second marriages or even 
to family law.
97 Gottlieb (1977) 26 ICLQ 734 analyses the Commonwealth 
authority. Ehrenzweig (n. 94 supra) at p. 171 claims that there 
are very few pertinent American cases. See also Robertson (1939) 
55 LQR 565 at p. 577.
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problem is not recognised98. It is not possible to elicit any 
simple rule in favour of the lex fori or the lex causae from the 
cases99. There is a wealth of academic literature on the topic, 
which is summarised by Gottlieb100. He divides the writers into 
three groups. The first is those who support the application of 
the lex fori; the second is those who support the application of 
the lex causae and the third is those who believe that no general 
rule is applicable.
Earlier writers were more prepared to commit themselves to the
lex fori or lex causae approaches. For example, Robertson101
concluded that,
"the preliminary question should be determined by the 
conflicts rules of that system of law which is selected as 
appropriate to determine the principal question. The reason
for this is  that this is the only way of respecting
the determination already made that the selected proper law 
is to govern the question in dispute."
Later writers have been more reluctant to support either
approach102. For example, Ehrenzweig, like others, points out
that the lex foristes give priority to "conformity of decision"
98 For example, Perrini v Perrini [1979] Fam. 84.
99 For example, Lawrence v Lawrence [1985] Fam. 106 and 
Perrini v Perrini [1979] Fam. 84 are irreconcilable with R v 
Brentwood Marriage Registrar ex p. Arias [1968] 2 QB 956 (see 
discussion below at Chapter 6 II A infra).
100 (1977) 26 ICLQ 734 at pp. 751 et. seq.
101 (1939) 55 LQR 565 at pp. 583-4.
102 See, for example, the change in approach between the 
earlier editions of Dicey and Morris (e.g. 6th edn. 1949, the 
first in which the problem was discussed, at p. 76) and the later 
editions (e.g. 12th. edn. 1993 at p.55).
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in the forum103 whilst the lex causards give priority to 
"uniformity of decision" among different fora104. He claims 
that there can be no general rule favouring one of the above 
stances, but
"Rather, the answer must hinge on the interpretation of the 
rule of decision, be it that of the forum or a foreign 
country, as to whether it gives priority to 'conformity' 
within its own legal system. . or to any international 
uniformity in the decision of the particular issue.105"
Gottlieb106 himself points out that where total renvoi107 is
adopted, then the incidental question must be decided by the lex
causae. This does not help at all in cases where renvoi would not
be applied. He declines to give any overall solution to the
Incidental Question on the basis that
"there is really no problem of 'the incidental question', 
but as many problems as there are cases in which the 
incidental question may arise"108.
In his first article on the subject he concluded that,
"In each case the acceptance or rejection of the renvoi, 
the general purpose behind each choice-of-law rule, the 
factors of consistency of decision and the public policy of
the forum may all be important to consider......... I have
attempted not so much to provide solutions to all the 
problems discussed as to suggest methods by which
103 This is often referred to as "internal harmony" or 
"internal consistency." See, for example, Khan-Freund, Problems 
in Private International Law (1977) at p. 291.
104 Often referred to as "international harmony" (ibid.).
105 Ehrenzweig (supra n.94) at p. 170, para. 92. See also
Khan Freund, The Growth of Internationalism in Private 
International Law (1960) at pp.9 et. seq. who sees this dichotomy 
as a pervasive one in the Conflict of Laws.
106 (1955) 33 Can. Bar. R. 523 at p. 547.
107 See Section VII infra.
108 Gottlieb (1955) 33 Can.Bar Rev. 523 at p. 555.
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reasonably satisfactory results may be achieved."109
His second article, whilst providing an excellent analysis of the 
caselaw and literature on the subject and, demonstrating a 
methodology, does not purport to formulate any solution to the 
incidental question.
It is submitted that despite the quantity of writing on the 
subject, the present state of the jurisprudence in relation to 
the incidental question is unsatisfactory. The lack of clear 
caselaw or academic support for any single approach results in 
almost complete uncertainty as to how a Court, faced with an 
incidental question, would decide the case. It is submitted that 
this flaw is particularly serious in relation to questions of 
status because parties and administrative officials may need to 
be able to ascertain the status of individuals110 without resort 
to Court. Thus, there is a need for a novel approach to these 
problems which is both theoretically sound and suitable for 
practical application. The purpose of this thesis is to seek such 
an approach.
B. THE 'CONFLICT OF RULES' ANALYSIS
In the 'conflict of rules'111 analysis, the focus is on a single 
question. For example, in relation to validity of marriage, the
109 Ibid.
110 See Law Com. W.P. No. 89 para. 2.35.
111 We must distinguish Khan-Freund's use of this term (n. 
103, supra at p. 285) to refer to the renvoi situation where the 
lex fori's choice rule is different from the lex causae's.
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question would be whether the party remarrying is "single"112 
for the purposes of entering the second marriage? In relation to 
succession, the question would be whether the first spouse is 
still married for the purposes of succession as spouse113. An 
appropriate question can be formulated for each situation. In 
each case, the question can be answered either by applying the 
relevant choice of law rules or by using the recognition rules 
to determine the validity of the divorce or nullity decree.
It is submitted that the 'conflict of rules" approach holds two 
advantages over the incidental question approach.
(a). The conflict will be perceived as one between the choice of 
law rules and the recognition rules of the forum rather than as 
between the recognition rules of the forum and those of the lex 
causae. This may appear to be pure semantics since it is clear 
that application of the forum's choice rules results in 
application of the recognition rules of the lex causae. However, 
it is suggested that the difference in analysis is significant. 
Firstly, if the conflict is seen as being between two different 
types of domestic rules of the forum, the use of forum policy114
112 See Levontin (n. 93 supra) at p. 106. His view is that 
no incidental question arises in this situation because the only 
question is whether the particular party is single and free to 
remarry. Previous events including obtaining a divorce or nullity 
decree in respect of a prior marriage are "ingredients that 
'feed' the answer to this question" rather than being a question 
in their own right.
113 According to Levontin (ibid) , this does raise a true 
incidental question because "the question whether the woman 
claimant was widow of the deceased was raised to 'serve' a 
question (that of the succession) beyond itself."
114 See Ehrenzweig (n. 94 supra) at p. 170.
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to solve the conflict is easily justified. Secondly, the approach 
should avoid the forum's recognition rules being preferred for 
purely parochial reasons115.
(b) Where the question is framed as a single question, it will 
be easier to adopt a 'separate issue' approach116 and to 
identify the relevant policy considerations.
V SOLUTIONS TO THE 'CONFLICT OF RULES' PROBLEM
Adopting the 'conflict of rules' analysis, two categories of 
solution to the problem can be identified. Firstly, a global 
rule could provide that a particular type of rule always 
prevails. Secondly, specific rules could be formulated to provide 
the desired result in each particular type of case.
Three possible global rules are:
1. Always prefer the recognition rule
2. Always prefer the choice of law rule
3. Always prefer the rule which is statutory.
In Part II (Chapters 2,3 and 4) we will examine each of these 
preference rules in turn to see if adequate theoretical 
foundation can be found to support any of them.
Part III of the thesis is based on the hypothesis that no
115 Kahn-Freund (n. 103 supra) at p. 321 refers to the 
"homeward trend."
116 Rees (1977) 26 ICLQ 954 advocates a 'separate issue' 
approach for cases where the 'incidental question' is the 
validity of the marriage i.e. there is no recognition rule 
involved.
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theoretical justification can be found for any of the global 
rules discussed in Part II and that choosing one of them over the 
others would be quite arbitrary. Instead, the 'conflict of rules' 
problem must be solved by specific rules designed to produce the 
result which is consistent with the domestic policy of the 
forum117 in relation to each issue. Sometimes, one of the global 
rules may be the most appropriate preference rule. In such a 
case, it is advocated as a specific rule because it will produce 
the desired outcome in relation to the particular issue, rather 
than because of the intrinsic merit of the rule.
The aim in Part III is to construct appropriate specific rules 
in relation to a number of chosen issues using a result-selecting 
approach. In Chapter 5, the precise methodology to be employed 
is developed against the background of a critical analysis of 
result-selecting techniques.
VI FORUM DECREES
A problem similar to the 'conflict of rules' dilemma may arise 
where a decree of the forum is not recognised by the lex causae 
of the issue in question. In relation to issues governed by the 
domicile118, this problem can only arise where:-
(a) there has been a change of domicile between decree and the
117 Von Mehren and Trautman, The Law of Multistate Problems
(1965) at p. 495 suggest that the "special policies and 
purposes"of the lex causae and possibly also the forum should be 
taken into account.
118 For example, capacity to remarry (but see Chapter 6 I C
infra), succession to movables.
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relevant event119 or
(b) (i) jurisdiction is taken on grounds other than the
domicile of both parties and
(ii) the choice of law rule for granting the decree is 
other than the lex domicilii120 of both parties121. 
Requirement (a) is purely factual. However, the two requirements 
necessary to satisfy (b) are legal and merit further examination.
(i) Until 1937, English Courts only had jurisdiction in 
matrimonial cases where the parties were domiciled in England.
119 For example, remarriage or death.
120 In some European countries, the law of the nationality
is still used to govern divorce In its unmodified form, this 
principle requires that a decree not be granted unless both 
parties are entitled to a decree under the law of their 
nationality. Alternatively, whilst a decree is granted on the 
basis of the national law of one, it is only considered effective 
in relation to that party and the other spouse is still 
considered as married. This used to be the case in France (see 
Hartley (1967) 16 ICLQ 680 at p. 688 ) . Under these theories,
there can be no conflict between the choice rule and the forum 
decree. In practice, however, many countries have modified the 
exclusive application of the law of the nationality (see Palsson, 
International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, Vol III Chpt. 16 
paras. 129 et seq.).
121 Where the divorce is governed by the personal law of one
spouse only, there may be a conflict where the decree is not 
recognised by the personal law of the other. See examples in 
relation to German law given by Palsson, Marriage in Comparative 
Conflict of Laws: Substantive Conditions (1971) pp. 229 - 232 and 
244 - 250. The German choice of law rule in divorce has now been 
reformed (see Dickson (1985) 34 ICLQ 231) and it is now more
likely that the divorce will be governed by a law which is not 
the national law of one or both parties (where there has not been 
a common nationality retained by one spouse, the divorce will be 
governed by the last common habitual residence, provided that 
this is retained by one and otherwise by the law with which the 
spouses are together most closely connected).
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However, jurisdiction was gradually widened by statute122 and 
today English courts can entertain applications for matrimonial 
decrees where either party is domiciled or has been habitually 
resident in the jurisdiction for one year123. Thus, there are 
many decrees granted in England to parties of whom at least one 
is not domiciled in the forum.
(ii) In England and Wales, the choice of law rule for divorce is 
the lex fori124. The position in nullity is more 
complicated125. Whilst the orthodox approach is that the dual 
domicile test applies to most issues, the position in relation 
to non-consummation126 has never been clear. Also, there are now 
some indications that at least in circumstances, capacity is 
governed by the intended matrimonial home or real and substantial 
connection test.127 Even where domicile is the relevant 
connecting factor, it is domicile at the date of the first
122 It will be remembered that until 1973 a married woman's 
domicile was dependent on her husband's. Thus a wife could only 
petition for divorce if her husband was domiciled in England. The 
hardship caused by this state of affairs was mitigated by two 
provisions. The Matrimonial Causes Act 1937 s. 13 provided for 
jurisdiction in a divorce case at the petition of the wife if she 
had been deserted by her husband or he had been deported and 
immediately prior to that he had been domiciled in England. The 
Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1949 provided for 
jurisdiction where the wife had been ordinarily resident for 
three years in England and her husband was not domiciled in the 
United Kingdom, Channel Islands or Isle of Man.
123 Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973 s. 5.
124 Zanelli v Zanelli (1948) 64 TLR 556.
125 See Law Commission W.P. No. 89, Part V.
126 see Bishop (1978) 41 MLR 512.
127 See Chapter 6 I C infra.
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marriage which is relevant in determining whether a nullity 
decree should be granted. Whereas the question of capacity to 
enter into the second marriage is governed by the law of the 
domicile at the date of that second marriage.
In relation to issues governed by other laws, the problem can 
arise whenever the forum decree is not recognised by the lex 
causae.128 It might be surprising therefore that there is no 
reported case129 in which an English130 Court has had to face 
this conflict between its own decree and its own choice rules. 
Whilst section 50 Family Law Act 1986 now provides for a re­
marriage of either party to a forum decree to be recognised, the 
problem may still arise in relation to other issues such as 
succession.
It should be noted that this situation differs from the case of 
a foreign decree because the forum decree has validity by virtue 
of domestic law rather than conflicts recognition rules131. In 
other words, the conflict is between domestic rules and conflict
128 e.g. The lex situs in relation to intestate succession 
to immovables.
129 The conflict would have arisen in Breen v Breen [1964] 
P. 144 if the English decree had not been recognised in Ireland 
and one of the parties was now domiciled in Ireland. The very 
fact that the question of recognition by Irish law was raised 
might be interpreted as an indication that the choice rule would 
apply in such a situation.
130 But there are a number of cases on the Continent of 
Europe in which the problem has had to be decided directly, see 
Palsson (n.121 supra.), pp. 229 et seq.
131 According to the Austinian conception of status (as 
explained by Engdahl (1969) 55 Iowa L. Rev. 56, 57 et seq.) this 
distinction is fundamental.
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choice rules rather than between conflict recognition rules and 
conflict choice rules. If, as a matter of policy the forum decree 
always prevails132, the discussion in this thesis is irrelevant. 
However, if there is no such global preference for the forum 
decree, it is suggested that the approach advocated to the 
'conflict of rules' situation in Part III is equally appropriate 
to solve the conflict between the forum decree and the choice of 
law rules.
VII THE APPLICATION OF THE CHOICE RULE AND RENVOI
We have seen that under the conflict of rules analysis, 
application of the choice rule133 results in application of the 
recognition rules of the lex causae. This might be seen as an 
application of the doctrine of renvoi because application of the 
lex causae to the problem means application of the 'whole' lex 
causae, including its conflicts' rules134. Here it is the type 
of conflicts rules, known as recognition rules, which are to be
132 It seems implicit from the judgments in Breen v Breen
[1964] P. 144 that this is not the case as the Court would 
apparently have been prepared to refuse to recognise the second 
marriage if the English divorce decree had not been recognised 
in Ireland, even though the only connection that Ireland had with 
the case was that it was the lex loci celebrationis.
133 Under the traditional analysis the same would be true of 
the application of the lex causae.
134 It is suggested that the essence of the problem of renvoi
is whether application of the lex causae requires application of 
only internal law or also its conflicts rules (i.e. the whole of 
the lex causae). This is what Robertson (1939) 55 LQR 565 at p. 
571 calls 'renvoi in the wider sense' . Thus, the issue of 
remission/transmission is not the central issue, although 
application of the whole of the lex causae may result in a 
transmission or remission to the law of another country. This 
seems to be what Robertson refers to as 'renvoi in the narrower 
sense'.
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Writers have commented on the interrelationship between renvoi 
and the incidental question. Ehrenzweig135 states that the 
incidental question is "closely related to that of renvoi." 136
Gottlieb137 suggests that renvoi relates to the "qualitative 
meaning of the word 'law', whilst the incidental question relates 
to the "quantitative interpretation of the word 'law'". However, 
he claims that whilst the two concepts bear similarities, they 
must be distinguished by their "relationship in time."138 Thus, 
renvoi concerns the determination of the law which is to govern 
the issue. Where renvoi applies, there is a remission or 
transmission from the initial lex causae either back to the forum 
or to a third country, which becomes the real lex causae. Thus, 
renvoi deals with the selection of the law governing the main 
question.139 Whereas, the incidental question applies after the 
selection of the law governing the main question.140
It is suggested that this distinction is inappropriate under the 
conflict of rules analysis. Since the focus is on a single
135 Op. cit. n. 94 supra at p. 170.
136 See also Robertson (1939) 55 LQR 565 at p. 568.
137 (1955) 33 Can. B.R. 523 at p. 543.
138 Gottlieb (1977) 26 ICLQ 734 at p. 750.
139 See Gottlieb (1977) 26 ICLQ 734 at p. 750.
140 Ibid and Robertson (1939) 55 LQR 565 at p. 567 and Khan-
Freund (n. 103 supra) at p. 291.
question, if that question is to be governed by the forum's 
conflict rule as opposed to its recognition rule, then where the 
lex causae selected by the choice rule itself refers to its 
conflict rules (including its recognition rules) in order to 
answer the question, this is an application of the doctrine of 
renvoi. For example, assume that in the Schwebel situation 
(example Ml141) , the forum refers to Israeli law to determine 
whether Natasha is single. This question must be answered by 
Israeli recognition rules, which will have to determine whether 
the get obtained in Austria can be recognised.
The doctrine of renvoi has been subject to considerable academic 
controversy142. Thus, it is appropriate to examine the 
criticisms which have been levelled at the doctrine generally and 
to analyse whether they are equally pertinent to the use of the 
doctrine in the conflict of rules scenario with which we are 
concerned.143
1. Renvoi causes unnecessary complication.
Renvoi has generally been used where there is a conflict between 
the choice rule of the forum and the choice rule of the lex 
causae. The forum has two options before it:-
141 Section III supra.
142 See, for example, Cheshire and North (n.l supra) pp. 62-
67; McClean, Morris: The Conflict of Laws (4th. edn.) 1993
(hereinafter 'Morris') at pp.478-80 and Collier, Conflict of Laws 
(1994) 2nd. edn. pp. 24 - 28.
143 Although it should be borne in mind that most authors
seem to have been primarily concerned with renvoi in the narrow 
sense.
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(i) to apply the internal law of the lex causae ignoring
completely that this is not the law which would be applied by the 
lex causae to such a case because of the foreign element
involved.
(ii) to apply the choice rule of the lex causae and thus decide 
the case according to the internal law of the country directed 
by that choice rule.
If the Court fails to perceive the problem of the conflict 
between the two choice rules, it will simply choose the first 
option and thus the doctrine of renvoi is not applied, by
default144. The advantage of this is simplicity.
In our situation, the problem cannot so simply be ignored. In 
order to determine the outcome of the case it is necessary to 
decide whether the relevant foreign judgment should be 
recognised. Thus, a Court cannot really ignore the problem,
unless it simply applies the recognition rule without making any 
reference to the choice of law issue.145 The very fact that we 
have a "conflict of rules' situation means that we have 
complexity. Using renvoi does not substantially add to this 
complexity.
144 Cheshire and North (n.l supra) at p. 60 cite a few 
decisions where the first option was chosen, but claim that it 
has been "unconsciously adopted in a multitude of decisions."
145 This is what happened in Perrini v Perrini [1979] Fam. 
84.
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2. The doctrine does not produce uniformity of result unless it 
is applied in one of the countries concerned and not the 
other.146
Where we have a 'conflict of rules' situation, it is inevitable 
that there will be some lack of uniformity between the position 
in different countries.147 Thus, application of renvoi here is 
not primarily designed to achieve uniformity of result.
3. The doctrine148 involves surrendering English conflicts' 
rules to foreign ones.
We saw above that this argument was used in relation to the 
incidental question to justify referring the incidental question 
to the lex fori rather than the lex causae. The need to avoid 
treating English conflicts rules as subservient to foreign rules 
may appear to be a valid reason for preferring the recognition 
rule to the choice rule where there is a conflict of rules.
It is suggested, however, that this reasoning can be easily 
countered. English choice rules direct that the law of another 
jurisdiction should apply because149 of the quality and degree 
of connection between the issues in the case and that
146 Indeed with total renvoi it is impossible to reach any
decision if both countries accept the doctrine. This is the so 
called circulus inextricabilis. This problem might be largely 
academic since most civil law countries do not have renvoi and 
most common law countries use the same connecting factors as each 
other.
147 See Chapter 6 II B 3 infra.
148 At least the doctrine of total renvoi.
149 For more detailed discussion of why there are choice,
rules see Chapter 2 infra.
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jurisdiction. Once the forum law has chosen the lex causae, it 
has fulfilled its function. Thus, applying the recognition rules 
of the
lex causae in the 'conflict of rules' situation is not an 
abrogation of our own choice rules. On the contrary, it is taking 
the application of those rules to their logical conclusion150.
4. The doctrine is difficult to apply
There are two reasons for this. Firstly, it151 may involve 
determining whether the lex causae accepts the doctrine of 
renvoi152. Secondly, some foreign connecting factors may be 
problematic to apply. For example, it is not clear which domestic 
law represents the 'law of the nationality' of a British 
subject153. Neither of these difficulties arises in our 
situation because we are primarily concerned with the recognition 
rules of the lex causae.
5. Renvoi is inappropriate in some areas of law
It has been judicially stated that renvoi should not apply in the 
law of contract154 or tort155. It is of interest that it has
150 As Collier (n. 142 supra at p. 25) says, "This process
is undertaken only because our Courts wish to undertake it."
151 Only the doctrine of total renvoi.
152 See Re Duke of Wellington [1947] Ch. 506, 515. Collier 
(n. 142 supra) at p. 25 argues that this objection is "either, 
misguided or exaggerated"
153 See Re O'Keefe [1940] Ch. 124.
154 Re United Railways of Havana and Regia Warehouses Ltd.
[1960] Ch. 52 and Amin Rasheed Shipping Corp. v Kuwait Insurance
Co. [1984] AC 50.
155 McElroy v McAllister (1949) S.C. 110.
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been mainly used in relation to succession, property and 
marriage. It is precisely these areas in which the 'conflict of 
rules' is most likely to arise.
Thus, it can be seen that the criticisms of the use of renvoi 
generally do not apply to its use in the 'conflict of rules' 
scenario. Analysis of the caselaw shows that the doctrine of 
renvoi has usually been invoked in order to produce the desired
result. We shall suggest below that the choice between the choice
rule and the recognition rule should be made expressly in order 
to achieve the result which is consistent with the policy of the 
forum. It is submitted that the use of renvoi, where it is 
required for this purpose, would be appropriate and in keeping 
with the development of that doctrine156.
VIII BIAS IN FAVOUR OF RECOGNITION RULES?
We may subconsciously favour application of the recognition rule 
in the 'conflict of rules' situation for two reasons. Firstly, 
in 'pure recognition cases' recognition rules take precedence 
without question.157 Secondly, in recent years there seems to 
have been a shift in the focus of Private International Law, in 
which jurisdiction and recognition rules have become more
156 Gottlieb (1955) 33 Can. B.Rev. 523 at p. 543 concludes
that in relation to both renvoi and the incidental question, "All 
mechanical solutions of the problem must fail, simply because 
they will not serve the function of helping to fulfil the purpose 
of each rule. Only individualization of each rule will bring to 
light what we are trying to achieve by its application."
157 See Section I B supra.
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prominent at the expense of choice of law rules. We will 
consider these two phenomena in turn.
A. 'PURE RECOGNITION CASES'
There are three situations in which recognition will be refused 
where the foreign judgment is inconsistent with the choice rule. 
We shall examine whether these exceptions in fact derogate from 
the principle of the prevalence of the recognition rule over the 
choice rule.
1. Foreign judgments will not be recognised where there is 
already an inconsistent English decision of the matter.158 The 
effect of this exception is to uphold the forum's choice of law 
rules, as applied in the original decision. However, the stated 
rationale is not one of preference for choice rules, but rather 
one of preference for a prior judgment.159
2. Recognition may be refused where the fact that the foreign 
judgment is inconsistent with forum choice rules makes 
recognition contrary to public policy.160 However, this 
exception is limited to those cases where the result of the 
application of different choice rules by the foreign court is
158 Vervaeke v Smith [1983] 1 AC 145 (discussed in Chapter 
5 at II B infra) . See also now Family Law Act s.51(1) and 
Brussels Convention art.27(3).
159 On the basis of the principle of res judicata. See
Vervaeke v Smith ibid.
160 See Gray v Formosa [1963] P. 259, Lepre v Lepre [1969]
P. 52 and Vervaeke v Smith [1983] AC 145. These three cases are 
analysed in detail below in Chapter 5 at II B infra.
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offensive to the forum.161 Thus it cannot be said to be based 
on preference for the choice rules themselves.
(c) Under article 27(4) of the Brussels Convention, the Court
does not have to recognise or enforce a judgment of another
Contracting State where that judgment depends on a decision as
to a "preliminary question" concerning inter alia the status of
natural persons
"in a way that conflicts with the private international law 
rules of State in which recognition is sought unless the 
same result would have been reached by the application of 
the rules of private international law of that State."162
It has been pointed out163 that the implication of this
exception is that in all other cases it is no defence that the
judgment for which recognition is sought is inconsistent with the
choice of law rules of the recognising court. It might appear
that the exception might indicate a general policy that whilst
recognition rules are generally given precedence, in relation to
certain matters, including status, choice rules should prevail.
However, it is suggested that the defence simply reflects the
fact that status judgments themselves do not fall within the
Convention. To require a Court to recognise a decision based on
161 For example, recognition of French nullity decrees was 
not refused in Galene v Galene [1939] P. 237 and De Massa v De 
Massa (1931) reported in [1939] 2 All ER 15On, even though they 
were based on the formal invalidity of marriages (on the basis 
of lack of parental consent) between parties which were valid by 
the English lex loci celebrationis. It is significant that the 
parties were both French and that the requirement of parental 
consent exists in English law, although it is of more limited 
scope and effect than its French counterpart.
162 Unless the same result would have been reached under 
those rules.
163 Jenard Report (OJ 1979 C59) p. 46.
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such a judgment would be indirectly extending the scope of the 
Convention.
Thus, the exceptions do little to undermine the principle of 
preference for recognition rules in pure recognition cases. To 
what extent this preference can justify a global preference for 
recognition rules in the 'conflict of rules' situation depends 
on the reason for this preference. Since the 'pure recognition 
case' is not perceived as a conflict situation, there has been 
no need to articulate the rationale for the preference. It is 
suggested that the prevalence of the recognition rule is simply 
a corollary of the principle that judgments are recognised 
without examining their merits. We will be considering the basis 
of this principle in Chapter 3 below.
B. RECENT TRENDS IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
In recent years, there has been an increased emphasis in Private 
International Law on jurisdiction and recognition rules for inter 
alia the following reasons.
1. The free market philosophy of the EC has placed great emphasis 
on the free flow of judgments within Europe. This has required 
a totally new approach to the recognition of judgments in English 
Private International Law under which judgments of Member States 
must be recognised and enforced without review of jurisdiction 
and subject to only limited defences.164
164 See Section II A 4 supra.
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2. Partly as a result of 2. above, most recent legislation in 
relation to Private International Law has been concerned with 
recognition.165 Law Commission recommendations166 and Hague 
Conventions167 on choice of law issues have not generally found 
their way onto the Statute book.
3. The emergence of the doctrine of forum non conveniens has 
reduced the likelihood that cases will be heard in England which 
require application of choice of law rules168 to determine the 
governing law.
4. In relation to contract, questions concerning the governing 
law frequently arise in relation to jurisdiction169 and 
recognition/enforcement170 rather than in a pure choice of law 
context
165 See Table 1.
166 See, for example, in relation to choice of law in tort, 
Law Com. No. 193.
167 See, for example, Conventions on Succession to the 
Estates of Deceased Persons (1988) and Celebration of Marriage 
(1978) .
168 Cf. where foreign law must be applied because the parties 
have expressly chosen a foreign law to govern their contract.
169 Before the enactment of the Contract (Applicable) Law Act 
1991, most of the reported cases concerning which law governs the 
contract arose in relation to application to serve notice of the 
writ abroad under R.S.C. Ord. 11 r. 1 (d) (iii) (e.g. Amin Rasheed 
Shipping Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co. [1984] AC 50; Armar Shipping 
v Caisse Algerienne [1981] 1 WLR 207 and Attock Cement Co. Ltd. 
v Romanian Bank for Foreign Trade [1989] 1 WLR 1147) or whether 
proceedings should be stayed (e.g. The Hollandia [1983] AC 165).
170 e.g. Tracomin SA v Sudan Oil Seeds Co. Ltd. (Nos. 1 and
2) [1983] 1 WLR 1026.
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5. In the non-commercial sphere, matters in which the lex fori 
applies (for example in relation to divorce and child custody) 
are nowadays more frequently litigated than matters where the 
choice of law rule may refer to a foreign law (such as validity 
of marriage, rights of succession).
6. In some areas, the choice of law rule is so uncertain (e.g. 
tort171) that parties are deterred from taking cases to Court or 
simply plead English law.
Thus, we can see that the reasons for the shift in the balance 
in favour of jurisdiction and recognition rules largely reflect 
practical and commercial realities rather than any perception 
that such rules have intrinsically greater merit or weight than 
choice of law rules. Therefore, in seeking a global solution, we 
should resist any subconscious bias in favour of recognition 
rules resulting from recent trends and rely on a proper analysis 
of the theoretical basis for each type of rule.
171 All the reported cases concerning the problem of
identifying the place of the tort arose in relation to 
applications to serve out of the jurisdiction. In the older cases 
it was necessary to decide whether the claim was founded on an 
act committed within the jurisdiction in order to come within the 
old wording of the relevant head of Order 11 r.l (see, for 
example, Distillers v Thompson [1971] AC 458 and Castree v Squib 
[1980] 2 All ER 589). However, even in Metall und Rohstoff AG v 
Donaldson, Lufkin and Jenrette Inc. [1990] 1 QB 39, where it was 
clear that the requirements of the new Order 11 r.l(l)(f) were 
satisfied, it was still necessary to decide what was the lex loci 
delicti in order to decide if there was a good arguable case 
before the application could be granted.
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CHAPTER 2: GIVING PREFERENCE TO CHOICE OF LAW RULES
I. INTRODUCTION
In this Chapter we shall be seeking justification for a global 
preference for the choice of law rule, where the result of its 
application conflicts with the recognition rule. Such justification 
can only be found by examining the rationale behind choice rules. 
Since we are primarily concerned with the 'conflict of rules' 
situation in English law and English choice rules are still basically 
jurisdiction selecting, we shall only be concerned with theories 
which explain such traditional rules.1
Generally the proponents of the theories do not distinguish clearly 
between choice rules and recognition rules, although there tends 
to be more emphasis2 on the application of foreign laws than on 
the recognition of foreign judgments. The purpose of our examination 
of the theories is to assess whether any of them can support giving 
precedence to choice rules over recognition rules as a matter of 
principle.
II: THE THEORIES
When considering each theory it should be borne in mind that the 
theories appear to have been expected to perform two, arguably 
distinct, functions. Firstly, they should explain why we have
1 There will be some discussion of result-selecting approaches 
at Chapter 5 III infra.
2 This is probably because the emphasis in the study of Private 
International Law was until recently on choice of law rather than 
recognition and enforcement of judgments. (See Chapter 1 at VIII 
B supra).
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conflicts rules at all. Secondly, the theories should be able to 
be applied in order to construct the choice of law rules.3 It will 
be seen that most of the theories 'fall down' on the second function. 
This might be because the original proponents only had the first 
function in mind. In other words, they were only seeking to explain 
existing choice of law rules and not to formulate principles upon 
which choice of law rules could be constructed where they did not 
already exist or to replace existing unsatisfactory rules.
For our purposes, the first function seems sufficient. By discovering 
why we have choice of law rules and recognition rules respectively, 
we might be able to determine which type of rule should take priority 
where there is a conflict between the two. It is suggested that 
this perspective is too simplistic. The basis on which the rules 
are constructed are also relevant in determining the comparative 
importance to be attached to each category of rule. For example, 
if we were to find that the doctrine of vested rights were a 
compelling reason for applying choice rules in preference to 
recognition rules, but that in practice vested rights had proved 
to be an inadequate basis for constructing choice rules, our previous 
finding in favour of choice rules would be substantially undermined.
Thus, it is submitted, that it is necessary to analyse the success 
of each theory in performing both the functions outlined above.
3 Carswell (1959) 8 ICLQ 268 at p. 288.
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A. COMITY
The doctrine of comity dates back to Huber and was adopted by Story.
The latter wrote,
"The true foundation on which the subject rests is that rules 
which are to govern are those which arise from mutual interest 
and utility; from the sense of the inconveniences which would 
arise from a contrary doctrine; and from a sort of moral 
necessity to do justice in order that justice may be done 
to us in return."4
It can be seen that Story's concept of comity includes a number
of different elements. It is therefore not surprising that the
notion of comity has been understood differently by different writers
and judges.5 It is submitted that the label 'comity' has been
applied to cover three distinct doctrines, which can be called
reciprocity,- judicial courtesy and business efficacy respectively.
Each of these will be examined in turn.
1. Reciprocity
In the choice of law context, the theory of reciprocity would state 
that an English Court applies foreign laws in cases with a foreign 
element so that foreign Courts will apply English law in cases 
involving English parties or other English connections.
It is quite clear that the court's willingness to apply a foreign 
rule does not in any way depend on any evidence that there would 
be reciprocity by the Courts of that foreign country. Thus, whilst
4 Story, Commentaries on the Conflicts of Law (1834) s.35.
5 See the judgment of La Forest J. in Morguard Investments 
Ltd. v De Savoye (1990) 76 DLR (4th.) 256, 262 et. seer. Although 
he is primarily concerned with recognition of judgments, much of 
what he says and the sources quoted are equally relevant to choice 
of law.
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in a general sense there may be some hope that if English Courts 
adopt the 'international' approach of applying foreign laws in 
appropriate cases, other Courts will do the same, this is far too 
vague a premise on which to base the whole system of choice of 
law rules6. In other words, the notion of reciprocity might perform 
the first function in explaining why we have choice of law rules 
at all, but it could not perform the second function of providing 
a basis for constructing those rules.7 We will find below8 that 
the notion of reciprocity is of much more importance in the field 
of recognition of foreign judgments.
2. Judicial Courtesy
It seems that this is the sense in which the word comity was 
originally used9 when justifying the application of foreign law. 
In other words, foreign laws are applied in order to show courtesy 
to other sovereign States.10
Comity in this sense has been severely criticised, largely because 
it appears to leave the application of foreign law entirely to
6 Although this theory might explain the application of foreign 
law in some particular instances. See Jaffey (1982) 2 OJLS 368, 
372.
7 Khan-Freund, (chapter 1, n. 105 supra) at p. 8 says, ". .comity 
supplies a legislative motive rather than a legislative content."
8 Chapter 3 at B 1 infra.
9 See, for example, Hughes v Cornelius (1680) 2 Shaw 232 and 
Dicey's Conflict of Laws (4th. edn., 1927) at p. 9. Llewelyn Davies 
(1937) 18 BYBIL 49 at p. 57 alleges that 'courtesy' is a 
misunderstanding of Huber's use of the term 'comity'.
10 Cheshire and North (Chapter 1 n.l supra) at p.5 point out 
that this theory can hardly explain the readiness of the English 
courts to apply enemy law in time of war.
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the discretion of the courts.11 Again, this suggests that while 
'courtesy' may explain why we have choice of law rules at all, 
it is so imprecise a doctrine that it does not appear to give us 
sufficient guidance to construct the rules. For example, courtesy 
does not tell us what degree of connection a party must have with 
a foreign country in order for the law of that country to govern 
the validity of his/her marriage or his/her liability in tort.
Taken to its extreme, courtesy might require that we should simply 
see whether the foreign country itself would apply its laws to 
the case in question and if so, follow suit.12 There are a number 
of problems with this approach. Firstly, we would be subordinating 
our own views as to the relevance of foreign law entirely to the 
views of foreign states. Secondly, we would have a problem if the 
laws of more than one foreign state 'wanted' to apply to the 
situation. In this case, 'courtesy' could not tell us which to 
apply. Thirdly, the approach can only work if other countries have 
conflicts rules13 stating when their own law should apply. 
Fourthly, we would end up with different results in similar cases
11 Cheshire and North (Chapter 1, n.l supra) at p. 4 claim 
that courtesy is a matter for sovereigns and not judges who are 
required to decide a case according to the rights of the parties.
12 Arguably, this is what happens when double renvoi is applied 
(for discussion of renvoi in relation to the subject of this thesis, 
see Chapter 1 VIII supra).
13 It could be argued that a rule stating when a domestic law 
is applicable is part of the domestic law itself and not a conflict 
rule. Only when there is no provision in domestic law as to whether 
it should apply does the court have to consider the application 
of foreign laws. The contrary argument is that a rule stating that 
a domestic law applies when a particular factor connecting the 
case with the forum is present can be seen as a conflicts rule 
because it provides which law is to apply in a case which involves 
foreign elements.
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depending on the view of the foreign Court in question.
We need some other principle to guide us. However, once we have 
determined what is the appropriate degree of connection, it would 
seem correct to say that at least one of the reasons that we are 
applying foreign law is out of courtesy to the foreign sovereign 
state.14
3. Business Efficacy
Huber wrote,
"Although the laws of one country can have no direct force 
in another country, yet nothing could be more inconvenient 
to the commerce and general intercourse of nations than that 
transactions valid by the law of one place should be rendered 
of no effect elsewhere owing to a difference in the law.15
Recently, a Canadian Judge has described the doctrine of comity
in modern times as follows:-
"[T]he rules of private international law are grounded in 
the need in modern times to facilitate the flow of wealth, 
skills and people across state lines in a fair and orderly 
manner. "16
Thus, comity is understood as meaning protecting the interest of
14 See Jaffey (1982) 2 OJLS 368 at p. 372, where he claims
(at n. 9) that the reference to "the needs of interstate and
international systems" in the American Law Institute's Restatement 
(Conflict of Laws) (2d) at s.6 is really "comity".
15 De Conflictu Legum. See translation in Llewellyn Davies
(1937) 18 BYBIL 49, 65.
16 In Morguard Investments Ltd. v Savoye (1990) 76 DLR (4th.) 
256 at p. 269 per La Forest J. In support he cites inter alia the 
following quotation from Yntema (1957) 35 Can. Bar. Rev. "..the 
function of conflict rules is to select, interpret and apply in 
each case the particular local law that will best promote suitable 
conditions of interstate and international commerce..."
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the commercial world . The role of choice of law rules is to promote 
certainty. Thus, when people are involved in transactions, which 
they reasonably expect to be governed by the law of a particular 
country, they should be able to rely on the fact that the law of 
that country will be applied throughout the world.
Whilst this idea may be viewed as part of the doctrine of comity17 
in the rather loose sense that the aim is to protect the 
international community as a whole, it is suggested that the need 
to protect the parties' expectations is more appropriately understood 
as part of the theory of 'justice'18 for two reasons. Firstly, 
the doctrine of comity is concerned with the interests of nations; 
whereas 'justice' emphasises the interests of the parties.19 The 
latter is more appropriate since we are essentially concerned with 
private law, which is designed to protect the interests of 
individuals. Secondly, the business efficacy concept can only apply 
in the commercial context; whereas 'justice' is equally relevant 
in the non-commercial context.
4. Conclusion About Comity
We may conclude from our review that the first two meanings of 
comity do not provide an adequate basis for constructing choice
17 cf. The comment of Meredith C.J.C.P. that "it is not the 
comity of nations, it is the needs of mercantile and other 
intercourses the world over that must govern" in Maguire v Maguire 
(1921) 50 Ont. L. R. 100 at p. Ill
18 See at C infra.
19 See Jaffey (1982) 2 OJLS 368.
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of law rules, although they may explain the reason for at least 
some of the rules, and that comity in the third sense is better 
understood as part of a separate theory. In any event, we must 
appreciate that to the extent that comity is a satisfactory 
explanation of choice rules, it is an equally satisfactory 
explanation*of recognition rules. In fact, we shall see in Chapter 
3 below that whichever meaning of comity is chosen, the theory 
would tend to support giving preference to recognition as opposed 
to choice rules.
B. VESTED RIGHTS
Under this theory,20 which was espoused by Dicey in England and 
Beale in the USA,21 the purpose of the conflict of laws is to 
recognise and enforce rights which have been duly acquired in foreign 
countries. It assumes that only one law has 'jurisdiction22' to 
determine what legal consequences attach to a given situation.
Where this law confers rights upon a person, that person should 
not be deprived of those rights simply because (s)he moves to another 
country. Thus, the validity of properly created vested rights should 
not be called into question anywhere. Conversely rights conferred
20 For brief history of the doctrine see Kegel, International 
Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, Vol. Ill, Chapter 3 at pp.9-10. 
For judicial approval in England see Re Askew [1930] 2 Ch. 259, 
267.
21 Who made it the basis of the First Restatement of the 
Conflict of Laws, American Law Institute, of which he was the 
Reporter.
22 'Jurisdiction' is not used here in its usual meaning of 
having the right to hear a case.
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by laws other than that with 'jurisdiction' are not recognised 
or enforced.
If the vested rights theory were universally recognised, then all 
countries would decide all conflict cases in the same way. In which 
case, it would be theoretically impossible for there to be a conflict 
between choice rules and recognition rules. Clearly this is not 
the case and, as we have seen, such conflicts do arise. The vested 
rights theory would seem to require that where there is such a 
conflict, preference should always be given to the choice of law 
rule, which gives effect to vested rights, because ex hypothesi 
the foreign judgment must have been wrong in giving effect to rights 
which were not properly created or refusing recognition to rights 
which were properly created.
It may therefore seem somewhat surprising that some writers23 have 
regarded the theory of vested rights as being the basis of the 
doctrine of 'obligation'24 which has been used to justify the 
recognition of foreign judgments . Other writers, however, strongly 
deny that there is any connection between the two doctrines.25
However, whether one accepts that there is any common philosophy 
behind the two doctrines, it is quite clear that for our purposes 
they are incompatible. As stated above, the vested rights theory
23 See, for example, Collier (Chapter 1, n.142 supra) at p.
380.
24 Discussed in Chapter 3 at II C infra.
25 See, for example, Morris (Chapter 1, n.142 supra) at p.
105.
would accord precedence to the choice of law rule, whereas the 
doctrine of obligation, which will be examined in more detail below, 
gives precedence to the recognition rule. For our purposes, though, 
the incompatibility between the two doctrines need not cause us 
any difficulty because the vested rights theory has now been 
effectively discredited26 by nearly every academic conflicts 
lawyer27 who has written on the subject. On the other hand, the 
doctrine of obligation still seems to be 'alive and well',28 To 
what extent it can support a preference for the recognition rule 
will be considered below.
C. JUSTICE TO THE PARTIES
1. What do we mean by justice?
This theory rests on the premise that it is often not just to the 
parties to apply the lex fori to cases with a foreign element29 
and that the purpose of choice of law rules, like that of domestic 
rules should be to do justice to the parties.30 
Cheshire and North31 write,
"..[W]hen the circumstances indicate that the internal law
of a foreign country will provide a solution more just, more
convenient and more in accord with the expectations of the
26 Morris ibid at p. 510 says, "We may as well admit it: the 
vested rights theory is dead."
27 See references in Kegel (n. 20 supra) at p. 10, footnotes 
69, 72 and 76 and references at Chapter 3 n. 73 infra.
28 see Morris (chapter 1, n. 142 supra) p. 107 and Cheshire 
and North (chapter 1, n.l supra) p. 346.
29 See Wolff , Private International Law (2nd. edn., 1950) 
pp. 1-2 and Carswell (1959) 8 ICLQ 268 at 277.
30 Jaffey (1982) 2 OJLS 368, 377.
31 Cheshire and North (chapter 1, n.l supra) at p. 39.
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parties than the internal law of England, the English judge 
does not hesitate to give effect to the foreign rules."
Jaffey32 claims,
"The most important factor underlying choice of law rules 
must be the desire to achieve justice between the parties."
McLeod33 opines,
"[A] theory of relative justice which attempts to balance 
the expectations of the individuals and the interests of the 
country and the administration of justice provides the best 
vehicle for the development of positive law."
Graveson34 seeks to maintain that
" [T]he basis and the guiding principle on which conflict of 
laws in the common law is being built up is that of doing 
justice in cases involving a foreign element, in which the 
court would fall short of achieving justice if it were to 
ignore the significance of such foreign elements in the case 
before it as are relevant."
Some writers35 have distinguished between the justice of substantive 
law (referred to as 'substantive justice') and justice in determining 
which system of law should determine the outcome of a case (referred 
to as 'conflicts justice') . Others have written about justice as 
a basis for the Conflict of Laws without making this distinction.36 
It is suggested that a general concept of justice is less likely 
to be able to serve as a basis for the construction of traditional 
choice of law rules than the notion of 'conflicts justice' . This 
can be seen from a comparison of the approaches of Von Mehren
32 Jaffey, Introduction to the Conflict of Laws (1988) p. 275.
33 McLeod, The Conflict of Laws" (1983) at p. 21 approved in 
Vladi v Vladi (1987) 39 DLR 4th. 563, 570.
34 Graveson, "Judicial Justice as a Contemporary Basis of the 
English Conflict of Laws, " in Graveson (ed.) , Comparative Conflict 
of Laws, Volume I (1977) at p. 51.
35 See Kegel (n. 20 supra) at pp.15 and 44 and Cavers, The 
Choice of Law Process (1965) at pp. 130 et seq.
36 See Graveson (n. 34 supra) and Von Mehren (1977) 41 Law 
and Contemporary Problems 27.
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and Jaffey.
Von Mehren37 suggests that the two main principles of justice (in 
the 'substantive7 sense) are that like cases should be treated 
alike and that rules of law should advance and express values and 
purposes accepted by society. He points out that these two principles 
often conflict in multi-state cases, but rarely in domestic cases. 
His conclusion is that traditional jurisdiction selecting choice 
rules cannot guarantee the achievement of either principle.
In contrast, Jaffey who uses justice in the 'conflicts' sense 
formulates a number of principles of justice, which can be used 
to construct choice of law rules. With respect to other writers, 
it is submitted that Jaffey7 s work is the most successful attempt 
at practical application of the 'justice7 theory to choice of law. 
Thus, further discussion of this theory will be on the basis of 
Jaffey7s principles.
2. Jaffey and the Principle of 1Reasonable Expectations7
Jaffey7 s principles are38:-
i. In favorem validitatis - implementing the parties7 wish that 
their transaction or relationship should be legally effective.
ii. Justice is done to a party if the law of his own country is 
applied
37 (1977) 41 Law and Contemporary Problems 27.
38 The principles are formulated slightly differently in his 
book (n. 32 supra) at pp. 275-8 and in his article at (1982) 2 
OJLS 368. The article deals with the topic more fully and the 
principles quoted here are based on the article.
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iii. Where both parties belong to the same country, the law of 
that country will usually be the appropriate law.
iv. Where one party in his own country acts or participates in 
a transaction or event that is entirely domestic to his country, 
except for the fact that the other party is (without his knowledge 
or without his choice) a foreigner, the first party should be able 
to rely on his own law.
v. A party should not be held liable to a greater extent than he 
is liable by the law of the country where he acted.
vi. Choice of law rules should be certain and predictable.
vii. There should be uniformity between the choice rules of different 
countries.
viii. The governing law should be a convenient one.
ix. No foreign law should be applied which grossly offends the 
standards of the forum.
Whilst Jaffey's principles may be quite workable in this form, 
for our purposes of assessing whether the justice theory can support 
a global rule in favour of choice rules, we need to be able to 
refer to a single principle which reflects the justice theory. 
Can such a principle be distilled from Jaffey's formulation?
It is suggested, that with the exception of the last principle 
(which can be seen as an exception to the principles of conflicts 
justice) , all these principles are to a large extent manifestations 
of the concept of giving effect to the reasonable expectations39
39 Sometimes also referred to as legitimate or justified 
expectations.
of the parties.40 Jaffey41 recognises that expectation is relevant 
to a number of the principles, although he maintains that it does 
not fully explain them.
A number of arguments may be put forward which might tend to refute 
the reasonable expectation principle.
(a) It may be argued that to attempt to construct rules from parties' 
expectations will result in circular reasoning because to a large 
extent parties' expectations are influenced by what the law is. 
For example, because domicile is the relevant connecting factor 
in English law, parties may expect that it will govern their personal 
status. But how did domicile, as opposed to say nationality or 
residence become the connecting factor?
Whilst it is difficult to counter this argument by logic, it is 
suggested that it does not present any practical difficulties for 
two reasons. Firstly, in relation to many less legalistic connecting 
factors, such as the place where a tort took place or a contract 
is to be performed or even habitual residence, it is possible to 
discern reasonable expectations without reference to the existing
40 The 'reasonable expectation' principle is part of most 
modern approaches to choice of law. For example, it is one of the 
Restatement Second's choice-influencing factors. The same basic 
concept has been expressed slightly differently by some writers. 
For example, Shapira, The Interest Approach to Choice of Law (1970) , 
Chapter 3 refers to the question of whether or not a party has 
fair notice of the applicability of a particular law. The principle 
is also consistent with the theory of justice propounded by 
philosopher Rawls and quoted in Cavers (n. 35 supra) at p. 130. 
However, no Judge or writer seems to have suggested that the 
'reasonable expectation' principle by itself can serve as the 
rationale and basis for construction of choice of law rules.
41 Op. cit. (n.20 supra) at p. 276.
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law. Secondly, we are not trying to construct choice of law rules 
in a vacuum. The present rules must serve as the point of departure 
of any reform or development of existing rules. Thus, it can simply 
be accepted as a 'fact of life' that in common law countries people 
naturally expect domicile, albeit shorn of some of its artificial 
aspects, to govern and that on the Continent they reasonably expect 
the law of their nationality to be applied.
(b) It may be supposed that a difficulty may arise where the parties 
quite legitimately have different expectations.
However, in practice this situation is unlikely to arise. Take, 
for example, the facts of Sottemeyer v De Barros (No. 2 ) .42 At 
first sight it might seem that the Portugese domiciled cousin would 
legitimately expect Portugese law to govern his capacity to enter 
into the marriage; whilst the English domiciled cousin would expect 
that English law should govern because the marriage took place 
in England and it is not reasonable for English domiciliaries to 
take into account foreign incapacities.43 However, as with most 
marriages, surely both parties when entering into the marriage 
assumed that it would be valid. Thus, this is simply an example 
of how the first of Jaffey's principles accords with the reasonable 
expectation principle.
We might be more likely to find an example of a divergence between
42 (1879) 5 PD 94.
43 This seems to be the basis of the reasoning of the Court 
in formulating the exception to the dual domicile rule in Sottomeyer 
v De Barros (No. 2) (1879) 5 PD 94.
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parties' expectations in tort, where there is generally no 
intentional transaction between the parties. Assume that A. in 
country X writes a statement about B. in a newspaper in country 
X, which would not be defamatory by the law of country X. The 
newspaper is, unknown to A, published in country Y, where B lives. 
In country Y, the statement is defamatory. Here, it might be argued 
that as A is acting in X, where he is not liable, he will reasonably 
expect that he should not be liable.44 On the other hand, B, who 
is injured in his own country Y would reasonably expect to be able 
to hold A. liable.45
In such a situation, it is suggested that it is simply necessary 
to make a decision as to which expectation should prevail. Here 
we might decide that the reasonable expectation of not being held 
liable should take priority over a reasonable expectation of being 
able to hold someone else liable. The justification for this is 
that the 'tortfeasor' should be able to rely on his reasonable 
expectations in deciding how to behave. Whereas, the injured party 
has no choice in the matter and thus his expectations only come 
into play after the alleged tort has been committed.
Thus, even where the parties have different reasonable expectations, 
it should be possible to determine which expectation should be 
accorded greater weight.
44 This is Jaffey's principle (v) above.
45 This is a slight modification of Jaffey's principle (iv) 
above.
(c) Whilst we might accept that reasonable expectation is the 
basis of justice and that justice ought to be the basis of choice 
of law rules, in fact this is not the case. The traditional 
mechanical choice of law rules do not always produce a result which 
is consonant with justice, as interpreted here. For example, it 
is difficult to believe that the parties in McElroy v McAllister46 
expected that Scottish law and English law would be applied together 
with the result that only the funeral expenses could be recovered, 
even though substantial additional compensation would have been 
available under either system in a purely domestic case.
The answer to this criticism must be that the Conflict of Laws 
is a constantly evolving area of law. As the justice theory becomes 
more accepted, we will find that more choice of law rules are 
consistent with it. Recent caselaw shows that the Courts now 
acknowledge the need to give effect to the parties' expectations47 
and are prepared to mould choice of law rules to achieve the just 
result. In particular,48 it is clear that following Boys v 
Chaplin49, the decision in McElroy v McAllister50 would be different
46 [1949] SC 110.
47 For example, the court invoked the party's expectations 
to support the result that it had reached by application of the 
choice of law rule in Johnston v Coventry Churchill [1992] 3 All 
ER 14 at p. 25. See also the leading Canadian tort case of Grimes 
v Cloutier (1989) 61 DLR (4th) 505 at p. 524.
48 The application of the intended matrimonial home test in 
Radwan v Radwan No. 2 [1973] Fam. 35 and of the 'real and substantial 
connection' test at first instance in Lawrence v Lawrence [1985] 
Fam. 106. are other examples.
49 [1971] AC 356.
50 [1949] SC 110.
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today. One of the bases for invoking the exception to the double 
actionability rule in Phillips v Eyre51 would be the parties' 
reasonable expectations that Scottish law should apply to determine 
the heads of damages available.52
(d) There are some choice of law rules which appear by their nature 
not to be consistent with the parties expectations. For example, 
it may be argued that parties will not expect their contract to 
be held void because performance is illegal. Indeed Jaffey's first 
principle is to uphold the parties' wishes that their transaction 
be legally effective.
However, it is suggested that parties' reasonable expectations 
may not always accord with their wishes. In the domestic context, 
two English parties making a contract in England must realise that 
it will be invalid if it is illegal according to English domestic 
law even if they want it to be valid. Similarly, in the international 
context the parties should anticipate that their contract will 
not be enforced if it is illegal according to a system which they 
can reasonably expect to apply. Thus, the choice rules for illegality 
of contract will be consistent with the reasonable expectation 
principle if effect is only given to invalidating rules of systems 
which the parties can reasonably expect to apply.
It is submitted that none of the above objections prevent us from
51 (1870) L.R. 6 Q.B. 1.
52 See Johnson v Coventry Churchill [1992] 3 All ER 14 at p.
25.
concluding that the principle of reasonable expectation is the 
single principle which most accurately reflects the justice theory 
and can therefore be used as the basis for an examination of whether 
the principle of justice can support a global preference for choice 
rules.
3. Can 1Justice' Support A Global Preference for Choice Rules?
In favour of choice of law rules, it can be argued that, assuming 
that such rules are carefully designed to do justice by protecting 
the reasonable expectations of the parties, then they should take 
precedence over recognition rules which simply require that a foreign 
judgment be applied 'blindly' without examining the merits and 
checking that the judgment has done justice in the above sense.
The argument in favour of recognition rules is that where parties 
have gone to the trouble and expense of litigating in a forum which 
has jurisdiction in the international sense, they should reasonably 
expect that the judgment will be recognised and enforced in other 
countries, even where its result is different from that which would 
have been obtained had the case been decided in those other 
countries.
The conflicting arguments can best be illustrated by referring 
to example M6 above.53 Up until the time of the nullity proceedings 
in Portugal, the parties' reasonable expectations would have been 
that the validity and continued subsistence of their marriage should 
be determined by New York law because all the connections deemed
53 At Chapter 1 III supra.
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relevant to validity of marriage both by New York law and by English 
law were with New York. However, once the decree has been pronounced, 
it can be argued that the parties should now reasonably expect 
that a decree pronounced by a Court of competent jurisdiction54 
is to be recognised throughout the world, even though it is not 
recognised by the law of their domicile. Does justice require that 
the 'new' expectations arising out of the Portugese proceedings 
override the original expectations?
One of the criticisms of excessive reliance on the parties' 
expectations has been that often parties do not actually address 
their minds to the question of which law governs the transaction 
or relationship into which they are entering. Thus, the law simply 
imputes expectations to them. It might be argued that where parties 
have gone to the trouble to litigate, they are more likely to have 
thought about and relied upon the fact that the judgment will be 
recognised in other countries. Thus, greater weight should be 
accorded to their expectations.
However, it is suggested that it is impossible to generalise about 
parties' actual expectations either in connection with the 
applicability of a particular law or the recognition of a judgment 
abroad. Sometimes parties give very careful thought to the legal 
consequences of their actions. This thought must be based on an 
expectation that a particular legal system is to govern. Conversely, 
when commencing litigation there may be no reason to think about
54 This assumes that competence is looked at through the eyes 
of English law.
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recognition/enforcement abroad because at that time they are only 
concerned with recognition/enforcement in the forum where they 
are litigating. Only because of later unforeseen events does 
recognition/ enforcement abroad become an issue.
Thus, whether parties' expectations about the applicability of 
the choice rule or their expectations over the enforcability of 
a judgment should prevail would have to be decided in each case 
or at least in each category of case.
Ill: CONCLUSION FROM THE THEORIES
We have seen that none of the theories which have been put forward 
to justify choice of law rules, whether they still command general 
acceptance or not, can adequately support a global rule giving 
precedence to choice of law rules over recognition rules. The theory 
of justice,* which is the most convincing contemporary rationale 
for choice of law rules, can equally be used to justify application 
of choice of law rules and recognition rules.
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CHAPTER 3: GIVING PREFERENCE TO RECOGNITION RULES
I. INTRODUCTION
In this Chapter we shall be seeking justification for preferring 
the recognition rule where the result of recognising the foreign 
judgment conflicts with the result of applying the choice of law 
rule. The approach taken will be the same as that taken in 
Chapter 2 in respect of choice of law rules. Thus, we shall be 
examining the various theories put forward to explain recognition 
rules and analyse whether any theory can adequately support a 
global preference for recognition rules. The Court of Appeal has 
recently stated that the "cases give virtually no guidance on 
this essential issue."1
In making the comparison with choice of law rules, it will be 
assumed, as concluded in Chapter 2, that the best theory to 
support choice of law rules is 'justice' in the conflicts sense 
and that this concept is most accurately represented by the 
'reasonable expectation' principle. Thus, in order to come to the 
conclusion that one of the rationales for recognising judgments 
does justify a global preference in favour of recognition rules, 
we would have to find that that rationale prevails over 
'justice' as defined above.
When discussing the rationale behind choice of law rules it was 
not necessary to distinguish between different areas of law. 
However, in relation to recognition of judgments, matrimonial
Cape v Adams Industries [1991] 1 All ER 929, 1037.
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causes must be distinguished from in personam judgments2 inter 
alia for the following reasons:-
(i) Business efficacy is not relevant.
(ii) Such decrees operate as in rem judgments and may be 
challenged by third parties.3
(iii) Non-judicial divorces and annulments may be recognised.
(iv) A matrimonial decree does not require a sum of money to be 
paid.
Thus, specific reference4 will be made as to the applicability 
of each theory to matrimonial causes and one theory advanced 
which is only applicable to matrimonial causes.5
Consideration of the theories behind recognition rules usually 
concentrate on the reasons why certain judgments should be 
recognised. However, in dealing with the conflict of rules 
scenario, we also need to consider the situation where the 
recognition'rules do not provide for recognition (to be referred 
to as non-recognition rules), but application of the choice of 
law rule would produce the same result as recognition. In order 
to decide if there is any justification for a global preference 
for the non-recognition rule, we need to understand the bases and
2 We will not be dealing with non-matrimonial judgments in
rem.
3 See, for example, Pemberton v Hughes [1899] 1 Ch. 781 and
Powell v Cockburn (1976) 68 DLR (3d) 700.
4 See n. 10, text accompanying 27 and text accompanying
n.71 infra.
5 See II E infra.
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reasons for non-recognition.
II THE THEORIES6
A. ESTOPPEL PER REM JUDICATAM7
This is a rule of evidence which has been summarised as follows
"Where a final judicial decision has been pronounced by 
either an English or (with certain exceptions) a foreign 
tribunal of competent jurisdiction over the parties to, and 
the subject matter of the litigation any party or parties 
to such litigation, as against any other party or privy 
thereto and in the case of decisions in rem, as against any 
other person, is estopped in any subsequent litigation from 
disputing or questioning such decision on the merits."8
It is now beyond doubt that this doctrine, which is frequently
referred to as res judicata9, applies to foreign judgments.10
6 Whilst Von Mehren and Trautman (1968) 81 Harv. L. R. 1601 
at p. 1603 claim that traditional theories "contribute little to 
any real understanding" of recognition practice, English and 
Commonwealth courts and writers still rely on them. In fact, Von 
Mehren's five policies and the principle of justice which they 
advocate (ibid) are all embodied in the theories discussed. 
There does not seem to be academic agreement as to which theories 
are separate. For example, Patchett, Recognition of Commercial 
Judgments and Awards in the Commonwealth (1984) treats 
reciprocity as separate from comity.
7 See Spencer Bower and Turner, The Doctrine of Res Judicata
(2nd. edn, 1969), Chapter 1.
8 Ibid at p. 9. This definition (which was contained in the
first edition of Spencer Bower) was cited with approval in Carl 
Zeiss Stifung v Rayner and Keeler Ltd. (No. 2) , [1967] 1 AC 853,
933.
9 This covers both cause of action and issue estoppel.
10 See House of Lords decisions in Carl Zeiss Stiftung v
Rayner and Keeler Ltd. (No. 2) [1967] 1 AC 853 and The Sennar
(No. 2) [1985] 1 WLR 490. Whilst the doctrine of res judicata
may be used in respect of matrimonial decrees (see Vervaeke v 
Smith [1983] 1 AC 145 and Family Law Act 1986 s.51(1), it does 
not help much in the conflict of rules context since it begs the 
question as to whether recognition of the change in matrimonial 
status, which is the res judicata of the foreign decree , 
necessarily requires recognition of resulting changes in rights 
and obligations. See at Section II B 1 in each of Chapters 6, 7 
and 8 infra.
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However, the doctrine of res judicata does not itself provide a 
reason for recognising foreign judgments. Rather it would seem 
that the effect of the recognition rules is to apply this 
domestic doctrine to those foreign judgments which are required 
to be recognised.11 Therefore, we need to identify one or more 
modern rationale(s) of the res judicata rule to see if it/they 
can equally support recognition of foreign judgments.
1. Finality of Litigation
There is said to be a general community interest in the 
termination of disputes and in the finality and conclusiveness 
of judicial decisions.12 This requires that parties should not 
be allowed to litigate in this country a dispute which has been 
decided by judicial decision elsewhere.
Can this interest supercede the interest in 'justice'? In the 
domestic context, once a party's rights of appeal are exhausted 
then it is assumed that justice has been done.13 Thus, there can
11 Von Mehren and Trautman (1968) 81 Harv. L.Rev. 1601 at p. 
1606 suggest that "treating recognition problems as an aspect 
of res judicata tends to lead to a confusion of concepts which 
should be kept separate" because of differences between the 
policies relating to domestic and foreign judgments.
12 Spencer Bower and Turner (n. 7 supra) at p. 10 and Reed,
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments (1938) pp. Ill - 
122. The finality point is summed up by the Latin phrase,
'interest rei publicae ut sit finis litum.'
13 Unless public policy requires otherwise. In the case of
Man (Sugar) v Haryanto [1991] 1 Lloyds 429 at 436, an English
decision upholding the contract was followed by an Indonesian 
decision declaring it unenforcable for illegality. The Court 
asked whether "as a matter of English law the public policy in 
favour of finality is overridden by some more important public 
policy based on the unenforcability of illegal contracts?" In 
this case, the answer was in the negative.
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be no conflict between the requirements of justice andhat of 
finality. In the conflict of laws7 context, this is not the case. 
The foreign decision may not be in conformity with 'conflicts 
justice7 and/or 'substantive justice7. To allow review of the 
merits of foreign decisions to test for 'substantive7 justice 
would completely undermine the idea of finality of judicial 
decisions in the international context.
However, it is suggested that to allow review of the 'conflicts7 
justice7 of foreign decisions in the few cases where the result 
of recognition is incompatible with the application of forum7 s 
choice of law rules could be allowed as an exception without 
detracting from the finality objective to any great extent14. 
Thus, it is submitted that finality cannot justify giving 
precedence to the recognition rule in the 'conflict of rules7 
scenario.
2. Protection of Individuals
There is said to be a right for an individual to be protected 
from vexatious multiplication of suits15. Without this 
protection, a party who has greater resources is given an unfair 
advantage. A financially weaker party may be unable to afford to 
defend numerous actions on the same issue that he has already won
14 It will be suggested below that this is in fact already
done under the guise of public policy. See discussion of Gray v 
Formosa [1963] P. 259 and Vervaeke v Smith [1983] 1 AC 145 at 
Chapter 5 II B infra.
15 Spencer Bower and Turner (n. 7 supra) at p. 10. Von
Mehren and' Trautman (1968) 81 Harv. L.Rev. 1061 refer to
protection against harassing or evasive tactics.
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in another court.
It is suggested that this rationale is part of the 'justice' 
theory elaborated in Chapter 216. Thus, it can be understood in 
terms of fulfilling the parties' reasonable expectations, which 
are assumed to be that the decision of a competent court is 
binding and cannot be challenged in other jurisdictions. However, 
as explained there, these reasonable expectations have to be 
weighed against reasonable expectations of having a particular 
law applied, where these exist and there can be no single 
definitive rule as to which of these expectations should prevail. 
The requirements of 'conflicts justice' will have to be 
determined in each case or category of case.
B. COMITY
Early judicial pronouncements17 on the question of recognition 
of foreign judgments clearly based such recognition on 'comity'. 
Comity is still mentioned loosely by Judges in relation to the 
recognition of foreign judgments18. In order to ascertain 
whether comity could be used as a basis of supporting a global 
preference, we must again specify which meaning of comity we are
16 At Section II C.
17 See cases quoted by Patchett (n.6 supra) p. 47 and by 
Piggott, Foreign Judgments (1908) Part i at p. 11.
18 See, for example, Macaulay v Macaulay [1991] 1 FLR 235 at 
p. 241 and Wood v Wood [1954] P. 254, where the Court of Appeal 
suggested that comity did not require giving exaggerated respect 
to the judgments of other States.
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using19.
1. Reciprocity
The concept of reciprocity in relation to the regulation of 
foreign judgements itself is used in different senses in the 
caselaw and literature. Firstly, it means that a Court will 
recognise a foreign judgment provided that the Courts of that 
foreign country would recognise such a decision of the forum. 
Reciprocity in this sense either requires a bilateral or 
multilateral treaty in which both countries agree to recognise 
judgments of the other on certain conditions or evidence of the 
practice of the foreign Court in relation to judgments of the 
forum.
Secondly, reciprocity may mean that the forum will recognise a 
foreign judgment if there exists in relation to the foreign court 
a connection20 which would have given the forum jurisdiction 
mutatis mutandis. It is reciprocity in this second sense which
19 The fact that comity has different meanings has been 
recognised by judges in connection with recognition of foreign 
judgments. In Wood v Wood [1957] P. 254, Ever shed M.R. said that 
"questions of reciprocity must always be relevant upon the matter 
of comity." This suggests that reciprocity is just one element 
of comity. He does not specify what the other elements are. For 
a detailed judicial analysis of the history and meaning of the 
concept of comity in relation to the recognition of foreign 
judgments, see Morguard Investments Ltd. v De Savoye (1990) 76 
DLR (4th.) p. 256, per La Forest J. at p. 262 et. seq. See also 
Cape v Adams Industries [1991] 1 All ER 929 at p. 1037.
20 Whether or not this is actually the jurisdictional base 
relied on by the foreign court, Robinson- Scott v Robinson-Scott 
[1957] 3 All ER 473. cf. Under some Commonwealth statutes, such 
as New Zealand Family Proceedings Act 1980, the foreign Courts 
must actually have exercised jurisdiction on one of the bases on 
which the forum would take jurisdiction.
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was used in the case of Travers v Holley21. MClean22 points out 
that the rule does not strictly involve reciprocity at all 
because it is not necessary to establish that the foreign country 
has a rule corresponding to that in Travers v Holley.
Patchett23 calls the second category 'judicially determined 
reciprocity' and contrasts this with 'legislatively determined 
reciprocity'. It is suggested that this division is theoretically 
unsound because it confuses two issues. The real distinction is 
between reciprocity in relation to recognition of judgments 
('recognition reciprocity') and reciprocity founded on 
jurisdictional bases ('jurisdictional reciprocity'). 
'Recognition reciprocity' could be determined legislatively or 
judicially24. However, in fact, in England25 there is no 
judicial determination of reciprocity in this sense. Thus, for 
practical purposes, Patchett's labelling is accurate.
21 [1953] P.246.
22 McClean, Recognition of Family Judgments in the
Commonwealth (1983) at p. 40. Von Mehren and Trautman (1968) 81 
Harv. L.Rev. 1601 at 1617 n.53 suggest that the term
'equivalence' is preferable to avoid confusion with reciprocity 
in the first sense.
23 Op. cit. (n.6 supra) at p. 52. See also Khan-Freund
(Chapter 1, n.105 supra) at p. 29 and Russell (1952) 1 ICLQ p. 
181.
24 Khan Freund ibid at p. 23 points out that the 
significance of this distinction is that legislation determines 
ex ante whether there is reciprocity; whereas Courts can only 
decided ex post.
25 cf. in the U. S. Hilton v Guyot (1895) 159 US 113.
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In England26 'jurisdictional reciprocity' cannot be considered 
as a basis for recognising foreign judgments. The rule in 
Travers v Holley has been held to be "limited to a judgment in 
rem in a matter affecting matrimonial status"27 and was repealed 
in relation to divorces and legal separations by the Recognition 
of Divorces and Legal Separation Act 1971 and in relation to 
nullity decrees by the Family Law Act 1986. Thus, we shall be 
using reciprocity exclusively in the 'recognition reciprocity' 
sense.
Whilst the common law rules for recognition of foreign judgments 
do not involve any requirement of reciprocity28, it has been 
suggested29 that the real reason that judges enforce foreign 
judgments is the hope that their judgments would be recognised 
and enforced abroad30. This 'self-interest'31 theory might be 
seen to be borne out by the fact that most of the later statutory 
recognition rules do require reciprocity. Thus, the 
Administration of Justice Act 1920 and the Foreign Judgments
26 cf. In Canada, following the decision of the Supreme
Court of Canada in Morguard Investments Ltd. v De Savoye (1990) 
76 DLR (4th.) 256, jurisdictional reciprocity is now a basis of 
recognition of in personam judgments, at least in relation to 
judgments of sister provinces.
27 Re Trepca Mines [1960] 1 WLR 1273, 1280-2 per Hodson
L. J.
28 See, for example, Adams v Cape Industries [1991] 1 All ER
929 at p. 1037.
29 See, for example Patchett (n.6 supra) at p. 41.
30 See, e.g., per L. Hardwick in Omychund v Barker (1777) 1
Ak 21, 50; 26 E.R. 15, 33.
31 This term is used by Patchett (n.6. supra).
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(Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 193332 both provide for 
registration of foreign judgments only where there is 
reciprocity33. However, Khan-Freund34 points out that here 
reciprocity is a condition for the use of a simplified 
enforcement procedure rather than for enforcement per se.
More recent developments would seem further to endorse the 
reciprocity theory. The whole basis of the Brussels and Lugano 
Conventions35, which provide for virtually automatic recognition 
of judgments, is that of reciprocity between member states. Thus, 
States are prepared to increase their obligation to recognise 
foreign judgments36 in return for the same treatment for their 
own judgments.
Nonetheless, so long as a good many judgments37 are still 
recognised or refused recognition without any regard to
32 See Chapter 1 II A 2 and 3 supra.
33 An Order in Council is required to extend the Act to a
particular country. Such an Order may only be made where there 
are reciprocal provisions for recognition of U.K. judgments by 
that country. See 1920 Act s. 14 (as amended by the Civil 
Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 s.35 (3)) and Foreign 
Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933 s. 1 (as amended by 
the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 s.35(1) and Sched. 
10) .
34 Khan-Freund (Chapter 1 n.105 supra) at p. 24.
35 Discussed at Chapter 1 II A 4 supra. See also the
Maintenance Orders (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1972.
36 For example, the defences available against recognition
are narrower under the Brussels and Lugano Conventions than at 
common law.
37 i.e. All judgments of States which are not parties to a
multilateral or bilateral recognition treaty with the U.K.
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reciprocity, this cannot be a complete explanation. In 
particular, it is worth noting that the rules for recognising 
matrimonial decrees38, whilst originally enacted39 in pursuance 
of membership of the Hague Convention on Recognition of Divorces 
and Legal Separations do not involve any element of reciprocity.
It is suggested that the importance of legislatively determined 
reciprocity is that it may allow the recognition of judgments 
which would not otherwise be recognised.40 Thus, whatever we 
decide is the rationale for recognition of judgments (which we 
will call the 'common law rationale') will have to be 
supplemented by legislatively determined reciprocity. This is 
significant for our purposes of weighing up the rationale for 
choice of law rules against the rationale for recognition rules. 
In those cases where there is recognition only41 because one of 
the Conventions applies, then reciprocity is the basis for 
recognition and we must decide whether reciprocity can support
38 See Chapter 1 II B supra.
39 In the Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations Act
1971.
40 Although not matrimonial decrees as "status and legal 
capacity of natural persons" are expressly excluded from the 
scope of the Brussels and Lugano Conventions (Art. 1) and the 
Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933 seems not to 
apply to matrimonial decrees, (see Maples v Maples [1988] Fam. 
14 and Vervaeke v Smith [1981] 1 All ER 55 at p.90 per Cumming- 
Bruce and Everleigh J., but cf. per Arnold P. at p. 87 and Law 
Com. No. 137 at para. 2.31).
41 This cannot apply to recognition of judgments under the
Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933 Act since the
Act primarily affected the method of recognition and made no 
fundamental change to entitlement thereto (although it has been 
held not to have been purely a codification of the common law - 
Societe Cooperative Sidmetal v Titan International Ltd. [1966]
1 QB 828).
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the automatic preference of the recognition rule.
It is suggested that the decisive factor here is that the
conflict of laws is essentially concerned with the private law
rights of individuals42. Legislatively determined reciprocity is 
based on the State's political and economic considerations. Thus, 
in so far $s recognition rules are based on reciprocity they 
should not take precedence over choice rules which we are
assuming to be based on 'justice' between the parties.
2. Judicial Courtesy
Again, comity in this sense would seem to have more force in 
relation to recognition of foreign judgments than in relation to 
choice of law rules. It is understandable that judges should wish 
to respect the decisions of other judges43 and that states will 
show respect "to the actions of a state legitimately taken within 
its territory."44 Many of the problems raised in relation to the 
applicability of this theory to choice of law rules do not apply 
to recognition45, for example:
(i) There are less likely to be conflicting foreign judgments
42 Patchett (n.6 supra) at p. 61 expresses this idea as,
"[T]he res litigiosa being considered by the enforcing forum is
a matter of private dispute rather than being a matter of 
international casus belli."
43 See Re E [1967] Ch. 287, 301 where Cross J. said that he 
was sending a copy of his judgment to the American Judge whose 
child custody order, he was not following.
44 Morguard Investments Ltd. v De Savoye (1990) 76 DLR 256
per La Forest J. at p. 268.
45 See Chapter 2 II A 2 supra.
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than conflicting foreign laws.46
(ii) The theory does not depend on other countries having 
conflicts rules.
(iii)Inconsistency of forum judicial decisions is not an issue. 
However Piggott47 argues that under the doctrine of comity it is 
difficult to explain the defences to recognition/enforcement. 
Moreover the fundamental problem that recognition would be based 
on judicial discretion48 as opposed to rights of the parties 
remains.
3. Business Efficacy
The idea that certainty in international commerce requires
recognition of foreign judgments is summed up by Jones LJ. in Re
Davidson' s S . T . s49
"It would be impossible to carry on the business of the 
world if Courts refused to act upon what had been done by 
other Courts of competent jurisdiction.1
More recently, Slade LJ's 'working of the society of nations' 50
cf. The recent case of Showlag v Mansour [1994] 2 All ER 
129, where the Privy Council stated that as a general rule the 
first judgment in time should take precedence. See also Brussels 
Convention art. 27(5).
47 Op. cit. (n. 16 supra) at p. 16.
48 Patchett (n. 6 supra) at p. 50 suggests that the
uncertainty and vagueness of the doctrine of comity was part of 
its strength because it enabled changes to be made in the light 
of socio-economic development.
49 (1873) 15 Eq. 383. See also Patchett (n.6 supra) at p.48.
50 Adams v Cape Industries [1991] 1 All ER 929, 1037. Slade
L.J. says that the principle of recognition of foreign judgments 
"..must stem from an acknowledgment that the society of nations 
will work better if some foreign judgments are taken to create 
rights which supersede the underlying cause of action, and which
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must be referring mainly to the functioning of international 
trade and commerce. However, as his Lordship recognises, this 
reasoning "tells one nothing of practical value about how to 
identify" which foreign judgments should be recognised.51
It was argued above, in relation to choice of law, that the 
'business efficacy' sense of comity should be better understood 
as part of the theory of 'justice7. This is equally applicable 
in the recognition context, in which the purpose is to protect 
the needs of commercial parties to be able to rely on the 
enforcement of judgments in other jurisdictions52. Under this 
approach, those judgments which the parties would reasonably 
expect53 to have effect in the requested state, should be 
recognised. •
We have already54 discussed the potential conflict between 
fulfilling parties' reasonable expectations about applicable law 
and their expectations about the enforcability of judgments and
may be directly enforced in countries where the defendant or his 
assets are to be found."
51 Ibid.
52 See Von Mehren and Trautman, (1968) 81 Harv. L. Rev.
1601 at p. 1603.
53 The Court of Appeal in Adams v Cape Industries [1991] 1 
All ER 929 at p. 1050 rejected using legitimate expectation as 
a test for determining whether the Court's method of assessment 
of damages was in breach of natural justice. This does not in any 
way undermine the idea that reasonable or legitimate expectation 
forms or should form the conceptual basis of recognition of 
j udgment rule s.
54 At Section A 2 of this Chapter and Section II C of 
Chapter 2 supra.
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concluded that therefore 'conflicts justice7 cannot support a 
global preference for either type of rule. Rather the 
requirements of 'conflicts justice7 have to be determined in each 
category of case.
Thus, we can conclude that none of the versions of the theory of 
comity can support a global preference in favour of recognition 
rules. Bearing in mind that the doctrine has been widely 
discredited, the only two senses of comity which would still seem 
to be supportable55 are that of legislatively determined 
reciprocity and business efficacy. It has been submitted that the 
first should not take precedence over 'justice7 between the 
parties and that the second should not really be treated as an 
aspect of comity at all, but rather as an aspect of 'conflicts 
justice7.
C. THE DOCTRINE OF OBLIGATION
1. Acceptance of the Doctrine
This doctrine, which can be traced back56 to the 1830s was 
summed up in the classic words of Blackburn J. in Schisby v
55 La Forest J., in Morguard Investments Ltd. v De Savoye
(1990) 76 DLR (4th.) 256 at p. 269, suggests that "the content 
of comity must be adjusted in the light of a changing world 
order."
56 See Warrender v Warrender (1835) 2 Cl. and Fin. 401, when 
Lord Brougham suggested that foreign judgments were not 
recognised ex comitatae but rather ex debito justiciae and the 
more explicit enunciation of the doctrine by Parke B. in Russell 
v Smyth (1842) 9 M & W 810 and Williams v Jones (1845) 13 M & W 
628.
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Westenholz57
"The judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction over the 
defendant imposes a duty or obligation on him to pay the sum 
for which judgment is given, which the courts in this 
country are bound to enforce."
There are a number of reasons why the doctrine of obligation was
enthusiastically espoused58 in the common law world.
(i) It fit in with the form of action59 by which foreign 
judgments were from the beginning enforced.60
(ii) It fit in with the finality requirement61.
(iii) It was consistent with the conclusiveness rule. The Court 
has to enforce a judgment even if it is wrong62 because what is
being enforced is not the prior legal obligation, but the fresh
obligation created by the judgment itself.
(iv) It was a method63 of achieving the aims of res judicata64, 
which was not previously thought to apply to foreign judgments.
57 (1870) LR 6 QB 155, 159. See also Goddard v Gray (1870)
27 LR 6 Q.B. 139.
58 The only opponent seems to be Piggott (n.17 supra) at
p.13. His argument that the obligation arising from a judgment 
is only enforcable in the state which calls it into being is 
unconvincing. If this were correct then we would not enforce any 
foreign created rights and conflict of laws would not exist. 
Piggott does not explain why what he calls inchoate obligations 
arising abroad should be recognised and choses jugees should not.
59 i.e. assumpsit. See explanation by Patchett (n.6 supra)
at p. 42.
60 See Blackburn J. in Goddard v Gray (1870) LR 6 QB 139 at 
p.150.
61 See per Lord Weston in HL in Nouvion v Freeman (1889)
15 App. Cas. 1 at p. 13 and Read, Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments (1938) at pp. 84-5.
62 See Goddard v Grey (1870) LR 6QB 139.
63 See Patchett (n.6 supra) at p.61.
64 See sub-section A. supra.
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(v) It was consistent with the defences, which were said to 
negative the existence or excuse the performance of the 
obligation65.
The main difficulty66 was that the doctrine of obligation was 
inconsistent with the non-merger rule. The latter was extensively 
criticised67 and has now been overruled by section 34 of the 
Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982.68
The doctrine of obligation has recently been reiterated in modern
terms by the House of Lords.
"A foreign judgment given by a court of competent 
jurisdiction over the defendant is treated by the common law 
as imposing a legal obligation on the judgment debtor which 
will be enforced in an action on the judgment by an English 
court in which the defendant will not be permitted to reopen 
issues of either fact or law which have been decided against 
him by the foreign court."69
Moreover, the Court of Appeal in Adams v Cape Industries70 has
sought to explain the doctrine in relationship to the foreign
65 See Piggott (n.17 supra) p. 12 and Cheshire and North
(Chapter 1, n.l supra) at p. 346.
66 Although this seems to have been explained away as an 
historical anomaly - see Piggott (n.17 supra) at pp. 17-18 and 
Cheshire and North (Chapter 1, n.l. supra) at p. 105 - and does 
not seem to have prevented general acceptance of the doctrine.
67 See, for example, Morris, The Conflict of Laws (2nd.
edn.) at p. 405 and per Lord Wilberforce in Carl Zeiss Stiftung 
v Rayner & Keeler (No. 2) [1967] AC 1 853, 966.
68 For application of this provision see Black v Yates
[1991] 4 All ER 722 and The Indian Grace [1992] 1 Lloyds Rep. 
124.
69 Owens Bank Ltd. v Bracco [1992] 2 WLR 621 per L. Bridge
at p. 627.
70 [1991] 1 All ER 929 at pp. 1038 - 1041.
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Court's territorial jurisdiction on the basis of the presence of
the defendant as follows,
11. . [B]y making himself present he contracts-in to a network 
of obligations created by the local law and the local 
courts."
It should be noted that the doctrine is inapplicable to 
matrimonial decrees because there is no obligation to pay any sum 
of money.71
2. Basis of the Doctrine
In order to assess whether the doctrine of obligation can justify 
a global preference for the recognition rule, we must examine its 
basis. As mentioned above72, there is a view that the doctrine 
of obligation is based on the vested rights the theory. If this 
is correct, then we might ask why was the vested rights theory 
itself not used to explain recognition of foreign judgments? Why 
was it necessary to create a new doctrine?
The first answer which suggests itself is that the vested rights 
theory was not adopted in relation to recognition of foreign 
judgments for the same reasons that it was discredited in 
relation to choice of law. However, most of the objections73 to 
the theory in the choice of law context do not apply in respect
71 See n.4 and accompanying text supra.
72 At chapter 2 II B supra.
73 See generally Morris (chapter 1, n. 142 supra) at pp. 443-
444; Collier (chapter 1 n.142 supra) at pp. 380-382; Wolff, 
Private International Law, 2nd. edn (1950) at p. 3; Cook, The 
Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws (1942) Chapter 
1 and Llwellyn Davies (1957) 18 BYBIL 49.
100
of recognition of foreign judgments.74 Thus, this explanation is 
not adequate.
The real difficulty, it is suggested, is that under the doctrine 
of vested rights itself, it is theoretically indefensible to 
distinguish between foreign laws and foreign judgments. It has 
been pointed out75 that to recognise a foreign judgment is in 
fact to recognise the law76 of the foreign country. Therefore, 
the vested’ rights doctrine cannot logically support the 
enforcement of rights acquired under the law applied by a foreign 
Court in preference to vested rights acquired under other 
re 1 evant 1 aws .77
Thus, it was necessary for a different doctrine to be developed 
which would only apply to foreign judgments. The doctrine of 
obligation met this need. Yet, it must be recognised that this 
doctrine is in fact merely a corollary78 of the vested rights
74 For example (i) There are rules telling us which Courts 
have jurisdiction to decide cases (cf. there are no rules telling 
us which country has 'jurisdiction' to vest particular types of 
rights, (ii) The problem of renvoi does not arise in relation to 
recognition of judgments because it is clear how the foreign 
Court has decided the case, (iii) There is no need to provide for 
cases dealing with capacities and disabilities since a judgment 
ex hypothesi creates rights.
75 See Patchett (n.6 supra) at p. 54 and Slade LJ, who
refers to the "obligations created by the local law and by the
local courts" (my emphasis) in Cape v Adams Industries [1991] 1 
All ER 929, 1038.
76 "i.e. the 'law' as represented in the document called the
judgment in which the foreign country has set out the respective 
rights of the parties involved in the dispute." (Patchett ibid).
77 Or vice versa, see Chapter 2 II B supra.
78 See Read (n. 12 supra) at pp. 84-5.
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doctrine. Instead of focussing on the right of the judgment 
creditor created by the judgment, this doctrine focusses on the 
obligation or duty of the judgment debtor. The question of 
applying the doctrine to enforce rights which have not yet 
crystallised into a judgment debt does not arise. By creating 
a new doctrine, the unjustifiable preference for the law of the 
judgment-giving state over the laws of other relevant states 
seems to have been legitimised.
Once it is appreciated that the doctrine of obligation is merely 
a selective application of the doctrine of vested rights to 
certain types of vested rights (i.e. those that have been 
confirmed by a judgment) , it will be seen that this doctrine 
cannot be used to support a global preference for recognition 
rules over choice of law rules.
Even if the view79 that the two doctrines are quite independent 
is accepted, there is no escape from the fact that conceptually 
the two doctrines are simply different manifestations of a single 
jurisprudential principle that rights created by jurisdictionally 
competent laws or courts will be enforced.80 To reiterate the
79 See, for example, Morris (chapter 1, n.142 supra) at p.
105.
80 This can be seen more clearly when the theories are 
described as follows. The theory of vested rights states that an 
English Court must recognise rights created by foreign law where 
English law considers that the foreign law in question has 
'jurisdiction' to vest those rights. The doctrine of obligation 
states that an English Court must recognise the rights of the 
judgment creditor as adjudged by a foreign Court where English 
law considers that the foreign Court has jurisdiction to decide 
the case.
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point made by Patchett81, recognition of a foreign judgment is 
in fact recognition of the law of the country of the Court 
rendering that judgment. Thus, it is submitted that the 
conclusion that the doctrine of obligation is merely a selective 
application of the theory of vested rights is equally forceful 
even if it is accepted that the two doctrines arose 
independently.
D. IMPLIED CONTRACT
It has been suggested that the basis of recognition of foreign 
judgments is that there has been an implied contract by the 
judgment debtor to pay the sum of money which the Court has 
decided is due82. In Grant v Easton83, Lord Esher said that,
"the liability of the defendant arises upon an implied
contract to pay the amount of the foreign judgment."
Read84, however, claims that implied contract is not a separate 
theory from the doctrine of obligation. He postulates that the 
implied contract theory was created so that the action of 
assumpsit, which was only available in relation to a contractual 
debt, could be used to enforce foreign judgments. Accordingly, 
he explains the words of Lord Esher and Brett M.R. in Grant v 
Easton85 as meaning that for procedural purposes the Court must
See n. 73 supra.
82 Read (n. 12 supra) at p. 112. See also Halsburys, Laws of
England, 4th edn (1975), vol 8 (Conflict of Laws), section 715.
83 (18 8 3) 13 QBD 302.
84 Read (n. 59 supra) at pp. 112 - 113.
85 (1883) L.R. 13 Q.B.D. 302 at p. 303.
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treat a foreign judgment as though it were enforcing an implied 
contract. This point has been illustrated86 by the fact that the 
creditor's action on a foreign judgment is barred after six years 
like contract claims; whereas a claim on an English judgment is 
only barred after twelve years.
If 'implied contract' were a separate theory, could it support 
a preference for the recognition rule? The theory is based on 
the enforcement of foreign contractual rights. Yet it provides 
for the selective enforcement of one particular type of 
contractual right i.e. the right to have the judgment satisfied. 
Surely, it would be anomalous to recognise a right based on an 
implied contract to satisfy the foreign judgment in preference 
to a right based on an express contract which had not yet been 
litigated. Thus, it is submitted that the implied contract theory 
cannot support giving precedence to recognition rules.
E. AVOIDANCE OF LIMPING MARRIAGES87
It is clear from perusal of the legislative history of the rules 
governing recognition of foreign matrimonial decrees that the 
main rationale behind those rules is to avoid limping 
marriages88. In order to achieve this aim, the traditional
86 Cheshire and North (chapter 1 n.l supra) at p. 346.
87 Jaffey calls this 'uniformity of status in different
countries', (1982) 2 OJLS 368, 369.
88 See e.g. 315 HL Debs (16.2.71) at cols 483-486 per Lord
Hailsham; Law Com. 34; Bellet and Goldman's Explanatory 
Document, Actes et Documents De La Haye, Onzieme Tome 
(translation at (1971) 5 Fam. LQ. 303, 321-367) paras. 9, 47 and 
48 and Anton (1969) 18 ICLQ 61.
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jurisdictional links were widened.
However, it is crucial to appreciate that preference for the 
recognition rule may not necessarily prevent limping marriages 
where there is a third country involved which does not recognise 
the decree.89 Thus, whilst this may be the rationale for liberal 
recognition rules, it cannot support a global preference for the 
recognition rule in the 'conflict of rules' situation.90
Ill: 'NON-RECOGNITION RULES'
A. INTRODUCTION
A judgment may be refused recognition because of lack of
jurisdiction or because one of the defences applies. In both 
situations, the rule which bars recognition will be referred to 
as a 'non-recognition rule' . In the first type, the 'non­
recognition rule' is simply the reverse of part of the
recognition rule. i.e. the judgment is not recognised because 
there is no recognised jurisdictional link. In the second type, 
the defences act as 'non-recognition rules'. The orthodox
approach is to treat jurisdictional requirements as recognition 
rules rather than 'non-recognition rules'91 and thus the two
89 See Chapter 6 II B 3 infra.
90 It should also be pointed out that avoidance of limping 
marriages requires recognition of a change in status, but does 
not necessarily require acknowledgment of consequences of that 
change other than the right to remarry.
91 Jurisdiction is generally treated as different from
defences in the textbooks, but cf. the Administration of Justice 
Act 1920 and the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 
1933 Act where lack of jurisdiction is listed together with 
defences as grounds for non-registration (see chapter 1, II A 2 
and 3 supra).
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types of rules now under consideration are treated as 
conceptually different and not categorised together as 'non­
recognition rules'. The justification for this approach is 
presumably that if the foreign Court does not have jurisdiction, 
the judgment is seen to be made without competent authority and 
thus there is no basis on which to recognise it. In contrast, the 
defences are literally reasons not to recognise a judgment which 
has been made by a competent tribunal and appears to be prima 
facie effective.
However, it is suggested that as both types of rule reflect a 
policy reason for non-recognition of the judgment, they should 
be considered together in examining the conflict between 'non­
recognition rules' and choice of law rules. We will have to 
consider the various policy reasons behind the different rules 
in more depth before determining whether or not a global 
preference in favour of the 'non-recognition rule' is appropriate 
in the case of either or both types of 'non-recognition rule'.
In most situations, non-recognition of a foreign judgment means 
that the issue can be litigated ab initio in the English Court 
and the English Court is free to apply its own choice of law 
rules. These may happen to produce the same result as the foreign 
judgement, but since the foreign judgment is not effective there 
is no actual conflict between the 'non-recognition rule' and the 
choice of law rules. However,, there are a few situations in 
which, although a foreign judgment is not entitled to 
recognition, application of choice of law rules to a subsequent
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transaction has the result of giving effect to the foreign 
judgment92 and thus is inconsistent with the 'non-recognition 
rule'. We will examine whether 'non-recognition rules' in such 
cases should take precedence over choice of law rules.
The 'non-recognition rules', like the recognition rules, are 
different in the case of matrimonial decrees. In particular, the 
defences in the case of matrimonial decrees, which are now 
statutory, are discretionary whereas in non-matrimonial cases the 
defences are. mandatory93. Thus, it will be appropriate to look 
at the two categories separately.
B. NON-MATRIMONIAL CASES
1. The Problem Explained
The problem can be illustrated by examples P3 and P494. In the 
former, if we recognise Zeldon's title in accordance with the 
choice rule we are indirectly recognising the Ruritanian 
judgment, which is not entitled to recognition. In the latter, 
if we refuse to recognise Zeldon's title we are indirectly 
enforcing the judgment of the Ruritanian Court. Without this 
judgment95, title would remain in Yves who would be able to pass 
it on to Zeldon.
92 This may be referred to as 'incidental recognition', see
Gordon (chapter 1, n.l supra) chapter 9.
93 Because they negative the existence of the obligation for
which recognition/enforcement is sought. See text at n.65 supra.
94 Chapter 1 III supra.
95 Since nothing else happens in Ruritania to divest Yves of
the title he had acquired while the painting was in Italy, prior 
to its entry into Ruritania.
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The crucial point in both situations is that the judgment of the 
Ruritanian Court changes the title while the painting is 
physically in Ruritania. If this change in title is recognised 
in accordance with the situs rule, then indirectly the judgment 
is being recognised and the choice rule prevails. If, however, 
the 'non-recognition rule' prevails, it would have to be held 
that no effect can be given to the vesting of title in Winkworth 
by that judgment. This could perhaps be done by way of public 
policy exception to the lex situs rule96.
2. Rationale for the xNon-Recognition Rules
In order to decide whether there should be a global preference 
for the 'non-recognition rule' we need to consider the possible 
bases for non-recognition and the rationale for each basis. 
Before looking at each basis individually, we will consider the 
theory that all defences are simply circumstances which negative 
the obligation. It is suggested that absence of obligation alone 
cannot provide a good reason to override the choice of law rule. 
Although no obligation is created by English law which 
necessitates direct recognition or enforcement of the judgment, 
this does not mean that the judgment should not give rise to 
rights and obligations in Ruritanian law, which would be given 
effect to by application of our choice of law rules.
Thus, we can only justify giving preference to 'non-recognition 
miles' if there is some stronger policy reason for non­
96 See the 'third exception' referred to by Slade J. in
Winkworth v Christie [1980] Ch. 496 at p. 501.
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recognition than simply negativing the obligation which would 
otherwise be created. We will consider the policy behind the 
common law defences to recognition of a foreign judgment97 with 
reference to example P398 :-
(a) Fraud
Assume that Winkworth brings fraudulent evidence to show that 
Yves did not buy in market overt in Italy.
The application of the fraud defence so as to allow the English 
Court to rehear the issue of fraud99 even where there is no new 
evidence has been criticised by academics100. The House of Lords 
in the recent decision of Owens v Bracco101 also indicated that 
the rule may not be defensible. However, they were unable to 
change it in that case because they were dealing with a the 
Administration of Justice Act 1920 and thus had to construe the 
fraud defence contained therein on the basis of the common law 
in 1920.
97 Listed in chapter 1, II A 1 supra.
98 Chapter 1 III supra.
99 See Abuloff v Oppenheimer (1882) 10 QBD 295; Vadala v
Lawes (1890) 25 QBD 310 and Jet Holdings v Patel [1990] 1 QB 355.
100 See, for example, Cheshire and North (chapter 1, n.l
supra) p. 380; Collier [1992] CLJ 439 and Read (n. 12 supra) at 
p. 279. Von Mehren and Trautman (1968) 81 Harv. L.R. 1601 at
1667 claim that the English approach is out of line with 
international practice and it has recently been rejected in 
Australia (see Sykes and Pryles, chapter 5 n.22 infra, at p. ix 
of the preface).
101 [1992] 2 All ER 193.
109
It is suggested that the reason that courts have been prepared 
to make what seems to be an anomalous exception in the case of 
fraud is because of the fundamental nature of fraud.102 Where a 
judgment has been obtained by fraud it is considered to be 
contrary to basic standards of justice to recognise or enforce 
it. Thus, even where the question of fraud has been considered 
and rejected by a foreign Court, an English Court will not ignore 
a plea of fraud. The policy seems to be that the risk of allowing 
multiplication of suits and preventing finality of litigation is 
less serious than the risk of enforcing a judgment obtained by 
fraud.103
Given this approach to fraud, which it is submitted is correct, 
no rights should be recognised which were obtained by virtue of 
the fraudulent Ruritanian judgment. It would not, it is 
suggested, be difficult to apply the public policy exception to 
the situs rule where the lex situs gives effect to a fraudulent 
j udgment.
102 Levontin (1967) 2 Isr. L. Rev. 197 at p. 207 suggests 
that it is the domestic rule not allowing review where fraud is 
alleged which is anomalous, but required for reasons of 
'sovereignty'; whereas "our treatment of foreign judgments 
fraudulently obtained is unmarred by considerations of respect 
for authority and is therefore more consonant with the dictates 
of pure justice and with the animus of the common law against 
fraud."
103 cf. the dictum of Beatty C.J. in the Californian case of
Pico v Cohn (1891) 25 P. 970 at 971 that "Endless litigation, in 
which nothing was ever finally determined...would be worse than 
the occasional miscarriage of justice."
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(b) Breach of natural justice
Assume that Yves was not given notice or the opportunity to be 
heard and so cannot bring evidence of the Italian market overt 
rule.
Breach of natural justice has in the past been limited to cases 
of lack of notice or lack of opportunity to be heard and these 
criteria were strictly interpreted104. In Jet Holdings Inc v 
Patel105, the Court of Appeal suggested that just as with 
fraud, so with breach of natural justice it should not be 
necessary to have raised the defence in the foreign proceedings. 
It is suggested that the analogy between the two defences can be 
extended for our purposes. Thus, breach of natural justice 
should be considered fundamental in the same way as fraud and 
there should be no recognition of any change in title based on 
a judgment, which has been obtained in breach of the rules of 
natural justice, even where choice of law rules would normally 
require this.
This suggestion can more easily be accepted if the defence of 
natural justice is kept within strict limits. However, the recent 
case of Adams v Cape Industries106 seems to have opened up the 
definition of this defence to include matters other than lack of 
notice or opportunity to be heard. With respect, Cheshire and
104 e.g. Jacobson v Frachon (1928) 138 LT 386, where a biased
expert's report was not sufficient to make out the defence 
because the Court was not bound to accept the report and the 
parties had availed themselves of the opportunity to attack the 
report in Court.
105 [1990] 1 QB 335, 345.
106 [1990] Ch. 433.
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North's suggestion107 that cases of other kinds of procedural 
unfairness should be dealt with under public policy is to be 
preferred.
(c) Contrary to Public Policy
The public policy defence has been so limited that it is 
difficult to construct a potential public policy defence in the 
context of the example being used here. For completeness, the 
situation will be examined, even though it is unlikely to arise.
The main difference between the public policy defence and the two 
defences already discussed is that the public policy defence will 
not succeed where the defence was available to the defendant in 
the foreign proceedings but was not raised there108. However, 
where this hurdle is overcome and the defence is made out, it 
seems almost obvious that no title derived from such a judgment 
should be recognised and that therefore the 'non-recognition 
rule' should prevail. Again, there would be no difficulty in 
achieving such a result by use of the public policy exception to 
the lex situs rule.
(d) Want of Jurisdiction
Assume, for.example, that Yves is not resident in Ruritania and 
does not submit to the Ruritanian Court.
The policy basis of the jurisdictional requirements in relation
107 Op. cit. (chapter 1, n.l. supra) at p. 386.
108 See Israel Discount Bank v Hadjipateras [1984] 1 WLR 137
and discussion in Cheshire and North (chapter 1, n.l supra) at 
pp.371-2 and p.381 and Collier [1984] CLJ 47.
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to recognition of in personam judgments is that it is not fair 
for the defendant to be bound by a decision of a foreign court 
unless he is either resident in the foreign jurisdiction or 
submits. The question arises whether this policy is sufficiently 
fundamental to override the choice of law rules where the effect 
of the application of these would be indirectly to recognise the 
foreign judgment.
Whilst there is no clear answer to this question as a whole, it 
is difficult to see how the policy of the 'non-recognition rule' 
can be considered fundamental in any situation where an English 
Court could have taken jurisdiction mutatis mutandis.109 Thus, 
without further discussion, we can conclude that an automatic 
preference for the lack of jurisdiction rule cannot be supported.
This means that a global preference for 'non-recognition rules' 
in non-matrimonial cases cannot be justified. Perhaps, though, 
a global rule in favour of the second type of non-recognition 
rule (i.e. the defences) could be supported.
It is suggested that the above conclusions can also be supported 
by an analysis based on 'conflicts justice'. The parties should 
reasonably expect that a judgment obtained by fraud or in breach 
of natural justice110 should not be either directly or
109 On the facts of example P3, the English Court would have
discretion to take jurisdiction under RSC Order 11 r. 1(1)(i).
110 Although the parties' expectations about the procedure 
alleged to be in breach of natural justice is not conclusive as 
to whether there has been such a breach or not, Adams v Cape 
Industries [1991] 1 All ER 929, 1050.
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indirectly recognised in other places. However, they might also 
reasonably expect that a judgment should be recognised if there 
is some real and substantial connection between the issue to be 
tried and the Court, even if that connection does not satisfy the 
relatively narrow English rules for determining the international 
jurisdiction of foreign tribunals.
C. MATRIMONIAL CAUSES
1. The Problem Explained
The question as to whether 'non recognition rules' should take 
precedence arises in the classic Schwebel v Ungar 'incidental 
question' situation, illustrated by example Ml111. If the 'non 
recognition rule' takes precedence, the remarriage will not be 
recognised and the first wife will retain all marital rights. 
Some commentators take the view that the 'non-recognition rule' 
should always take precedence as a matter of common sense112 or 
because it is based on public policy.113 There have also been 
suggestions114 that a distinction might be drawn between non­
recognition for want jurisdiction and non-recognition because one 
of the defences is successfully invoked. In order to determine 
whether either of these approaches can be supported, we need to
111 Chapter 1 III supra.
112 See Law Commission Consultation Paper on "Recognition of 
Foreign Nullity Decrees and Related Matters" (1983) at para 6.50. 
This Consultation Paper was not published (for explanation see 
Law Com. No. 137 at para. 1.8), but a copy is available from the 
Commission on request.
113 For example, Gordon (chapter 1, n.l supra) at p. 151.
114 By consul tees of the Law Commission (see Law Com. No. 137 
at para. 6.60).
114
consider the policy behind the various 'non-recognition rules' 
and to analyse whether all or any of these policies require an 
automatic preference for the 'non-recognition rule'.
2. Rationale for the 'Non-Recognition Rules'
When we examine each 'non-recognition rule' in turn, we will find 
that one of the rationales for a number of the rules is 
protection of the Respondent. Thus, it will be helpful at the 
outset to consider whether this policy requires giving precedence 
to the 'non-recognition rule'. The first question to ask is how 
non-recognition of the divorce protects the Respondent who is 
usually the wife. Non-recognition cannot force her husband to 
return to her and indeed where the divorce is a religious one, 
she will be considered by her community as divorced.
Perusal of the Parliamentary debates suggests that it is 
primarily financial protection which is envisaged.115 However, 
this seems to ignore the fact that since 1984, the English Court 
has jurisdiction to make an order for financial provision 
following a recognised formal divorce on the same basis as after 
an English divorce.116 The reason that the wife who is divorced 
informally may be in need of financial protection if the divorce 
were recognised is that Parliament has decided to deny her the 
opportunity to claim financial relief. In any event, not all
115 See, for example, per the Lord Chancellor at 473 HL Debs
col. 1082 (22.4.86) . See also per Lord Simon at 343 HL Debs col. 
320 (8.6.73) in a debate on s. 16 of the Domicile and Matrimonial 
Proceedings Act 1973, which instituted the restrictions, which 
were extended by the Family Law Act 1986.
116 Under Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 Part
III.
115
wives need financial protection. In some cases, the husband has 
no available assets and in others the wife has more assets than 
the husband.
Even more crucially, the non-recognition rule far from protecting 
the Respondent, may actually be prejudicial to the him/her117, 
if (s)he wishes to remarry.118
Thus, we may conclude that the policy of protecting the 
Respondent cannot justify an automatic preference for the non­
recognition rule. We will now examine the various non-recognition 
rules, which will be illustrated by reference to the examples set 
out in Chapter 1 above119, to discover whether they are based on 
any other policies which can support such a preference.
(a) Not Effective Under the Law of the Country where obtained 
In example Ml, assume that Natasha and Alexander were in Vienna 
long enough to acquire a habitual residence there. The get would 
still not be recognised because it was not effective under the 
law of Austria, even if was recognised by the law of the Russian 
domicile.
It may seem obvious that a judgment should not be given greater
117 This situation is only likely to arise where there is
want of jurisdiction because the defences are discretionary.
118 See comment of Anton in relation to informal divorces in
the Hague Conference Proceedings, Actes et Documents De La Haye, 
Onzieme Tome, p. 100.
119 At section III.
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effect abroad than it has in the jurisdiction in which it was 
granted120. However, at common law, a divorce could be 
recognised, even though it was of no effect whatsoever in the 
country where it was obtained, provided that it was recognised 
by the law of the domicile of the parties under the rule in 
Armitage v Attorney-General.121
In addition, a foreign decree could be recognised even though,
because of procedural irregularities122, it was a "mere scrap of
paper"123 in the country where it was given124. Levontin
explains this apparent paradox on the basis that
It is no concern of ours to discipline the officers, 
judicial or others, of foreign States, to make them abide 
within the limits of their respective stations. It is 
certainly not our concern to the extent of making us 
sacrifice substantive justice."125
So, why was the requirement of effectiveness introduced? Under 
the Recognition of Legal Divorces and Separations Act 1971, the 
requirement of effectiveness applied only to 'overseas divorces' 
recognised under section 2. Thus, whilst the rule on procedural
120 See Levontin (1967) 2 Isr L.R. 197 at pp. 201-202.
121 [1906] P. 135.
122 cf. Internal incompetence by the municipal law of the
judgment granting state will prevent its recognition, see Adams 
v Adams [1971] P. 206 and Papdopoulos v Papadopoulos [1930] P 55.
123 Levontin, (1967) 2 Isr. L.R. 197 at p. 203.
124 Pemberton v Hughes [1899] 1 Ch. 781, Merker v Merker. 
[1962] 3 All ER 928 and Vanguelin v Bouard (1863) 15 CBNS 341.
125 (19 6 7 ) 2 Isr. L.R. 197 at p. 298. This rationale seems
wide enough to cover cases of lack of internal competence, but 
see n. 118 supra.
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irregularities was probably reversed126, the rule in Armitage v 
Attorney- General was saved by section 6 of the Act. There was 
no discussion by the Law Commission or in Parliament about the 
effectiveness requirement. It appears that the wording simply 
followed that of the Hague Convention127 which was being 
implemented128, although it was clearly not necessary to adopt 
this restriction129.
In 1984, the Law Commission130 recommended extending the 
effectiveness requirement to divorces and anullments obtained on 
the basis of domicile. In their view, the statutory reversal of 
a few decisions is "a small price to pay" for the increased 
simplicity and certainty which will result from having uniform 
requirements for all the jurisdictional bases of recognition. 
With respect, this approach evades the real issue as to why it 
is not sufficient that the divorce is recognised by the law of
126 Cheshire and North (chapter 1, n.l supra) at p. 660 n.8
suggest that in the case of procedural irregularities, the decree
should be recognised if it is effective in the country unless and 
until it is set aside.
127 Article 1 specifies that the Convention applies to 
divorces ...."which follow judicial or other proceedings 
officially recognised in that State and which are legally 
effective there" (emphasis supplied). The effectiveness 
requirement was not in the preliminary draft. Goldman and Bellet 
(n. 88 supra) suggest that the requirement was probably already 
implicit from the word 'obtained', but "it seemed preferable to 
spell it out in some many words." There is no discussion of the 
rationale behind the requirement.
128 Law Com. No. 137 (1984) at para. 6.12.
129 The Convention provides the minimum requirements for
recognition and Contracting States are allowed to be more 
generous (art. 17).
130 Law Com. No. 137 paras. 6.13 et seq.
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the domicile, when this had been sufficient since 1906. There is 
no discussion of the policy basis of the requirement of 
effectiveness.131
Moreover, the uniformity argument put forward by the Commission 
is not convincing. The distinction between domicile and the other 
jurisdictional bases can be justified both on historical132 and 
rational grounds133. If uniformity is so precious, it could 
equally have been achieved by extending the other jurisdictional 
bases to include decrees recognised by the law of the nationality 
and the law of the habitual residence.134 Furthermore, whilst 
the Law Commission's approach might have been justifiable in the 
context of their proposals under which there would only be one 
set of jurisdictional bases, it cannot be supported in the 
context of the actual legislation which retained the differential 
jurisdictional bases.135
Thus, so far we have not discovered the rationale behind the 
effectiveness requirement. Two suggested explanations are (i)that
131 Von Mehren and Trautman (1968) 81 Harv. L.R. 1601 do
present such a discussion and conclude at p.1660 that "there are 
situations in which a judgment void where rendered can properly 
be treated as valid, particularly, when it becomes incidentally 
relevant in litigation in another jurisdiction.1
132 That domicile has traditionally governed matters of 
personal status at common law.
133 Since capacity to remarry is governed by the law of the 
domicile, the 'conflict of rules' problem will be less likely to 
arise if recognition by the law of the domicile is sufficient. 
This argument is restricted to domicile in the English sense.
134 As in Australia, see Family Law Act 1975 s. 104(8) .
135 See Chapter 1, II B 2 and 3 supra.
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the requirement is based on respect for the policy of the state 
where the divorce or annulment is obtained, which may be seen as 
an aspect of comity136 and (ii) that the requirement is designed 
to reduce limping marriages.
In relation to the former, we have already seen that comity 
cannot support a preference for recognition rules137 and there 
seems to be no reason why this conclusion should not apply 
equally to 'non-recognition' rules. In respect of the latter, if 
the decree is recognised by a third jurisdiction, there will in 
any event be a limping marriage.138
(b) Lack of jurisdiction (judicial divorces)
Assume the facts of example M4. The Mexican divorce is not 
recognised because neither party has a relevant connection with 
Mexico.
Two reasons may be identified for requiring a relevant 
jurisdictional link. Firstly, it is unfair to the Respondent to 
allow the Petitioner to litigate in a forum with which neither
136 cf. Levontin (1967) 2 Isr. L. R. 197, who claims that 
comity does not generally extend to "enforcing administrative or 
public or fiscal laws of other countries" and thus substantive 
justice should not be sacrificed in order to enforce internal 
regulation of the administration of justice in a foreign State. 
Although the reference is to procedural irregularities, this 
point might equally apply to the foreign's country's insistence 
that divorces etcetera take place in a civil Court.
137 Section II B supra.
138 See at II E supra.
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spouse has any real connection139. Secondly, parties should not 
be allowed to evade the law of the countries to which they 
belong. It is suggested that the second reason is weak because 
there is no general concept of 'fraud a la loi7 in English 
law140 and because the wide jurisdictional requirements 
themselves allow evasion141. In any event, the forum only has a 
real interest in preventing evasion of its own law. Thus, 
protection of the Respondent can be seen as the main purpose.
(c) Lack of notice or opportunity to participate
Assume that in Example M4 above, Evita is a citizen of Mexico and 
thus the divorce is prima facie entitled to recognition under 
s.46(1) . However, assume that no notice is given to Pedro of the 
divorce hearing or that he is not afforded an opportunity to take 
part in the proceedings.
The English Court has discretion to refuse recognition under 
Family Law Act 1986 s.51(3) (a). Caselaw142 shows that
139 The concept of requiring a real connection was made 
explicit in the common law rules, see Indyka v Indyka [1969] 1 
A.C. 33 (which was followed in relation to nullity decrees in Law 
v Gustin [1976] Fam. 155) . The Law Commission has expressed the 
view that the policy behind the statutory bases of recognition 
contained in the Recognition of Legal Divorces and Separations 
Act 1971 "is very close to Indyka v Indyka, though stated with 
the greater-precision of a statute." (Law Com. No. 137 at para 
5.14). It should be noted that whilst this comment might hold 
true of the Family Law Act 1986 in relation to formal divorces, 
it does not hold true in relation to informal divorces.
140 See Kahn-Freud (chapter 1, n. 103 supra) at p. 284.
141 For example, where one party obtains a divorce in the 
country of his/her nationality, with which (s)he retains a purely 
nominal link and the other spouse has no connection at all or 
where one party obtains a 'domicile7 in a country like Nevada 
after a very short period of residence (as, for example, in 
Lawrence v Lawrence [1985] Fam. 106).
142 e.g. Newmarch v Newmarch [1978] Fam. 79 and see Dickson 
(1979) 28 ICLQ 132.
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recognition is usually only refused where it would cause hardship 
to the Respondent143. Thus, the policy behind this 'non­
recognition rule' is also primarily to protect the Respondent.
(d) Lack of jurisdiction in informal divorces (the domicile 
requirement)
Assume the facts of M7.
It appears that the considerably more restrictive jurisdictional 
requirements in relation to informal divorces reflect a policy 
of minimising the recognition of such divorces because of their 
' uncivilised' nature144 and because they discriminate 
against145 apd do insufficient to protect women146. There also 
seems to be an element of protection of the taxpayer because if 
the divorced wife is not provided for by her husband, the State 
will have to support her.147 However, again it seems that the
143 As in Joyce v Joyce [1979] Fam. 93. The enactment of Part 
III of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984, which 
allows financial provision to be awarded by an English Court 
after an overseas divorce has been granted, reduces the 
likelihood of recognition causing hardship. See the recent 
Scottish case of Tahir v Tahir [1993] SLT 194.
144 See per Lord Hailsham in 473 HL Debs Cols 1081-1082 
(22.4.86) and per Cumming-Bruce LJ in Chaudhary [1985] 2 WLR 350 
at 359 F-G.
145 If this policy was taken to its logical conclusion no 
unilateral divorce would be recognised, whether formal or 
informal, if that form of divorce was only available to men.
146 See per Lord Hailsham at n. 144 supra and 102 H.C. Debs., 
Family Law Bill 24/10/86 per Mr. Brown at at col. 1443 and per 
Solicitor-General at col. 1444. cf. Young [1987] LS 78 at 82, who 
points out that certain types of formal divorces may be just as 
prejudicial to women and that in some societies women may be 
protected by community practice rather than legal provisions.
147 See per Lord Simon 343 HL Debs col. 320 (8.6.73). See
also text accompanying n. 116 supra.
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element of protecting the wife is dominant148.
(e) Lack of jurisdiction in informal divorces (habitual residence 
in England).
Assume in example M7 that both parties are domiciled in India and 
that the talaq is recognised in India. However, at the relevant 
time, Ahmed has been habitually resident in England for more than 
12 months.
Again the 'jurisdictional requirements' in s.46 (2) Family Law Act 
1986 are not met and the talaq will not be recognised. Whilst, 
the habitual residence provision may be understood as part of the 
policy of minimising recognition of informal divorces, it is more 
difficult to explain the actual restriction itself in terms of 
protection of the wife, especially where the wife has remained 
resident in India throughout. Why should the wife need more 
protection just because the husband has been living in 
England?149
At least one of the rationales for the requirement appears to be 
to prevent 'evasion' of the English divorce law, which can be 
resorted to wherever one party has been habitually resident in 
England for one year immediately preceding institution of the
148 i.e. the reason that the divorces are regarded as
uncivilised and that their discriminatory nature is disliked is 
because they appear to prejudice the wife.
149 Lord Hailsham in 473 HL Debs col. 1082 (22.4.86) said that
the aim was to give greater protection to wives resident in the 
UK because it would be wrong to deny a wife living here the 
protection of our Courts. Whilst this may have been a sound 
explanation of the position between 1974 and 1986, where a 
foreign informal divorce was only refused recognition where both 
parties had' been habitually resident in England (see per Lord 
Simon 343 HL Debs col. 321 (8.6.73)) it does not explain the
increased restrictiveness of the 1986 Act.
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proceedings.
Does this selective application of an anti-evasion policy150 
justify a global preference for the non-recognition rule? Two 
questions must be considered. Firstly, is it in fact evasion to 
obtain a divorce in the country of domicile rather than in place 
of the habitual residence?151 Secondly, how does non­
recognition further the anti-evasion policy? As we have 
seen152, the'main concern in Parliament seems to have been about 
evasion of financial obligations. Non-recognition might be a 
deterrent. It is not worthwhile for the English domiciled Indian 
Muslim to go back to India to divorce his wife by talaq because 
he will still be bound to support her in England and the new wife 
he marries in India will not be able to enter the country.153 
However, the deterrent argument is not applicable if it is the 
wife who wishes to remarry. Thus, at least in this situation, the 
non-recognition rule should not take precedence and therefore the 
anti-evasion policy cannot support a global preference for the 
non-recognition rule.
150 See text accompanying n.140 supra.
151 See Young [1987] LS 78, 86. It is particularly difficult
to justify a positive answer to the question if the Petitioner 
has not been habitually resident in the UK for one year.
152 See n. Ill and accompanying text supra.
153 cf. If he is domiciled in India, the remarriage may be a 
valid polygamous marriage even if the divorce is not recognised. 
However, the second wife may not be able to enter the UK because 
of the restrictions of the Immigration Act 1988 s.2.
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(f) Lack of-certification
Assume in example M7 that both parties are domiciled in India and 
neither has been habitually resident in England for 12 months. 
However, for bureaucratic reasons a certificate confirming the 
effectiveness of the divorce under Indian law cannot be obtained.
The English Court may refuse recognition under Family Law Act
1986 s.51(3) (b) . There is no reported caselaw yet on this
provision and it is not known what approach the Courts will take
in lack of certification cases154.
If, as with lack of notice in judicial proceedings, the 
discretion to refuse recognition is only exercised where 
recognition would cause hardship to the Respondent, then it will 
be clear that the purpose of this 'non recognition rule' is also 
protection of the Respondent. If discretion is exercised more 
widely, it may seem that the purpose is generally to minimise 
recognition of informal divorces. However, as seen above155, the 
reason for this policy is also primarily to protect wives.
(g) Contrary to Public Policy.
The public policy exception could be invoked in many different 
situations. We will give three examples
(i) Assume in example M7 that neither party has been habitually 
resident in the UK for 12 months. However, both parties have been 
habitually resident in New York for a number of years. Although, 
the requirements of s.46 (2) are met, the Court decides that 
recognition'would be contrary to public policy because the only 
purpose of the husband returning to India to pronounce the talaq
154 In the House of Commons, the Solicitor General 102 HC.
Deb. at col. 1444 (24/10/86) said that the policy was "the
necessity and desirability to have some objective certification 
or assurance of the validity of the relevant divorce." With 
respect, this adds little to the legislation itself.
155 At (c) supra.
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was to attempt to evade his financial responsibilities to his 
wife156 under the law of New York157.
Here the 'non-recognition rule' performs the dual purpose of 
protecting the wife158 and preventing evasion of New York law. 
However, again, it is suggested that the second purpose is 
subsidiary to the first. We are only concerned with evasion of 
New York law because it causes prejudice to the wife. Thus, in 
this example, it is suggested that the purpose of the public 
policy 'non recognition rule' would also be protection of the 
wife.
(ii) Assume in example M8 that the trans-national get is held to 
be an overseas formal divorce which is prima facie entitled to 
be recognised under s.46(1) Family Law Act 1986, but that it is 
refused recognition on public policy grounds as being contrary 
to the policy of FLA 1986 s.44(1).159
Here the major concern appears to be with the evasion of English 
law by acts done on English soil. The wife is not in particular 
need of protection. She is not prejudiced any more than if the 
husband travelled to Israel and started the get proceedings 
there, in which situation the divorce would have been recognised. 
In any event, the divorce is effected by the wife's voluntary
156 See for example Joyce v Joyce [1979] Fam. 93.
157 Assume that a talaq pronounced in New York would not be
valid there (Shikoh v Murff 257 F.2d 306 (2 Cir. 1958) and that 
the New York Court would not award financial provision in this 
case (cf. Chaudhary v Chaudhary 159 N.J. Super 566, 388 A. 2d 
1000 (1978)).
158 See also Zaal v Zaal (1983) 4 FLR 284, where the bare
talag was held to fulfill the jurisdictional requirements under 
the 1971 Act, but was refused recognition on grounds of public 
policy and in particular that the wife was not informed that she 
had been divorced until some time afterwards.
159 See Chapter 1, II B 4 supra.
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acceptance of delivery of the get. Also, adequate financial 
safeguards for divorced wives exist under Israeli law. Thus, it 
might be argued that even where it is the wife who wishes to rely 
on the trans-national divorce, forum policy would require that 
no effect be given to it.
(iii) In example M5, assume that the decree is refused 
recognition, on public policy grounds on the basis that 
recognition is inconsistent with the English policy of validation 
of sham marriages.
Presumably one of the purposes of this policy is to deter sham 
marriages. If remarriage after the decree is recognised, the 
effectiveness of the deterrence is substantially impaired.
We may conclude from the above survey of 'non recognition rules' 
in relation to matrimonial decrees that there is no clear 
distinction between the policy objectives of the jurisdictional 
requirements and the 'defences'. A better distinction is between 
'non-recognition' rules which are primarily designed to protect 
the Respondent and those which are designed to prevent evasion 
of either English law or some other domestic system of law or to 
deter a particular type of undesirable behaviour per se.160 
However, even in relation to the second category it may not 
always be possible to justify preferring the 'non-recognition' 
rule if this prejudices the Respondent. In any event, it is clear 
that the a global rule in favour of 'non-recognition' rules in 
matrimonial cases cannot be supported.
160 The effectiveness requirements seems to be sui generis.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The doctrine of obligation seems to be the generally accepted 
basis for recognition of foreign judgements. Since in essence 
this doctrine is no more than a selective interpretation of the 
vested rights doctrine, it cannot justify a global preference for 
the recognition rule viz-a-viz the choice of law rule. Nor can 
any of the other theories advanced to explain recognition of 
foreign judgments support such a global preference.
Further, whilst an automatic preference for some of the 'non­
recognition rules' may be supported, this is not universally true 
because the policies behind 'non-recognition' rules are not 
uniform.
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CHAPTER 4: GIVING PREFERENCE TO THE RULE WHICH IS STATUTORY
I. INTRODUCTION
In this Chapter we shall be seeking justification for preferring 
the statutory rule, where one of the rules is statutory and the 
other is not. This would be a global rule applicable in all cases 
where one of the relevant rules was not statutory. Clearly such 
a rule would not be of any use to a country where the whole of 
the Conflicts of Law is codified or where none of it is enacted 
in statutory form. However, in England and other common law 
countries, where there has been piecemeal statutory reform of the 
Conflict of Laws, it is now not unusual for one of the rules in 
question to be statutory and the other common law.
A problem of definition may arise in relation to common law rules 
which are saved by statute. Are such rules now to be considered 
as common law or statutory for the purposes of the suggested 
rule? It is suggested that this may depend on the form of the 
statute. If the rules are actually set out in the legislation, 
they would now derive their force from the statute.1 Whereas, if 
the legislation is simply clarifying the fact that the common law 
rules have not been changed2, then the rules can arguably still
1 This would seem to be the case with s.6 of the Recognition
of Divorces and Legal Separations Act 1971 (as amended by the 
Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973) , which defined and 
extended the common law rules.
2 For example, the Canadian Divorce Act 1985 s.22 (3)
provides:- "Nothing in this section abrogates or derogates from 
any other rule of law respecting the recognition of divorces 
granted otherwise than under this Act." See also Australian 
Family Law Act 1975 s.104(5).
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be regarded as part of the common law.
Table 1 shows which recognition rules and choice rules have been 
enacted in England.3 It can be seen that recognition rules have 
been codified more than choice of law rules. Thus, in England 
a rule giving preference to the statutory rule would in most 
cases be identical4 in practice to a rule giving preference to 
the recognition rule. In contrast, in Israel, as can be seen from 
Table 2, choice rules have been put into statutory form more than 
recognition rules.5 Thus, it will be instructive to compare the 
operation of the proposed preference in favour of the statutory 
rule in England and Israel.
Particular reference will be made to the classic example of the 
'conflict of rules' situation involving capacity to remarry after 
a foreign divorce which is recognised by the law governing 
remarriage and not by the forum or vice versa.6 We have already 
examined the English recognition rules. The English choice of law 
rule is assumed to be the dual domicile test.7 In Israel, 
Article 64(2) of the Palestine Order in Council 1922 provides 
that capacity to marry is governed by the law of the nationality
3 In the Appendix I.
4 The difference would be in the rationale. The 
applicability of the recognition rule would be being justified 
by virtue of its statutory form rather than because of the nature 
of the rule.
5 In the Appendix infra.
6 As in examples Ml to M4 at Chapter 1, III supra.
7 cf. Chapter 6 I C infra.
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of the parties8. In contrast, there are no local provisions 
governing recognition of foreign matrimonial decrees. Article 
46 of that Order9, provides that the English common law should 
fill any gaps in local law and thus the common law recognition 
rules would seem to be applicable.10
II. THEORETICAL BASIS
A. THE RATIONALES
It is suggested that three rationales can be given for preferring 
the statutory rule.
1. Statutory rules are invariably more certain than common law 
rules.
This point can be illustrated in a number of ways. Codifications
8 There is express provision for renvoi where the law of the
nationality applies the law of the domicile.
9 This has in fact now been repealed by the Foundations of
Law 1980 section 2(a). However, section 2(b) of that Law saves 
all English law which had already been adopted in Israel before 
the coming into force of that Law. It would seem that this is 
true of the rules for recognising foreign decrees. See n.10 
infra.
10 In the case of Kaba v Saikaly C.A. 189/4546 A.L.R. 270,
discussed in Levontin (1954) 3 Am.J. Comp. Law 199 at p. 203, the 
Supreme Court of Israel refused to recognise the divorce obtained 
in a Syrian Court in respect of parties domiciled in Israel, even 
though they were nationals of Syria. Levontin argues that it is 
illogical to have a choice rule based on nationality and not to 
respect a determination of status made by the Court of the 
nationality.
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of recognition rules11 in England do not suffer from the same 
ambiguities as the common law recognition rules.12 The potential 
uncertainty of common law choice rules can be seen from the 
debate surrounding the English choice of law rule governing 
capacity to marry.13 In Israel, it is not clear how the old 
English common law rules for recognition of divorces would apply 
in practice because of certain important differences between the 
two systems14.
11 Whether the codification of the contract choice of law 
rules has lead to greater certainty is a matter of dispute. See 
Cheshire and North (chapter 1, n.l supra) and references cited 
there.
12 For example, it is still not clear whether presence in 
the foreign country is sufficient jurisdictional basis for 
recognition of an in personam judgments (see chapter 1, n.19 
supra). The uncertainty of the 'real and substantial' connection 
test, introduced in Indyka v Indyka [1969] 1 AC 33, was one of 
the motivations for the speedy enactment of the 1971 Recognition 
of Divorces and Legal Separations Act (see per Hailsham 315 HL 
Debs col. 485 (16.2.71).
13 See at chapter 6 I C infra.
14 Firstly, domicile in Israel is more like the Continental 
than the common law concept. See, the definition in Succession 
Law 1965 s. 135 as "the place in which his life is centred" and 
articles by Shaki, (1966) 16 Scripta Hierosolymitana 163 and
Shava (1983) 5 Tel Aviv Studies in Law 144). Secondly, the rule 
in Travers v Holley is difficult to apply because the divorce 
jurisdiction in Israel is very broad. When the divorce 
jurisdiction of the religious Courts is combined with the divorce 
jurisdiction of the civil Courts under 1969 Dissolution of 
Marriages (Special Cases) Law , the only marriages which there 
is not jurisdiction to dissolve are those where both parties 
belong to one of the recognised religions (see 1969 Law s.2) but 
do not fall within the jurisdiction of the appropriate religious 
Court (e.g. Jews who are neither resident nor nationals of 
Israel) . However, under the latter Act, the President of the 
Supreme Court does have discretion not to grant relief wherever 
this is not appropriate and it is expected that he would exercise 
this discretion in a case which had no connection with Israel 
(Shava (1970) 26 Hapraklit 302 at p. 304)(Hebrew). However, a
literal application of the rule in Travers v Holley would seem 
to mean that almost all foreign divorce decrees should be 
recognised. Levontin (1954) 3 Am. Comp. Law 199 argues that the 
common law recognition rules are completely inappropriate because
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2. Statutory rules have usually been enacted to further a clearly 
defined policy whereas the policy behind common law rules may be 
obscure and outdated.
This can be illustrated by the English recognition codes, which 
were enacted to implement International Conventions. The policy 
behind the 1971 enactment of the recognition rules for divorces 
was to reduce limping marriages15. The policy behind the Civil 
Jurisdiction and Judgments Act was to facilitate free flow of 
judgments within the European community.16
In contrast, the policy behind choice of law rules cannot be 
stated definitively. The rationale for the dual domicile test, 
would seem to be that the country of the domicile has the most 
interest in the status of its domiciliaries17. The criticisms of 
the domicile rule stem from the argument that the interest of the 
domicile is weak, or non-existent, where the parties no longer 
have any connection with that country. Of course, if the choice 
rule is a more flexible rule, as advocated by various writers18, 
the policy behind it may be clearer and stronger.
nationality and not domicile governs issues of personal status 
in Israel. It should be noted that Levontin was writing before 
the decisions in Travers v Holley and Indyka v Indyka.
15 See references at chapter 3 n.88 supra.
16 See the Preamble to the Brussels Convention.
17 See Law Com. W.P. No. 89 para 3.27.
18 See Jaffey (1978) 41 MLR 38 (discussed at chapter 5 III
B 3 infra) and (1982) 2 OJLS 368 and Fentiman [1985] CLJ 256.
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In Israel, the position is more obscure. It is not clear whether 
there was any policy rationale behind the deliberate preference 
by the Mandatory legislature of the nationality choice rule19 
over the common law domicile rule. Vitta20 claims that it was 
simply a retention from the old Ottoman Law; whereas Silburg21 
suggests that the preference for nationality stems from the fact 
that most foreign nationals during the period of the Mandate were 
immigrants from Europe, where their status was governed by the 
lex patriae. In any event, since 1959 domicile has been 
preferred in choice of law provisions in statute.22 Thus, there 
seems to be no sound policy reason behind the nationality rule 
today.
The application of the old English common law recognition rules 
is simply a leftover from the period of the Mandate and is only 
applicable by virtue of a residual provision of the Palestine 
Order in Council.23 However, the first two common law rules of 
recognition24 are consistent with the trend in Israeli Private
19 Enacted in Palestine Order in Council 1922, article
46(2) .
20 (19 7 7) 12 Isr. L.Rev. 129
21 Silberg, Personal Status in Israel (1958, Hebrew) at p.
335
22 For example in section 17 of the Family Law Amendment
(Maintenance Law) 1959, section 76 and 77 of the Capacity and 
Guardianship Law 1962 and sections 136, 137 and 139 of the 
Succession Law 1965 . See Shaki 1966, Scripta Hierosolymitana
(1966) 163 and Shava (1983) 5 Tel Aviv University Studies in Law 
144.
23 Art. 46 - see supra n. 9.
24 Which depend on domicile (see chapter 6 I B 1 (a) infra) .
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International Law of the increasing use of domicile as a 
connecting factor25. The reciprocity rule would not be easy to 
apply in Israel26. It is difficult to believe that the Indyka 
"real and substantial connection test", which was abrogated in 
England shortly after its creation27, is intended to further any 
Israeli policy. Although, curiously, it may well be that taking 
into account the President's discretion28 to determine 
jurisdiction under the 1969 Dissolution of Marriage (Special 
Cases) Law, the Israeli position on jurisdiction in divorce cases 
is similar to the Indyka test.
3. Rules of statutory interpretation require that a statutory 
provision overrules any pre-existing inconsistent common law 
rule29.
In English law, the statutory recognition rule is not directly 
inconsistent with the common law rule because they are different 
types of rules. However, it might be argued that since the result 
of application of the statutory rule is inconsistent 
with the result of the application of the choice rule, the former 
should prevail.
25 See references at n. 23 supra.
26 See n. 14 supra.
27 By the Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations Act
1971, although it is still applied in some Commonwealth
jurisdictions (see chapter 6 I B 1 (a) infra).
28 Supra n. 14 .
29 Edgar, Craies on Statute Law 7th. edn. (1971) pp. 338 et
seq.
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In relation to Israel, there is a stronger argument that the 
statutory rule should take precedence because English common law 
is only to be introduced into Israel where local law does not 
extend or apply and "so far only as the circumstances of Israel 
and its inhabitants..permit and subject to such qualification as 
local circumstances render necessary."30
B. 'NON-RECOGNITION RULES'
It may be argued that statute need not be preferred in the case 
of non-recognition because the statute only states the 
circumstances when recognition is accorded. It does not, with the 
exception of non-judicial divorces obtained within the British 
Isles31, provide that divorces which do not meet the
jurisdiction requirements should not be recognised, although this 
is the way the statute is applied.32 Further, as we have seen 
the defences merely provide the Court with the opportunity to 
refuse recognition of the matrimonial decree. The Court is not 
mandated to refuse recognition where one of the defences is made 
out.
This argument would lead to the result that a statutory 
recognition rule should be preferred where it results in
30 Palestine Order-in-Council 1922, Art. 46. Levontin (1954) 
Am. J. Comp. Law 199 at 206 argues that as the local choice rule 
makes provision for determining the status of a foreigner, there 
is no need to have recourse to the common law recognition rules.
31 Family Law Act 1986, s.44(1).
32 For example, informal divorces have not been recognised 
where one of the parties is domiciled in England, as in Chaudhary
v Chaudhary [1985] Fam. 19.
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recognition, but not necessarily where it results in non­
recognition.33 The difficulty with this is that it would be 
necessary to find another rule to deal with the non-recognition 
situation and thus the preference for the statutory rule would 
no longer be a global rule.34
Ill RESULTS
We will consider how examples M2 and M435 would be decided in 
England and Israel using the preference for the statutory rule 
approach. In example M2, the remarriage will be valid in England 
because the divorce is recognised under the statutory recognition 
code. Conversely, in Israel, whilst the divorce should be 
recognised on the basis of the Indyka test36, the remarriage 
will be invalid because there is no capacity under the 
Argentinian law of the nationality37.
33 This can also be supported by the presumption (see 
Craies, n.30 supra) that statute invades common law rights as 
little as possible, i.e. the statutory 'non-recognition rule" 
should not remove from the 'spouse' the common law capacity to 
remarry where (s)he has such capacity by the law of his/her 
domicile because of the application of a statutory 'non- 
recognition" rule, unless the statute clearly requires this 
result.
34 However, a specific rule will be constructed which 
reflects this point, (see chapter 6 II 3 (d) infra).
35 Chapter 1, III supra.
36 The decision in Kaba v Saikaly (n. 10 supra) might have
been different today on the basis that the Syrian Court was a 
Court with a real and substantial connection, although it is
significant that nationality alone will not necessarily be
sufficient under the Indyka rule (see e.g. Keresztessy v
Keresztessy (1976) 73 DLR (3d) 347).
37 Unless renvoi applies (supra n.8).i.e. Argentina refers
the issue of capacity to the law of the domicile which it 
considers is Mexico.
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However, the opposite results will be achieved where the divorce 
is not recognised by the forum. Thus, in example M4, the English 
Court will not recognise the remarriage. Conversely, in Israel, 
preference for the statutory rule would mean applying the 
nationality choice rule. Thus, the remarriage will be recognised 
because the divorce is recognised by Argentinian law, which is 
the lex patriae.
IV. CONCLUSION
Whilst there may be some merit in the rationales put forward in 
favour of the statutory rule, they fail to explain the difference 
between the results in England and those in Israel in the above 
examples. The fact that there is a fortuitous element in whether 
a choice rule or recognition rule is enacted increases the risk 
of arbitrary results which is inherent in all mechanical global 
rules.
In Part III, we will be constructing specific preference rules 
to overcome this problem. From the discussion in this chapter 
it can be concluded that, whilst specific rules should be 
formulated without reference to whether they result in giving 
precedence to the statutory rule over the common law rule, the 
fact that a proposed preference rule has such an effect will 
provide additional support for it.
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PART III 
SPECIFIC SOLUTIONS
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CHAPTER 5 : THE RESULT-ORIENTED METHODOLOGY
I. INTRODUCTION
A number of writers, mainly American, have rejected the 
traditional jurisdiction selecting choice of law rules in favour 
of rules designed to ensure that the desired result is achieved, 
referred to as result-selecting rules. The global principles, 
which we considered in Part II, are analogous to jurisdiction 
selecting rules because they are applied 'blindly' without any 
attention being paid to the result of their application in each 
particular case. In this Part, we will be applying a result 
selecting approach to determine which of the two conflicting 
rules should prevail in the 'conflict of rules' scenario.
In this Chapter, we will be developing a result-selection 
methodology which is appropriate for our purposes. Firstly, in 
order to understand the rationale for result-selection, the 
defects of mechanical rules will be explained and the use of the 
'escape device' of public policy illustrated . Then, the result- 
oriented approach, which it is proposed to adopt in this thesis, 
will be illustrated by reference to choice of law examples in the 
literature and analysed critically. Some of the problems with 
result-orientation in relation to pure choice of law will be 
found not to be relevant in the conflict of rules context. 
Solutions to the remaining difficulties will be sought. Finally, 
the conclusions of this analysis will be converted into a 
practical methodology for use in subsequent chapters.
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II. THE RATIONALE FOR RESULT SELECTION
A. CRITICISMS OF MECHANICAL RULES
The impetus for the result selection movement seems to have been
disillusionment with some of the results1 produced by mechanical
jurisdiction selecting rules, which paid no attention to the
content of the rules to be applied2 or to the result of the
application3 of those rules. The critcism of the traditional
rules is summarised by Collier4,
" [T] he concepts of choice of law are too rigid and 
artificial and cause the courts to reach decisions 
repugnant to common sense and ideas of justice or to use 
transparent devices to arrive at a more satisfactory 
result, by avoiding their application.1
It is suggested that this criticism can equally be applied to the
global principle in favour of the recognition rule. Foreign
judgments are generally recognised 'blindly7 without any concern
for the contents of those judgments. We have already seen5 in
relation to non-recognition rules that mechanical preference for
a non-recognition rule may not necessarily achieve the policy
behind the rule. Thus, Courts may be tempted to use 'transparent
1 See, for example, Cook, Logical and Legal Basis of the
Conflict of Laws, Chapter 1; Cavers (1933) 47 Harvard LR 173 and 
Currie, Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws (1963).
2 Cavers ibid refers to "an austere unconcern for the
consequences."
3 In particular, whether the result was in accordance with
the social policies behind the rules. See, for example, Hancock 
"Three Approaches to the Choice of Law Problem, " in Nadelman et 
al (ed.) Legal Essays in honour of H.E. Yntema (1961).
4 Collier (chapter 1, n.142 infra) at p. 384. See also
Shapira 'The Interest Approach to Choice of Law7 (1970) pp. 20 - 
24.
5 At chapter 3 III supra.
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devices' or 'escape routes'6 in order to achieve the desired 
result.
B. PUBLIC POLICY AS AN ESCAPE ROUTE
Public policy has been chosen for more detailed examination 
because it is easy to show how it could apply in the conflict of 
rules context as a method of 'escaping' from an undesirable 
result produced by a global principle in favour of the 
recognition’ rule. Two cases, Gray v Formosa7 and Vervaeke v 
Smith8, concerning recognition of foreign nullity decrees9 will 
illustrate this point. Although they are not strictly 'conflict 
of rules' cases because recognition was the only issue in the 
case before the Court10, each case could have arisen in a choice 
of rule context.11 In example M9, the 'conflict of rules' does
6 Carter (1993) 42 ICLQ 1 at p. 1.
7 [1963] P. 259 (followed reluctantly in Lepre v Lepre
[1969] P. 52).
8 [1983] 2 All ER 144.
9 The fact that the cases are matrimonial decrees is not in 
itself important here, because the public policy defence relied 
on applies equally in relation to other judgments.
10 They belong to the category of 'pure recognition cases'
(see chapter 1 I B supra).
11 Vervaeke v Smith could easily have presented a choice of 
rule problem if the issue of recognition had arisen in the course 
of litigation about the succession to the estate of the second 
husband and such succession had been governed by a foreign law. 
Gray v Formosa could have arisen in a choice of rule context if, 
for example, the parties had remarried and the decrees were not 
recognised by the law governing the validity of the remarriages. 
In such a case, the Court could (prior to s.50 Family Law Act 
1986) have openly applied the choice of law rule in preference 
to the recognition rule or achieved the same result by refusing 
to recognise the judgments on public policy grounds. Following 
s.50 only the latter course would be available.
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arise in a similar fact situation.12
In both cases, nullity decrees were granted by Maltese and 
Belgian Courts respectively in relation to marriages which had 
been celebrated in England. The ground for the decree in the 
first case was lack of celebration in Roman Catholic form as 
required by Maltese law13 and in the second that the marriage 
was a sham as the parties never intended to live together as 
husband and wife. In Gray v Formosa, the application of English 
choice of law rules to the question of the validity of the 
marriage would have led to the application of English law as the 
lex loci celebrationis and the marriage would have been held 
valid. The position in Vervaeke v Smith is slightly more 
complicated. The Court of Appeal found that the validity of the 
marriage fell to be determined by English law under the exception 
in Sottomeyer v De Barros (No. 2)14. Thus, the Petitioner's 
foreign incapacity, which was unknown to English law, would be 
ignored because she married an English domiciliary in England. 
In the House of Lords, only Lord Simon considered the choice of 
law issue. He found that the question of the validity of a sham 
marriage was a question of quintessential validity and should be 
governed either by the lex loci celebrationis or alternatively 
by the country with which the marriage has the most real and 
substantial connection. Either way, English law governed and the 
marriage was valid.
12 See chapter 1, III supra.
13 The husband was Maltese.
14 (1879) 5 P.D. 94.
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The English courts refused to recognise both of these nullity 
decrees15. In Gray v Formosa, the Court found that recognition 
would constitute a denial of "substantial justice". It has been 
suggested that this concept coincides with that of public 
policy.16 In Vervaeke v Smith, the House of Lords17 concluded 
inter alia18 that recognition of the decree was precluded by 
public policy.
Carter19 includes both of the above cases in his third category 
of public policy, i.e. application of a foreign rule or 
recognition of a foreign judgment would "lead to an unacceptably 
unjust result in the particular circumstances of the instant 
case." The injustice in Gray v Formosa is that the wife would 
have been deprived of financial relief if the foreign decree had
15 cf. Merker v Merker [1963] P. 283, Galene v Galene [1939]
P. 237 and De Massa v De Massa [1939] 2 All ER 150n, where
nullity decrees were recognised even though the marriages would 
have been valid by English choice of law rules. See also the 
Australian case of Vasallo v Vasallo [1952] SASR 129 and the 
South African case of De Bono v De Bono 1948 (2) SA 802 where 
Maltese nullity decrees were recognised on similar facts to Gray 
v Formosa.
16 Carter (1993) 42 ICLQ 1 at p. 5. According to Sir John 
Arnold P. in Armitage v Nanchen (1983) 4 FLR 293 at 298 it is 
"very much like public policy."
17 The Court of Appeal, [1981] 1 All ER 55, had held that 
recognition was not contrary to public policy, but refused 
recognition on other grounds.
18 Arguably the ratio (or at least the main ratio) of the
case was the narrower ground that the Belgian judgment was 
inconsistent with an earlier English judgement on the same 
issue, which should therefore have been treated as res judicata 
by the Belgian Court. Non-recognition of foreign matrimonial 
decrees in such circumstances is now provided for by Family Law 
Act 1986 s.51(1).
19 (1993) 42 ICLQ 1.
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been recognised20. It is more difficult21 to pinpoint the 
injustice in Vervaeke v Smith. Carter suggests that, although the 
Petitioner's unsavoury background was said not to be relevant, 
in fact this combined with her behaviour in the course of 
litigation led to the unarticulated feeling that it would be 
unjust for her to win and succeed to the estate of the man she 
alleged to be her husband by virtue of the second marriage.
It is suggested that the idea that the Courts refused to 
recognise the judgments because the result was unjust can be 
refined by postulating that what the Courts were really doing was 
preferring the 'just' result of the application of choice of 
law22 rules to the 'unjust' result of the application of the 
recognition rule.23 A hint that this thinking underlay the 
decision in Vervaeke v Smith can be seen from the judgment of 
Lord Simon24. He expressly states that the fact that the choice 
of law rule provides for English law to determine the validity 
of the marriage is a reason for preferring English policy in
20 Whereas because the decree was not recognised the English 
Court was able to grant a divorce itself and the wife could then 
claim financial relief.
21 Jaffey (1983) 32 ICLQ 500 at 503 claims that there was no 
question of any injustice to the Respondent.
22 See Sykes and Pryles, Australian Private International 
Law 3rd. edn. (1991) at p. 475.
23 Ogden v Ogden [1908] P. 46 might also be seen as an
example of preferring the English choice of law rule (under which
the marriage was formally valid by the English lex loci 
celebrationis) to the recognition rule which would have required 
recognition of the nullity decree granted by the French Court of 
domicile on the basis that the parties lacked capacity due to 
absence of parental consent. However, it can hardly be said that 
the result of the application of the choice rule was more just 
in this case because the wife was unable to obtain a divorce.
24 [1983] 2 All ER 144 at p. 159.
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relation to sham marriages and for refusing recognition of the 
Belgian decree, which is contrary to public policy.
In Gray v Formasa Lord Denning said, "the marriage was lawful in 
England, as lawful as any marriage would be"25. Since the 
marriage took place in England and at the time both parties were 
domiciled here, the Court was no doubt thinking about English 
domestic law. However, it is clear that applying choice of law 
rules, English domestic law was the relevant law to determine 
formal validity of the marriage and that it was because the 
Maltese decision was inconsistent with English law that it 
offended English ideas of justice.26 Donovan LJ said27
"It ill accords with present day notions of tolerance 
and justice that a wife validly married according to 
our law should be told by a foreign court that she is 
a mere cohabitant and her children bastards simply on 
the ground that her husband did not marry her in the 
ch urch of a p a r t i c u l a r  reli g i o u s  
denomination".(emphasis supplied)
In Lepre v Lepre28, the facts of which virtually identical with 
those of Gray v Formosa, Sir Jocelyn Simon P referred to the fact 
that the marriage was valid by the English choice of law rule.
He followed Gray v Formosa in refusing to recognise the Maltese 
decree because it offended against English concepts of justice.
25 [1965] P 259 at p. 367.
26 This conclusion has been widely criticised by
commentators. See, for example, Lipstein [1972B] CLJ 67 at p. 89.
27 [1963] P. 259 at p. 270.
28 [1969] P. 52.
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Thus, in all three cases public policy was a 'transparent
device'29 used to escape from the result of applying the
recognition, rule blindly when the result of the application of
the choice of law rule was preferred. If this approach can be
found in a case where the choice of law rule did not strictly
come into play, a fortiori we would expect to find it in a real
choice of rule case. Carter30 suggests that the need to resort
to an escape route indicates that there are shortcomings in the
rules themselves and that the ultimate method of eliminating
reliance on public policy is
"improvement in the detail of, the sophistication of, and 
not least the realism of, choice of law rules and rules 
governing the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments."
In other words, so long as we have rigid mechanical and global 
principles we will need to have resort to the unruly horse of 
public policy. The alternative, at least in the 'conflict of 
rules' context, is result-selection.
III. RESULT-ORIENTED RULES
A. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN AD HOC RESULT SELECTION AND RESULT- 
ORIENTATION.
A number of different result selecting techniques have been 
advocated by various writers31, mainly from North America. Some
29 This may account for the criticism, which has been
levelled at' the use of public policy in these cases. See, for 
example, Carter (1962) 38 BYIL 497 and (1978) 49 BYIL.
30 Carter (1993) 42 ICLQ 1.
31 See summaries of the various theories in Kegel (chapter 
2, n. 20 supra).
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critics have 'lumped them' altogether32. However, in fact two 
main categories may be distinguished.
1. Methods which require judges to select the appropriate result 
ad hoc on the basis of, for example, which of the conflicting 
laws is 'better'33; which government has an interest in 
application of its own law34 or which country's interest will be 
less seriously impaired35 if its law is not applied.
2. Methods which create rules designed to achieve the desired 
result in each particular category of case. These techniques, 
which we shall call collectively result orientation, can be said 
to be a via media between traditional jurisdiction selection36 
and the case by case ad hoc result selection discussed above. It 
involves the construction of choice of law rules for particular 
categories of case to ensure that the desired result is reached.
See, for example, Collier (chapter 1, n.142 supra) pp. 
383 - 386.
33 Ehrenzweig (chapter 1, n. 94 supra) , who uses the term 
lex potior, cites American judicial support for this approach (at 
p. 229) .
34 Currie, Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws (1963). 
According to this approach, where there is a 'true conflict' 
between the interests of different governments, the lex fori 
should apply.
35 Baxter (1963) 16 Stan LR 1. This approach has been
adopted by the Supreme Court of California inter alia in Bernard 
v Harrah's Club 546 P 2d 719 (1976).
36 As Morris, (chapter 1, n. 142) at p. 450, points out, 
some of our apparently mechanical choice rules can be seen as "a 
synthesis" of a number of result orientated rules.
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Most of the criticism by English writers37 has been directed 
against the first category. Whilst some of their objections are 
not applicable in the conflict of rules scenario38, the 
fundamental defects of lack of certainty, predictability and 
consistency are fatal to the acceptance of such an approach in 
England.39 Thus, we may reject the ad hoc result selection 
approach40 and concentrate on result-orientation.
B. EXAMPLES OF RESULT-ORIENTED RULES
1. Caver's Principles of Preference
Cavers, who' seems to have been the founder41 of this approach, 
advocates "a selection between individual substantive rules of 
private international law"42 by means of principles of 
preference. This means that in each area of law there are a 
number of possible jurisdiction selecting rules. The principles 
of preference provide which of those rules should apply to a
37 See, for example, Jaffey (1982) 2 OJLS 368 at p. 378 and 
Fawcett (1982) 31 ICLQ 150.
38 For example, the objection to over-emphasis on the lex 
fori because it negates the whole purpose of the conflict of laws 
is not applicable in a situation where ex hypothesi the conflict 
is between the choice rules of the forum and the recognition rule 
of the forum (see chapter 1 IV 2 supra).
39 The only part of the approach which might be acceptable 
is the identification of false conflicts. See Morris (chapter 1 
n.142 supra) pp. 461 et. seq.
40 Gottlieb (1979) 26 ICLQ 734 at pp. 782 - 795 seems to be 
adopting an ad hoc approach when he attempts to isolate the prime 
consideration in each of his model problems. He admits that his 
solutions involve value judgments which may not be universally 
accepted.
41 He first advocated it in (1933) 47 Harv. L. Rev. 173. See 
also his book, The Choice of Law Process (1965).
42 Kegel (chapter 2, n.20 supra) at p. 39.
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particular law-fact pattern.43 The principles are designed to 
ensure that the result produced in each law-fact category will 
be just between the parties.
2. Morris
Morris uses a result-oriented approach to recommend a choice of 
law rule for capacity to enter into a contract44.
He starts by identifying the two most likely choice of law rules 
as being the proper law of the contract and the law of the 
domicile of the party alleged to be incapable. He then 
distinguishes two law-fact situations:-
(i) The party in question has capacity by the law of the domicile 
but not by the proper law.
(ii) The party in question has capacity by the proper law but not 
by the law of his domicile.
He concludes that the first category results in a false 
conflict45. In order to come to this conclusion he has to rely 
on two hypothoses. Firstly, that the purpose of the invalidating 
rule is to protect the minor from his own immaturity and 
secondly, that a country only has an interest in protection of
43 For example, in Cavers' five principles applicable to 
torts, depending on the law-fact situation, one of the following 
rules will apply:- (i) the law of the place of acting; (ii) the 
law of the parties' home state; (iii) where the parties have 
different home states, the law of that which affords the lower 
degree of protection; (iv) the law of the state in which a 
relationship between two parties has its seat.
44 Morris (chapter 1, n.142 supra) at pp. 269 - 271.
45 The idea of the false conflict originates from Currie 
(n.34 supra).
minors who are its own domiciliaries. Thus, reasons Morris, 
neither country has any interest in invalidating this contract; 
whereas the proper law, which has other connections with the 
contract, has an interest in upholding contracts.
The second category produces a real conflict. The law of the 
domicile does have an interest in protecting the minor. The 
proper law has an interest in upholding contracts. The latter 
should generally be preferred because of commercial convenience.
Accordingly, Morris produces a result orientated rule46 that a 
contract will be valid if there is capacity by either the law of 
the domicile or the proper law. It can be seen that Morris has 
used a generalised governmental interest analysis approach to 
determine whether a particular law should apply in a particular 
law/fact situation. The conclusion of the analysis is used to 
create a rule which applies to all similar law/fact situations.
3. Jaffey47
Jaffey adopts a similar approach in relation to essential 
validity of marriage. He identifies the two most likely choice 
of law rules as being the domicile of each party and the intended 
matrimonial home. He then investigates each different type of 
incapacity to determine what interest each of these laws has in 
relation to each reason for invalidity. On this basis he proposes 
a rule which will produce the desired result in each law-fact
46 See Dicey and Morris (chapter 1, n.l supra) rule 181(1) .
47 (1978) 41 MLR 38.
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situation.
In relation to polygamy, Jaffey concludes that it is the society
in which the couple are living which is most affected by
polygamy. However he adds that,
"English law can tolerate the validity of a polygamous 
marriage between foreigners who come to live in England 
after the marriage... when polygamy is in accordance with 
the religious belief of the community or communities to 
which the parties belong at the time of the marriage"48
Thus, he concludes that a polygamous marriage should only be
invalid "if is so by the law of the domicile of one or both of
the parties at the time of the marriage."49
The same conclusion is reached in relation to prohibited degrees 
of relationship because the matrimonial home has most 
interest.50
Whereas in relation to non-age, it is claimed that the law of the 
domicile of the 'under-age' party has an interest in protecting 
its domiciliaries from premature marriage and should therefore 
govern.
48 Ibid at p. 40.
49 Ibid.
50 Because "[t]he purpose of such rules is to prevent
marriage relationships which are offensive to the morality or 
religion prevailing in the country concerned." (ibid). It is not 
expressly stated that marriages which are allowed by the spouses' 
domicile can be tolerated by the matrimonial home. It is 
suggested that there must be limits to such tolerance. For 
example, it must be doubtful whether a marriage between a brother 
and sister would be recognised in England, even if valid by the 
law of the domicile.
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C. CRITIQUE OF RESULT-ORIENTED RULES
1. Basis of Construction of Rules
Morris alleges that Cavers' approach would not work any better 
than Currie's interest analysis approach in an international 
situation51 because a judge cannot express a preference for 
rules adopted by one sovereign state over those of another. This 
criticism seems to be based on Cavers' own admission that his 
principles are "value judgments" but it is suggested that it is 
misconceived. Surely, the difficulty is not in expressing 
preference for the laws of one state over that of another because 
the whole basis of choice of law rules is to express such a 
preference. Rather, the objection is to using subjective criteria 
to exercise this preference.52 Whilst the description of Cavers' 
principles as value judgments may suggest that they are 
subjective, it is submitted that there is a significant 
difference between Cavers and Currie. The criteria used in 
Cavers' principles can be objectively ascertained and applied by 
anyone. They do not depend on the Court's views as to what is 
'better' or whether a State has an interest in the application 
of its law to a particular situations. True, subjective notions 
have to be taken into account in formulating the principles. But 
this is equally so with all choice of law rules. For example, the 
rule that the lex domicilii applies to determine the essential 
validity of a marriage involves the subjective notion that the 
domicile is the most appropriate law to govern. Furthermore, as
51 As opposed to an inter-state case.
52 This was one of the main problems with both the 'better
law' approach and Currie's governmental interest analysis (see 
n. 34 supra).
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with traditional choice rules, Cavers' principles are the result 
of reasoned analysis53. The fact that not everyone will agree 
with that analysis does not make his principles subjective any 
more than the fact that not everyone agrees that the law of the 
domicile is the most appropriate choice of law rule for marriage.
Indeed Morris and Jaffey's approach of basing their rules on 
governmental interest analysis is no less problematic from this 
point of view. Whilst result-orientation overcomes the difficulty 
of actually determining the interests of each particular 
Government in each particular case, it does not solve the problem 
of identifying governmental interest in the first place. Whilst 
this might be relatively easy in Morris' contract example, it is 
more speculative in relation to a potentially controversial issue 
like marriage and the analysis of the author of the rule may not 
command general acceptance.
It may be concluded that, in the choice of law context, the
problem of the basis on which to select the result for each 
category of case can only be solved by the development of a set 
of objective criteria54 and principles to inform the 
categorisation of law-fact patterns and the construction of the 
result-oriented rules.
See p. 133 of Cavers' book (n. 41 supra) . Analysis
behind the principles of preference can be seen in the specific 
chapters of the book (e.g. torts in chapter VI).
54 Such as Jaffey's principles of justice (see chapter 2 II
C 2 supra ).
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However, it is submitted that the absence of objective criteria 
is not a problem in the context of our search for a preference 
rule in the 'conflict of rules' situation. We are using 
principles of preference to decide between English choice rules 
and English recognition rules. The appropriate objective criteria 
should have already been taken into account in formulating the 
choice of law and recognition rules. Where there is a conflict 
between those rules, then the policy of the forum must determine 
which prevails and thus it is appropriate to base the principles 
of preference on English 'value-judgments' as reflected in 
domestic policy. We will deal with the problem of ascertainment 
of domestic policy below.55
2. Self-Sufficiency and Complexity.
Caver's approach is not, nor does it purport to be, self- 
sufficient and it is potentially excessively complex. In a sense, 
these two points may be two sides of the same coin. It may be 
that Cavers has not attempted to formulate a complete system to 
cover every conceivable law-fact pattern because to so would be 
excessively complex. In any event, since it is beyond the realms 
of human ability to foresee every possibility, some provision 
must be made for the unforeseen case.
These criticisms do not seem applicable to Morris and Jaffey 
because they are both attempting to deal only with a specific 
issue which has only a limited number of variables. Thus, it is 
possible to create a non-complex self-sufficient rule.
55 See at D infra.
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Similarly, the variables in the 'conflict of rules' situation 
are limited. Thus, it should be possible to formulate principles 
to cover all likely situations without undue complexity and the 
likelihood of an unforeseen situation arising is substantially 
reduced.
3. Certainty
It has been suggested that if the task of formulating the 
principles of preference is left to the Courts, there would be 
considerable uncertainty during the development period.56 
Again, this criticism is not pertinent in the present context. 
The outcome of cases where the conflict of rules arises is at 
present uncertain apart from where statute57 applies. Thus, the 
adoption of a result-oriented approach would not create any 
further uncertainty.
D. ASCERTAINMENT OF POLICY
The need to determine the policy behind substantive laws has been 
one of the most criticised aspect58 of result-selection. Whilst 
the criticism is generally made with reference to ad hoc result 
selection, most of it is equally pertinent to the search for 
policy in order to construct result-oriented rules, especially
56 The Law Commission (W.P. No. 89, p. 28 at fn. 104)
suggest "50 years is too long for most people to wait for the 
establishment of rules to determine whether their marriage is 
valid."
57 i.e. Family Law Act 1986 s.50 (see chapter 6 II B 2
infra).
58 North, Essays in Private International Law (1993) at p.
114, claims that the "difficulties are legion".
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where it is envisaged that the Courts themselves will have to 
develop the rules.
However, North like other writers, emphasises that the search for 
the policy of a particular rule is "immeasurably more 
difficult"59 in the international rather than the inter-State 
context, in which the approach has been applied in the USA. Even 
then, judicial attempts at analysis of the policy of the rules 
of sister-States have been exposed as "forum oriented 
assessment."60 This is exactly what is required for our 
purposes!
Nonetheless, it must be appreciated that even assessment of forum 
policy is not free from problems. Firstly, we must guard against 
the idea that an English judge or any other English lawyer can 
instinctively divine what domestic policy is on any issue. In 
order to ascertain policy, proper research of the domestic law 
and its basis must be undertaken. Reference should be made, where 
appropriate, to the legislative history of statutes61.
Secondly, as North points out62, considerable care has to be 
taken when dealing with older statutes and cases, which may no
59 Ibid at p. 116.
60 Cheshire and North (chapter 1, n.l supra) at p. 33.
61 cf. North (n. 58 supra) at p. 115. English Courts will
now refer to Hansard in certain situations (see Pepper v Hart 
[1993] AC 593) . In any event, we are not expecting Courts to 
ascertain forum policy in each case.
62 Ibid at p. 115.
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longer reflect domestic policy. It is suggested that this problem 
can be solved to a large extent by reference to the reports of 
the Law Commission or other bodies. In fact, there are relevant 
reports relating to all the topics covered in this Part of the 
thesis.
Thirdly, we should remember that whilst we refer to forum policy, 
the State itself rarely has an interest in disputes between 
individuals other than the pervasive interest of ensuring that 
justice is done between the parties. Thus, the search for the 
policy of the forum is really a search for the forum's idea of 
what constitutes justice63 between the parties in each case. For 
convenience, we will continue to refer to this as the forum's 
policy, but the justice point should be borne in mind.
E. CONCLUSION IN RELATION TO RESULT ORIENTATION
As with choice of law rules, a result selecting approach, as 
opposed to a global or mechanical rule, can ensure that results 
are reached which are consistent with the forum's policy.
The fundamental distinction between the two situations is that 
in the pure choice of law context, there may be a legitimate 
concern for the policies behind foreign laws; whereas in the 
'conflict of rules' context, these policies if appropriate have
63 In this connection, justice means 'substantive justice'
between the parties. Assuming that our conflicts rules are based 
on justice (see chapter 2 II C supra ) , then either solution to 
the problem should be in conformity with conflicts' justice 
because either the choice of law rule or the recognition rule 
will be applied.
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already been taken into account in formulating the choice of law 
and recognition rules. Thus, where there is a conflict between 
those rules, it is justifiable to determine which prevails on the 
basis solely of the policy of the forum.
Provided that clear result-oriented rules are constructed to give 
effect to forum policy, the approach advocated will not cause 
uncertainty or unpredictability. Since the 'conflict of rules' 
only arises in limited circumstances, it should be possible to 
create rules which are easily understood and not over-complex.
IV METHODOLOGY
A. INTRODUCTION
In the next five chapters we will be constructing result-oriented 
rules, which will be called preference rules, to solve the 
conflict between choice rules and recognition rules in relation 
to particular topics. Our aim is to produce results which are in 
conformity with the policy of the forum. Whilst, we are mainly 
concerned with result, it will be more intellectually satisfying 
and easier to justify the proposed rule if an acceptable
theoretical basis can be found for the proposed rule.
B. IDENTIFICATION OF THE CONFLICT
In order to understand the scope of the problem, an assessment 
will be undertaken of when the conflict of rules is likely to 
arise in relation to each topic. This will involve a
consideration of the relevant choice of law rules and a brief
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survey of the recognition rules of other countries64 to indicate 
when a decree will be recognised abroad and not in the forum and 
vice versa.
C. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
Four possible preference rules will be considered in relation to 
each issue. These are:-
1. Always prefer the choice rule.
2. Always prefer the recognition rule.
3. Prefer the choice rule for some purposes and the recognition 
rule for others (a 'differential rule').
4. Prefer the rule which upholds the validity of the marriage, 
the succession claim, matrimonial property rights or the tort 
claim, as the case may be.
It will be seen that the first two rules are identical with the 
global rules, which we have rejected65. However, whilst these 
rules cannot be supported as global rules, they may produce the 
appropriate result in a particular category of case. Where the 
desired result can be achieved either by application of one of 
the global rules or by means of an expressly result selecting
64 The English recognition rules are outlined in Chapter 1. 
The survey of foreign recognition rules for matrimonial decrees 
in Chapter 6 at I B is equally relevant to Chapters 7, 8 and 9.
65 We saw in Chapter 4 above that the third global rule,
preference for the statutory rule, in English law would always 
result in a preference, if at all, for the recognition rule. 
Thus, it is not helpful to consider it as a separate preference 
rule. However, we should bear in mind our conclusion that, where 
the recognition rule is favoured, then the fact that it is 
statutory (if that is the case) may add extra weight to its 
selection as the preference rule.
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rule, the former may be preferred as being more consistent with 
orthodox theory.
There are number of possible differentiations which may serve as 
the basis for the differential approach in the third preference 
rule. These will be considered in Chapter 6 and it will be 
concluded that only one can be supported, which will thereafter 
be referred to as the 'differential rule'.
D. CONSTRUCTION OF THE RESULT-ORIENTED RULE
1. For each of the four possible preference rules in turn:-
(a) The theoretical basis for the rule in relation to the 
particular topic will be sought.
(b) Any caselaw and statutory authority for each rule will be 
reviewed.
(c) The results produced by the rule in relation to each of the 
possible law-fact patterns will be demonstrated and illustrated 
in tabular form.
2. Forum policy will be ascertained by examination and analysis 
of legislation, caselaw and reports of law reform bodies.
3. Forum policy will be applied to determine by analogous 
reasoning what result is required by such policy in the conflict 
of rules situation in relation to each law-fact category.
4. The rule(s) which produce(s) the desired result for each law- 
fact category will be recommended as the appropriate preference 
rule(s) for that situation.
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CHAPTER 6: CAPACITY TO REMARRY
I. SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM 
A . INTRODUCTION
The likelihood of a conflict arising between the choice rule and 
the recognition rule in relation to remarriage after a 
matrimonial decree has increased substantially over the last 50 
years. Until 1953, foreign divorces and nullity decrees were only 
recognised in England when they were granted by or recognised in 
the country of domicile. As the choice rule for capacity to 
marry was the law of the domicile, a conflict between the choice 
rules and the recognition rules could only arise where the party 
in question had changed his/her domicile between the date of the 
divorce or nullity decree and the date of the remarriage. The 
widening of the grounds of recognition of foreign divorces and 
nullity decrees at common law meant that the conflict could arise 
even without a change of domicile where the decree was recognised 
by the widened rules.
As we have seen1, recognition of divorce and nullity decrees are 
now governed by statute. In order to identify the scope for the 
'conflict of rules' arising we need to examine the rules for 
recognition of matrimonial decrees in other countries.
At chapter 1 II B supra.
162
B. RECOGNITION OF DECREES IN OTHER COUNTRIES
A brief survey of some foreign recognition rules will be 
sufficient to indicate in what sort of situation divorces will 
be recognised in England and not in the country of domicile and 
vice versa. It will be convenient to consider the position in 
Commonwealth countries, the USA and civil law countries 
separately.
1. Commonwealth countries2
(a) Recognition rules in Commonwealth countries 
In general Commonwealth countries still adhere to the common law 
recognition rules3. Thus a foreign divorce etc. will be 
recognised in the following four situations:-
(i) Where it is obtained in the country of the parties' 
domicile.4
(ii) Where it is recognised by the law of the parties' 
domicile5.
2 See generally McClean (chapter 3, n.22 supra).
3 Often these have been codified or expressly saved by 
statute. See McClean, ibid chapter 3, the Canadian Divorce adn 
Corollary Relief Act 1985 s.22 (3) and the Australian Family Law 
Act 1975 s.104(5).
4 Rule in Le Mesurier [1895] AC 517. Where the wife has a 
separate domicile statute will usually provide that it is 
sufficient if the divorce is granted in the domicile of either 
parties (e.g. Australian Family Law Act 1975 s. 104(3)). Even 
where the wife's domicile is dependent on the husband, statute 
may be provided that a divorce granted on the basis of the wife's 
domicile, determined as if she were unmarried will be recognised 
(e.g. Canadian Divorce Act 1968 s.6(2)).
5 Rule in Armitage v A-G [1906] P. 135.
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(iii) Where the recognising Court would mutatis mutandis have 
jurisdiction on the basis of the facts existing in relation to 
the foreign Court.6
(iv) Where it is obtained in a country with which one of the 
parties had a 'real and substantial connection'.7
Some countries have added to those rules by statute either to 
promote certainty®7 or in order to enable them to ratify the 
Hague Convention on Divorce and Legal Separations9.
(b) Comparison with English recognition rules
In relation to formal divorces, the English statutory
6 Travers v Holley [1953] P. 246 (for application in
Australia see Sykes and Pryles (chapter 5, n.22 supra) at p. 466 
and in Canada see Allerie and Director of Vital Statistics (1963) 
41 DLR (2d) 553) . It is not sufficient that the divorce would be 
recognised in such a country, i.e. it is not possible to combine 
the rule in Armitage with that in Travers v Holley, Mountbatten 
v Mountbatten [1959] P. 43.
7 Indyka v Indyka [1969] 1 AC 33 (for application in
Australia see Nicholson v Nicholson [1971] 1 NSWLR 1 and In the 
Marriage of Dornom, Australian Digest, 3rd edn (1992) 35-417
para. 18.68, and in Canada see Kish v Director of Vital
Statistics (1973) 35 DLR (3d) 530). It seems to be sufficient
that the divorce etc. was recognised in the country with which 
there is a real and substantial connection, Mahoney v Mahoney
[1968] 1 WLR 1773 (i.e. it is possible to combine the Indyka rule 
with the Armitage rule), although this result has been 
criticised. For analysis of the development of the Indyka rule 
see McClean (chapter 3, n.22 supra) at pp. 43 et. seg.
8 For example, in Canada, there is statutory provision for 
recognition of a divorce granted on the basis of the domicile of 
the wife (determined as if she were unmarried) and for a divorce 
granted in a country where either party was ordinarily resident 
for more than one year before commencement of the proceedings 
(Divorce Act 1986 s.22).
9 For example, in Australia.
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jurisdictional bases will generally produce more liberal results 
than the common law rules. For example, nationality alone10 or 
domicile in the sense of the decree granting state after a period 
of short temporary residence11, will not constitute a 'real and 
substantial connection',12 The reciprocity principle will only 
lead to more generous results in the rare situation13 that the 
recognising country has jurisdiction rules wider than habitual 
residence, nationality or domicile.
However, the effectiveness requirement in the English statute may 
restrict recognition of divorces which would be recognised under 
the common law rules14 or under a foreign statute. For example,
10 Keresztessy v Keresztessy (1976) 73 DLR (3d) 347.
Although in Australia, such a divorce would be recognised under 
the reciprocity principle because jurisdiction is taken on the 
basis of nationality alone (Family Law Act 1975 s.39(3)(a)).
11 As in Nevada. See Suko v Suko [1971] VR 28 and compare 
Lawrence v Lawrence [1985] Fam. 106.
12 A fortiori, connections other than nationality, habitual 
residence or domicile will not be sufficient (e.g.the place where 
the marriage was celebrated and the parties were previously 
domiciled, Peters v Peters [1968] P. 275) . The possibility of 
residence which is not yet habitual being sufficient is unlikely, 
given the liberal interpretation of habitual residence in 
England, see R v London Borough of Brent ex p. Shah [1983] 2 AC 
309) and the fact that periods of residence of less than a year 
have been held not to evidence a real and substantial connection 
(see e.g. Re Darling [1975] 1 NZLR 382 and other cases cited by 
McClean (chapter 3, n.22 supra) at p. 48).
13 For example, in Australia, nullity jurisdiction may be 
founded on mere presence (Family Law Act 1975 s.39(4) (b)).
14 It has been held in Australia that under the statute, as 
at common law, it is sufficient that the tribunal has general 
competence, to hear the type of action involved and that it is not 
relevant that the jurisdiction was exercised irregularly, see
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in Australia it is sufficient that the divorce is "effected in 
accordance with the law of an overseas jurisdiction"15; whereas, 
as we saw above, the English statute requires that the divorce 
is effective in the jurisdiction in which it was obtained. Thus, 
for example, a talaq or ghet pronounced or obtained in Australia 
would be recognised16 there provided that it was done so in 
accordance with the law of a foreign country, such as Pakistan 
or India, with which one of the required connecting factors 
existed.
In relation to informal divorces, the scope for discrepancy is 
much wider because of the English legislation which was designed 
to be more restrictive than the common law17 . There is no 
evidence that foreign courts will refuse to recognise informal
Norman v Norman (No. 3) (1970) 16 FLR 231. (For discussion of the 
effectiveness requirement in England see chapter 3 at II C 2 (a) 
supra).
15 s.104(8) makes clear that the phrase "effected in 
accordance with the law of an overseas jurisdiction" includes all 
situations where the overseas jurisdiction recognises a divorce 
etc. obtained in a third country. It is arguable that this 
provision only applies to the statutory bases of recognition and 
so does not overrule Mountbatten v Mountbatten [1959] P. 43. (see 
Sykes and Pryles (chapter 5, n.22 supra) at p. 470.
16 Sykes and Pryles ibid; cf. English Family Law Act 1986
s.44(2) (discussed in Chapter 1, III B 1 supra).
17 See leading pre-1973 English case of Qureshi v Qureshi
[1972] Fam. 173. The Australian legislation specifically provides 
that all the recognition provisions apply "in relation to 
dissolutions and annulments effected whether by decree, 
legislation or otherwise" (Family Law Act 1985 s.104(10). The 
word 'decree' has been removed in the recognition provisions of 
the Canadian Divorce and Corollary Relief Act 1985 to remove any 
ambiguity (see Castel, Canadian Conflict of Laws, 2nd edn. 1986 
at p. 315).
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divorces on public policy grounds.
2. The United States
(a) US Recognition Rules
The position in relation to recognition of foreign divorces in 
the USA is not entirely clear. Scoles and Hay18 discern the 
following general rules from the caselaw:-
(i) A foreign divorce of foreign nationals obtained in a country 
with which one party has a close relationship19 will be 
recognised provided that it is valid in that country. This will 
include extra-judicial divorces obtained abroad20. The fact that 
the parties are domiciliaries of a US State would not seem to 
prevent recognition21.
(ii) A foreign divorce of US nationals obtained in the country
18 Scoles and Hay, Conflict of Laws (1982) at pp. 495 et.
seq. See also Baade, 72 Col L.R. (1972) 329 pp. 334 et. seq. and
Comment (1969) 35 Minn. L.Rev. 612.
19 Based on US Restatment (2nd) para. 72 which provides for 
divorce jurisdiction "if either spouse has such a relationship 
to the state as would make it reasonable for the state to 
dissolve the marriage."
20 e.g. Machransky v Machransky 31 Ohio App. 482, 166 NE 423
(1927) and see Chaudry v Chaudry 159 N.J. Super 566, 388 A. 2d
1000 (1978) discussed at text accompanying n.28 infra.
21 Sherif v Sherif 76 Misc. 2d 905, 352 NYS.2d 781 (1974) 
(talaq obtained in Pakistan).
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of domicile22 will be recognised provided that it is valid 
there.
(iii) A foreign inter partes divorce of US domiciliaries who 
travel abroad for the purposes of obtaining the divorce will be 
recognised, even if the jurisdiction of the foreign Court is 
based on short residence or mere appearance.23 However, ex parte 
divorces obtained in such circumstances will not be recognised24 
and nor will 'mail-order' divorces obtained whilst remaining in 
the USA.25
(iv) Extra-judicial divorces obtained in the USA will not be 
recognised.26 The key distinction is whether the divorce 
authority originates from abroad and not whether the parties were
22 Domicile of one party is probably sufficient. See Comment
(1969) 53 Minn. Law Rev. 612 at pp. 619-20.
23 Thus, easy 'vacation' divorces obtained in Mexico, Haiti
and the Dominican Republic have been recognised. See, for 
example, leading New York case of Rosentiel v Rosentiel 16 N.Y. 
2d 64, 73, 262 N.Y.S. 2d 86, 209 N.E. 2d 709, 712 (1965).
Provided that such a divorce is recognised in one State, a 
declaratory judgment obtained therein will be recognised in all 
other states of the Union under the Full-Faith-and-Credit 
principles of the US Constitution.
24 Scoles and Hay (n. 18 supra) p. 501.
25 See Rosenbaum v Rosenbaum 309 N.Y. 371, 130 N.E 2d 902
(1955) .
26 See Shikoh v Murff 257 F.2d 306 (2d. Cir. 1958) and
Chertok v Chertok 208 App. Div. 161, 203 NYS 163 (1924) . and
Comment (1969) 53 Minn. L.Rev. 612, 627 et seq.
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physically present in the USA or not.27 Thus, in Chaudry v 
Chaudry28 a trans-national talaq pronounced at the Pakistani 
Consulate in New York and later confirmed by a Court in Pakistan, 
where the wife was resident at the time, was treated as obtained 
in Pakistan and recognised29.
(b) Comparison with English Recognition Rules
There would seem to be little scope30 for discrepancy between 
principle (i) and English law in relation to formal divorces. 
However, informal divorces may be recognised in situations where 
they would not be recognised in England31.
Principle (ii) would seem to yield similar results to the English 
rules both in relation to formal divorces32 and informal 
divorces.33
27 Comment ibid at p. 635.
28 159 N.J. Super 566, 388 A. 2d 1000 (1978).
29 Under the principle in (i) above. It was held that
'principles of comity' required recognition.
30 Although ex parte divorces obtained in the country of 
nationality of one party might not be recognised, at least where 
the parties are U.S. domiciliaries.
31 For example a bare talaq pronounced in the circumstances 
of Sherif v Sherif 76 Misc. 3d 905, 352 NYS 2d 781 (1974), would 
not be recognised in England because it was not obtained in the 
domicile of either party.
32 Habitual Residence under English law may well amount to 
domicile in the US sense.
33 Except perhaps in relation to a divorce where one party 
has been habitually resident in England for 12 months.
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The divorces recognised under principle (iii) will only be 
recognised in England where one party is a national of, domiciled 
in or habitually resident in the foreign country. Thus, usually 
vacation divorces will not be recognised34 unless one party has 
become domiciled in the 'divorce haven' within the meaning of the 
concept in that country.35 .
Divorces refused recognition under principle (iv) will not be 
recognised in England because they are not effective in the place 
where they are obtained. There is no English authority on a 
'foreign' trans-national talaq. It was argued above36 that the 
pronouncement of a talaq in a third country does not infringe 
English public policy and thus there is no reason to deny 
recognition to such a divorce.
3. Civil Law Countries
A distinction must be drawn between those countries which have 
adopted the Hague Convention37 and those which have not. In the
34 Mere residence or appearance will not suffice. Thus, a 
decree obtained in Mexico after two days residence there, would 
still not be recognised in England, even if recognised in the New 
York residence of the wife (as in Mountbatten v Mountbatten 
[1959] P. 43).
35 See e.g. Lawrence v Lawrence [1985] Fam. 106 discussed 
at II B 2 infra.
36 See discussion in Chapter 1 II B 4 supra.
37 Czechoslovkia, Cyprus, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, Italy, 
The Netherlands, Norway, Slovak Republic, Sweden and Switzerland 
(written communication from Secretariat Hague Conference dated 
28th. July 1994).
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former, the only scope for discrepancy in relation to formal 
divorces and legal separations covered by the Convention38, will 
be where the English rules are more generous39 than those of the 
Convention or where a reservation has been entered under article 
19 or 24 of the Convention.40 Informal divorces are not covered 
by the Convention.
In relation to divorces not covered by the Convention, civil law 
countries tend to combine jurisdictional and choice-of-law 
considerations to determine whether to recognise a divorce.41 In 
general, a foreign divorce of a home national will not be 
recognised unless it is consistent with the substantive law of
38 The Convention only requires recognition of divorces 
obtained in Contracting States (art. 1).
39 e.g. Under the Hague Convention, the nationality of the 
petitioner is only a sufficient jurisdictional base if (s)he is 
or has been (for at least one year in the previous two) 
habitually resident in the country of nationality (art. 2(4). 
Alternatively, where the country of last habitual residence does 
not provide for divorce, it will be sufficient if the petitioner 
was present in the country of his/her nationality at the date of 
the institution of proceedings (art. 2(5)). Similarly the 
habitual residence of the petitioner alone is not sufficient 
unless the habitual residence has lasted for at least one year 
or the spouses last habitually resided there together (art. 
2 (2)) .
40 Czechoslovakia, Italy, Luxemburg and the Slovak Republic 
entered reservations under art. 19 para. 1. Switzerland and 
Czechoslovakia have entered reservations under art. 24 (see 
Information Concerning Hague Convention on Private International 
Law (1993) XL Netherlands Int. Law Review 278 - 279).
41 For example, France. See Rabel, The Conflict of Laws: A 
Comparative Study, vol. 1 (1958) at p. 509.
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the nationality. This may result in refusal to recognise 
divorces42 which would be recognised in England, where 
recognition does not depend on what substantive law was applied.
No distinction seems to be made between formal and informal 
divorces, although extra-judicial proceedings in the forum may 
well not be recognised.43
4. Countries not Providing for Divorce
The 'conflict of rules' will arise wherever one of the parties 
is domiciled in a country which does not allow divorce at all44. 
Most of the relevant English decisions concerned Italian 
domiciliaries at a time when Italian law did not provide for 
divorce and would not recognise the foreign divorces of their 
nationals.45 In recent years, Italy and various other countries
42 The likelihood of this will decrease as grounds for
divorce are liberalised (see Scoles and Hay, n. 18 supra, at p. 
506 para 15.27 n. 2).
43 For example, in Germany - see decision in BGH [1982] NJW
517, cited in Scoles and Hay, Conflict of Laws 1989 - 1990 
Supplement para. 15.24.
44 Art. 20 of the Hague Convention on Legal Separations and
Divorce allows a contracting state to reserve the right not to 
recognise a divorce if it does not provide for divorce and both 
parties are nationals of that country. This reservation has not 
been used (see reference in n. 40 supra).
45 For example, Perrini v Perrini [1979] Fam. 84, R v
Brentwood Marriage Registrar ex p. Arias [1968] QB 956 and 
Padolecchia v Padolecchia [1968] P 314.
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which did not make provision for divorce have now done so.46 
Thus, the scope for conflict where the lex causae is a country 
which does not recognise divorce at all is relatively small47 in 
practical terms.
C. CHOICE OF LAW RULE FOR CAPACITY TO MARRY
There has long been a dispute between leading English academics 
as to whether capacity to marry is governed by the dual domicile 
test48 or the intended matrimonial home test49. Whilst the 
decisions in most of the old caselaw were equivocal, there was 
little express judicial preference50 for the intended 
matriominial home test. More recently some judges have favoured
46 For example, Argentina (Law No. 23.515, which came into
effect on June 21st. 1987), Brazil (Amendment XI to Constitution 
in 1977) and Spain (Law No. 30/1981 of July 7th. 1981).
47 Divorce is still not available in the Republic of
Ireland following the success of the opponents of divorce in the 
referendum of 26th. June 1986. However, foreign divorces granted 
by the Court of the domicile wil be recognised. See North, 
(chapter 1, n. 1 supra), at pp. 380 - 381. The possibility of 
extending the recognition of foreign divorces is discussed ibid 
at pp. 381 et seq.
48 Supported in successive editions of Dicey and Morris
(chapter 1, n.l supra) and Morris (chapter 1, n.142 supra).
49 Supported in early editions of Cheshire's Private 
International Law, e.g. 7th. edn. (1965) pp. 276 et. seq.
50 cf. Radwan v Radwan (No. 2) [1973] Fam. 35. However,
Cumming-Bruce J. specifically limited his decision to capacity 
to enter into a polygamous marriage and the decision has been 
trenchantly criticised. See, for example, Karsten (1973) 36 MLR 
291 and Pearl [1973] CLJ 143.
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a real and substantial connection test51 or a rule of 
alternative reference52, which seems to be a modern version of 
the intended matrimonial home test. Thus, the law may be said to 
be in a state of flux53 in England.
In general, it will make little difference to the 'conflict of 
rules' analysis which rule is used. However, in some cases, 
applying a law other than the domicile may make it possible to 
avoid the 'conflict of rules' problem completely where there is 
no dispute between the law to be applied and the forum about the 
recognition of the decree54. It must be borne in mind, though, 
that it will not always be possible to show that another law has 
a closer connection than the law of the domicile55.
51 See Lincoln J. in Lawrence v Lawrence [1985] Fam. 106 and
Lord Simon in Vervaeke v Smith [1983] A.C. 145. See also Fentiman 
[1985] CLJ 256.
52 See Cairns L.J. in Lawrence v Lawrence [1985] Fam. 106.
53 According to the Law Commission, W.P. No. 89 at p. 60 
"there is no decision which prevents the Court of Appeal or the 
House of Lords from adopting either test". Furthermore, one of 
the reasons that they did not make any recommendations for 
statutory reform of the choice of law rule for essential validity 
of marriage in Rept. No. 165 was to allow the Courts to continue 
to develop the law themselves.
54 As was done by Anthony Lincoln J. at first instance in 
Lawrence v. Lawrence [1985] Fam. 106. Here the forum itself was 
held to be the country with the most real and substantial 
connection and thus no conflict could arise.
55 In R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal ex p. Rafika Bibi
[1989] Imm AR 1, it was held that the real and substantial 
connection test was inappropriate because the marriage had 
connection with two legal systems. The husband was a British 
citizen domiciled in England who married a Bangladeshi 
domiciliary in Bangladesh in 1969. As the wife remained in
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For ease of exposition, we will continue with the assumption that 
the choice rule for capacity to marry is the lex domicilii, 
unless otherwise stated.
II POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS56
A. PREFER THE CHOICE RULE 
1. Theoretical Basis
This approach, under which the validity of the remarriage is 
determined solely according to the choice of law rule governing 
capacity and the forum's recognition rules are ignored can be 
supported by the following alternative theories.
(a) 'The status theory'
The concept that status is governed by domicile is fundamental57 
and takes precedence over other competing rules.58 This idea 
can be illustrated by the fact that historically, the English
Bangladesh and the husband lived in England, there was found to 
be no matrimonial home.
56 For tabular illustration of results of applying each
preference rule, see Table 3 in the Appendix infra.
57 See Udny v Udny (1869) LR. 1 Sc. and Div. 441 at p. 457
per Lord Westbury , Dicey and Morris 9th. edn. (1973) Rule 31 
and Graveson, The Conflict of Laws 7th. edn. (1974) at p. 226. 
Levontin (1953) 3 Am. J. Comp. Law 199 at 202. writes, "Anglo- 
American law.... considers the community of a person's domicile 
as the one most intimately connected with his status and with the 
legal, social and economic consequences flowing therefrom." The 
Law Commission (Rept. No. 137 para. 6.59) refers to "the 
tradition .of the common law that status is exclusively to be 
determined by the law of the domicile."
58 See Gottlieb (1977) 26 ICLQ 734 at p. 778.
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rule for recognising foreign divorce and nullity decrees was 
simply an application of the domicile choice rule. However, even 
then it was possible for a conflict to arise where there was a 
change of domicile. The question of recognition would be governed 
by the law of the domicile at the time of the decree whilst the 
capacity w.ould be governed by the law of domicile at the time of 
remarriage. In such a case, the 'status theory' would seem to 
favour the domicile at the time of remarriage because in 
determining the party's present status the deciding factor is 
whether the remarriage is valid.59
(b) 'The capacity theory'
This theory is based on the premise that the validity of the
remarriage depends upon the capacity of the parties and that
capacity is separate from status. Thus, capacity is governed by
the law indicated by the choice of law rule and does not flow
directly from status as determined by the foreign decree. Allen
distinguishes between status, capacity and rights as follows,
"Status, the condition which gives rise to certain 
capacities or incapacities or both; Capacity, the power to 
acquire and exercise rights; and the Rights themselves
59 In Padolecchia v Padolecchia [1968] P. 314, the Court
favoured the domicile at the time of the remarriage because 
otherwise the propositus would be denied the power "to change his 
capacity by changing his domicile or nationality." Palsson 
(chapter 1, n. 121) cites a German case (at p. 223) supporting 
application of the national law at the time of the remarriage and 
an Italian case (at p. 222 n. 706) supporting application of the 
national law at the time of the divorce Gottlieb (1977) 26 ICLQ 
734 at p. 777 suggests that it might be sufficient if either 
domicile recognises the divorce.
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which are acquired by the exercise of capacity." 60
One advantage of the 'capacity theory' over the 'status theory' 
is that it does not depend on the choice of law rule for the 
essential validity of marriage being the domicile.
2. Authority
Support for the 'status theory' can be found in the two classic 
common law cases61 where this issue arose, the Ontario case of 
Schwebel v Ungar62 and the English case of R v Brentwood 
Superintendent Registrar of Marriages ex p. Arias.63 It will be 
helpful to give a summary of the facts of these cases.
In Schwebel v Ungar, the defendant W. married her first husband 
HI in Hungary in 1945. Shortly after their marriage they decided 
to emigrate to Israel. In a transit camp in Italy HI gave W. a 
get, an extra-judicial Jewish divorce. The defendant then 
continued to Israel where she acquired a domicile of choice and 
lived for a number of years before coming to Ontario where she 
met and married the Ontario domiciled Plaintiff. The Jewish 
divorce was not recognised either by the law of Hungary or Italy 
and was thus not eligible for recognition under the recognition 
rules of Ontario. However, the get was recognised in Israel, the 
domicile of W. It was held that since by her domicile W. was
60 (1930) 46 LQR 277, 279. Engdahl (1969) 55 Iowa L.Rev.
56, 65 contrasts this approach with Austin who would say that 
"the rights, duties, capacities or incapacities ... constitute 
the status."
61 Palsson (chapter 1, n. 121 supra) pp. 229 - 239 brings
many examples of the supremacy of the lex patriae in Continental 
decisions.
62 (1963) 42 DLR (2d) 622 afd. (1964) 48 DLR (2d) 644.
63 [1968] 2 QB 596 (hereinafter 'the Brentwood Marriage
case').
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single and had capacity to remarry, the second marriage was 
valid.
In the Brentwood Marriage case, H. was an Italian national 
domiciled in Switzerland. His first marriage had been dissolved 
in Switzerland and his first wife had remarried. However, under 
the law of H7s nationality the divorce was not recognised and he 
did not have capacity to remarry. Since the Swiss law referred 
capacity to marry to the law of the nationality he was unable to 
remarry in Switzerland and thus came with his intended second 
wife to England hoping to remarry. The Swiss divorce was eligible 
for recognition under English recognition rules. The Brentwood 
Marriage Registrar refused to marry them because H. lacked 
capacity. This decision was upheld by the Divisional Court on the 
ground that capacity to marry is governed by the law of the 
domicile and that by Swiss law H. did not have such capacity.
In the Brentwood Marriage case, the problem was not expressed by
the Court as being a conflict between choice rules and
recognition rules. However, in line with the 'status theory7, the
Court emphasised the importance of status being governed by the
law of the domicile. In the words of Sachs L.J., "status is
particularly a matter for the law of the country in which the
parties are domiciled.1164
In Schwebel v Ungar, where there does seem to have been an
awareness of the conflict between Ontario recognition rules and
Ontario choice rules, it was stated that
"to hold otherwise would be to determine the personal 
status of a person not domiciled in Ontario by the law of 
Ontario instead of by the law of that person7s country of 
domicile."
and
"for • the limited purpose of resolving the difficulty 
created by the peculiar facts of the case, the governing 
consideration is the status of the Respondent under the law
[1968] 2 QB 956 at pp. 967 - 968.
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of her domicile at the time of her second marriage and not 
the means whereby she secured the status.1
Again, the supremacy of the domicile seems to have been the main
concern65 in line with the 'status theory.'
3. Results
a) Where the lex causae recognises the decree.
This is the situation in example Ml.66 We saw that application 
of the choice rule will lead to the validity of the remarriage 
between Alexander and Bella.
This may lead to absurdity67 if the forum is called upon to 
determine the validity of the matrimonial decree in a different 
context. For example, suppose that Natasha, the first wife 
becomes domiciled in England. It would seem that she would not 
have capacity to remarry because the get is not recognised. If 
she died intestate domiciled in England, Alexander would seem to 
have the right to claim the surviving spouse's share as he would 
seem to be recognised as Natasha's husband by the law of her
65 An alternative explanation of Schwebel v Ungar is that
the case extended the Ontario recognition rules so that a divorce 
would be recognised if it was recognised by a domicile 
subsequently acquired by one of the parties, see Gottlieb (1977) 
26 ICLQ 734 at p.776 and Webb (1965) 14 ICLQ 659.
66 Chapter 1, III supra.
67 See Jaffey (1975) 91 LQR 320, 322 and Gordon (chapter 1
n.l. supra) pp. 151-2.
179
domicile at the date of her death.68 Similarly if Alexander were 
to become domiciled in England and to die intestate, he might be 
considered to leave two widows. It is thus possible that
Alexander might be considered as married to Bella for some
purposes and to Natasha for other purposes. This has been
referred to as 'legal bigamy'69 and 'internal disharmony.'70
Engdahl argues that such disharmony is not problematic71 because
the notion of universality of marriage72 is misconceived.
Whether or not Engdahl's view is accepted, the fact that the
result creates disharmony cannot be considered separately from
the other aspects of the result. As Clark73 says,
"Logical inconsistency need not bother us if a valid social 
policy is served."
We shall examine below74 forum policy in relation to remarriage
68 cf. The approach in the German decision, KG 13 Jan 1925,
JW 1925, 2146, brought by Palsson (chapter 1, n.121 supra) at
p.223, where it was held that whilst the original divorce decree 
was not recognised, the celebration of a valid remarriage by one 
of the parties had the effect of ending the first marriage from 
the date of the remarriage. Gordon (chapter 1, n.l supra) at p. 
151-153 supports such an approach.
69 Palsson ibid at pp. 216 and 225.
70 See chapter 1, n. 103 supra.
71 (1969) 55 Iowa L.Rev. 56. At p. 101 he gives other
examples of where marriages are recognised for some purposes and 
not others.
72 See Graveson (n. 57 supra) at pp. 234 - 238.
73 The Law of Domestic Relations 2nd. edn. (1987) para.
13.4.
74 At section III infra.
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following divorce.
We should also point out that in many cases inconsistency of 
status within the forum will be an entirely theoretical problem 
because the party's status will not in fact become an issue in 
the different circumstances postulated. Usually the parties to 
the first marriage which has been purported to be dissolved will 
not wish to assert that their marriage continues. Any claim, 
relying on the continued subsistence of that marriage, can be 
barred by the doctrine of preclusion75 where appropriate.
b) Where the lex causae does not recognise the decree 
In this situation too, there will be internal disharmony. As we 
saw in the Brentwood Marriage case, whilst the first marriage was 
no longer considered to be subsisting for any purposes as between 
the parties to it, in relation to the proposed remarriage the 
husband was still considered to be a married person. This 
inconsistency created by the English decision simply mimics the 
inconsistency76 of the Swiss position.
75 Discussed in detail at Chapter 6, II A 3 infra.
76 It may be argued that this position contains no 
inconsistency but merely distinguishes between the effect of a 
divorce decree in ending the legal relationship between the 
parties to the first marriage and the effect of a divorce decree 
as a licence to remarry. See Palsson (chapter 1, n.121 infra) at 
p. 240 and discussion at B 1 infra.
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A similar phenomenon can be seen from example M277. Evita is 
considered as a divorced person in England because the divorce 
is recognised. However, she cannot validly remarry whilst she 
retains her Argentinian domicile.
This practical problem is the converse of 'legal bigamy'. Thus, 
one78 or both79 parties are in a state of 'enforced legal 
celibacy' . The spouse in question is no longer married to his/her 
first spouse and cannot remarry80. (S)he is thus being denied 
the fundamental right of marriage81. The unfairness of this 
situation is exacerbated where the other party to the first 
marriage is free to remarry, as in the Brentwood Marriage case.
B. PREFER THE RECOGNITION RULE 
1. Theoretical Basis
It may be argued that, where the foreign decree is recognised, 
the recognition policy of the forum should be applied to its 
logical conclusion by giving 'full effect' to the foreign divorce
77 Chapter 1, III supra.
78 In the Brentwood Marriage case, it was only the husband 
who could not remarry because of his Italian nationality.
79 In example M2, Pedro also cannot remarry whilst he retains 
his Brazilian domicile.
80 This has been called 'legal schizophrenia', Palsson
(chapter 1, n.121 supra) at p. 256.
81 Khan Freund (chapter 1, n.103 supra at p. 293) writes
"The revulsion which one feels against this decision is not, 
however, caused by its treatment of the incidental question, but 
by its result which is inimical to the freedom of marriage."
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decree. Ackner L.J. expresses the logic as follows,
"I consider that it is plainly inconsistent with 
recognising a divorce to say in the same breath that the 
marriage which it purported to dissolve still continues in 
existence. Such a recognition would be a hollow and empty 
gesture"82
This rationale assumes that it is necessary to allow remarriage 
in order to give 'full effect7 to a matrimonial decree.
The basis for preferring the recognition rule where the decree 
is not recognised is much less clear.83 It has been suggested 
that the basis is the forum's interest in monogamy84. Thus, 
whilst the forum still considers the first marriage to be 
subsisting it cannot recognise the validity of the second 
marriage, even if it is valid by the law of the domicile85. 
Nott86 suggests that a distinction might be drawn in this 
situation between allowing remarriage in the forum, which would 
be tantamount to authorising bigamy and recognition of a 
foreign remarriage in which the forum has less interest.
82 [1985] Fam. 106 at p. 123 The same idea has been 
expressed variously as "the obvious consequences" (per Anthony 
Lincoln J. in Lawrence v Lawrence [1985] Fam. 106 at p. 112) and 
"the tail must go with the hide" (per Douglas J. in Estin v Estin 
334 U.S. 541, 68 S.Ct. 1213 (1948)).
83 We have already seen that the policy behind the non­
recognition rule does not necessarily require invalidation of 
the remarriage (chapter 3 III C supra).
84 See Palsson (chapter 1 n.121 supra) at p. 216.
85 See Jaffey (1979) 91 LQR 320 at p.322.
86 (1985) 15 Fam. Law 199 at p. 202.
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2. Authority
(a) Where the decree is recognised
Support for the 'full effect' or 'logical conclusion' approach
can be found in recent English caselaw and statute.
In the Court of Appeal case of Lawrence v Lawrence87, HI and W 
were at all material times domiciled in Brazil. W. obtained a 
divorce from Hi in Nevada. This divorce was not recognised in 
Brazil, but did satisfy the English recognition rules because 
of W's domicile in Nevada in the Nevada sense. The case 
concerned the validity of W's remarriage to H2, an English 
domiciliary. A majority of the Court of Appeal held that the 
recognition of the divorce by virtue of the 1971 Recognition of 
Divorce and Legal Separations Act 1971 carried with it the 
right to remarry and thus the second marriage was valid. The 
minority in the Court of Appeal and the first instance Judge 
came to the same conclusion on different grounds88.
Whether or not this approach in fact represented English law at 
the time of the decision in Lawrence is open to doubt. In 
particular, it will be noted that the decision appears to be 
irreconcilable with that in the Brentwood Marriage case. There 
are, however, two possible ways in which the cases might be 
distinguished.
Firstly, it might be argued that it is the wording of the 1971 
Act89 which requires the conclusion that recognition of the
87 [1985] Fam. 106.
88 i.e. that the essential validity of the second marriage
was governed by English law as the law of the intended 
matrimonial home or the law with the most real and substantial 
connection to the marriage (see section I C supra).
89 i.e. that in section 3 of the 1971 Act (now section 46 
Family Law Act 1986) where it is stated that, "the validity of 
an overseas divorce... shall be recognised" the word divorce 
must be taken to have the same meaning as divorce in English
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divorce automatically confers freedom to remarry. This seems to 
be the basis of Sir David Cairn's judgment90, which is narrower 
on this point than Ackner L.J.'s. Since the divorce in the 
Brentwood Marriage case was recognised under common law prior 
to the 1971 Act, this conclusion did not follow there.
Secondly, the Brentwood case concerned the question of a priori 
permission to remarry whereas Lawrence concerned the ex post 
facto recognition of a second marriage which had already taken 
place. It might be argued that the policy of giving 'full 
effect' to the foreign divorce is more important where the 
parties have already relied on that divorce in order to effect 
a second marriage91. However, it is clear that neither of the 
majority in Lawrence purported to make such a distinction.
It is therefore submitted that both of these apparent 
distinctions merely attempt to disguise the fact that the 
policy in the two cases is diametrically opposed. In the 
Brentwood case, precedence was accorded to the domicile choice
domestic law unless the contrary is stated.
90 He interprets divorce in section 3 as denoting 
dissolution with the consequential right to marry again, as in 
English domestic law. (see at [1985] Fam. 106 at p. 135 C-D of 
the judgement).
91 This view was taken by German Courts prior to 1971 (see 
Palsson, chapter 1, n.121 supra, at p. 232). But cf. Clarkson
(1990) 10 Legal Studies 80 at p. 82 who claims that there is 
no justification for applying more lenient rules to the ex post 
facto situation, because taken to its logical conclusion this 
approach would require recognition of all marriages.
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rule; whereas in Lawrence precedence was accorded to the
recognition rule. This conclusion can be supported by reference
to the case of Perrini92.
In this case, Wl, an American domiciled in New Jersey 
obtained a nullity decree from H, an Italian national, in
the New Jersey courts. This decree was entitled to
recognition in England on the basis of Wl's residence in
New jersey for more than three years, but was not 
recognised in Italy. H. subsequently remarried W2, an
English domiciliary, in England. It was held at first 
instance that the second marriage was valid.
The main problem with this decision is that the conflict
between the recognition rule and the choice rule does not seem
to have been perceived by the Judge who does not mention the
Brentwood case. However, the mere fact that Sir George Baker P.
simply treated the case as a recognition case suggests that he
agreed with the conclusion later reached by Ackner L.J. that
recognition of a foreign divorce or nullity decree confers
capacity to remarry. Since the case concerned common law
recognition rules, Sir David Cairns' 'via media' could not
apply.
Whether or not Lawrence and Perrini were correctly decided at 
the time, the enactment of section 50 Family Law Act 1986 has 
ensured that the decisions would today be correct. However, 
these pre-section 50 decisions are not only of historical 
interest for two reasons. Firstly, as already seen they give us 
some insight into the basis for giving precedence to the
[1979] Fam. 84.
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recognition rule and secondly, they may be relevant where the 
case falls outside section 50 as explained below.
Section 50 Family Law Act 1986 states:
"Where in any part of the United Kingdom-
(a) a divorce or annulment has been granted by a court of 
civil jurisdiction, or
(b) the validity of a divorce or annulment is recognised 
by virtue of this Part93
the fact that the divorce or annulment would not be 
recognised elsewhere shall not preclude either party to 
the marriage from re-marrying in that part of the United 
Kingdom or cause the remarriage of either party (wherever 
the re-marriage takes place) to be treated as invalid in 
that part."
This provision replaces section 7 of the Recognition of 
Divorces and Legal Separation Act 1971 which was limited to 
persons re-marrying in the United Kingdom after a foreign 
divorce. The anomalies caused by this limitation94 can be seen 
by the fact that section would have applied to the facts of the 
Brentwood case, but did not apply in Lawrence. Indeed this 
discrepancy may help to explain the attitude of the Court of 
Appeal in the latter case95.
93 i.e. Part II of the Family Law Act 1986.
94 Discussed in more detail at C infra.
95 Sir David Cairns ([1985] Fam. 106 at p. 135) claims
that it would be absurd if the divorce enabled the wife to 
remarry in England but not in Nevada. However, the ratio of the 
majority in the Court of Appeal in Lawrence appears to render 
section 7 of the 1971 Act redundant. Sir David Cairns overcomes 
this difficulty by suggesting that section 7 was strictly 
unnecessary and was enacted to avoid any doubt for the benefit 
of Marriage Registrars requested to celebrate marriages after 
foreign divorces, cf. Purchas L.J. (at p. 131).
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Thus, in searching for the policy behind section 50, it is
helpful first to consider the history of section 7. The 1971
Act was enacted to give effect to the 1970 Hague Convention on
Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations, the objective of
which was to increase recognition of divorces and legal
separations in the member states and thus to reduce limping
marriages. Article 11 of the Convention provides:
"A State which is obliged to recognize a divorce under 
this Convention may not preclude either spouse from 
remarrying on the ground that the law of another State 
does not recognize that divorce."
This seems to have been understood by the United Kingdom96 as
only requiring a State to allow remarriage in that State
following ' a recognized foreign decree. But, as the Law
Commission points out97, the Article is ambiguously phrased and
could be interpreted as precluding a State from not recognizing
the validity of a foreign remarriage following a recognized
decree. Thus, it is suggested, that the Law Commission could
have based its recommendation to extend section 7 to cover all
remarriages on this ambiguity98 and on the anomalies caused by
96 Most of the other Contracting States apparently did not
find it necessary to make any special provision to comply with 
Article 11 because their law already preferred the recognition 
rule. See Palsson (chapter 1, n.121 supra) at p. 254. cf.
Australian Family Law Act 1975 s.104 (9) . It is also of interest 
that none of the pre-1970 Commonwealth legislation has any 
provision regulating the validity of remarriages. See McClean 
(chapter 3-, n.21 supra) at pp. 61 et seer.
97 Law Com. 137 at para. 6.55.
98 Although Article 11 clearly does not apply to
remarriages after English divorces, the inclusion of such cases 
within section 50 could have been explained on the basis of the
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the limitations in section 7. Nonetheless, the Law Commission
went further and clearly supported
"the policy that where a divorce or annulment is 
recognised in this country, the parties should be free to 
remarry, whether here or abroad, even though regarded as 
incapable by the law of their domicile because of non­
recognition there of the divorce or annulment."
What is perhaps strange is that the Commission does not attempt
to justify their support for this policy other than by
asserting, without proffering any evidence, that there would
seem to have been general agreement as to this policy. With
respect, the Brentwood Marriage case itself together with the
fact that in 1971 the Bill submitted to Parliament included the
limited section 7 instead of the wider version suggested at
that time by the Law Commission" contradict this assertion.
What is clear is that section 50, which enacted the Law
Commission's 1984 recommendation on widening section 7, is
based on a policy of giving precedence to the recognition rule.
(b) Where the decree is not recognised
The only English case which might appear to support application 
of the recognition rule in the situation where the foreign
limited policy of giving full effect to decrees of the forum 
(but cf. infra at C 2 (b)).
99 Clause 7 of the Draft Bill (Law Com. 34 at p.40) simply
states that "neither spouse should be precluded from 
remarrying" Whilst there is no geographical limitation in the 
clause, it does not expressly state that foreign remarriages 
will be recognised as does s.50 Family Law Act 1976. Thus, its 
meaning was ambiguous.
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decree is not recognised by the forum is Shaw v Gould100. In 
this case, the Scottish divorce decree was not recognised in 
England. However, the 'conflict of rules' problem did not in 
fact arise in that case for two reasons. Firstly, the real 
issue was one of succession and the succession in question was 
governed by English law101. Secondly, even if the real issue 
had been one of capacity to marry, the wife's capacity to 
remarry was in fact governed by English law. She could not 
obtain a domicile of choice in Scotland because according to 
English law she still had a domicile dependent on her first 
husband.
However, Palsson's survey102 among European countries reveals 
that in general the recognition rule has been preferred and the 
re-marriage not recognised103. The Law Commission in their 
Consultation Paper104 had recommended that this rule should be 
adopted. However, because of opposition at the consultation
100 (18 6 8) LR 3 H L 55.
101 The testator died domiciled in England and the 
succession was in relation to movables.
102 Op. cit. (chapter 1, n.121) at pp 213 - 216.
103 Although he does point out that, in most of the cases, 
the capacity of the other party to the second marriage was 
governed by the lex fori as either the lex domicilii or lex 
patriae. So the decisions could be explained on the basis that 
the impediment of the prior marriage was treated as bilateral 
and rendered the other party incapable by his/her personal law.
104 (1983) unpublished (see chapter 3, n. 112 supra) at 
para. 6.50.
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stage, this recommendation was not contained in the Report. 
Thus, section 50 only covers cases of recognition of foreign 
decrees and leaves unclear what would be the result in a 
Schwebel type cases.
3. Results
The remarriage will be recognised and will therefore limp 
between the forum and the law of the domicile, which does not 
recognise its validity. Thus, in example M2105 the marriage 
limps between England and Argentina.
It might be argued that in many cases the remarriage will limp 
already if the decree-granting jurisdiction recognises the re­
marriage. Thus, in example M3106, the marriage already limps 
between Israel and Russia. However, this result will not follow 
if the decree granting jurisdiction itself prefers the choice 
rule to its own decree.107 Thus, in example M2, if Mexico 
applies the law of the nationality to determine the validity of 
the marriage there will be no limp.
Where the marriage does already limp, the decision of the forum 
will determine whether the marriage limps between the forum and
105 At chapter 1 III supra.
106 Ibid.
107 This was the position of Swiss law in the Brentwood 
Marriage case.
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the domicile or between the forum and the decree-granting 
jurisdiction. On one view, once the marriage limps the harm is 
already done and whatever the forum decides will not make any 
difference. On the other hand, it might be crucial which way 
the marriage limps because the limp will only cause actual 
hardship if the parties have a real interest in the views of 
both of those jurisdictions as to the validity of their 
marriage. Thus, where they no longer have a connection with the 
decree-granting jurisdiction, as in example M2, it can be 
argued that a limp with that country does not matter as much as 
a limp with the domicile which will continue to have an 
interest in the status of the parties. On the other hand, where 
the parties retain a strong connection with the decree granting 
jurisdiction a limp between the forum and that jurisdiction may 
be more serious than a limp with the domicile.
Also, the degree of hardship caused by the limp depends on the 
circumstances in which the validity of the marriage is called 
into question. One major problem is that it is impossible to 
foresee the future and so it is not known when the question of 
validity in a particular jurisdiction will arise. If the second 
marriage limps there would always seem to be the potential for 
abuse by one party. For example, on the breakdown of the second 
marriage, a deserting husband might choose to move to a country 
where the second marriage is not recognised because his 
financial obligations to his second wife cannot be enforced
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against him there.
b) Where the decree is not recognised
The effect of applying the recognition rule would be that the 
remarriage is invalid with the result that the second marriage 
limps as between the forum and the domicile. In example Ml,108 
the remarriage would limp as between Israel and England.
The Law Commission in their Report dismiss this problem by 
explaining that it is very unlikely to arise for two
reasons109. Firstly, the United Kingdom's liberal recognition 
laws mean that few foreign divorces are not recognised.
Secondly, where the remarriage takes place in the United
Kingdom, capacity by the lex loci celebrationis is required in 
addition to capacity by the domicile. The Commission further 
justifies its inaction by reference to the Australian
legislation110 which is in similar terms to what is now Family 
Law Act 1986 section 50. With respect, the Law Commission's 
reasons are not convincing. We have already seen that the 
English rules for recognition of divorces are significantly 
more restrictive than their Australian counterparts111, in 
particular with respect to informal divorces. Secondly, there
108 Chapter 1, III supra.
109 Law Com. No. 137 at para. 6.60.
110 Family Law Act 1975 s. 104 (9) .
111 Section I B 1 supra.
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is no clear authority that capacity by the lex loci 
celebrationis (even where it is part of the United Kingdom) is 
required112 . Apart from this, the question of validity of a 
second marriage contracted abroad after a non-recognised decree 
is just as likely, if not more so113, to arise.
We have already demonstrated that the policy behind 'non­
recognition rules'114 does not necessarily require 
invalidation of the second marriage and that, on the contrary, 
invalidation may harm the 'victim' whom the non-recognition 
rule is designed to protect. Everything will depend on the 
circumstances and who is denying the validity of the decree. 
Thus, automatic preference for the recognition rule could lead 
to hardship. Maybe this was why, at the end of the day, the Law 
Commission left the problem to the Courts.
C. A 'DIFFERENTIAL RULE'
1. Introduction
Under a differential approach, the choice of rule is preferred 
in some fact situations and in others the recognition rule
1 Law Com. W.P. 89 para 3.8 and Clarkson (1990) 10
Legal Studies 80.
113 The very fact that the decree is not recognised in 
England means that the parties are likely to remarry in a 
country where it is recognised.
114 Chapter 3 III B supra.
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prevails. English law probably115 did and possibly still 
does116 adopt such an approach to the 'conflict of rules' 
problem.
The clearest example of a differential approach is section 7 
of The Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations Act 1971. 
This purports to apply the recognition rule where the 
remarriage takes place in England after a foreign decree. Thus, 
the common law preference for the choice rule117 would have 
remained applicable where (a) the remarriage was abroad or (b) 
the remarriage followed an English decree or (c) the remarriage 
followed a foreign nullity (as opposed to divorce) decree.
It has alr.eady been seen that whilst section 50 Family Law Act 
1986 removes the above distinctions in respect of marriage 
following divorces which are recognised, it maintains the 
silence of section 7 of the 1971 Act in respect of decrees 
which are not recognised. Thus, we are again left with a 
differential approach. Where the divorce is recognised, the 
recognition rule is applied. Where the divorce is not 
recognised by the forum, the choice rule is applied. We shall 
call this differentiation (d).
115 The doubt is caused by the decision in Lawrence v
Lawrence [1985] Fam. 106, which seems to treat section 7 of the 
Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations Act 1971 as 
redundant or merely declaratory.
116 If the choice rule is preferred in the Schwebel v Ungar 
situation (see example Ml at chapter 1 III supra).
117 See A2 supra.
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2. The Possible Bases for Differentiation
We will examine these four bases for differentiation in turn:-
(a) The place of the remarriage
The apparent118 discrepancy between the treatment of 
remarriages in the United Kingdom119 and those abroad under 
section 7 of the Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations 
Act 1971 was perceived by many120 including the Law 
Commission121 as anomalous. The differential approach of 
section 7 is however supported by Carter122. Whilst in general 
denigrating any rule which accords preference for the 
recognition rule he suggests that such preference can be 
justified in the narrow circumstances provided for by section 
7. He argues that the marriage is only likely to be celebrated 
in England if at least one party is domiciled and the marriage 
has a real and substantial connection with England. Hence, 
application of the forum's recognition rules is justifiable.
With respect, the first part of Carter's explanation is 
difficult to accept. In the situation which he envisages,
118 See n.118 supra.
119 For convenience we will refer below to celebration in
England.
120 See, for example, the concluding comment of Sir David
Cairns in Lawrence v Lawrence [1985] Fam. 106 at p. 135E.
121 Law Com. No. 137 para. 6.56.
section 7 is not needed to validate the remarriage in England. 
The party whose incapacity is in doubt cannot be domiciled in 
England because then there would not be any discrepancy between 
the choice rule and the recognition rule. Where the party whose 
incapacity is not in doubt is domiciled in the United Kingdom, 
the marriage will in any event be valid under the rule in 
Sottomeyer v De Barros (No. 2)123.
The second part of his explanation might however provide a 
sound policy base for the differential approach in section 7, 
which could then be justified as follows. In cases where there 
is no prior connection between the parties and the forum, the 
supremacy of the domicile principle applies to the question of 
the validity of the remarriage; whereas if the remarriage takes 
place in the United Kingdom, this provides sufficient 
connection with the forum for it to prefer its own recognition 
rules to that of the domicile. Academic124 and judicial 
support125 for the interest of the forum in the capacity of 
the parties where it is also the lex loci celebrationis can be 
found. On the other hand, this justification of the rule almost 
encourages forum shopping. Where parties know that a marriage 
will not be recognised by the law of the domicile because of
123 (1879) 5 PD 94.
124 See Clarkson [1990] 10 Legal Studies 80 and references
therein at p. 83.
125 Sottomeyer v De Barros (No. 2) (1879) 5 PD 94.
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non-recognition of a foreign decree, they can come to England 
to get remarried even if they had no prior connection with 
England provided that the foreign decree is recognised by the 
relatively liberal English recognition rules. It would seem 
that discouragement of such forum shopping was one of the 
reasons why the Court in the Brentwood Marriage case126 
refused to allow the parties to remarry in England.
With respect, the Brentwood approach is to be preferred. The 
mere fact that the marriage is celebrated in England should not 
in itself affect whether precedence is given to choice of law 
rules or recognition rules. However, a different view may be 
taken where the fact of the celebration of the marriage in 
England is indicative of a real and substantial connection with 
the country. An appropriate test might be either that England 
is the intended matrimonial home of the parties or that one of 
them has been habitually resident in England for one year.
Thus, it is suggested that a differential approach cannot be 
justified if it depends entirely on whether the remarriage was 
celebrated in the forum. Only where there is some further 
connection with the forum, as suggested above, could the 
displacement of the choice rule in favour of the recognition
[1968] 2 QB 956.
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rule be justified127. It might be noted that this idea is 
really a rejection of the domicile rule where the forum is seen 
to be more closely connected with the issue128. Thus, a 
similar result might be achieved by replacing the domicile 
choice rule with a real and substantial connection129 rule. 
There would then be no need for this differential approach 
because the choice rules would anyway require that English law 
is to be applied in the circumstances in which it is envisaged 
above that the recognition rule should displace the choice 
rule.
(b) The place of the decree130
Although the question has never directly arisen, there are weak 
dicta in Breen v Breen131 which may indicate that the choice 
rule should apply to a foreign remarriage following an English 
decree. Nonetheless, commentators132 seem to have assumed
127 This idea of displacing a foreign governing law in 
favour of the law of the forum where the latter is more closely 
connected to the issue can be found in relation to the choice 
of law rule for torts in the House of Lords' decision in Boys v 
Chaplin [1971] A.C. 356.
128 Just as the Boys v Chaplin 'exception' is a rejection
of the lex loci delicti where the forum (or in theory some
other law) is more closely connected.
129 See supra at I C.
130 See supra at chapter 1 VI.
131 [1964] P. 144.
132 Law Com. No. 137 para. 6.56; Cheshire and North
(chapter 1, n.l supra) p. 592 and Lipstein [1972B] CLJ 67 at 
p.95. This problem has caused much difficulty in various
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that, notwithstanding the wording of section 7, where a 
remarriage followed an English divorce or nullity decree the 
parties would automatically be accorded capacity to remarry, 
regardless of the choice of law rules, without any better 
justification than that it would "seem right" to do so133. 
This seems to be an assertion of the 'full effect' or 'logical 
conclusion' argument which is the basis of giving precedence to 
the recognition rule in all cases134. The question here is 
whether, if that argument is not accepted generally, there is 
any particular reason why, on a differential approach, it 
should apply to remarriages following English decrees. Two 
possible reasons might be suggested for treating remarriages 
following English decrees differently. The first is that such 
decrees are intrinsically in some way of greater weight than 
foreign decrees and the second that as matter of policy a Court 
should give 'full effect' to its own decrees even if it does 
not give 'full effect' to foreign decrees which it recognises.
(i) 'English decrees are of greater weight.'
If the jurisdiction rules for granting decrees are narrower 
than those for recognising decrees, it could be argued that an 
English decree involves a stronger connection with the parties
European countries, in particular Germany and Switzerland. See 
Palsson (chapter 1, n.121 supra) at pp. 229 et. seq.
133 See Cheshire and North ibid at p.592.
134 See B 1 supra.
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than a foreign decree, which therefore justifies the decree 
overriding the law of the domicile. In fact, as we have seen, 
recognition rules in respect of formal divorces are more 
liberal in that decrees granted in the country of nationality, 
habitual residence for less than one year and domicile in the 
sense of the decree-granting jurisdiction will be recognised, 
although none of these bases are sufficient for jurisdiction in 
England and Wales.
However, the argument is defective, partly because of the 
artificial nature of domicile. Whilst domicile in the English 
sense may involve a greater connection than domicile in the 
foreign sense135, the converse might equally be true136. 
Moreover, it does not seem possible to differentiate between 
those foreign decrees where jurisdiction is based on domicile 
or habitual residence for one year and English decrees.
(ii) Policy
It is clearly undesirable that a legal system should in one 
breath grant a person a divorce and in the next refuse to allow 
him/her to remarry because such a divorce is not recognised by 
the law of the domicile. However, it might be argued that this 
phenomenon is no more than a manifestation of the general
135 See, e.g. in Lawrence v Lawrence [1985] Fam. 106, where 
domicile in Nevada was acquired after 6 weeks residence, which 
was only intended to be temporary.
136 For example where a domicile of origin has revived.
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'internal disharmony' problem which, as we have seen137, 
arises from according precedence to the choice rules. In which 
case, if, despite the inconsistency problem, the choice rule is 
preferred there is no reason to distinguish between forum 
decrees and foreign decrees.
On the other hand, the view might be taken that inconsistency 
between the forum's decree and the party's status is more 
serious than where the inconsistency arises from the 
recognition of a foreign decree. In particular, parties will 
invariably expect that a divorce in England will allow them to 
remarry or have a remarriage recognised in England; whereas 
they might not automatically assume that a divorce abroad will 
enable them to remarry or have their remarriage recognised in 
England.
Thus, it may be possible to justify a preference for the 
forum's domestic law over the choice rule on the basis of 
'conflicts justice'138 , even if the choice rule takes 
precedence over recognition rules in relation to foreign 
decrees.
(c) Type of Decree
It is clear that the reason that section 7 only applied to
137 See at A 3 supra.
138 See chapter 2 II C supra.
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divorce and not nullity decrees is because the 1971 Act itself 
did not deal with nullity decrees rather than because of any 
deliberate policy to distinguish between the effects of the two 
types of decree on capacity to remarry. However, the decision 
in Perrini139 was justified by some commentators140 on the 
basis that it concerned a nullity decree rather than a divorce 
decree as in the Brentwood Marriage case141. But there is no 
explanation as to why there should be any difference between 
the two types of decree.
From a private international law perspective, the main 
difference between divorce and nullity is that nowadays the lex 
fori frequently governs the former142, whereas the personal 
law at the time of the first marriage, at least where the 
marriage is alleged to be void as opposed to voidable, usually 
governs the latter. It might be argued that where the foreign 
court has applied the parties' personal law rather than its own 
law qua lex fori the decree somehow has greater weight, which 
justifies giving precedence to the recognition rules. However, 
this argument is anathema to the general principle of not
139 [1979] Fam. 84 (discussed at B 2 supra) .
140 See, for example, Young (1980) 24 ICLQ 515, 518.
141 [1968] 2 QB 596 (discussed at A2 supra) .
142 Palsson, International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law,
Volume III Chapter 16 at para. 16-125 et. seq., explains that 
many Continental jurisdictions have modified the nationality 
choice rule to such an extent that the law of the forum usually 
applies.
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examining the intrinsic merits of foreign judgments. 
Application of the personal law rather than the lex fori
reduces the likelihood of conflict between choice and
recognition rules. In any event, there are far fewer nullity 
decrees than divorces granted. However, it is not clear why the 
reduced likelihood of the 'conflict of rules7 situation arising 
indicates that a different principle should govern when it 
does143.
(d) Whether or not the decree is recognised by the forum.
We will assume that the result of the enactment of section 50 
of the Family Law Act 1986 is that the recognition rule applies 
where the decree is recognised and that the choice rule applies 
where the decree is not recognised.144
This differential rule may be justified on the basis that the 
'full effect7 doctrine only applies when the decree is
recognised. We have seen that whilst the policy of recognising
a decree may require that capacity to remarry is
conferred145, the converse is not true.146
143 On the contrary, the Family Law Act 1986 deliberately 
places recognition of foreign nullity decrees and foreign 
divorce decrees on the same footing despite the differences 
mentioned above (see discussion at Law Com 137 paras. 5.12- 
5.13.)
144 See n.119 supra.
145 At B 1 supra.
146 At chapter 3, III C supra.
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3. Conclusion about 'Differential Rules'
It may be concluded that the first and third bases of 
differentiation cannot be supported. The second basis might be 
supportable, but as it merely enables differentiation between 
forum decrees and foreign decrees, it assumes a preference for 
the choice of law rule in respect of the latter. Thus, for our 
purposes, it is identical with the first preference rule. 
However, the fourth basis, which reflects the assumed 
consequences of section 50 Family Law Act 1986, could provide a 
sound preference rule. Thus, throughout this thesis 'the 
differential rule' will mean according precedence to the 
recognition rule where it leads to recognition and otherwise to 
the choice rule.
D. PREFER THE RULE WHICH UPHOLDS THE VALIDITY OF THE MARRIAGE
The principle of upholding the validity of the marriage has 
been supported by a number of writers147. The reason given is 
because of the general social policy in favour of marriage. The 
presumption in favour of validity is usually considered to 
apply once a marriage has already been celebrated rather than 
when the parties are seeking permission to celebrate a
147 Law Com. W.P. 89 para 2.35(e); Hartley (1972) 35 MLR
571; Jaffey, (1978) 41 M.L.R. 38; Scoles and Hay, (n.18 supra) 
at p. 416 and Palsson (chapter 1 n.121 supra) at p. 18. The 
decision in the German case mentioned at n.68 supra would seem 
to be based on the policy of upholding the validity of the 
remarriage.
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marriage148.
It may however be argued that the presumption should apply 
equally to the first marriage. Thus, it does not help us to 
decide which marriage should be upheld. It is suggested that 
this argument is fallacious for the following reasons. 
Firstly, the presumption relates to the validity ab initio of 
the marriage and therefore does not have any relevance in 
relation to whether a valid marriage has been terminated149. 
Secondly, in so far as there is a presumption of the continued 
validity of the first marriage, it may be countered by a 
presumption of the validity of the foreign divorce.150 
Thirdly, the recognition of the second marriage does not 
necessarily mean that the first marriage should be considered 
as terminated for all purposes. Once it is recognised that 
marriage and divorce need not be universal151, it is possible 
to allow the continuation of marital rights arising from the
148 Law Commission ibid.
149 In Hussain v Rahman 10th. October 1980 (Lexis) , the
Court clearly wished to uphold the validity of the second 
marriage, despite the lack of any clear evidence that the first 
marriage had been dissolved.
150 See Powell v Cockburn (1976) 68 DLR 3d 700 at p. 706.
Clark (supra n. 73) at p. 136 states that the presumption that
the latest of successive marriage is valid prevails over the 
other presumptions of validation of marriage.
151 See North (chapter 5, n.58 supra) at p. 132-3.
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first marriage where it is just to do so152, whilst also 
recognising the second marriage. Thirdly, to the extent that 
the recognition of the second marriage is inconsistent with the 
continued subsistence of the first,153 there may be policy 
reasons for preferring the second marriage, to which the 
presumption would give effect.
Ill POLICY
A. THE PRESENT LAW154
The sole ground for divorce is irretrievable breakdown of 
marriage. This can be proved by five alternative facts of which 
three are virtually identical to the old matrimonial 
offences155 and two involve periods of separation. The 
substitution of the breakdown principle for the doctrine of 
the matrimonial offence was recommended by the Law Commission 
to enable "the empty legal shell" of broken marriages "to be 
destroyed with the maximum fairness, and the minimum 
bitterness, distress and humiliation."156
152 Below, we will be seeking to construct result-oriented 
preference rules for this purposes in relation to succession, 
matrimonial property and claims in tort in Chapters 7, 8 and 9 
respectively.
153 For example, a Court would not be able to order the 
spouse who has remarried to cohabit with the first spouse.
154 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 ss.l - 10, reenacting
Divorce Reform Act 1969.
155 Adultery, cruelty (now behaviour) and desertion.
156 The Field of Choice, Law Com. No. 6 at para. 14
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It is clear, both from the Law Commission's Report157 and from 
the Parliamentary debates158 on the bill that one of the 
motivating factors behind the reform was to enable those whose 
marriages had broken down to be able to remarry. In particular, 
there was concern about the number of illicit stable unions, 
which were thought159 to be a result of the restrictive 
divorce law, and the resultant illegitimate offspring. Thus, 
one of the main reasons for enabling dead marriages to be 
buried was in order to facilitate remarriage. In other words, 
the focus of divorce law had started to shift from concern 
about the • reason for the breakdown of the first marriage to 
concern about second relationships.
The main160 limitation to the 'burying dead marriages' policy
157 Ibid para. 33 et seq.
158 See, for example, 775 H.C. Debs, Divorce Reform Bill
(17.12.68) at col. 1062 per Mr.D. Weitzman and at col. 1091 per 
Mr. D. Awdry. Also, 784 H.C. Debs Divorce Reform Bill (12.6.69) 
at col. 203 per Mr. D. Awdry and at col. 207 per Mr. L. Abse.
159 The fact that non-marital cohabitation continued to
increase after the liberalisation of the divorce law (See 
Social Trends 18 (1988), Central Statistical Office) suggests
that this assumption was not correct.
160 In addition, the grant of the decree absolute could be
delayed in two situations
(a) Where the divorce is on the basis of two years or five 
years separation and the Respondent shows that insufficient 
financial provision has been made for him/her by the 
Petitioner. (Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 s.10) Since usually 
the Petitioner can obtain proper provision through an
application for financial provision, this section is rarely 
used.
(b) In exceptional circumstances where it is desirable in the 
interests of the child for the decree to be delayed
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is the 'hardship bar". The Court may refuse to grant a decree 
on the basis of five years' separation where it would cause 
grave financial or other hardship to the respondent and it 
would in all the circumstances be wrong to dissolve the 
marriage.161 This provision prefers the interests of the 
'innocent' Respondent to the general policy. However, apart 
from the fact that only a small percentage of decree are based 
on five years' separation162, the provision has been
interpreted very restrictively163 and in practice is only 
likely164 to be successfully invoked where the parties are 
middle aged and there is the loss165 of the expectation of a 
widow's occupational pension166 for which the husband is
(Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 s.41 (2), as amended by the 
Children Act 1989 Sched. 12 para. 31).
161 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 s.5.
162 The figure has gradually dropped from 11.6% in 1971 to
5.5% in 1989. The statistics do not show fact relied on after 
1989.
163 The fact that divorce has been contrary to the
Respondent's religious beliefs has not been sufficient 
hardship. See Rukat v Rukat [1975] Fam. 63 and Banik v Banik 
[1973] 1 WLR 860.
164 Even if grave financial hardship is made out it may
still not be 'wrong' to dissolve the marriage. See e.g.
Brickell v Brickell [1974] Fam. 31 and Matthias v Matthias 
[1972] Fam. 287, 299 et seq.
165 The loss must be a net loss to the wife. Thus, there
will not be considered to be a loss where any payments to the
wife would result in a pro tanto loss of social security
benefits, Reiterbund v Reiterbund [1975] Fam. 99 and Jackson v 
Jackson [1993] 2 FLR 848.
166 As in Julian v Julian (1972) 116 S.J. 763.
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unable to compensate by other means167. Otherwise, it has been 
recognised that it is the separation which causes the hardship 
and not the divorce itself.
Thus, it can be seen that the present law gives precedence to 
second marriages, subject to limited protection for first 
spouses. Only in exceptional circumstances should the first 
spouse be protected by keeping the dead marriage alive.
B. THE LAW COMMISSION'S PROPOSALS168
Divorce would be granted on the petition of either or both 
parties after a set period of reflection and consideration169 
has elapsed on the basis of a statement that the marriage has 
irretrievably broken down, without requiring any proof thereof.
The Law Commission's work confirms the shift away from the 
question as to whether or not a marriage can be terminated. 
However, 'illicit stable unions' are no longer seen as a social 
problem in the same way as in 1966. Rather, it has been
167 For example, taking out an annuity as in Le Marchant v
Le Marchant [1977] 1 WLR 559.
168 Law Com No. 192 (1990) , canvassed by the Government in
a Green Paper, "Looking to the Future" Cmnd. 2424 (Lord
Chancellor's
Dept. 1993).
169 The period recommended is one year.
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realised that the process of divorce170 can have long term 
effects on the parties and their children. Thus, today171 the 
emphasis is placed on the method of burying dead marriages, 
i.e. ensuring that the burial172 is as humane as possible so 
that the parties can get on to make a new start in life after 
their failed marriage. Thus, it is taken for granted that the 
central concern is about future relationships. It is not 
sufficient simply to validate second marriages, but also to put 
the parties in the right frame of mind to maximise their chance 
of success. The title of the recent Government Green Paper, 
"Looking to the Future"173 aptly describes this policy.
It might be thought that a number of aspects of the proposed 
scheme detract from the principle of burying dead marriages. 
Firstly, the introduction of the waiting period means that some 
spouses would have to wait longer to get a divorce174.
170 Divorce is seen as part of a massive transition, which 
divorce law should make as smooth as possible for the parties 
and their children (Law Com. No. 170 para. 3.50).
171 The Field of Choice also called for marriages to be
dissolved with the maximum fairness and minimum bitterness. 
However, the retention of the fault based grounds meant that 
this aim was not realised. See Law. Com. No. 170 paras. 3.13- 
3.27.
172 The 'burial' involves not only obtaining a decree but
also sorting out all the ancillary matters, such as children 
and property.
173 Supra n. 168 .
174 At present fault-based divorces may be obtained in a
few months ("Looking to the Future" ibid para. 5.2.) .
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Secondly, the Court, on application of one of the parties, 
would be able to extend the one year period where this would be 
desirable in order to enable proper arrangements to be made in 
relation to the children or financial provision175. Thirdly, 
the existing hardship bar would be retained and would become 
available in relation to all divorces176.
However, it is suggested that in fact these do not indicate any 
change in the policy of giving precedence to second marriages. 
One of the reasons that the parties may be required to wait a 
little longer is so that the second marriage is more likely to 
start out on the right footing177.
IV APPLICATION OF POLICY
It is submitted that the 'bury dead marriages' and 'looking to 
the future' policies outlined above both require that, where 
the first marriage has in fact broken down and a second 
marriage has been entered into after a dissolution (whether 
that dissolution is in fact recognised in English law or not), 
it is the second marriage (the 'alive' marriage) which should 
be recognised in preference to the first (the 'dead' marriage).
175 Law Com. No. 192 para. 5.58 and cl. 6 of Draft Bill.
176 Ibid para. 5.72 - 577 and cl. 4 of the Draft Bill.
There is provision for the bar to be revoked if circumstances 
change.
177 See "Looking to the Future" (n.168 supra) .
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Whilst it is more than possible that by the time the issue 
reaches Court, the second marriage may also be 'dead'178, 
policy would seem to dictate that the one which has been 'dead' 
the longest should be buried first. Alternatively, it might be 
considered that the relevant time for deciding which marriage 
is to be preferred is at the date of the second marriage179.
Forum policy can be implemented by adoption of either 'the 
differential rule'180 or the express result selection rule of 
upholding the validity of the marriage181. The former is 
tentatively preferred because the rule itself may be supported 
independently of the result.
It must be stressed that the rule recommended here only applies 
to the conflict between choice rules and recognition rules in 
relation to the validity of the remarriage. It does not attempt 
to solve this conflict, for example, in relation to succession
178 Frequently, the issue of the validity of the second
marriage comes to light because one party wants a decree of 
nullity on the ground of bigamy. See, for example, Schwebel v 
Unger (1964) 48 DLR (2d) 644 and Lawrence v Lawrence [1985]
Fam. 106.
179 This seems to be the approach taken by the putative 
marriage doctrine applied in some countries. For example, in 
Stephens v Falchi [1938] 3 DLR 590, the second husband could 
succeed to the estate by virtue of the doctrine even though the 
divorce was not recognised and the second marriage was 
therefore void. The second marriage had also broken down before 
the death of the wife.
180 Supra at C 3.
181 Supra at D.
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or financial or property issues. Thus, whilst deciding that the 
remarriage is a valid monogamous marriage, this does not mean 
that the first spouse might not retain entitlement to some 
rights from the first marriage, for example in relation to 
succession, maintenance and pension rights. Where entitlement 
to these rights is governed by the law of a foreign country, a 
'conflict of rules" may arise, which will have to be solved by 
a preference rule which reflects the policy in relation to that 
particular issue182. Where entitlement to these rights is 
governed by the law of the forum183, then there is no
'conflict of rules" and if the forum does not recognise the
decree, the first wife should retain her marital rights184.
It is suggested that the possibility of the first spouse 
retaining rights, despite the validity of the remarriage,
reflects the policy of domestic law of giving precedence to 
second marriages and, wherever possible, providing protection 
for the first spouse by means other than keeping alive a dead 
marriage.
See Chapters 7, 8 and 9 below.
183 Either qua lex fori or because the relevant choice rule
points to the forum.
184 Unless the doctrine of preclusion is applied to such
cases. See chapter 7 II A 3 infra. The problem of two 'spouses" 
sharing rights is discussed in relation to specific issues at
chapter 7 I C and Chapter 8 I E infra.
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V. RECOMMENDATION
The preference rule recommended is the differential rule, under 
which the recognition rule prevails where the decree is 
recognised and the choice rule prevails where the decree is not 
recognised. It will be noticed that this solution is consistent 
with section 50 of the Family Law Act 1986, but goes further 
than that section by providing for cases which fall outside 
it.185
185 See Briggs (1989) 9 OJLS 251 at p. 258 and Jaffey
(1985) 48 MLR 465 at p. 469.
CHAPTER 7: SUCCESSION BY SPOUSES
I. SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM
A . INTRODUCTION
Where there is disagreement between the lex fori and the lex 
successionis as to whether a matrimonial decree1 made in respect 
of a marriage of the deceased should be recognised, there will 
be a conflict as to whether the 'spouse' may succeed as a spouse. 
In example Ml2, if the choice of law rules are followed, 
Israeli law will apply as the law of the domicile of the deceased 
in relation to the devolution of movables on his intestacy. Thus, 
the divorce is recognised and the first 'spouse', Natasha, 
will not receive the share of Alexander's estate which is due to 
a spouse under a will or intestacy since under that law (s)he is 
no longer married to the deceased at the date of death. Whereas 
if the forum's recognition rules are applied, Natasha will take, 
as (s)he is still considered as married to the deceased.
As with the case of re-marriage, this problem has traditionally 
been analysed as an example of the incidental question. The 
question posed is whether the incidental or preliminary question 
of the recognition of the decree is governed by the conflicts 
rules of the lex fori or the conflicts rules of the lex causae. 
However, as in the case of validity of remarriages, it is
1 A judicial separation would also be relevant here because
in many systems, including English domestic law, such a decree 
terminates the rights of the parties to inherit from each other 
on intestacy.
2 Chapter 1, III supra.
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suggested that it is more helpful to treat the problem as a 
single question: in this case, whether the 'spouse' is to be 
treated as a spouse for the purposes of succession. The issue 
is whether this question should be governed by the forum's choice 
rules including renvoi3 (i.e. the whole of the lex successionis) 
or by the forum's recognition rules. The scope for discrepancy 
between the latter and the foreign recognition rules has been 
examined.4
B. CHOICE OF LAW RULES
It is well established that the law of the domicile at the date 
of death applies in relation to movables5 and that the lex situs 
applies in relation to immovables6 both in intestate succession 
and in determining devolution of the property under a will. In 
relation to wills, questions of formal validity may be governed 
by a number of alternative laws (of which the domicile at death 
is one) and questions of construction are governed by the law 
intended by the testator7, which is presumed to be governed by 
the law of the domicile at the date the will is made. It is not 
clear whether the question of whether a person is a spouse of the 
deceased should be regarded as a question of construction of the 
will or of devolution of the property.
See chapter 1, VII supra.
4 Chapter 6, I B  supra.
5 Dicey and Morris (chapter 1, n. 1 supra) Rules 134 and 
139.
6 Ibid Rules 135 and 140.
7 Ibid Rule 141.
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The scission between movables and immovables and the application 
of the lex situs to intestate succession have been subject to 
severe academic8 and judicial9 criticism. The Hague Conference 
on Private International Law's Convention on Succession, to which 
the UK is a party, provides for unity of succession with habitual 
residence and nationality at the date of death being the main 
connecting factors. However, the UK has not ratified this 
Convention and thus we must work on the basis that scission will 
remain for the foreseeable future.
Thus, where the law of the situs of the immovables is different 
from the domicile at death or indeed where there are immovables 
situated in more than one jurisdiction, the devolution of each 
type of property will be governed by its own lex successionis. 
If the question of whether a persons is a spouse is a question 
of devolution of the property, a person who is considered to be 
a spouse for the purposes of succession to movables may not be 
considered to be a spouse for the purposes of succession to 
immovables and a person who succeeds as spouse to immovables in 
one jurisdiction may not be so entitled in another jurisdiction.
This anomaly may be considered to be a good reason for preferring 
to apply the law governing the interpretation of the will to
8 See Morris (1969) 85 LQR 339, 348-352; Cohn (1956) 5 ICLQ
395 ; Wolff, Private International Law, 2nd. edn (1950) p. 567 
et seq.
9 See comments of Sir Nicholas Brown-Wilkinson V-C in Re 
Collens [1986] Ch. 505, 512-513.
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determine whether an alleged spouse can inherit as a spouse.
C: DISCRETIONARY FAMILY PROVISION SCHEMES
The 'conflict of rules' can only arise where the English court 
applies foreign rules of succession. Thus, it is clear that the 
problem can occur in relation to testate succession, intestate 
succession and fixed inheritance rights. However, there is no 
English authority on whether an English court would be prepared 
to apply a foreign discretionary family provision statute of the 
lex successionis. The English texts do not discuss this 
point10, but there is some pertinent Commonwealth caselaw11.
In Re Paul in12, Sholl J. in the Supreme Court of Victoria
refused to apply the New South Wales statute on the basis that 
under that statute, discretion to make orders was granted only 
to the New South Wales Court. In Re Bailey13, the New Zealand 
High Court held that it was unable to apply the English
discretionary scheme in respect of immovables in England because 
the testator did not die domiciled in England as required by the
10 Dicey and Morris (chapter In. 1 supra at pp. 1035 -
1038) talk only about the jurisdiction of the English Court to 
make an order under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and 
Dependants) Act 1975 and the jurisdiction of other Courts to make 
orders under their own similar legislation.
11 In addition to cases discussed below, see also Re Corlet
[1942] 3 DLR 271 where the Alberta Court held that its family
provision legislation did not apply because the deceased died 
domiciled in the Isle of Man. It did not consider it necessary 
to examine whether similar provision was available under Isle of 
Man law. See also Re Terry [1951] NZLR 30.
12 [1950] VLR 462. See also Heuston v Barber (1990) 19 NSWLR
354.
13 [1985] 2 NZLR 656.
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legislation. The very fact that the Court considered the terms
of the English legislation might suggest that in principle they
would have been prepared to apply it if it did not contain the
limiting requirement. However, Prichard J. went on to consider
the Australian Courts' refusal to make orders affecting foreign
immovables even where both jurisdictions had discretionary
schemes. He commented,
"This attitude, if not strictly logical, is eminently 
reasonable because the remedy is, from its nature, a 
discretionary one - from which it follows that the Court in 
which the proceedings are brought can afford relief 
affecting immovables in another Sate in accordance with the 
lex situs only by purporting to exercise a discretion which 
is in fact reposed in the Judges of the Courts of the lex 
situs."
With respect, it is submitted that the reasoning of both Prichard 
J. and Sholl J. pays insufficient attention to the policy behind 
the legislation. The prime motivation14 for the enactment of 
family provision statutes was to protect family members to whom 
a legal duty of support, or at least a moral duty, was owed by 
the deceased during his lifetime. No doubt, the legislature had 
in mind the exercise of the discretion by their own Courts. 
However, this is true of any domestic statute. There is nothing 
inherent in the discretion which requires it to be exercised by 
the home Courts only.
As Sholl J. himself pointed out15, where the foreign law 
provides for fixed succession rights for dependents, it would
See III 2 (c) infra.
[1950] VLR 462 at pp.466 - 467.
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enforce those rights, as in Re Ross16. With respect, it is 
anomalous to treat fixed rights differently from discretionary 
schemes, as the purpose behind the two is the same.17 The reason 
that some systems have preferred discretionary schemes is in 
order to preserve flexibility.18 Application of the scheme by 
a foreign Court does not impinge on flexibility.
The result of a refusal to apply foreign discretionary schemes 
is to leave a gap in the protection accorded. This is 
particularly apparent in a case like Re Paul in19 where the forum 
itself has similar legislation. In that case, the fact that part 
of the estate consisted of immovables in another State reduced 
the amount of the order in favour of the widow. The widow could 
only recover this amount by taking out a second application in 
the State where the immovables were situated.20 One of the aims 
of the Conflict of Laws is to enable the same result to be 
reached whichever forum is chosen and to avoid unnecessary 
multiplicity of litigation. Refusal to apply foreign 
discretionary schemes is inconsistent with this objective.
16 [1930] 1 Ch. 377.
17 See III 2 (d) infra.
18 Law Com. No. 52 para. 34. cf. Scottish Law Commission
Report No. 124 in which retention of fixed shares is recommended 
to preserve certainty.
19 [1950] VLR 462.
20 If the immovables had been situated in England, the
English Court would not have had jurisdiction under its 
discretionary scheme because the deceased died domiciled in 
Victoria. Thus the gap would have been greater (See Re Bailey 
[1985] 2 NZLR 656 discussed in the text at n.13 supra).
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The Victoria Court did try to prevent the need for a second
application. In determining how much to order under the Victoria
Act, the Court calculated the amount that would be due if an
order were made for the whole estate, including the immovable
property in New South Wales. Sholl J. then apportioned the order
in proportion to the value of the property in the respective
countries. He said that the purpose of spelling out how much
would be ordered by the New South Wales Court was
"in order that the parties may consider the possibility of 
agreement hereafter in order to avoid an application to the 
New South Wales Court."21
Thus, ironically, by indirect means the Victoria Court achieved 
a result virtually identical with that which would have been 
achieved if it had been prepared to apply the New South Wales' 
legislation. With respect, it would have been preferable to have 
reached this result directly and to have avoided the need for the 
widow to have the continued aggravation of negotiation and the 
likelihood of having to accept a smaller sum to avoid the need 
for further litigation.
For present purposes, we shall assume that the English Court 
would be prepared to apply a foreign discretionary scheme.
D. SECOND MARRIAGES
It should be reiterated that each particular instance of conflict 
between choice rules and recognition rules is being treated as 
a separate problem. Thus, the fact that the second marriage is
21 [1950] VLR 462 at p. 468.
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regarded as valid under the proposed preference rule for the 
validity of remarriages, set out in Chapter 6 above, should not 
necessarily mean that the first marriage be treated as no longer 
valid for the purposes of succession.
However, a further more difficult question arises. Should the 
validity of the second marriage for the purposes of succession 
be governed by the principles suggested in Chapter 6 above or 
by the principles which are considered appropriate for 
succession cases.
It is suggested that the policy22 behind the preference rule 
recommended in Chapter 6 requires that where the second marriage 
is upheld under that rule, it should be upheld for all purposes. 
Thus, the second spouse should be entitled to a spouse's rights 
to succession. Therefore, if the preference rule to be 
constructed for succession results in the first spouse retaining 
succession rights, the first and second spouses will both be 
entitled to succeed as spouses, unless the first spouse is 
estopped from claiming under the doctrine of preclusion23. In 
this situation, legal bigamy is not just a theoretical problem, 
but a practical reality. However, according to Palsson24, legal 
bigamy is least problematic where the bigamous marriages have in 
any event been dissolved by death. Presumably this is because the
22 See chapter 6 III and IV supra.
23 See II A 4 infra.
24 Op. cit. (chapter 1, n.121) at p.225. He is commenting on
the German case RG 24 Jan 1941 RGZ 165,398 where both 'widows'
were held to be entitled to a widow's pension.
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policy of the law which prohibits bigamy is not actually 
infringed by a decision that a marriage which has now been 
terminated by death was bigamous.
The practical difficulty of two spouses sharing succession rights 
can be solved relatively simply by dividing the spouse's share 
whether in a will or on intestacy between the two 'spouses' 
equally. This is already necessary in the case of valid actually 
polygamous marriages.25 The Law Commission26 envisages the 
possibility of a bigamist being held liable to make provision for 
two wives under the family provision legislation where the 'wife' 
in the void marriage bona fide believes it is valid.27
The difficulty with this pragmatic approach is that it may 
involve selective application28 of two laws. Thus, in example 
M229 above, the preference rule recommended in Chapter 6 would 
lead to the validity of the second marriage by application of the 
recognition rule. Thus, Juan may succeed as Evita's husband. If 
we decide that in succession the choice rule should be preferred,
In Re Sehota [1978] 3 All ER 385, everything was left to 
one of the wives. The other claimed successfully under the 1975 
Inheritance Provision for Family and Dependents) Act 1975. 
However, it has not yet been judicially decided whether each wife 
should be entitled to a surviving spouse's statutory legacy or 
whether this amount should be shared between them.
26 Law Com. No. 61 para. 29.
27 See definition of spouse under Inheritance (Provision for
Family and Dependants) Act 1975 s.25(4).
28 This is known as "depecage" or "picking and choosing":
see Morris (chapter 1, n.142) at p. 463.
29 At chapter 1 III supra.
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Argentinian law will be applied as the lex successionis and Pedro 
will be able to claim as Evita's husband. The solution suggested 
here is that they should share the husband's portion. However, 
this result does not accord either with the recognition rules of 
the forum, which would only allow Juan to take or with the 
Argentinian lex successionis, which would only allow Pedro to 
take.
A similar problem could arise if we were to assume that we decide 
that recognition rules should be preferred for the purposes of 
succession. In example Ml30, as the divorce is not recognised, 
Natasha would be able to claim the wife's share31. However, as 
the remarriage will be recognised under the preference rule for 
remarriages, Bella can also succeed as Alexander's wife. The 
solution under which they share the wife's portion does not 
accord with either the recognition rules of the forum, which 
would only allow Natasha to succeed, or the Israeli lex 
successionis, which would only allow Bella to succeed.
Morris32 suggests that 'picking and choosing' is not a problem 
where "the issues are unrelated except by the circumstances that 
they both arise in the same case." In the present situation, are 
the claims of the two 'widow/ers' related? In one sense they are 
both claiming in the same succession. On the other hand, the key
30 Ibid.
31 This would also be the case where English law is the lex
successionis, as for example in relation to immovables situation 
in England.
32 Morris (chapter 1, n. 142) at p. 463.
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question in each case is the relationship of the claimant with 
the deceased. It is suggested that there is no reason why- 
different laws should not apply in relation to the two claimants 
if this is necessary in order to produce a result which accords 
with the policy of the forum. Even though the forum only 
recognises one spouse as the valid spouse, making provision for 
both spouses might actually be in accordance with its policy33 
on what might loosely be called 'family provision on death'.
II POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS34 
A. PREFER THE CHOICE RULE
1. Theoretical Basis
The main argument for preferring the choice rule in relation to 
succession cases is the fundamental nature of the rules that 
succession to movables is governed by the domicile and succession 
to immovables by the lex situs.
The former seems to flow from the 'status theory' discussed 
above.35 In both testate and intestate succession to movables, 
whether and how much a surviving spouse is to receive is governed 
by the law of the domicile at death. Thus, it is logical36 that 
this law should also determine whether an alleged surviving
33 See III and IV infra.
34 For tabular illustration of the results of applying the
different preference rules see Table 4 in Appendix infra.
35 At chapter 6 II A 1 supra.
36 Ehrenzweig (chapter 1 n.94 supra at p.170) suggests that
"foreign rules of succession may well be inseparable from the 
family law to which they refer."
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spouse is in fact a surviving spouse or an ex-spouse whose 
marriage has been terminated by a divorce or nullity decree.
Whilst the application of the lex situs to immovables has been 
criticised37, there is force in the underlying rationale that 
only the lex situs can control the ownership of immovables within 
its territory. Thus, any determination of ownership which is 
inconsistent with the lex situs may be ineffective, a mere brutum 
fulmen.38 Regardless of the arguments for and against the 
application of the lex situs, so long as that law does govern 
both testate and intestate succession to immovables it is only 
logical that it should also govern whether an alleged surviving 
spouse is in fact a surviving spouse or not.
If the question of whether the 'spouse' is to be treated as a 
'spouse' is really a question of interpretation which is presumed 
to be governed by the law of the domicile at the time of making 
of the will39, the above reasoning is inapplicable. However, the 
preference for the choice rule could then be supported on the 
basis of the rationale for that rule. i.e. giving effect to the 
intentions of the testator.
2. Authority
There is no direct English authority on the 'conflict of rules'
See references at n.8 supra.
Morris (chapter 1, n.142 supra) p. 345.
See n.7 supra.
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in succession cases. However, it has been suggested40 that the
Australian case of Hague v Hague41 is authority in support of
applying the conflicts rules of the lex successionis42. The
material facts were as follows
The husband, who was domiciled in India, although resident 
in Western Australia divorced his second polygamous wife, 
Azra, by talaq. He later remarried her, but the remarriage 
was irregular by Muslim law. The High Court of Australia 
held that Azra could not succeed as according to Muslim 
law, which was applicable under the law of the deceased's 
domicile, she was not his wife. Thus, the first wife and 
the children of the two marriages took the movable estate43 
in the shares prescribed by Muslim law.
It may be argued that the case is not strong authority because
it was not clear that the result would have been any different
if the recognition rule had been applied. Firstly, it would seem
that the second marriage, which took place in Western Australia,
was not recognised as valid in that jurisdiction because it was
a polygamous marriage. Secondly, if the marriage was valid, it
would seem that the divorce would have been recognised under the
common law rules because it was 'obtained' in India, the place
of the couple's domicile. Nonetheless, the Court clearly
preferred the choice rule as they did not discuss the issue of
40 See Gottlieb (1977) 26 ICLQ 734 at 774.
41 (1962) 108 CLR 230.
42 The case might also be understood as relating to 
matrimonial property because a deed was entered into between the 
parties on marriage. This aspect is discussed at chapter 8 II A 
2 infra.
43 In Hague v Hague (No. 2) (1964) 114 CLR 98, it was held 
by a majority of the High Court of Australia that all the 
property was movables. Thus, the issue of succession to 
immovables did not arise. However, Barwick J., dissenting in 
relation to some of the assets, held that succession to the 
immovables was governed by the law of Western Australia as the 
lex situs and that the immovables would pass under the will of 
the deceased, which was valid under that law, although not 
recognised by Muslim law.
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recognition.
There is English authority that where there is a conflict between
a choice rule of the forum and the application of the lex
successionis concerning the right of a beneficiary to succeed,
the lex successionis prevails over the choice rules of the forum.
In the case of Re Johnson44, the lex successionis was 
Maltese law45, under which the deceased was legitimated and 
therefore her next of kin could succeed. Under English law, 
she was not treated as legitimated46 and therefore the next 
of kin could not succeed. It was held that Maltese law 
should apply to determine how the estate should be 
distributed.
Ehrenzweig47 suggests that the real rationale for application of 
the lex successionis in cases like this is that the forum
44 [1903] 1 Ch. 821. The case of Dogliani v Crispin(1866)
L.R. 1 H.L. 301 is also sometimes cited as favouring the lex 
successionis. However, in fact, there was no conflict in this 
case. Both English law and Portugese law agreed that the son was 
illegitimate. The difference was that Portugese law, which was 
the lex successionis allowed the natural son of the deceased to 
succeed provided that the deceased was not 'noble'. In any 
event, the real basis for the decision in this case was that the 
English Court was bound to recognise the decision of the 
Portugese Court regarding the administration of the estate as it 
was the Court of the domicile.
45 The deceased died domiciled in Baden, under which law
succession was governed by nationality. The deceased was a 
British subject. It was held that Maltese law should govern as 
the law of her domicile of origin was Maltese. There seem to be 
two alternative grounds for this decision. Either, the change of 
domicile was ineffective because Baden disregarded domicile. 
Alternatively, reference to the law of the nationality was a 
reference to how English law would apply to this particular 
propositus. The first ground has been held to be wrong (See Re 
Annesley [1926] Ch. 692 Re Askew [1930] 2 Ch. 259 and Casdagli 
v Casdagli [1918] P. 89). But the refusal to follow Re Johnson 
on this point does not weaken the case as an authority in favour 
of the choice of law rule.
46 Her father was domiciled in England.
47 Op. cit. (chapter 1, n.94 supra) .
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considers that unity of distribution of the estate is more 
important than unity of family relationships. This rationale 
would apply equally to the cases where there is a conflict 
between the recognition rule of the forum and the application of 
the lex successionis. Ehrenzweig7s explanation may seem flawed 
in relation to those systems48 whose choice of law rules for 
succession allow for disunity between succession to movables and 
immovables and between succession to immovables situated in 
different jurisdictions.49 However, it may be argued that this 
possibility of disunity may make it more important that there 
should not be further disunity in relation to recognition of 
status.
3. Results
(a) Where the lex causae recognises the decree.
In this situation, the first spouse will not be able to take. 
Thus, in example Ml50, Israeli law will apply to succession to 
movables and Natasha will not be able to claim as she is no 
longer considered to be Alexander7s spouse.
If Alexander leaves immovables, whether Natasha can claim will 
depend on whether the lex situs recognises the get. Where the 
immovables are situated in England, there can be no conflict of 
rules because English law will be the lex successionis as well
48 Including English law and U.S. law about which he was 
primarily writing.
49 In Re Johnson [1903] 1 Ch. 821, the estate consisted only 
of movables.
50 Chapter 1, III supra.
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as the lex fori.
The barring of the first wife from succession may not be a just 
result. In particular, the reason that the divorce is not 
recognised by the forum may be because of some unfairness in the 
acquisition or effect of the divorce. This problem would have to 
be dealt with by judicious use of the doctrine of public policy. 
In other words, the lex successionis will not be applied where 
its application would lead to a manifestly unjust result.
(b) Where the lex successionis does not recognise the decree.
In this situation, the first spouse will be able to succeed. 
Thus, in example M251, Juan can succeed because under 
Argentinian law he is still married to Evita. This result occurs 
irrespective of the merits of the 'spouse', whether or not (s)he 
instituted the divorce and whether or not (s)he has remarried. 
This problem may be alleviated by use of the doctrine of 
preclusion. Since this doctrine is most likely to operate in 
relation to succession it will be convenient to consider it in 
detail at this point.
4. The Doctrine of Preclusion
(a) The Operation of the Doctrine
This doctrine, which is a form of estoppel52 has been applied
51 Ibid.
52 The doctrine is referred to as preclusion here rather
than estoppel to emphasise that it need not be limited by the 
constraints of the latter doctrine, as for example in the dicta 
in Gaffney v Gaffney [1975] IR 133, discussed in detail below.
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in Canada and the United States53, although not yet in England. 
It has been criticised, particularly by British commentators. 
Thus, it is necessary to examine the operation of the doctrine 
in North America, its basis and the criticisms levied against 
it in order to assess whether it would be appropriate to 
incorporate it in some form into the preference rule which we are 
seeking to construct.
The American Restatement54 provides the most helpful description
of the doctrine. This states as follows
"A person may be precluded from attacking the validity of 
a foreign divorce decree if, under the circumstances, it 
would be inequitable for him to do so."
The subsequent comments on the scope of the rule include the
following passage:
"The rule is not limited to situations of what might be 
termed 'true estoppel' where one party induces another to 
rely to his damage upon certain representations as to the 
facts of the case. The rule may be applied whenever, under 
all the circumstances, it would be inequitable to permit a 
particular person to challenge the validity of a divorce 
decree. Such inequity may exist when action has been taken 
in reliance on the divorce or expectations are based on it 
or when the attack on the divorce is inconsistent with the 
earlier conduct of the attacking party."
Thus, if the doctrine were applied under the situation under 
discussion, even where the lex successionis holds that the 
decree is not recognised and thus the 'spouse' can take by way
53 Where it is sometimes referred to as quasi-estoppel. See,
for example, Krause v Krause 282 N.Y. 355, 26 N.E. 2d. 290
(1940).
54 American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law, Second, 
Conflict of Laws, 2d (1971), Section 74. This was cited with 
approval by the Supreme Court of Canada in Downton v Royal Trust 
Co. (1973) 34 DLR (3d) 403.
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of succession, (s)he would be precluded from doing so where it 
would be inequitable to allow reliance by the 'spouse' on the 
invalidity of the decree. Whilst this is clearly a very broad 
definition, in practice the doctrine is only likely to operate 
in the following circumstances:
(i) the claimant 'spouse' initiated the matrimonial 
proceedings55 ;
(ii) the claimant 'spouse' participated56 in the proceedings 
unless there is some alleviating explanation.57
(iii) the claimant 'spouse' has obtained some benefit from the 
proceedings. This might include claiming and being awarded 
alimony or other financial provision only obtainable on 
termination of the marriage58.
(iv) the claimant 'spouse' has relied on the validity of the 
proceedings by remarrying59.
Potentially the doctrine of preclusion might be applied in any
55 As in Re Jones (1961) 25 DLR 595.
56 See Stephens v Falchi [1938] 3 DLR 590, 595. cf.
Caldwell v Caldwell 298 N.Y. 146, 81 N.E. 2d 60, where the New 
York Courts would not apply the doctrine in relation to Mexican 
'mail order' divorces. The reason seems to be that they did not 
want to accord any effects at all to such divorces on public 
policy grounds.
57 See Downton v Royal Trust Co (1973) 43 DLR (3d) 403 where
the wife's submission to the Nevada Court would have precluded 
her from later claiming under the Family Relief Act in 
Newfoundland where the decree was not recognised, but for the 
fact that her submission was only in order to protect existing 
benefits under a separation agreement and did not confer on her 
any further benefits.
58 See dicta in Downton v Royal Trust Co. (1973) 34 DLR (3d)
403 .
59 Ibid.
case where a 'spouse'60 was seeking to deny the validity of a 
divorce in order to obtain a pecuniary benefit61. For the 
present we are only concerned with its application where the 
'spouse' is seeking to claim to succeed to the deceased's estate. 
The doctrine has been held to apply to inheritance on 
intestacy62 and under will63. By analogy it ought also to apply 
to fixed rights of inheritance64.
(b) Rationale of the Doctrine
The rationale for the doctrine is set out by Laskin C.J., giving
the judgment of the Court in Downton v Royal Trust Co.65.
"The doctrine has an ethical basis: a refusal to permit a 
person to insist, to his or her pecuniary advantage, on a 
relationship which that person has previously deliberately 
sought to terminate."
In one case, a Canadian judge said that to allow the 'spouse' to
rely on the invalidity of the decree in order to claim benefits
out of the estate of the deceased spouse would be a "parody of
60 In Fromovitz v Fromovitz (1977) 79 DLR (3d) 148, it was
held that the doctrine could only apply against a party to an 
invalid decree and that a third party could not be precluded from 
relying on the invalidity of the decree. In this case, a man was 
not precluded from relying on the invalidity of his 'wife's' 
Mexican divorce from her first husband in order to deny any 
obligation to maintain her.
61 Such as claims under Insurance Policies, Fatal Accidents
Acts, Workmen's Compensation Legislation. See Battersby (1977) 
16 U.W. Ont. L.R. 163.
62 See Re Capon (1965) 49 DLR (2d) 675 and authorities
quoted there.
63 Re Jones (1961) 25 DLR 595, but see criticism by
Battersby (1977) 16 U.W.Ont. L.R. 163 at pp. 176-7.
64 See Battersby ibid at p. 190.
65 (1973) 43 DLR (3d) 403 at p. 412.
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justice. "66
(c) Criticism of the Doctrine
Battersby67 claims that the problems resulting from the 
application of the doctrine are such that the doctrine cannot be 
justified. His main criticisms are:-
(i) If the forum does not recognise the decree, it is illogical 
that it should give the decree some validity through the doctrine 
of preclusion.
(ii) The doctrine creates problems for personal representatives.
(iii) The doctrine creates anomalous distinctions because there 
are other situations in which it is inequitable for one spouse 
(e.g. estrangement or misconduct) to claim against the other's 
estate and yet there is no preclusion.
(iv) The doctrine is crude in that it cannot balance the merits 
of the 'spouse' against the merits of the beneficiaries who will 
take in his/her place.
(v) The doctrine may not operate fairly to the extent that it 
puts emphasis on who actually applied for the foreign decree. 
Where both parties have agreed to obtain a decree, it may be 
purely arbitrary who actually petitions for it and whether the 
other party participates in the proceedings.
(vi) To allow the 'spouse' to claim is not a "parody of justice" 
because to attempt to do something (in this case terminate the 
marriage) is not the same as succeeding in doing it .
66 Per Schroeder J.A. in Re Capon (1965) 49 DLR (2d) 675 at 
p. 692.
67 (1977) 16 U.W.Ont. L.R. 163.
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It must immediately be pointed out that Battersby is concerned 
with the situation where both the lex fori and the lex 
successionis agree that the decree should not be recognised. In 
other words, there is no conflict of conflicts rules. In the 
context with which we are concerned, the forum does recognise 
the decree. Once this is borne in mind it can be seen that most 
of Battersby's arguments are either inapplicable or of less 
force. Using the same numbered paragraphs:-
(i) This point is inapplicable because the forum does recognise 
the decree although the lex successionis does not. Thus, the 
application of the doctrine actually gives effect to the law of 
the forum by way of an exception to the application of the lex 
successionis.
(ii) Since there is already a dispute about the validity of the 
decree, the personal representatives are already in a difficult 
situation. Application of the doctrine of preclusion will not 
make things worse and may be a just solution to the conflict.
(iii) The situation is not comparable with other domestic 
situations. Here the doctrine is applied to solve a particular 
problem arising in the conflicts of law.
(iv) If the doctrine is treated as discretionary, the relative 
merits could be considered.
(v) The problem of the emphasis on who is the petitioner can be 
resolved either by treating the doctrine as discretionary or 
restricting the operation of the doctrine to cases where the 
'spouse' has obtained benefits as a result of the decree, 
irrespective of who actually applied for it.
(vi) The fact that the foreign decree is not only valid by the
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law of the place where it was obtained but also by the law of the 
forum, although not by the lex successionis, removes the force 
of this point.
(d) Application of the doctrine in England
There is little English caselaw on the question. Dicey and Morris 
claim that "all of it is hostile to the adoption of a doctrine 
of preclusion or estoppel."68. However, closer examination of 
the cases will reveal that there is nothing in them to deny the 
application of the doctrine of preclusion in an appropriate 
case69, at least not in the 'conflict of rules' context.
Two of the cases involved what have been referred to as "strictly 
matrimonial causes."70 In Bonaparte v Bonaparte71, the wife 
contended, on her second husband's petition for nullity, that he 
was estopped from questioning the validity of the foreign divorce 
decree in relation to her first marriage because it was obtained
68 Dicey and Morris (chapter 1, n.l supra) at p. 760. The 
case of Palmer v Palmer (1859) 1 Sw. & Tr. 551 is quoted by Sykes 
and Pryles (chapter 5. n 22 supra) at p.481 . In this case, it 
was held obiter that even if the foreign decree which the wife 
had obtained was invalid, she could not complain of her husband's 
adultery with his second wife. It seems that this case is 
probably better explained on the basis that the wife could be 
seen as responsible for the adultery and therefore could not rely 
on it rather than on the basis of the doctrine of preclusion. No 
doubt this is why the case is not quoted by the English 
textwriters.
69 Dicey and Morris, ibid, admit that "the English Courts
have not yet been confronted with such starkly unmeritorious 
claims as the American and Canadian courts have sometimes been."
70 Downton v Royal Trust (1972) 34 DLR (3d) 403, 413.
71 [1892] P. 402 followed in the Australian decision of
Alexsandrov v Alexsandrov [1967] SASR 303.
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by his fraud and misrepresentation. It is hardly surprising that 
her contention was not accepted because if the doctrine of 
estoppel had been applied, the parties' status would have been 
left uncertain. In any event, even in North America, the doctrine 
cannot be applied against a third party.72
In Hornett v Hornett73 , the husband sought a declaration that 
the foreign decree of divorce was valid. It was held that the 
fact that the parties had continued to cohabit for 11 years after 
the valid foreign decree did not estop him from later asserting 
the validity of that decree. Again, if the doctrine had been 
applied the parties' status would have been uncertain. Cumming- 
Bruce J. said
"..there are great difficulties about applying a doctrine 
of estoppel to a legal decree affecting status."
As has been pointed out74, this comment must be viewed in the 
context in which it was made75. The rejection of the doctrine of 
preclusion as against a party seeking a nullity decree or a 
declaration of status does not necessarily imply its rejection 
in other contexts76.
72 See Fromovitz v Fromovitz (1977) 79 DLR (3d) 148.
73 [1971] P. 255.
74 Carter (1971) 45 BYBIL 410 at p.412.
75 For example, it is clear that estoppel per rem judicatam
and promissory estoppel may operate to prevent a party attacking
a forum decree. See King v Kureishy (1982) 13 Fam. Law 1982 and
Lexis (23.11.82).
76 Indeed in Downton v Royal Trust Co. (1972) 34 DLR (3d)
403, 413, it seems to have been accepted that the doctrine could 
not apply in "strictly matrimonial causes" because "marital
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However, there are also two cases, one English and one Irish, 
which seem to suggest that the doctrine does not apply even in 
cases which are not "strictly matrimonial causes."
In Papadopolous v Papadopolous77 , the decision of a Magistrate 
awarding maintenance to a wife, who had obtained a decree of 
nullity from a Maltese Court which was not recognised here, was 
upheld. It was assumed that because the parties were still man 
and wife there was no alternative78 but to award maintenance. 
Although Counsel for the husband claimed that the Magistrate was 
wrong in holding that the wife was not estopped from alleging 
that she was a wife, this point is not considered in any of the 
judgments79. Thus, while on the merits this might have been a 
case where the doctrine could have applied, the lack of 
discussion of the issue makes it a weak precedent.
In the Irish case of Gaffney v Gaffney80 both parties were 
domiciled in the Republic of Ireland. Under duress by the
status per se cannot be altered or perpetuated by a preclusion 
doctrine."
77 [1935] P. 55.
78 Ibid at p. 68.
79 cf. Lord Merrivale's interruption ibid at p. 58
referring to Jenkins v Robertson (1867) L.R. 1 H.L. Sc. 117, 121. 
This seems to relate to the issue of whether the parties' consent 
to the foreign judgment created an estoppel rather than to the 
equitable doctrine being discussed here.
80 [1975] I. R . 133.
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husband, the wife obtained81 a divorce in England by stating 
falsely that she and her husband were domiciled in England. The 
wife later claimed in the husband's intestacy. It was held that 
the English decree was not valid because of the lack of 
jurisdiction and that the wife was not estopped from claiming. 
The latter can clearly be supported on the basis that the 
estoppel should not operate against a spouse who had obtained a 
divorce under duress. However, the Court went on to state that 
in even if the Plaintiff had been a free agent there could not 
be any estoppel in relation to the question of whether a marriage 
had been dissolved82.
The main basis for this assertion was that the decree in England 
could not support an estoppel because the Court did not have 
jurisdiction. It is suggested that this decision is not good 
authority against the use of the doctrine of preclusion in the 
context under discussion for the following reasons. Firstly, for 
our purposes, the disputed decree is assumed to be valid and made 
with jurisdiction in the country where it is obtained and is also 
recognised by the law of the forum, although not the lex 
successionis. Secondly, at least two83 of the four Judges in the 
Gaffney case were concerned with the technicalities of estoppel 
by record. The doctrine advocated here is a flexible equitable
81 In fact, the husband made all the arrangements and the 
wife simply signed the documents as requested and attended Court 
on the husband's instructions.
82 [1975] I.R. 125 at 143 per Kenny J. at first instance. In 
the Supreme Court at p. 152 per Walsh J; at p. 154 per Henchy J. 
and at p. 157 per Griffin J.
83 Griffin and Henchy JJ.
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doctrine which does not depend on the record, but on the
injustice of allowing a party to obtain a pecuniary advantage 
because of the fortuitous fact that the decree is not recognised 
by the lex successionis.
It should be reiterated that in all four of the cases discussed 
above, the decree was not recognised by the law of the forum. 
Whereas in the 'conflict of rules' situation presently under 
discussion, the decree is recognised by the forum, but not by 
the lex successionis.
The main English textwriters oppose the application of the
doctrine.84 Dicey and Morris85 claim that the doctrine leads to
the loss of "all certainty in question of matrimonial status."
Cheshire and North explain that estoppel is inappropriate in the
present context because
"the paramount issue from which all else flows is the
marital status of the parties at the time of the
[deceased]'s death, and of that there can be no doubt."
With respect, it is submitted that this statement oversimplifies
the issue. In the present context, we already have a conflict
between the recognition rules of the forum and the lex
successionis as to the marital status of the parties at the date
of death and thus it cannot be said that there is no doubt as to
the marital status for the purpose of succession. That is the
very matter which is in dispute. Instead we should focus on the
84 cf. Carter who suggests that the use of the doctrine of
estoppel "seems attractive" in the context presently under
discussion in (1971) 45 BYBIL 410 at p. 412.
85 Op. cit. (chapter 1, n.l supra) at p. 759.
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single question of whether the 'surviving spouse' should inherit. 
This will involve looking at the policy of the forum on this 
matter. If that policy dictates that the 'spouse' should not 
inherit despite the fact that (s)he can take under the lex 
successionis86, there seems no reason why a discretionary 
doctrine of preclusion should not operate as a rule of the 
forum's public policy. Use of preclusion in this way does not 
prevent the 'surviving spouse' from claiming the validity of the 
marriage in other contexts and therefore should not be seen as 
incompatible with the general principle that the existence of a 
matrimonial decree does not prevent either party from claiming 
the continued subsistence of the marriage.
B APPLY THE RECOGNITION RULE
1. Theoretical Basis
Application of the recognition rule where the decree is 
recognised is based on the 'full effect' doctrine, in the same 
way as in relation to remarriage. The hypothesis is that the 
recognition of a decree annulling or dissolving marriage 
logically requires full recognition of all the consequences 
thereof. Thus, once a decree is recognised, the 'spouse' must 
cease to be the spouse for all purposes87, including succession 
. However, this interpretation is open to challenge by the 
argument that recognition of a divorce decree is simply an
86 Assumed here to be the applicable rule.
87 This argument is expressed in Estin v Estin 334 U.S. 541, 
68 S.Ct. 1231 (1948) as "once a divorce is granted, the whole 
marriage relation is dissolved, leaving no roots or tendrils of 
any kind."
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acknowledgment of the change of status and does not necessarily 
involve acceptance that there has been any variation in the 
rights and obligations flowing from status.88
It is much more difficult to justify application of the 
recognition rule where it will result in non-recognition. It may 
be suggested that the very fact that the decree has not been 
recognised suggests that there has been some 'unfairness' in the 
process of obtaining the decree89 or in its effect90. Thus, it 
would be unfair to debar the 'spouse' from inheriting as a result 
of that decree, even where the lex successionis would recognise 
the decree. The forum's interest is in preventing the loss of 
rights by means of the 'unfair' decree.
2. Authority
The New York decision In re Degramo's Estate91 has been cited92 
as authority for preferring the forum's non-recognition rule in 
a succession case. However, since it was held that the damages 
received by the deceased's estate from the railroad company 
responsible for her death should be distributed according to the
88 See Engdahl (1969) Iowa L.R. 56 at pp. 111-114. Dicey and
Morris 9th. edn. (1973) Rule 31 distinguish between status and
the results of status. See also Graveson (chapter 6, n.57 supra) .
89 Either because an unconnected forum has been chosen (i.e.
forum shopping) or because of lack of notice or opportunity to 
participate.
90 i.e. because its effect is manifestly contrary to public 
policy.
91 33 New York Supplement 502 (1895).
92 Gottlieb (1977) 6 ICLQ 743 at p.770.
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'wrongful death' statute of the lex loci delicti and not 
according to the law governing the succession, the case should 
be treated as authority in relation to wrongful death claims 
rather than succession and will be discussed in that context 
below.93
No other authority has been found which supports preference for 
the recognition rule in a succession case.
3. Results
(a) Where The Decree is Recognised.
The spouse will not be able to take irrespective of the 
circumstances surrounding the divorce and his/her connection with 
the forum. Thus, even a spouse who has been divorced against 
his/her will and perhaps without his/her knowledge in a forum 
with which (s)he has no connection may be prevented from 
receiving any share in the estate of his/her 'spouse' because of 
the liberal recognition rules of the forum, even though the law 
governing the succession would award him/her such. The hardship 
would seem to be particularly apparent where the 'spouse' is 
closely connected to the lex successionis and not at all 
connected to the forum.94
Can we assume that this problem would not arise because 
recognition would be refused in such a case? A formal divorce 
will be recognised if a relevant connection exists between either
93 At chapter 9 II B 2 infra.
94 The case may be being heard in the forum because, for 
example, the executors are resident here or movables are situated 
here.
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spouse and the country where the divorce is obtained.95 Thus, 
lack of consent or connection would only seem to be relevant 
where they result in lack of notice or opportunity to 
participate. However, even these grounds are limited because the 
question as to whether it would have been reasonable to take 
steps to notify a party of the proceedings or to give a party 
opportunity to participate is assessed in the light of the nature 
of the proceedings. Thus, if a foreign system allows unilateral 
divorce by Court order ex parte, it is difficult to see how 
recognition can be refused under s.51(3)(a)96.
Recognition may also be refused under s.51 (3) (c) where 
recognition would be manifestly contrary to public policy. Would 
the fact that one party did not consent to the divorce and/or 
that one spouse had no connection with the jurisdiction where the 
divorce was obtained render recognition contrary to public 
policy? In Chaudhary v Chaudhary97, Ormrod LJ said that it was 
against public policy in a case where both parties were domiciled 
in England to allow one to avoid the incidents of his/her 
domiciliary law by travelling abroad to a country whose laws 
appeared to be more favourable to him/her. It is far from clear 
that this would be the case where the parties were domiciled 
abroad as there would be no 'evasion' of English law. Also, the
95 See chapter 1 II B 2 supra.
96 And the better view seems to be that in such cases, lack
of notice should not be a ground for refusal of recognition on 
the ground of public policy. See Gordon (chapter 1, n.l supra) 
at pp.134-5 and D v D (Recognition of Foreign Divorce) [1994] 
1 FLR 38 at p. 52.
97 [1985] Fam. 19.
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concern here was that the husband would be avoiding his financial 
obligations by obtaining a divorce in a particular jurisdiction. 
In the case of succession, the deprivation of the surviving
spouse's inheritance rights occurs as a result of the divorce per 
se and not as a result of the divorce in a particular
jurisdiction. However, where the surviving 'spouse' has not 
obtained any financial relief following divorce because it was 
obtained in an inappropriate jurisdiction, it may be against
public policy now to deprive him/her also of any rights to
succession on death.
In deciding whether to exercise their discretion to refuse
recognition where the grounds under s.51(3)(a) or (c) are
satisfied, the Courts take into account all the surrounding
circumstances including
'an assessment of what the legitimate objectives of the 
petitioning spouse are, and to what extent those objectives 
can be achieved if the foreign decree remains valid."98
In two cases99, recognition has been refused where it would
prevent the petitioner from obtaining financial relief. By
analogy, 'unfair'100 deprivation of the wife of inheritance
98 Newmarch v Newmarch [1978] Fam. 79, 95.
99 Joyce v Joyce [1979] Fam. 93 and Mamdani v Mamdani 
[1984] FLR 699. These cases both involved lack of opportunity to 
participate. They would probably be decided differently today 
because even if the foreign decree where recognised the wife 
could claim financial provision in England under the Matrimonial 
and Family Proceedings Act 1984 (see chapter 8 I A infra).
100 Because no other provision had been made in circumstances 
where it was reasonable for such provision to be made. Sometimes 
it may still be possible to claim financial provision ancillary 
to the matrimonial decree from the estate in the country where 
the divorce was obtained. In English law, an application for 
financial relief is not a cause of action which survives for or
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from an estate would be a factor in favour of exercising the 
discretion to refuse recognition. However, as against this, 
Courts also have to consider other aspects101 of the effects of 
non-recognition, including
"the likely consequences to the spouses and any children of
the family ..if recognition would be refused."102
Since one of the spouses is dead and the other relies on the lack 
of validity of the decree, there should not be any adverse 
consequences to the spouses provided that the validity of a 
subsequent remarriage of the deceased can be recognised in 
accordance with the rule recommended in Chapter 6. Where the 
refusal of recognition would affect the validity of the 
subsequent marriage103, the situation may be more 
problematic.104 The children may of course be affected if their 
share of the estate will decrease if the first spouse can claim, 
but this is not a factor of any weight.
against a party's estate See Bromley and Lowe, Bromley's Family 
Law (1992) 8th. edn., p. 652. Thus no order could be made for 
relief after a foreign divorce under the Matrimonial and Family 
Proceedings Act 1984 Part III after the death of either party.
101 The Courts seem reluctant to exercise their discretion
to refuse recognition because of concerns about comity. See, for 
example, Newmarch v Newmarch [1978] Fam. 79.
102 Ibid at p.95.
103 Where the decree is not recognised by the lex domicilii,
non-recognition by the forum will result in invalidation of the 
second marriage (there is no conflict of rules and section 50 
Family Law Act 1986 does not apply).
104 Although in Joyce v Joyce [1979] Fam. 93, Lane J. held
that the disadvantage to the wife of not having any share in the 
matrimonial home outweighed the disadvantage to the husband of 
non-recognition, despite the fact that the husband had remarried 
on the strength of the decree.
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In conclusion, whilst one of the 'non-recognition' rules may 
operate where recognition would result in 'unfair' 
disinheritance, this result cannot be guaranteed.
(b) Where the Decree is not Recognised
If the recognition rule is preferred, non-recognition by the 
forum will allow the 'spouse' to inherit. However, as we have 
seen the policy behind the non-recognition rule may not require 
that both spouses should retain succession rights. A divorce will 
usually be refused recognition in order to protect the 
Respondent105 Thus, whilst it might106 be unfair to debar the 
Respondent from succeeding to the deceased Petitioner's estate, 
it is less likely to be unfair to debar the Petitioner from 
succeeding to the Respondent's estate. On the contrary, it might 
seem unfair to allow the Petitioner to inherit in this situation.
Again the doctrine of preclusion might be used here in order to 
prevent succession by the unmeritorious by preventing the 
claimant spouse from attacking the decree. The use of the 
doctrine is more difficult to justify in this context than 
previously because here it is the forum which refuses 
recognition. The effect of application of the doctrine is to 
give some validity to the decree in direct conflict with the non­
recognition by the forum107. However, it is submitted that the 
situation can still be distinguished from the cases in which the
105 See Chapter 3 III C supra.
106 But not if the Respondent has already received adequate
provision.
107 See Battersby's first criticism at text accompanying n.67
supra.
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use of the doctrine has been expressly or impliedly rejected, 
because there is already a dispute as to the validity of the 
decree. The effect of the operation of the doctrine is in fact 
to prefer the choice of law rule by way of exception to a 
principle of preference in favour of the recognition rule of the 
forum.
C. THE DIFFERENTIAL RULE
1. Theoretical Basis
In relation to validity of remarriage, the theoretical basis of 
the 'differential rule' was stated to be that the 'full effect' 
doctrine only applies where the decree is recognised and that 
otherwise the arguments in favour of application of the choice 
of law rule prevail.108 The same basis is applicable here with 
the caveat that the application of the 'full effect' doctrine is 
more controversial in relation to termination of the first 
spouse's succession rights109.
2. Result
Since the divorce is always recognised, the 'spouse' will be 
debarred from inheritance in every case.
D. UPHOLDING SUCCESSION RIGHTS
It was submitted earlier that the key issue in relation to 
succession should not be seen as the continued validity of the 
first marriage, but rather whether the 'former spouse' should
108 Chapter 6, II C 2(d) and 3 supra.
109 See at B 1 supra.
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inherit. Thus, a principle based upon the presumption of validity 
of marriage110 is not appropriate to decide this question.
Here, it is suggested that a similar approach of validating 
rights would lead to a presumption of upholding succession rights 
for 'spouses', where it would not be unfair to do so. Such an 
expressly result selecting preference rule could take the form 
of a presumption in favour of the application of whichever law 
resulted in succession by the 'spouse'. The presumption might be 
rebutted in circumstances where the doctrine of preclusion would 
estop the claimant from relying on the invalidity of the decree.
Ill POLICY
An examination of the English domestic rules relating to 
succession by spouses under will, on intestacy and by Court- 
ordered family provision is required in order to ascertain the 
relevant forum policy.
A. WILLS
In interpreting a will, the policy of the law is to give effect 
to the intention of the testator.111 This can be illustrated by 
section 18A Wills Act 1837 (as amended by FLA 1986) , which 
provides that where a marriage has been terminated by a divorce 
or annulment which is entitled to recognition in England and 
Wales under the Family Law Act 1986 (i) an appointment of the
110 See chapter 6 II D supra.
111 See Clark and Ross Martyn, Theobald on Wills 15th. edn.
(1993) at p. 199.
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former spouse as an executor is deemed to be omitted and (ii) any 
devise/bequest to a former spouse lapses except in so far as 
contrary intention appears from the will.
The rationale behind this provision must be that a former spouse 
should not benefit from a will made before divorce112 because it 
is assumed113 that the testator did not wish to benefit the
former spouse, but simply forgot to change his will114.
It is not entirely clear when this provision of domestic English 
law will be applicable in a case involving a foreign element. If 
the provision is considered to relate to a question of 
interpretation, then it will apply if it was the law which the 
testator intended to govern the will. This would be presumed to 
be English law where the testator was domiciled in England at the 
time of making of the will115. If it is regarded as an issue of 
essential validity, then the provision will be applied in 
relation to immovables situated in England and in relation to
movables where the testator died domiciled in England.
112 See Law Reform Committee's 22nd. Report, "Making and 
Revocation of Wills" (1980) Cmnd 7902 and the Law Commission 
Consultation Paper, "The effect of Divorce on Wills" (1992), 
which recommends changing the method of giving effect to this 
policy.
113 The exceptional case is covered by the proviso that the 
provision does not apply where a contrary intention appears.
114 In Parliament, the Lord Chancellor said, "At present, 
divorce has no effect on a will and thus there can be unintended 
results where a testator who does not remarry fails to make a new 
will." (428 H.L. Debs. Administration of Justice Bill, 8th. 
March 1982 col. 31).
115 See n. 7 supra.
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B. PROVISION FOR DEPENDANTS 
1. The scheme of the 1975 Act
Under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act
1975, the Court has discretion to award financial provision from
a deceased's estate in favour of a spouse or former spouse where
the effect of the deceased's will and/or the laws of intestacy
is such that reasonable financial provision has not been made for
the claimant. In the case of a former spouse, the reasonable
financial provision is restricted to such financial provision as
"it would be reasonable in all the circumstances of the 
case for the applicant to receive for his maintenance."116
In the case of a surviving spouse,117 reasonable financial
provision is such provision as
"it would be reasonable in all the circumstances of the 
case for a husband or wife to receive, whether or not that 
provision is required for his or her maintenance."118
In the latter case, in deciding whether provision is reasonable,
the Court must take into account how much the applicant might
have expected to receive if the marriage had been terminated by
divorce instead of by death.119
Where the deceased died within 12 months of the matrimonial 
decree and the application for financial provision has not been 
made or has not been determined by the date of death, the Court
116 Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act
1975 s.1(2)(b).
117 Unless there was a decree of judicial separation in
force.
118 Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act
1975 s.1(2)(a).
119 Ibid s.3 (2) .
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may, if it thinks it just to do so, treat the former spouse as 
a surviving spouse for the purpose of determining reasonable 
financial provision under the Act.120 The Act applies wherever 
the deceased died domiciled in England and Wales.121 However, 
in applying the Act, the Court is applying domestic English law 
rules as the lex fori122. Thus, no conflict of rules problem can 
arise.
2. Former Spouses
"Former spouse" was originally defined to include only those 
whose marriages have been dissolved or annulled under the 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. Thus, those who had obtained a 
matrimonial decree abroad which was recognised in England and 
Wales could not claim
under the category of former spouse. Three reasons were given for 
this exclusion in the Law Commission Report123 which preceded 
the 1975 Act:-
(i) It is not appropriate for English Courts to interfere where
120 Ibid s. 14.
121 Ibid. s . 1.
122 In relation to movables, English law will also be the lex
successionis. The issue of whether an order can be made in 
respect of immovables situated abroad has not come before the
English Courts. It would appear that there would be jurisdiction
to hear the case under the 1975 Act provided that the deceased 
died domiciled in England and Wales. The first exception to the 
Mocambicrue Rule (see Cheshire and North, chapter 1 n.l supra, at 
pp.255-256) should be applicable as the action is founded on the 
obligation of the deceased. However, Commonwealth Courts have 
consistently refused to make such orders under similar Family 
Provision legislation. See cases cited by Miller (1990) 39 ICLQ 
261 at p. 271.
123 Law Comm No. 61 para. 45 et. seer.
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a foreign law has decided financial provision.
(ii) Where the former spouse is still dependent on the deceased 
(s)he can claim as a dependent under s.1(1)(e) of the 1975 Act.
(iii) In order to extend the definition it would have been 
necessary to cover the whole question of financial provision in 
England after the dissolution or annulment of a marriage abroad.
The first and third reasons could no longer be sustained once 
legislation to provide financial provision after a foreign 
matrimonial decree was proposed by the Law Commission. Thus, it 
was recomended124 that the definition of 'former' spouse be 
widened to include those whose divorce or annulment was 
recognised. This recommendation was implemented in the 
Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984.125
Maybe the most interesting aspect of this legislation for our 
purposes is the recognition that a former spouse, wherever the 
decree was obtained, may have a legitimate claim for maintenance 
from the estate of the testator126. Thus, the legislature has 
made it plain that there is a continuing obligation to provide 
for a former spouse unless there is a Court order made at the 
time of the financial provision order on divorce barring an order
Law Comm W.P. 77 and Rept. No. 117.
125 s.25 (2) amending the Inheritance (Provision for Family 
and Dependants) Act 1975 s.25(1).
126 Provided of course that the testator dies domiciled in 
England and Wales.
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on death127.
It was made clear by the Court of Appeal in Re Fullard128 that 
there would be few situations in which a successful claim could 
be made by a former spouse since in most cases, (s)he will have 
already received all that (s)he is entitled to at the time of the 
decree. This would not be the case though where there have been 
insufficient assets at the time to provide adequately for the 
claimant and following death a capital sum has been released,129 
which will enable the claimant to be maintained. Alternatively, 
if the claimant is dependent on unsecured maintenance which ends 
on death, if there is sufficient capital in the estate this can 
be used to ensure continuation of the maintenance. It is also 
possible to envisage cases where the claimant was badly advised 
and did not pursue his/her right to maintenance at the time of 
the decree. Depending on the other claims on the estate, it might 
be appropriate for maintenance to be paid to the former spouse 
out of the estate.
3. The rationale behind discretionary family provision for 
spouses and former spouses*
The rationale behind the present discretionary family provision 
for spouses and former spouses can be seen to be twofold.
127 Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants Act)
1975 s. 15 Act. Following the substitution of this section by
Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 s.8, such an order 
can be made without the consent of the parties.
128 [1981] 2 All ER 796.
129 For example, under life insurance or pension policies.
255
Firstly, a person's obligation to his/her spouse does not end on 
death. The family is still treated as the main support unit even 
once a provider has died. Thus, where (s)he is able, a testator 
should make provision for the other family members and should not 
leave his/her dependants, including spouses and, where 
appropriate, ex-spouses to rely upon the State for support. Where 
(s)he has failed to do so, the law will do so for him/her.
Secondly, in relation to spouses, discretionary family provision 
is needed to enable the inequities caused by the system of 
separation of property to be counter-balanced.130 Where spouses 
have both contributed in different ways to the acquisition of 
assets, their respective contributions may well not be properly 
reflected in the legal and beneficial ownership of those assets. 
Typically, men who earn outside the home tend to own more of the 
assets, whereas women who have contributed to the family in the 
home whether financially or otherwise tend to own less of the 
assets. Discretionary family provision on death, just like 
property adjustment on divorce131, enables a Court to make 
provision for the survivor132 which will reflect these
130 See Miller (1986) 102 LQR 445.
131 See Wachtel v Wachtel [1973] 2 WLR 366. The Law
Commission decided that the widening of family provision on death 
for a spouse to be akin to that on divorce made it unnecessary 
to introduce fixed rights of inheritance for a spouse. The 
Wachtel approach meant that the wife would usually get one third, 
which was what they had suggested would be the appropriate fixed 
share. Law Com. No. 52 para. 44
132 Usually the wife, but cf. Re Moody [1992] 2 All ER 524, 
where a widower successfully claimed under the Act against his 
deceased wife's estate. He was allowed to continue to live in the 
matrimonial home which had belonged to the deceased.
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contributions133.
The second reason explains why the level of provision which may 
be made for a wife is higher than for other dependents. This 
reason does not apply to a former spouse because it is assumed 
that there will have been financial provision at the time of the 
decree.134 Where for some reason adequate provision has not been 
made at the time of a decree, an award restricted135 to 
maintenance may still be available on death.
4. Fixed Share Schemes
Some laws136 ensure proper provision for dependents by setting 
down fixed amounts or fixed shares137 which have to be 
bequeathed to each category of relative on death.138 If a will 
fails to make the required provision, it will automatically be
133 Stead v Stead [1985] FLR 16, where the award was small 
and did not reflect the contributions. See criticism by Miller, 
(1986) 102 LQR 445 at p. 467.
134 That this is so is apparent from the s. 14 of the 1975 Act
(see text at n. 118 supra).
135 Unless the case comes within s. 14 of the Act (see text 
at n. 118 supra).
136 For example, in Scotland, the surviving spouse has a
right to one third of the deceased's movable estate if there are 
issue of the deceased surviving and otherwise to one half (see
Scottish Law Com. No. 124 para 3.1), In the U.S., most separate
property states give the surviving spouse a fixed share or fixed 
sum (see Miller (1990) 39 ICLQ 261).
137 Sometimes referred to as 'forced shares' or 'non-barrable 
interests'.
138 In community systems, there are usually fixed shares for 
descendents. See, for example, French Civil Code Art. 913, which 
reserves 2/3 of the estate for the children where there are two 
children. For Italian law see Re Ross [1930] 1 Ch. 377; for Swiss 
law see Re Trufort (1887) 36 Ch. D. 600.
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varied so as to do so.
The Law Commission139 considered the possibility of introducing 
a fixed share scheme in England. However, they preferred to 
extend the discretionary scheme because of its flexibility.140 
However, it is clear that the two alternative schemes were simply 
treated as different methods of implementing the policy of making 
provision for dependents and thus the rationale for making such 
provision in relation to spouses should be the same as that 
identified above.
C . INTESTACY
1. The present scheme
At present on intestacy the surviving spouse receives as 
follows:-
(i) All the chattels and
(ii) If there are no surviving issue, parents or siblings of the 
whole blood, the whole estate or
(iii) If there are issue, a statutory legacy of 125,000 pounds 
and life interest in half of the rest of the deceased's property 
or
(iv) If there are no issue, but parents or siblings (or their 
issue) , a statutory legacy of 200,000 pounds and half of the rest
Law Com No. 52 paras 31-45.
140 cf. Scottish Law Com. No. 124 at paras 3.3. et. seq.
where the Scottish Law Commission considered the same issue and 
came to the opposite conclusion.
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absolutely.141
Under the Matrimonial Homes Act 1952 a surviving spouse is 
entitled to insist that the matrimonial home is appropriated to 
him/her towards any absolute interest which (s)he has in the 
estate. Where the value of the matrimonial home is more than the 
surviving spouse's absolute interest in the estate, (s)he can 
make up the difference from his/her own resources. In many cases, 
the matrimonial home will be held in joint names and therefore 
will pass to the surviving spouse under the principle of 
survivorship.
The Law Commission of England and Wales has recently produced a 
working paper142 and report143 considering reform of the 
intestacy rules. They recommended inter alia that on intestacy 
a surviving spouse should receive the whole estate144.
2. The Policy Behind Intestacy Provision for Spouses
The Law Commission's discussion is relevant in considering this 
issue. In the Working Paper145, four possible bases on which 
intestacy law might be based are mooted. These are
(i) presumed wishes of the deceased deduced from the provisions
141 Both of the sums were increased by S. I. 1993/2906 which 
came into effect from 1st. December 1993.
142 Law Com. W.P. No. 108.
143 Law Com. No. 187.
144 cf. Scottish Law Com. No. 124 in which the continuation
of the scheme of a statutory legacy for the spouse was 
recommended.
145 Law Com.W.P. No. 108 , Part IV.
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that the average testator makes in his will;
(ii) provision to those who are most likely to have the greatest 
need;
(iii) provision according to desert;
(iv) provision according to length of the cohabitation during the 
marriage.
In their Report146, the Commission state that their proposed 
reforms are based on two 'considerations' . The first is the need 
for certain, clear and simple rules. The second, which is more 
relevant for our purposes and upon which it is claimed consultees 
agreed, is the 'need to ensure that the surviving spouse receives 
adequate provision.' This can be seen to correspond roughly to 
the second of the bases in the Working Paper. Thus, it is 
submitted that whilst it is alleged147 that consultation 
produced "no agreement upon the single most appropriate principle 
to be applied," the Commission itself has chosen provision for 
the surviving spouse to be the most important policy objective 
of intestacy law. This conclusion is clearly supported by the 
recommendation in the Report that the surviving spouse should 
take the whole estate. For what it is worth, over 70% of the 
respondents in the Law Commission's public opinion survey 
supported the surviving spouse receiving all, even where there 
were children148.
Law Com. No. 187 paras. 24 to 26.
Ibid para. 24.
Law Com. No. 187 Appendix C, para. 2.8.
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Whilst the Law Commission's views cannot be regarded as 
representing domestic policy unless and until they are adopted, 
it is suggested that in fact the present law to a large extent 
supports their view that the most important purpose of the law 
of intestacy is to make adequate provision for a surviving 
spouse. Whilst the Law Commission argue that the present law does 
not actually do this at the moment in all cases149, it is still 
clear that in the majority of cases the surviving spouse will 
receive the whole of or at least a very substantial proportion 
of the estate.150
It is suggested that the reasons for the policy of giving 
priority to the surviving spouse are the same as the reasons put 
forward above151 for the Court's discretion to award financial 
provision to a surviving spouse where reasonable provision has 
not been made. It should be remembered that that discretion 
extends to cases where the rules of intestacy do not make 
adequate provision for the surviving spouse.
IV APPLICATION OF POLICY
Having identified the policy of English law in relation to 
inheritance by spouses in purely domestic cases, we need to see
149 Where the matrimonial home is not jointly owned, the 
rules on intestacy will often result in a surviving wife 
receiving less than (s)he would on divorce.
150 The recent increase in the size of the statutory legacy 
from 85,000 pounds to 125,000 pounds may be thought to reflect 
the Law Commission's favoured policy, especially in view of the 
fact that house prices have not risen at all, and in many cases 
have fallen, in England in recent years.
151 At B 3 supra.
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how this policy applies in relation to cases which have a foreign 
element and where there is a dispute about the validity of the 
decree between the forum and the lex successionis♦
A. WILLS
We have seen that it is axiomatic that in interpreting a will 
the aim is to uphold the wishes of the testator. Thus, it could 
be argued that where there is a will, whether a 'spouse' should 
be considered to be a 'spouse' should be decided in the way in 
which the testator would have wished.
1. Where the testator is the other 'spouse'
Where there has been a divorce, judicial separation or nullity 
decree pronounced, unless there was evidence that the testator 
did not accept the validity of the decree, it must be presumed 
that (s)he did not intend the person whom (s)he considered to be 
his/her 'former spouse' to inherit. This seems to be the 
assumption behind the Wills Act 1837 section 18A as amended.
The policy behind this statutory provision can be achieved for 
cases where English law is not the lex causae by selecting a 
preference rule which will result in disinheritance. Thus, the 
'differential rule'152 is appropriate.
2. The testator is a third party
What happens where the will of a third party confers a benefit 
on the spouse of X and there has been a matrimonial decree
See at II C supra.
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between X and his/her spouse the validity of which is in dispute 
between the lex causae and the forum? It is not quite so clear 
that the testator did not intend the 'spouse' to take. The 
existence of an invalid decree might not affect his/her wish to 
benefit the 'spouse'. But which law should decide whether the 
decree is valid? It is suggested that the issue of validity 
should so far as possible be seen through the eyes of the
testator.
In this situation, it would seem that application of the law of 
the testator's domicile at the time of making the will, as the
law governing interpretation, is more likely to reflect the
testator's intention than his domicile at the date of death. 
Against this, it might be argued that the reason that the
testator desisted in changing his/her will before death was 
because (s)he relied on the view taken by the law of his/her 
domicile at that time as to the validity of the decree. Both 
positions involve an element of speculation. It is suggested that 
since the choice of law rule for interpretation of a will is the 
same for movables and immovables it will be convenient to apply 
that rule.
Should the doctrine of preclusion apply in this situation? In 
Re Jones153, it was held obiter that it should. Battersby154 
disagrees on the basis that the doctrine is too blunt an
153 (1961) 25 DLR (2d) (B.C. Sup. Ct.) 595 upheld (1962) 31
DLR (2d) 292 (Sup.Ct.Canada).
154 (1977) 16 U.W. Ont. 163 at 177.
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instrument to produce rational results in the context of wills. 
He suggests that problems in relation to wills can be solved as 
questions of construction. This might help in determining whether 
a gift to 'the spouse of X' was meant to refer to the first 
spouse in relation to whom there had been an invalid decree or 
the second spouse where the validity of the marriage was in 
doubt. However, it would not help if X had not remarried. There 
is only one possible 'spouse' of X and yet if the decree is 
valid, the gift lapses. However, the writer agrees with Battersby 
that preclusion is inappropriate here because the testator's 
intention is not known.
Therefore, it is submitted that the best alternative is to assume 
that the testator's definition of spouse is the same as the lex 
causae, which should be treated as being the law governing 
interpretation of the will.
B. PROVISION FOR DEPENDENTS
1. Discretionary Schemes155
It will usually be necessary to determine whether the first 
marriage has been terminated either because the foreign scheme 
does not provide for ex-spouses or because there is a different 
level of provision for spouses and ex-spouses, as in the English 
scheme.
We saw above that English policy requires that proper provision
155 It will be remembered that we are assuming that an
English Court would be prepared to apply a foreign discretionary 
scheme - see I C supra.
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should be made for both spouses and former spouses. Thus, we 
should apply whichever rule will enable the 'spouse' to obtain 
the higher level of provision. We saw above that this would be 
achieved by a presumption in favour of upholding succession 
rights of spouses. Since the provision is discretionary, the 
Court will only make an order in favour of a 'spouse' who is 
meritorious. Thus, for example, no order will be made where the 
'spouse' has already been adequately provided for in divorce 
proceedings.
2. Fixed Share Schemes156
It is quite conceivable that an English Court would be faced with 
a case where a foreign will fails to provide the fixed amount 
specified by the lex succesionis for a 'spouse' . The personal 
representatives argue that there has been a divorce and so the 
'spouse' is not entitled to the fixed share and the 'spouse' 
argues that the divorce is not valid.
Since the rationale behind such fixed shares is assumed to be 
the same as that behind the discretionary system157, the same 
policy should in principle be applicable. Thus, the preference 
rule would be the presumption in favour of upholding succession 
rights of spouses.
The main problems with this solution is that, the fixed share 
system does not have the same safeguards against abuse as the
156 See II B 4 supra.
157 Ibid.
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English law discretionary system. The latter can ensure that 
unmeritorious claimants do not succeed and that, for example, a 
spouse who has obtained financial provision following a 
matrimonial decree cannot have a 'second bite of the cherry'158; 
whereas under the fixed share system the 'spouse' would take 
automatically under the proposed preference rule.
It is suggested that to some extent these safeguards might be 
provided by a limited use of the doctrine of preclusion, under 
which a 'spouse' who had already received financial provision 
could not rely on the invalidity of the decree in order to claim 
a fixed share on death. It will be seen that such a limited use 
of the doctrine of preclusion avoids the main criticisms of that 
doctrine159. In particular, it is irrelevant whether the 
claimant petitioned for the decree or participated in the 
proceedings. The operation of the doctrine is not based on a 
vague notion that the 'spouse's' involvement in the proceedings 
is inconsistent with claiming a pecuniary benefit, but on the 
specific principle that since the 'spouse' has obtained adequate 
provision on an alleged termination of the marriage, (s)he cannot 
now claim more provision on the real termination of the marriage 
by death.
This solution would also deal with the difficulty which may arise 
where the parties were subject to a community of property regime, 
but the lex successionis is a separate property system. Thus,
158 See Re Fullard [1982] Fam. 42.
159 See at II A 4 (c) supra.
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where the community property has already been divided on 
termination of the marriage by matrimonial decree, the 'surviving 
spouse' should be precluded from relying on the invalidity of the 
decree in order to claim a fixed share in the succession, because 
(s)he has already had the benefit of the operation of the marital 
property regime160.
Thus it is suggested that in relation to fixed shares, the 
presumption of upholding succession rights of spouses should 
apply subject to the limited operation of preclusion doctrine. 
Whilst this will clearly not provide the same flexibility as the 
discretionary system, it is suggested that it is the preference 
rule which most closely reflects domestic policy.
C . INTESTACY
We saw above that the rationale behind the law in respect of 
spouses on intestacy was in reality the same as that of the 
discretionary family provision. Thus, we would expect that the 
same preference rule would be appropriate. Two particular points 
should be made to support this hypothesis.
Firstly, the policy of providing for spouses is not limited to 
spouses who are still living in marital harmony. Thus, the mere
160 The purpose of community property interests and fixed
shares are essentially the same. (See Marsh, Marital Property in 
the Conflict of Laws (1952) at p. 245) . The problem of 'over­
protection' or 'under-protection' as a result of migration from 
a community state to a separate property state or vice versa is 
well documented. (See, e.g. Marsh ibid; McClanahan, Community 
Property Law in the United States (1982) at Chapter 13 and Miller 
(1990) 39 ICLQ 261, 263 - 267) .
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fact of separation without any decree does not prevent a spouse 
claiming the full share on intestacy. This approach was endorsed 
by the Law Commission161. Secondly, the policy of providing for 
spouses on intestacy should apply to all spouses who have not 
been provided for at the time of a matrimonial decree. This 
result can be ensured by applying the doctrine of preclusion to 
those for whom adequate provision has already been made. The 
comments about this doctrine162 made in relation to fixed shares 
are equally applicable here.
V RECOMMENDATIONS
The following preference rules are recommended:-
1. (a) In relation to testate succession between spouses, the 
'differential rule7 should apply.
(b) In relation to testate succession of a third party, the 
choice of law rule for interpretation of the will should be 
applied.
2. In relation to discretionary schemes and fixed shares, there 
should be a presumption in favour of whichever rule upholds 
succession rights. In the case of fixed shares, this should be 
subject to the doctrine of preclusion.
3. On intestacy, there should be a presumption in favour of 
whichever rule upholds succession rights, subject to the doctrine 
of preclusion.
161 Law Com. No. 187 para. 39.
162 At text accompanying n. 159 supra.
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CHAPTER 8: MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY
I. THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM
A. INTRODUCTION
Where there is a disagreement between the lex fori and the law 
governing the matrimonial property relations of the party as to 
whether a matrimonial decree should be recognised, there may be 
a conflict about the matrimonial property rights of the parties. 
The recognition or otherwise of the decree may affect the 
question of whether property acquired after the decree falls 
within the matrimonial regime and who has control over the 
property included within the regime.
At the outset we should emphasise that the English Court will 
generally not be concerned with establishing the spouses' 
respective rights under a foreign matrimonial property regime if 
it has jurisdiction to make a financial provision order under the 
English discretionary distribution scheme. Such jurisdiction will 
exist automatically where the English Court has granted the 
matrimonial decree.1 Applications for financial relief following 
a recognised foreign formal divorce may be made with the leave 
of the Court where the jurisdictional requirements of section 15 
of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 are 
satisfied.2 In this situation, the conflict of rules problem
1 Unless the application for financial relief is made after
the Petitioner has remarried.
2 Where either party was domiciled or habitually resident in
England for one year at the time of the application or at the 
time when the foreign divorce was obtained or either has a 
beneficial interest in possession in a dwelling-house in England
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will not arise because it is clear that the scheme only applies 
where English law recognises the foreign divorce. Thus, the Court 
is only likely to be concerned with determining rights under 
foreign matrimonial property regimes on death, on bankruptcy of 
one of the parties or on marriage breakdown where the English 
scheme is not applicable.3
We will have to spend more time than in previous chapters 
defining the scope of the problem for two reasons. Firstly, the 
choice of law rule is not clearly established. Secondly, there 
has been little discussion of the conflict of laws' treatment of 
deferred community of property regimes and equitable distribution 
schemes.
B. THE CHOICE OF LAW RULE
Traditionally, choice of law rules in respect of matrimonial 
property have been classified into cases where there is a 
marriage contract and where there is none. However, this 
distinction has been criticised by a number of writers who claim 
that all matrimonial property regimes are contractual. Upon 
marriage, they are either expressly or impliedly agreed by the 
parties or are presumed by law. According to the proponents4 of 
this contractual analysis, there is a presumption, in the absence
and Wales.
3 For example, where the parties do not wish to take 
matrimonial proceedings; after a foreign decree which is not 
recognised or where the applicant spouse has remarried before 
applying for financial provision.
4 Goldberg (1970) 19 ICLQ 557 and Castel, Canadian Conflict 
of Laws Vol. 2 (1977) at p.422 and (1982) 60 Can. Bar. Rev. 180.
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of an express or implied contract, that the parties have agreed 
on the application of the basic regime imposed by the law of the 
husband's domicile5. This presumed contract, like express and 
implied contracts, is governed by its proper law.6
The contractual analysis has a number of attractions. Firstly, 
it protects the justified expectations of the spouses7. 
Secondly, it avoids the problems of devising an appropriate 
choice of law rule. Thirdly, the use of the proper law provides 
flexibility®. Fourthly, it would seem that the proper law 
applies to both movables and immovables. Finally, as we shall 
see, it can be applied more easily to diverse types of 
matrimonial property regimes.
However, the dual classification is too entrenched to be ignored. 
The choice of law rule in cases where there is no express or 
implied contract would seem to be the law of the matrimonial 
domicile, at least in relation to movables. Ownership of
5 In the recent British Columbian case of Tezcan v Tezcan
(1992) 87 DLR (4th.) 503, it was held that whether there was a 
contract or not was a question for the law which would be the 
proper law if there were a contract. In this case, Turkish law 
held there was no contract.
6 Where there is such an agreement, the rights of the 
parties are governed by the proper law of such agreement (as 
determined at common law because the Rome Convention is 
inapplicable (art. 1(2)(b)).
7 Castel, Canadian Conflict of Laws Vol. 2 (1977) at p. 422.
8 For example, where the spouses have separate domiciles.
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immovables would seem to be governed by the lex situs9. 
According to caselaw, the matrimonial domicile is presumed to be 
the husband's domicile at the date of the marriage10. The 
problem of ascertaining the matrimonial domicile following the 
abolition of the wife's dependent domicile has not been 
judicially considered. The Hague Convention on the Law Applicable 
to Matrimonial Property Regimes (1978) attempts to solve the 
problem by providing the law of the common habitual residence11 
of the parties after marriage12 as the governing law, in the 
absence of designation by the spouses. However, as this 
Convention has not been signed by the United Kingdom, it is 
necessary to find a solution based on the traditional domicile 
rule.
Two suggestions have appeared in recent publications. The editors 
of the latest edition of Dicey and Morris have proposed that 
where the spouses have separate domiciles,
Welsh v Tennant [1891] A.C. 639; Tezcan v Tezcan (1992) 
87 DLR (4th.) 503. This would seem to be unsatisfactory for the 
same reasons that the scission between movables and immovables 
for succession is unsatisfactory (see chapter 7 n.8 supra). In 
particular, the spouses' property relationship could be governed 
by a number of different regimes if they own immovable property 
in several different jurisdictions. On the other hand, at least 
the lex situs is always certain. Maybe this is why it has been 
adopted statutorily as the choice of law rule in, for example, 
Nova Scotia (s. 22 Matrimonial Property Act 1980) and New Zealand 
(s.7 Matrimonial Property Act 1976).
10 Re Egerton's Will Trusts [1956] Ch. 593. As we have seen, 
the proponents of the contractual analysis take a different view 
about the nature of the presumption referred to here.
11 Art. 4 .
12 See also the Ontario Family Law Act 1986 s. 15 and the 
Nova Scotia Matrimonial Property Act s.22 which prescribe the 
last common habitual residence of the spouses.
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"the applicable law should be that of the country with 
which the parties and the marriage have the closest 
connection, equal weight being given to connections with 
each party." 13
Davie14 suggests adopting the United States approach, under 
which the law of the domicile of the person who acquired the 
property applies.
With respect, the former is to be preferred. One of the 
rationales for matrimonial property regimes is that the spouses" 
rights should not depend on acquisition. If the assets acquired 
by each party are subject to different regimes, anomalous results 
may be produced. The main defect in Dicey and Morris" formulation 
is the lack of certainty of the unstructured proper law test. It 
is suggested that this may be alleviated by the use of 
presumptions.15
English caselaw has not finally established16 whether the 
governing law changes with a change of domicile by one or both 
parties. However, the majority of academic opinion17 seems to
13 Dicey and Morris (chapter 1, n.l supra) at p. 1069.
14 (1993) 42 ICLQ 855 at p. 875.
15 Analogous to those in the Rome Convention art. 4. For
example, there could be a presumption that the marriage is most 
closely connected to the country where the parties have or had 
their last matrimonial home.
16 For discussion of the apparently conflicting caselaw see
Davie (1993) 42 ICLQ 855 at pp. 876 - 880 and Dicey and Morris
(chapter 1, n.l supra) at pp. 1082 - 1086.
17 Cheshire and North (chapter 1, n.l supra) at p.871;
Morris (chapter 1 n. 142 supra) at p. 370; Dicey and Morris, The 
Conflict of Laws, 11th edn. (1987) Rule 156 supported by Collier 
(chapter 1 n.142 supra) pp. 2 83-4. (However, in the 12th. edn,
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favour the North American18 system of partial mutability under 
which the law of the new domicile will govern subject to vested 
rights which have already been acquired under the law of the 
previous domicile.
The problem of change of domicile is made considerably more 
complicated by the wife's independent domicile. Most writers 
point out that one spouse should not be able to upset the whole 
matrimonial property regime by a unilateral change of 
domicile19. The proper law formula suggested by Dicey and Morris 
should avoid such difficulties. Whilst change of domicile of one 
of the parties will clearly be relevant, if the other spouse has 
no connection with the new domicile it will be unlikely to be the 
most connected law.
Whilst we should bear in mind the difficulties with the choice 
of law rule, in order to concentrate on the problems with which 
we are dealing we will assume that the spouses have a common 
domicile at all relevant times, unless the contrary is stated.
(1993) Dicey and Morris have adopted the immutability rule in 
Rule 152.) Under the contractual analysis, the spouses can change 
the matrimonial regime by express agreement.
18 Scoles and Hay (chapter 6, n.18 supra) write at p. 461,
"The cases in the United States are quite uniform in applying the 
law of the marital domicile at the time the property is acquired, 
but respect the continued existence of marital rights acquired 
during an earlier domicile elsewhere." For Canada, see Re Heung 
Won Lee (1963) 36 DLR (2d) 177 at pp. 183-4.
19 Cheshire and North (chapter 1, n.l supra) at p. 872. It
might be noted that under English law, the spouses could acquire 
different domiciles while still living happily together, if upon 
losing their common domicile of choice, they did not acquire a 
new domicile of choice but both reverted to their respective 
domiciles of origin.
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C. DIFFERENT TYPES OF MATRIMONIAL REGIME
We will now examine how, if at all, the conflict of rules 
problem may arise in respect of different types of matrimonial 
property regime. We shall use the traditional division into three 
basic types of regimes: separate property regimes, immediate
community regimes and deferred community regimes. We shall also 
consider whether discretionary distribution20 schemes operating 
on divorce can be considered as a fourth type of regime. However, 
we should be aware of the limitations of this classification. 
Firstly, there are so many variations in individual regimes that, 
as Wolff21 said "a general survey can do no more than describe 
the fundamental types ignoring the deviations between them."
Secondly, reforms in recent years have to a large extent blurred 
the distinctions between separate and community schemes.22
1. Separate Property Regimes
Under separate property systems23, neither party has any rights 
in the property of the other by virtue of the marriage. The rules
These are generally called equitable distribution schemes 
in the US, but the adjective'discretionary' , which is used in 
England is more appropriate (See Glendon, New Family and New 
Property (1981) at p.64).
21 Wolff, Private International Law, 2nd. edn (1950) at p. 
353.
22 See Glendon (n. 20 supra) at p. 58 and Rheinstein and 
Glendon (1980) International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law. 
vol. iv chapter 4 at p. 170.
23 Examples of completely separate property states are
Muslim countries such as Turkey (see Tezcan v Tezcan (1992) 87 
DLR (4th.) 503) and Iran (see Vladi v Vladi (1987) 39 DLR (4th.) 
563) .
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to be used to determine their respective beneficial interests in 
property where the legal title is vested in one or both spouses 
are the same24 before, during and after their marriage. Thus 
the recognition or otherwise of the decree is irrelevant to the 
ownership of property and the conflict of rules problem cannot 
arise. We shall consider below to what extent if at all the 
introduction of a scheme for apportioning the assets on 
termination of the marriage affects this conclusion.
2. Community of Property Regimes
(a) The Various Schemes
Common to all types of immediate community regime is the fact 
that during the marriage the property which is included within 
the scheme is owned jointly by the spouses.
The differences lie in three main aspects of the regimes. 
Firstly, which property25 is subject to the regime? In 
particular, pre-marital property and post-marital gifts and 
inheritances are excluded from 'acquests' regimes. But there are 
a number of different permutations. Secondly, who has the right
24 Although certain presumptions may apply during the
marriage, such as the presumption of advancement. It is suggested 
that the fact that there has been a divorce or nullity decree, 
whether recognised or not, would usually be sufficient to rebut 
the presumption. Thus, the issue of recognition would not of 
itself be decisive as to ownership.
25 It is possible to have a community limited to particular 
types of assets. For example, the Law Commission recommended 
joint ownership of the matrimonial home (Law Com. No. 86) and 
later of chattels bought for joint use (Law Com No. 175) . If 
these suggestions had been taken up, there would have been a 
Statutory Community scheme in relation to the specified type of 
property.
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to deal with the community during the continuation of the 
marriage? Traditionally, the husband had sole control, but this 
power has been substantially eroded in many community systems.26
Thirdly, how are the assets divided on divorce?27. Originally, 
each spouse simply retained his/her undivided half share in each 
asset. Where possible, the assets were physically divided and 
otherwise they could be sold and the proceeds divided. This is 
called the "item theory". In modern times, the assets are 
usually divided between the parties by agreement or, failing 
consensus, by a Court. Some systems28, still clinging to the 
philosophy of the 'item theory', provide that this partition has 
retroactive effect to the date of divorce. Other systems29 have 
abandoned the 'item theory' in favour of the 'aggregate theory' 
in which they work out an equal division of all the assets. 
Ownership changes from the date of the division. Some community 
states30 have gone a step further and moved from equal division
26 Since the French reform of 1966, the wife's cooperation
is now required in transactions of major significance. (See 
Rheinstein and Glendon (n. 22 supra) at para. 11 et. seq.) Some 
of the American Community States have introduced 'joint 
management' (see Glendon, n. 20 supra, at pp. 147-8) .
27 See McClanahan (chapter 7, n. 158 supra) at pp.531 et 
seq.
28 e.g. France and Holland. In Puerto Rico each spouse
becomes immediately entitled on divorce to one half of the 
property. From that time onwards "the spouses may sell, assign 
or convey their rights in the conjugal property, subject to the 
final liquidation" See McClanahan (chapter 7, n.158 supra) at 
p. 539.
29 For example, California, Lousiana (from 1981).
30 For example, Arizona, Idaho, Nevada, Texas and
Washington.
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to equitable division. Others31 have simply given the Court 
power to depart from equal division where this would lead to 
injustice.
(b) The conflict of rules scenario.
Assume that the foreign matrimonial decree is not recognised by 
the forum but is recognised by the lex causae, as in example 
M10.32 If the recognition rule is applied, the marriage still 
subsists and Theresa may33 be able to share in property acquired 
after the alleged divorce. Also, until a valid divorce is 
pronounced the community regime for management will continue and 
neither spouse will be able to realise his/her share in the asset 
or request partition.
Conversely, if the choice rule is applied, the marriage no longer 
subsists and the community is dissolved. Thus, post-decree 
acquisitions are the separate property of the 'acquirer'. In 
example M10, Theresa will be able to realise her share
31 For example,. France and Holland, cf. California, Nevada 
and New Mexico where equal division is only to be departed from 
in specified circumstances, (see Rheinstein and Glendon, supra 
n. 22 at para. 99).
32 At chapter 1, III supra.
33 In some countries property acquired after separation is
the separate property of the acquiring spouse (e.g. California
Civil Code s.5118). In the jurisdictions where there is a
discretion to vary the 50/50 split of assets, this discretion 
may be used to exclude post-separation acquisitions from the 
community, where inclusion of them would be inequitable.
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immediately.34
3 . Deferred Community Regimes35
(a) The Various Schemes
Under these regimes, property is owned separately during the 
marriage and each party has full powers to deal with his or her 
own property. However, on termination by divorce36, and in most 
systems also by death37, the property included within the regime 
is shared equally between the parties. Again, there are 
differences as to which property comes within the regime. In some 
countries all the property of both spouses is included38, 
subject to mutual agreement to the contrary. In other 
jurisdictions, only the gains made during the marriage are 
included39. However, it must be pointed out that under most
34 In those systems which give retrospective effect to the
final division, the ownership is treated as changing at the date 
of divorce.
35 ' Sometimes also called participation schemes. Friedmann
"Matrimonial Property Law" (1955) uses the term "Intermediate 
Schemes".
36 A different regime usually applies where the marriage is 
annulled.
37 cf. The Israeli scheme. Also in some systems, such as
Germany, the rules on death are different and the surviving 
spouse may elect between taking under the inheritance or the 
'community' rules.
38 For example, Scandinavian countries and Holland. This 
may be called a deferred universal community.
39 This may be called a deferred community of acquests. Such 
a regime operates in Israel and in Germany. Under the 
Reunification Treaty, West German family law applies throughout 
Germany from October 3rd. 1990. However, in the case of spouses 
married in East Germany before that date, either may elect that 
the old GDR regime still applies (see Frank, (1991) 30 J. Fam. 
Law 335, 341 - 343).
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modern schemes, a Court has discretion to deviate from equal 
sharing of the community assets.40
A second important difference is the method of distribution. In 
some systems41, each spouse acquires a right to share in the 
property of the other on dissolution of the community. Whereas 
in other systems42, the 'loser7 spouse simply has a right to 
claim an equalising 'compensation7 payment from the 'gainer7 
spouse. Thus, it has been suggested43 that the labelling of the 
West German scheme as a deferred community scheme is misleading. 
Nevertheless, in order to be consistent with most of the 
literature, we will include what might be called 'fixed 
distribution7 or 7 compensation7 schemes under the heading of 
deferred regimes, whilst bearing in mind the important 
differences.
(b) Conflicts7 Treatment of Deferred Schemes
The standard English conflicts of law texts do not discuss the
40 For example, under the Swedish Marriage Act of 19 87
uneven division is allowed where the relevant circumstances 
indicate that equal division would be unreasonable. Similarly in 
British Columbia, the Court may vary the equal division where it 
would be unfair having regard to the various circumstances set 
out therein (Family Relations Act 1979 s.43).
41 Such as the Danish, Dutch and British Columbian schemes.
42 Such as the German and Ontario regimes. For discussion
of the difference between the British Columbia and Ontario 
schemes see Tezcan v Tezcan (1992) 87 DLR (4th.) 503 at p. 512 
and Raffery, (1982) 20 UWOL Rev. 177 at 197.
43 Voegeli and Wilenbacher, "Property Division and Pension-
Splitting in FRG" in Weitzmann and Maclean (eds.) "Economic 
Consequences of Divorce. The International Perspective, (1992) .
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conflictual aspects of deferred schemes44 because they treat 
them as separate property schemes45, under which property rights 
are not affected by marriage. Thus, where the community 
crystallises on divorce, the issue will be seen as one of 
financial relief on divorce, which is governed by the lex fori. 
If this is correct, the conflict of rules problem cannot arise 
because ex hypothesi there can be no conflict where the choice 
of law rule is the lex fori. Where the English Court has no 
jurisdiction to deal with financial relief on divorce, it would 
presumably have to decide any issue regarding ownership of the 
matrimonial property on the basis of separate property 
principles46, under which the termination is irrelevant.
Where the community crystallises on death, the issue is likely 
to be treated as one of succession. Thus, if the law governing 
the deferred community is the lex successionis, it will be 
applied. Otherwise, the appropriate lex successionis will be 
applied.
44 However, Courts and legislatures in other jurisdictions
have recognised the issues. For example, in Vladi v Vladi (1987) 
39 DLR (4th.) 563 (discussed further below), the Nova Scotia
Supreme Court applied the West German (fixed right distribution) 
scheme as the law of the last common habitual residence of the 
parties. The New Zealand Matrimonial Property Act 1976 s. 7 
provides a choice of law rule for application of its fixed right 
distribution regime.
45 See, for example, Dicey and Morris (chapter 1, n.l supra) 
at p. 1068 and Morris (chapter 1, n.142 supra) at p. 366.
46 The procedure under the Married Women's Property Act 1882 
s. 17 can be used in respect of foreign property provided that 
there is jurisdiction over the Defendant, Razelos v Razelos 
[1969] 3 All ER 929.
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It is respectfully suggested that the assumption of the text 
writers should be challenged and that foreign deferred community 
schemes should come within the matrimonial property choice of 
law rules and therefore be capable of being given effect to by 
the English Court on divorce, where there is no jurisdiction 
under the English discretionary distribution scheme, and on 
death. The desirability of such an approach can best be 
illustrated by means of an example.
Suppose that Marguerita and Hans are Danish domiciliaries who 
marry in Denmark. In the absence of contrary agreement, their 
matrimonial property is subject to the Danish deferred regime. 
Hans acquires substantial property in England. The marriage 
breaks down. The parties leave Denmark and have no remaining
assets there. Hans goes to live in Japan and Marguerita goes to
live in France. Hans obtains a divorce in Japan. He is currently 
working in England for a few months and Marguerita wishes to 
claim title to half of Hans' property in England, to which she 
is entitled under Danish law, on the dissolution of the deferred 
community.
If the Court is not prepared to give effect to the Danish
deferred regime, it would have to declare that all the property 
is Hans' separate property47. It is suggested that such a result 
is not consistent with conflicts' justice because it does not 
accord with the parties' legitimate expectations. It is
distortionary because it accords neither with the domestic policy 
of the forum nor with that of the law governing the parties' 
matrimonial property relationship.48
47 This is the same problem as that experienced when spouses
migrate from a separate property state to a community state. This 
problem has been dealt with in the United States, inter alia, by 
treating some property as quasi-community property. See 
McClanahan (chapter 7, n.160 supra) chapter 13 and Schreter
(1962) 50 Calif. L.R. 206.
48 Both England and Denmark provide for sharing of assets on 
divorce.
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As there is no jurisdiction under the Matrimonial and Family 
Proceedings Act 1984, it would seem that Marguerita's only 
recourse is to obtain a judgment in Denmark granting her a half 
share which can be recognised in England. This would seem to be 
virtually impossible, without Hans' cooperation.49 Even if it is 
possible, surely it will be fairer and more convenient for the 
English Court50 to apply the Danish regime directly.51 In 
particular, it should be noted that if the couple came from 
Belgium or some other immediate community state, the Court would 
clearly be prepared to enforce Marguerita's title to half the 
property.
(c) Basis for Applying Foreign Deferred Schemes
Whether or not the contractual analysis is accepted, the English
49 A foreign judgment will only be recognised if Hans is 
resident in the relevant foreign country or submits to the 
jurisdiction of the foreign Court. It should be noted that as the 
issue is a right in property arising out of a matrimonial 
relationship, it is excluded from the scope of the Brussels 
Convention.
50 Which would seem to be the forum conveniens. In both
Tezcan v Tezcan (1987) 46 DLR (4th.) 176 and Vladi v Vladi
(1986) 73 NSR (2d) 418, the respective Canadian Courts were
prepared to take jurisdiction because otherwise the wife would 
not obtain any share in the husband's property.
51 It may be argued that the English Court cannot calculate
the shares of the parties in specific items of property if other 
items of property are not within its jurisdiction. However, 
account can be taken of the value of the foreign properties. In 
Tezcan v Tezcan (1992) 87 DLR (4th.) 503, the Court took into
account the value of Turkish properties in ascertaining how to 
divide the British Columbian Properties. It should also be noted 
that the English Court, in deciding whether and how much 
financial relief to grant after a foreign divorce, has to take 
into account foreign financial provision which has already or is 
likely to be made (MFPA 1984 ss 16(2) and 18(6)).
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Court will only enforce the foreign scheme if it classifies it 
as a matrimonial property regime rather than ancillary relief 
on divorce. There is some Canadian authority for such a 
characterisation. In Tezcan v Tezcan52, the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal characterised the claim before them as a 
property53 matter because it would be so under both of the 
competing jurisdictions, Turkey and British Columbia. They found 
that the deferred regime contained in their own Family Relations 
Act was a property matter because "its true nature and character 
is to regulate the right to the beneficial use of property and 
its revenues and the disposition thereof."54
Nova Scotia seems to have avoided the problem of classification, 
at least in respect of movables55, by providing the same choice 
of law rule (i.e. the last common habitual residence) in relation 
to "the division of matrimonial assets and the ownership of 
movable property as between the spouses.". In Vladi v Vladi,56 
this provision was used in order to apply the West German 
deferred scheme.
52 (1992) 87 DLR (4th.) 503.
53 It was common ground that the lex situs was the common 
law choice of law rule applicable to proprietary claims arising 
from marriage in respect of immovable property.
54 This definition was adopted from the case of Derrickson 
v Derrickson (1986) 26 DLR (4th) 175.
55 Section 22 (2) of the Matrimonial Property Act 1980
(N.S.) provides that "The ownership of immovable property as 
between spouses is governed by the law of the place where that 
property is situated." Thus, in relation to immovables it would 
seem necessary to determine whether the issue was one of division 
of assets or ownership of the property.
56 (1987) 39 DLR (4th.) 563.
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It is suggested that the classification of deferred schemes as 
issues of matrimonial property, rather than divorce, can be 
supported on a number of grounds.
(i) In most systems the deferred regime was not introduced in 
order to provide a solution on divorce. It was introduced in
order to give effect to the matrimonial partnership57 concept
whilst allowing women more independence during marriage58.
(ii) As we have seen, in practice there is often little
difference between immediate and deferred regimes in the divorce 
situation.
(iii) It is incorrect to say that ownership of marital
acquisitions is totally unaffected by the existence of the 
marriage59. This is reflected by the common anti-avoidance 
provisions, under which one spouse is either prohibited from 
dealing with certain types of property60 or can be restrained61
57 See Gray, Reallocation of Property on Divorce (1977),
Chapter 2.
58 In some systems, such as Quebec, traditional community
regimes have been reformed into deferred regimes for this reason.
59 Although the Israeli Spouses' Property Relations Law s.4
specifically states this.
60 For example, under the Danish regime, the matrimonial
home cannot be sold or mortgaged without both spouses consent 
(see Pederson (1965) 28 MLR 137 p. 140) . There is a similar 
provision in the German Family Code Art. 15 - See Forder (1987) 
1 Int. J. of Law and the Family 47 at p. 61.
61 By Court order. Note that under English law, a
restraining order can only be sought once matrimonial proceedings 
have been commenced, Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 s.37.
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from dealing with his own property in a specific way if this 
would defeat the rights of the other under the deferred 
community. Under some regimes,62 one party can ask for 
dissolution of the community if the other has abused his powers 
under the community, even whilst the marriage still subsists.
However, even if the issue is classified as one of matrimonial 
property, it is not clear whether an English Court would be 
prepared to do any more than simply declare the property rights 
which have been vested by the foreign scheme.63 In which case 
a distinction would have to be made between those regimes under 
which rights in the property are acquired and those where only 
a right to compensation is acquired.64 It is suggested that such 
differential treatment would be unfortunate and that the Court 
should take the view that it can enforce a foreign matrimonial 
property regime even where the rights are not yet vested.
(c) Application of the Choice Rule
Under the contractual analysis, the English Court would enforce 
the terms of the implied/presumed contract, which are supplied 
by the provisions of the foreign deferred regime. The foreign 
law, in the above example Danish, will govern as the proper law 
of the contract.
62 For example, the Danish regime para. 38 and Dutch regime
para. 180. See Pederson (1965) 28 MLR 137 at p. 141.
63 It might take the view that it has no power to
redistribute assets other than that accorded to it by statute. 
See Pettit v Pettit [1970] AC 777.
64 See text at notes 41 - 43 supra.
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The situation is more complicated if the contractual analysis is 
rejected. How would the English matrimonial domicile rule work 
in relation to deferred schemes? The particular difficulty with 
deferred schemes is one of timing. This problem did not arise 
in the two Canadian cases discussed above. In Vladi v Vladi65 
the choice of law rule, the last common habitual residence, 
specifies the appropriate time. In Tezcan v Tezcan66, the 
property concerned was immovable and thus subject to the lex 
situs which is unaffected by time.
However, under the domicile rule, we need to know at what point 
in time the parties have to be domiciled in the deferred regime 
country in order for that scheme to be applied. It is suggested 
that as a matter of principle the most appropriate option67 is 
to apply the domicile at the date of the acquisition of each item 
of property, as this corresponds to the partial mutability 
approach advocated above.68 The very essence of the deferred
65 (1987) 39 DLR (4th.) 563.
66 (1992) 87 DLR (4th.) 503.
67 The other two options are:-
(i) The date of the marriage. This approach is subject to the 
same defects as the immutablity principle. Whilst it has been 
adopted in Israel, it has been criticised (Shava (1982) 31 ICLQ 
307 and Goldwater (1981) 16 Isr. L.R. 368) and an amendment
proposed (Fasberg (1990) 39 ICLQ 856 at p.858 ).
(ii) The date of the termination of the marriage. This 
corresponds to full mutability and treats the scheme as if it is 
a pure distribution rather than a community regime at all. (An 
even more extreme form of mutability can be found in the New 
Zealand Matrimonial Property Act 1976 .7 which provides that the 
New Zealand deferred regime applies wherever either spouse is 
domiciled in New Zealand at the date of the application. This is 
criticised by Forsyth (1977) 7 NZULR 397 at 399).
68 See text accompanying n. 18 supra.
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regime is that the actual realisation of rights is deferred. This 
assumes that inchoate and largely unenforcable69 rights are 
actually acquired during the marriage, presumably at the time of 
acquisition. The parties' legitimate expectations as to their 
rights in acquests during the marriage will presumably reflect 
the matrimonial property regime in the country of domicile at the 
time of acquisition. Thus, that regime should be applied on later 
termination in relation to those acquests. The problem of the 
non-vesting of rights could be solved by saying that on the 
subsequent termination of the marriage, the rights are 
retrospectively vested according to the law of the domicile at 
the time of acquisition.
The main drawback with this proposal is the practical complexity 
of determining the domicile at the time of the acquisition of 
each asset. It is suggested that this problem should not be 
exaggerated. It is unusual for couples to change domicile more 
than once during their marriage. In any event, the administrative 
difficulties are no greater than in applying the partial 
mutability approach to immediate community schemes.
It should be reiterated that application of the deferred regime 
by the English Court would not affect the English Court's 
jurisdiction to apply its own discretionary scheme, where 
available70, at the date of divorce. The English71 discretionary
69 Until termination of the marriage, the only method of
enforcement is usually by means of anti-avoidance devices (see 
n. 62 supra).
70 See text accompanying notes 1 and 2 supra.
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scheme allows for the variation of all rights in the property, 
whether or not vested under any previous scheme. Nonetheless, the 
legitimate expectations of the parties at the time of acquisition 
should at least be a relevant72 factor.
(d) Conclusion
If the above hypothesis is correct, then the 'conflict of rules' 
problem will arise in relation to deferred regimes,73 where 
there is a dispute as to whether the foreign decree is recognised 
or not. The recognition or otherwise of the decree may74 affect 
both the quantum of the property to be included within the 
deferred community and whether or not the rights thereunder can 
yet be realised75. Thus in the example given above, the problem
71 Although some discretionary distribution schemes are 
limited to property acquired during the marriage.
72 The Court is obliged "to have regard to all the 
circumstances of the case." (Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 s.25(1) 
as amended by Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984). For 
discussion of then effect of a matrimonial property contract, see 
Cretney and Masson, The Principles of Family Law 5th. edn.(1990) 
chapter 21 and Law Society , Maintenance and Capital Provision 
on Divorce (1991).
73 At least those under which rights in property are vested 
automatically on termination.
74 As with immediate community schemes, some systems exclude 
from the community property acquired after separation. See for 
example New Zealand where property acquired after the parties 
have ceased to live together normally constitutes separate 
property as distinct from matrimonial property. (Matrimonial 
Property Act 1976 s.9(4)). In Germany, the Court may prevent a 
party from sharing in post-separation acquisitions of the other 
where separation follows from the deliberate choice of the former 
(see Gray, n. 57 supra) at p. 253.
75 Although under some regimes, the community can be 
dissolved otherwise than on divorce or death. For example, under 
the Ontario Family Law Act 1986 a claim for division can be made 
where there is separation with no reasonable prospect of resumed 
cohabitation ( see Baxter (1987) 35 Am. J. Comp. Law 801, 804).
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would arise if the Japanese decree was recognised by Danish 
law76 and not English law or vice-a-versa. This could affect 
Marguerita's rights to property acquired by Hans after the decree 
or her right to claim at all.77
4. Discretionary Distribution Schemes
(a) Introduction
In modern times, most Western separate property systems78 have 
introduced discretionary schemes for reallocation of matrimonial 
property on divorce, similar to the English scheme. Can the 
conflict of rules problem arise in relation to such regimes?
At first sight, the answer would seem to be in the negative 
because the English Court always applies English law to the 
question of redistribution of property on divorce, even where the 
divorce was obtained abroad.79 However, this does not cover the
In Denmark, one party may apply to dissolve the community where 
the other has abused the assets (para. 38 of the Danish 
Matrimonial Property Act 1925).
76 Under all the versions of the choice of law rules 
discussed above, Danish law would still apply even if one or both 
spouses has lost their Danish domicile since they have not 
acquired a new common domicile and there does not seem to be any 
other country which is now more closely connected with the 
marriage.
77 Although no doubt she could in any event request 
dissolution of the community.
78 For example, in Australia, Canada and the separate 
property states of the USA. According to Bala (1987) 1 Int. J. 
Law and Family 1 at 16, by 1984 all 42 common law property states 
had adopted some form of discretionary distribution law, although 
in three the reform was judicial rather than legislative.
79 The Law Commission expressly preferred English law to 
govern financial relief following a foreign divorce because (i) 
the foreign law may not give effective relief which is exactly 
the mischief aimed at; (ii) it is not easy to think of an 
appropriate choice of law rule and (iii) it would be expensive
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situation where the English Court does not have jurisdiction to 
exercise its powers of property adjustment following an overseas 
divorce,80 but simply has to determine who has ownership of 
property situated in England.81 The orthodox approach would be 
to apply the foreign law7 s separate property system, ignoring its 
distribution scheme. It is submitted that this approach should 
not be accepted without further analysis.
(b) Should Foreign Discretionary Schemes be Applied?
It is suggested, that as a matter of principle, an English Court 
should be prepared to apply a foreign equitable distribution 
scheme, where it cannot apply its own,82 for the same reasons as 
those advocated above in relation to deferred community 
schemes.83 In particular:-
(i) Statutory redistributive powers were created in order to 
reflect the real value of the non-economic contributions of the 
wife, which cannot otherwise be recognised under a separate 
property system,84 and the modern concept of matrimonial 
partnership.85 Thus, discretionary distribution schemes in
and difficult to get expert evidence about foreign law.(Law Com. 
W.P. No. 77 (1980) para. 56).
80 See supra pp. 276 - 277.
81 For example under s. 17 Married Woman's Property Act 1882.
82 This deals with the Law Commission's first objection,
supra n. 79.
83 The arguments are also similar to those put forward in 
relation to discretionary financial provision on death, see 
Chapter 7 I C supra.
84 See chapter 7 III B 3 supra.
85 See n. 57 supra. and Law Com. No. 25.
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separate property systems should not create substantive rights 
any less than deferred community systems.86
The main reason87 for preferring discretionary regimes seems to 
be the desire for flexibility88 to take into account variation 
between the circumstances, including the length and financial 
circumstances89 of specific marriages. This demonstrates the 
difficulty of finding an appropriate fixed formula for such 
rights rather than any inconsistency with the conferring of 
substantive rights which crystallise when their quantum is fixed 
by a Court.
86 See Gray (n. 57 supra) at p. 336. Waters (1970) 22 McGill 
LJ 315 at p. 318 writes, "Community of acquests is a deliberate 
modern attempt to place the parties in a fair and equitable 
position; separation as to property, accompanied by a statutory 
judicial discretion to allocate assets between the parties on the 
termination of marriage, is another. The second deserves as much 
respect as the first." A number of English writers have commented 
on the similarity of the results obtained under the English 
discretionary system and deferred community of acquests regimes. 
See, for example, Freedman et al., "Property and Marriage: An 
Integrated Approach" Institute of Fiscal Studies Reports Series 
No. 29 (1988) and Forder (1987) 1 Int. J. of Law and the Family 
47 at p. 48.
87 See Law Com. No. 52.
88 It is significant that in recent years there has been 
increasing disillusionment with discretionary systems. In New 
Zealand, the discretionary system introduced in 1963 was replaced 
by a deferred community system in 1976. In England there is now 
a fixed formula system in relation to child support under the 
Child Support Act 1991. It has also been suggested that the use 
of computerisation may enable the creation of formulae which are 
sufficiently sophisticated to take into account all relevant 
factors. See Green, Maintenance and capital provision on divorce: 
A need for precision? (1987).
For example, under the 1973 Act, early caselaw showed the 
need for a different approach in high, middle and low income 
cases, see Bromley and Lowe, chapter 7 n. 100 supra, at pp.767- 
768.
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T!he fact that under discretionary distribution systems one spouse 
lias rights in the property of the other prior to divorce has been 
recognised by a number of American writers90 and Courts91 in 
U.S. community states when considering the nature of property 
brought in by migrants from separate property states.
(ii) Applying the foreign law's separate property system without 
its discretionary distribution scheme may produce results which 
are not consistent with conflicts' justice and are 
distortionary.92
However, it may be argued that there is a significant 
distinction between deferred community and discretionary schemes 
because of the practical difficulty of ascertaining how the 
foreign court would have exercised its discretion in any 
particular case. It is suggested that this difficulty is largely
90 Sampson, Common Law Property in a Texas Divorce (1979) 42
Tex.B.J. 131 quoted in Scoles and Hay at p. 466 writes, "It is 
true that 'common law separate property' assets or rights brought 
into Texas by a husband come with legal title vested in him.
However, it follows logically that the property also must come
to the state attached with whatever equitable claims the wife has 
under the statutes and caselaw of the common law jurisdiction. 
Thus, if the husband's separate property is subject to equitable 
division in the state of origin, it must be similarly subject to 
such treatment in Texas."
91 For example, in Hughes v Hughes 91 N.M. 339, 573 P.2d
1194, 1201 (1978) , the New Mexico Court held that the
characterization of the property as separate must be made under 
the applicable laws of the State of Iowa from where the parties 
had migrated. Thus, "the property is subject to all the wife's 
incidents of ownership, claims, rights and legal relations 
provided in any and all of the law of the State of Iowa that 
affect marital property." See also Rau v Rau 432 P. 2d 910 
(Arizona 1967), Burton v Burton 531 P. 2d 204 ( Arizona 1975), 
Berle v Berle 546 P. 2d 407 (Idaho 1976).
92 See text accompanying n.48 supra.
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illusory. After examining caselaw, a foreign court is in almost 
as good a position as a domestic court93 to exercise the 
discretionary powers. Also as we have seen modern immediate and 
deferred community schemes usually allow for Court discretion to 
vary the equal shares94 or in some cases95 for equitable 
distribution ab initio. It would seem that today in order to 
apply most immediate or deferred community schemes, a Court will 
have to consider whether to exercise such a discretion96.
(c) Basis for Application of Foreign Discretionary Schemes 
Under the contractual analysis, it could be held that where 
parties are domiciled in an equitable distribution regime at the 
date of the marriage, the provisions of the discretionary scheme 
form the terms of an implied or presumed contract. In other 
words, the parties are deemed to agree that on termination of the 
marriage their property rights are to be determined by a Court 
in accordance with the statutory regime. The English Court should 
be able to enforce the terms of that contract. Such contract 
might be varied by express or implied agreement, where the
93 One of the reasons for the disillusionment with 
discretionary scheme is the evidence of inconsistency between 
decisions of different courts. See Eekelaar, Regulating Divorce 
(1991) pp.61 et. seq. There is no reason why this should be any 
worse where a foreign court is involved. There is also no reason 
why there should be any more difficulty in bringing evidence of 
the foreign law than in any other type of case. This answers the 
Law Commission's third objection (supra n.79).
94 For example, in Germany and Nova Scotia.
95 Arizona, Texas, Idaho, Nevada and Washington.
96 In Vladi v Vladi (1987) 39 DLR (4th) 563, the Trial Judge 
expressly found that there was no case for invoking the West 
German provision for unequal division where equal division would 
be grossly unfair.
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parties' domicile changes. If the contractual analysis is 
rejected, the choice of law rule would be the domicile of the 
parties at the date of the acquisition of the asset in 
question.97
However, as we saw in relation to deferred community schemes, 
whichever analysis is adopted, an English Court can only apply 
a foreign regime if it can classify it as relating to matrimonial 
property rather than to financial relief on divorce. It is 
reluctantly conceded that the classification problem seems to be 
insurmountable in relation to discretionary distribution schemes. 
In this situation, the forum has a domestic scheme of its own. 
Thus, its classification will be heavily influenced by its own 
scheme, which is treated as relief ancillary to divorce.98 
Whilst there are cogent arguments99 in favour of classification 
as a matrimonial property regime, it is unlikely that these would
97 See text accompanying n.67 supra. This answers the Law 
Commission's second objection ( n. 79 supra).
98 Even where financial provision is awarded under the 
Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984, it is clearly 
regarded as being ancillary to the foreign divorce.
99 (i) Division of property between the parties is basically 
a private law issue inter se, as distinct from the issue of 
whether a divorce should be granted or recognised, which is a 
matter for the policy of the forum, (ii) Parties may rely on the 
financial provision law in their place of domicile in organising 
their financial affairs, in much the same way as they may rely 
on a traditional matrimonial property regime. For example, they 
may take much less care about who has legal title to investments 
and household durables. Thus, it is not only on divorce that the 
scheme is relevant. Acknowledgment of this fact led most of the 
community states in the USA to treat property brought in by 
migrants from separate property states as 'quasi-community' 
property which is available for distribution on divorce (see 
references at n. 47 supra).
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be accepted in England.100
(d) Conclusion
Despite the real similarities in the rationale behind 
discretionary distribution schemes and community schemes, it is 
unlikely that an English Court would be prepared to give effect 
to a foreign discretionary scheme. Thus, it is more realistic to 
proceed on the basis that the conflict of rules situation could 
not arise in relation to such schemes.
D. MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY AND SUCCESSION
The interrelationship between matrimonial property and succession 
is complex.101 In the situation of a disputed decree followed by 
death of one of the parties, there may well not have been any 
division of the matrimonial property on divorce.
If the relevant regime only provides for realisation on 
termination by divorce,102 then if the decree is not recognised, 
the divorce regime will not apply at all and the only issue will 
be as to succession. If the decree is recognised, the regime will 
have to determine whether rights to division of assets on divorce
100 There is also the problem of whether an English Court has 
power to order redistribution of assets at all. (supra n. 63 and 
accompanying text).
101 For some aspects of this see references at n. 160 in 
chapter 7 supra.
102 This is the position with all discretionary distribution 
regimes and some deferred community regimes, for example Israel.
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can be claimed by or against the estate of one of the 
spouses.103
Where the community or deferred community regime applies on death 
as well as divorce, whether or not the decree is recognised may 
affect the question whether post-decree acquisitions are part of 
the community property to be distributed on death. If the divorce 
is not recognised, the distribution on death will be as normal. 
If the divorce is recognised, then in theory the community is 
dissolved by the divorce and division should take place under the 
divorce rules in favour of or against the deceased's estate. This 
will clearly be the case where the effect of divorce is to impose 
an automatic division of assets. It is less clear what will be 
the position where partition requires agreement or Court order 
and neither has been obtained before the date of death.
E. SECOND MARRIAGES
We must consider how the matrimonial property rights of the first 
spouse should be affected where there has been a second marriage 
which is valid under the preference rule recommended in Chapter
6. As with succession, the validity of the second marriage should 
not necessarily mean that the first marriage has ceased to 
subsist for all purposes. However, the possibility of the two 
wives sharing the rights is more problematic than in relation to 
succession104 both as a matter of principle and from the 
practical point of view.
103 In English law, no order for financial relief can be made 
after the death of either party. See Bromley and Lowe (chapter
7, n.100 supra) at p. 725, citing Dipple v Dipple [1942] P. 65.
104 See chapter 7 I D supra.
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As a matter of principle, the difference is that it is more 
objectionable to enforce the marital rights of the concurrent 
marriages by affording property rights to both wives during the 
lifetime of the 'bigamist' . From a practical point of view, how 
can property acquired by one spouse (we will assume the husband) 
after the disputed decree form part of the community of property 
or deferred community regime105 of two different spouses?
It is suggested that the best solution, where the first marriage 
ought to be upheld for the purposes of matrimonial property 
rights, is to limit the matrimonial property rights of the second 
spouse. Her property rights would be considered to be subject to 
those of the first spouse. In other words, the husband's half 
share in his post-decree acquisitions under the community regime 
with the first wife would belong to the community with the second 
wife.
11 POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS106
A. APPLY THE CHOICE RULE
1. Theoretical Basis
Since the choice rule depends on whether there is a contract 
governing the matrimonial property, we will have to consider the 
contractual situation separately. Under the 'contractual
105 In some regimes, the assets will not be included in the 
first regime because they have been acquired after separation. 
Otherwise, depending on the circumstances, it may be appropriate 
to invoke the unfairness exception to equal sharing (where there 
is such an exception, in relation to these assets.
106 For tabular illustration of results of applying different 
preference rules, see Tables 5A and 5B in the Appendix infra.
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analysis',107 all situations would fall within this category, 
including deferred community regimes.
(a) Where there is a contract
The question as to whether particular property has been acquired 
during the continuation of the marriage would seem to be a pure 
question of construction of the contract, which should be 
governed by its proper law. It would seem anomalous if the proper 
law were to determine the existence of all the requirements 
necessary for the creation of a right under the marriage 
settlement except for the question of the continued existence of 
the marriage.
It will be remembered that application of the choice rule in the 
'conflict of rules' scenario involves use of the doctrine of 
renvoi in the broad sense that we are using the conflicts rules 
(the type known as recognition rules) of the lex causae.108 It 
has been judicially stated109 and is generally accepted110 that 
renvoi does not apply in relation to contract. Does this cause 
any problems for the above view that the choice rule should apply 
where there is a marriage settlement?
There would seem to be two main reasons why renvoi is thought
107 See supra, text accompanying n. 4 et seq.
108 See chapter 1, VII supra.
109 Re United Railways of Havana and Regia Warehouses Ltd.
[1960] Ch. 52; Amin Rasheed Shipping Corporation v Kuwait
Insurance Co. Ltd. [1984] AC 50.
110 Article 15 of the Rome Convention expressly excludes 
renvoi.
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inappropriate in contract cases. Firstly, the doctrine of unity 
requires that, unless the parties provide otherwise, all 
contractual issues should be decided by the same law to avoid 
distortions which can occur from the interrelationship between 
two systems with different rules. In our context, there is no 
breach of unity because we are not remitting a contractual issue 
for determination by another domestic system. We are simply using 
the recognition rules of the proper law to determine the validity 
of the decree. Indeed, the rationale behind the doctrine of unity 
would seem to require that the validity of the decree should be 
tested by the proper law rather than by the forum. Otherwise, a 
distortionary result could occur under which rights would be 
conferred on a spouse under the marriage contract even though 
such rights would not be conferred either under the proper 
law111 or under the forum.112
A second reason for rejecting renvoi in relation to contract is 
that when parties choose a law to govern their contract, they are 
assumed to refer to the domestic law of that legal system only 
and not to its conflicts provisions. Again this argument has no 
real relevance to our problem. If we are concerned with the 
parties" intention at the time of contracting, it would seem more 
likely that they would envisage the issue of continued 
subsistence being determined by their chosen113 proper law than
111 Because it considers the marriage to have been previously 
dissolved.
112 Because, for example, it did not recognise the validity 
of the marriage contract.
113 Whether expressly, impliedly or by presumption.
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by a forum, whose identity is not yet known to them.
Thus, it is suggested that arguments of principle point to 
application of the choice rule in all cases where there is a 
marriage settlement, although these would seem to be considerably 
weaker in the case of implied and presumed contracts.
(b) Where there is no Contract
There would seem to be two main arguments in favour of the choice
rule. The first is the familiar one that the domicile is dominant
in relation to all matters relating to status. The second is the 
internal consistency of the regime itself. Even if the regime is 
not treated as being contractual, it is designed to be a complete 
scheme for determining the rights of the parties in respect of 
matrimonial property. It should define itself all the various 
requirements which have to be fulfilled in order for certain 
rights to be created. One of the most fundamental requirements 
will be the formation and continuation of a valid marriage. The 
law governing the regime should determine whether this 
requirement is met. Otherwise, as we have seen, we may end up 
with distortionary results which are consistent with neither the 
lex causae nor the lex fori.
One practical difficulty with applying the choice rule is that 
under the principle of partial mutability there may be several 
different systems applying to different items of property where 
there has been a change in domicile. This creates the potential
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for considerable complexity, if the divorce is recognised by some 
of the systems and not others. However, it would seem wrong to 
reject the choice rule for all cases just because there may be 
cases where there are two or more successive domiciles.
2. Authority
The Australian case of Hague v Hague114, which we discussed 
above in relation to succession115, may also be cited in support 
of the application of the law governing the marital property 
settlement. In this case, the settlement was governed by Muslim 
law and the Court applied Muslim law to determine if Azra was the 
deceased's wife. The limitations of the case as authority in 
relation to the 'conflict of rules', explained in chapter 7116, 
are equally applicable here.
3. Results
It will be helpful to examine how the choice rule would work in 
practice by reference to a hypothetical example. We will assume 
that the contract or the regime provide that:-
(i) The contract/regime applies to all property acquired 
during subsistence of the marriage and
(ii) Some rights under the contract or regime are only 
realisable on termination.
(1962) 108 CLR 230.
At chapter 7 II A 2 supra.
Ibid.
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(a) Where the lex causae recognises the decree.
This will lead to exclusion from a share in post-decree 
acquisitions, but will allow immediate realisation where this is 
an issue. One spouse may use the decree117 in order to exclude 
unfairly the other from sharing in post-decree acquisitions. As 
with succession, the reason that the decree is not recognised by 
the forum may be that there has been some element of unfairness 
about the way in which it was obtained or its effect118. The 
unfairness may be exacerbated where the parties no longer have 
any real connection with the country whose law governs the 
contract or the matrimonial regime applicable to the assets in 
question. Again, it seems that this problem would have to be 
dealt with by judicious use of the doctrine of public policy. In 
other words, the recognition rules of the proper law of the 
contract or of the matrimonial domicile would not apply where 
their application would lead to a manifestly unjust result.
(b) Where the lex causae does not recognise the decree.
This would result in the potential sharing of post-decree 
acquisitions, but may prevent immediate realisation. This gives 
rise to two possible difficulties.
The first is legal bigamy. We have already seen that this concept 
per se is not a fatal objection to the application of the choice
The decree may have been obtained specifically for this
purpose.
118 See chapter 7, II A 3 (a) supra.
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rule,119 although it is more problematic in relation to 
matrimonial property than succession.120 Furthermore, we have 
already suggested a solution to the practical problem of one 
party being subject to matrimonial property regimes with two 
successive spouses at the same time.121
The second is the possibility of abuse whereby a spouse relies 
on the fortuitous fact of non-recognition by the lex causae in 
order to obtain a pecuniary benefit. This argument seems to have 
less validity here than in relation to succession122 because the 
lex causae will have or have had a real connection with both 
spouses. Under the contractual analysis it is a law chosen either 
expressly, impliedly or by reference to objective factors 
pertaining at the time of the creation of the contract. 
Otherwise, it is the law of the matrimonial domicile at the 
relevant time. Thus, it is not simply fortuitous that this law 
applies to determine the continued subsistence of the marriage. 
This can be compared with the situation on succession where the 
law governing the distribution may be a law which has no 
connection with the marriage between the parties.123 If,
119 See chapter 6 at II A 3 (a) supra.
120 See I E supra. It is arguable that the contractual
situation is less problematic because the marriage is being 
treated as still subsisting only for the purposes of the 
contract, which can be considered as legally isolated from the 
provisions of general law rules.
121 At I E supra.
122 See chapter 7, II A 3 (b) supra.
123 Either the lex situs in the case of immovables or the
domicile at death, which was acquired by the deceased after the 
separation of the parties.
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however, there were a situation in which one party's reliance on 
non-recognition was abusive, the doctrine of preclusion124 could 
be used to prevent denial of the validity of the decree.
It may be argued that the delay in realisation is not a problem 
because it is appropriate for the law governing the regime to 
specify when realisation is possible.
B. APPLY THE RECOGNITION RULE
1. Theoretical Basis
It is suggested that the 'logical consequences' argument is
weaker here than in relation to remarriage or succession. In
particular, Courts have shown a willingness to ignore the 
financial and proprietary effects of a foreign decree even though 
they recognise the decree.
For example, under the doctrine of divisible divorce, the New 
York Courts125 have been prepared to continue and even to grant 
a spousal maintenance order,126 even though they were obliged to 
recognise a decree of divorce obtained in a sister state. The 
English Court of Appeal in Wood v Wood127 in effect128 applied 
this doctrine when they allowed an English maintenance order
124 Discussed in detail in chapter 7 at II A 4 supra.
125 Estin v Estin (1948) 334 U.S. 541 and Vanderbilt v
Vanderbilt (1956) 1 N.Y. 2d 342.
126 As opposed to an order of alimony between ex-spouses.
127 [1957] P. 254.
128 Lord Evershed M.R. preferred to reach the same result by
different means
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granted in favour of a married woman to continue129 despite the
fact that the subsequent Nevada divorce was required to be
recognised.130 The following comment by Goodhart, in a note on
the first instance decision is apt in our context
"Thee is much to be said for the American doctrine of 
divisible divorce, as it provides that a marriage which has 
been terminated by the Courts of one State, having proper 
jurisdiction, must be regarded as terminated in all other 
states, so that no problems of bigamy or illegitimacy can 
arise in the case of subsequent marriage, but it does not 
follow from this that a husband should be enabled, by 
obtaining such an ex parte divorce to avoid all the 
financial obligations which he may owe to his wife." 131
Furthermore, s.51(5) Family Law Act 1986 specifically
provides132 that there is no requirement to recognise any 
maintenance or other ancillary order made in the foreign 
matrimonial proceedings.
2. Results
(a) Where the decree is recognised
Application of the recognition rule will prevent sharing of post 
decree acquisitions, but allow immediate realisation. The former 
may be unjust where a divorce has been obtained ex parte, or in
129 There was no jurisdiction to grant post-divorce
maintenance.
130 cf. the opposite situation arose in Macaulay v Macaulay
[1991] 1 FLR 235. The English Court refused to recognise the
Irish maintenance order because it was irreconcilable with the 
English divorce decree.
131 (1957) LQR 29 at p. 32.
132 This replaces s.8 (3) 1971 Recognition of Divorces and
Legal Separations Act 1971. See Sabbagh v Sabbagh [1985] FLR 29 
where the Court recognised the Brazilian judicial separation, but 
did not recognise its effect of freezing the proprietary rights 
of the parties.
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some other way unfairly, and the Respondent is the one deprived 
of the share. As we have seen, whilst deprivation of financial 
provision on divorce is a factor to be taken into consideration 
in exercising the discretion to refuse to recognise a decree 
under Family Law Act 1986 section 51, there is no guarantee that 
recognition will be refused in every case where it would be 
unjust to deprive the 'spouse" of a share in post-decree 
acquisitions under a foreign matrimonial property regime. In 
particular, it should be pointed out that here, as in relation 
to succession, the deprivation occurs as a result of the divorce 
per se and not as a result of the fact that the divorce was 
obtained abroad.133
(b) Where the decree is not recognised
The 'spouse" will be allowed to share in post-decree 
acquisitions, but may not be able to claim immediate realisation. 
Any unfairness caused by one spouse relying on the fortuitous 
fact of non-recognition by the forum in order to obtain a benefit 
can be dealt with by the doctrine of preclusion.134
The inability to realise may be more of a problem here. The 
spouses have obtained a decree which is recognised by the law 
governing their matrimonial property regime. And yet they cannot 
realise their rights under that regime because the forum does not 
recognise the decree.
133 As in Joyce v Joyce [1979] Fam. 93 and Mamdani v Mamdani 
[1984] FLR 699.
134 Discussed in detail at chapter 7, II A 4 supra.
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They would seem to have two options. The first is to litigate in 
the country of the lex causae where they will be able to obtain 
an order for immediate realisation. However, this may not be 
practicable where one or both parties have severed all connection 
with that country. Even if a judgment is obtained in the foreign 
country, it will not be recognised in England unless the 
defendant is resident there or submitted to the foreign 
Court.135 The second option is for them to obtain a fresh 
divorce either in the forum or which will be recognised by the 
forum. This can only be done if the relevant jurisdictional 
base136 and grounds exist.137
C. THE 'DIFFERENTIAL RULE'
Application of the 'differential rule'138 leads to recognition 
in all cases and therefore would produce the result that there 
would be no sharing in post-decree acquisitions, but there could 
be immediate realisation.
135 Even if it is a judgment of the Court which granted the
matrimonial decree. Whilst the case of Philips v Batho [1913] 3 
KB 25 suggests that an in personam judgment which is ancillary 
to an in rem judgment (in this case the matrimonial decree) will 
be recognised, the decision has been severely criticised and is 
generally considered to be incorrect. See, for example, Cheshire 
and North (chapter 1, n.l supra) at p.363.
136 I.e. one party is domiciled in or has been habitually
resident in England for one year.
137 In relation to a divorce in England, the latter will not
generally be a problem where a divorce has already been obtained, 
although it is not recognised.
138 See chapter 6 II C 3 supra.
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D. UPHOLDING MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
It will be remembered that in the preceding two chapters, there 
were mooted express result selection preference rules in favour 
of upholding of the remarriage and of succession rights 
respectively. By analogy, it might be suggested here that an 
appropriate preference rule would be to apply the rule which 
would uphold matrimonial property rights.
The difficulty is in defining what we mean by upholding 
matrimonial property rights. It is suggested that this has to be
understood in the context of the purpose of the scheme in
question. Since all types of community scheme are primarily 
designed to promote sharing, it might seem that rights are best 
upheld by including post-decree acquisitions in the scheme to 
maximise sharing. Where actual sharing depends on realisation it 
might seem that upholding rights also requires allowing the 
parties access to their shares. However, we have seen that in the 
case of a disputed decree these two objectives will often139 be 
mutually inconsistent.
Thus, it seems that a preference rule based on upholding 
matrimonial property rights is not practicable.
Ill POLICY
A. OVERVIEW OF ENGLISH DOMESTIC LAW
In order to determine the policy of English law, we will have to
139 Unless realisation may take place other than on divorce
or annulment.
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give a brief summary of domestic 'matrimonial property' law. The 
separate property system introduced by the Married Women's 
Property Act 1882 still applies in principle to determine 
ownership of the matrimonial property, subject to a number of 
limited specific exceptions.140
However, the importance of the separate property system has been 
considerably diminished by the introduction in 1970 of extensive 
property adjustment powers exercisable by a Court on termination 
of a marriage by a divorce or nullity decree and on the granting 
of a decree of judicial separation. The 1970 provisions were 
consolidated in 1973 and have since been amended by the 1984 
Matrimonial Property and Family Proceedings Act. Courts have made 
clear that wherever possible in disputes about ownership of 
matrimonial property following breakdown of marriage, parties 
should rely on these wide redistributive powers rather than ask 
the Courts to settle the issue of beneficial ownership.141 
However, there will still be situations in which ownership may 
have to be ascertained. These include on succession142, the 
insolvency of one spouse or if there is no jurisdiction to apply
140 The common law presumption of advancement and statutory
provision for sharing of the unused part of housekeeping 
allowances (Married Women's Property Act 1964) and acquisition 
of a share in property by making improvements thereto 
(Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1970 s.37).
141 See Wachtel v Wachtel [1973] Fam. 70, 92 and Kowalczuk 
v Kowalczuk [1973] 1 WLR 930, 934.
142 Although there is discretion to provide provision for a 
spouse out of the estate under the Inheritance (Provision for 
Family and Dependants) Act 1975, this will not be exercised until 
the exact respective shares of the deceased and the surviving 
spouse have been established.
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the statutory regime143.
Indeed, the Law Commission144 in 1973 considered that, despite 
the width of the property adjustment powers, there was a need to 
provide automatic statutory co-ownership of the matrimonial home, 
which in most marriages is the most valuable asset. In 1988, they 
made a further recommendation145 that in relation to pure 
personalty, goods intended wholly or mainly for the use or 
benefit of both spouses should vest in them both jointly.146 The 
implementation of these proposals would be tantamount to 
introducing a system of community of property for couples who do 
not have investments, other than the matrimonial home. However, 
there is no indication that they are likely to be implemented. 
This is no doubt partly because in most cases the difficulties 
of ownership only arise on divorce147 and because in any event 
spouses are increasingly putting assets into joint names.148
Given the above state of affairs, it might be difficult to state
143 Supra nn. 1 and 2 and accompanying text.
144 Law Com. No. 52. They reiterated this proposal in 1982 
in Law Com. No. 115 at para. 112.
145 Law Com. No. 175. It is interesting to note that the 
Commission preferred this limited proposal to complete 
introduction of community of property largely for pragmatic 
reasons. See paras. 3.3-3.6.
146 The Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985 provides inter alia 
for a presumption that household goods are owned in equal shares.
147 In relation to unmarried cohabitees, ownership has to be 
determined on breakdown of their relationship. However, the 
proposals for joint ownership would not apply to cohabitees.
148 See Bromley and Lowe (chapter 7, n.100 supra) at p. 564 
n. 2.
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the policy of English law in relation to matrimonial property 
prior to breakdown. However, the policy of providing for sharing 
of matrimonial property on termination by divorce or annulment 
is clear.
B. ENGLISH LAW APPROACH TO THE ISSUES IN QUESTION
How does English law deal with the two issues which are of 
concern in relation to the conflict of rules situation?
1. Sharing of Post-Decree Acquisitions
Under the English discretionary distribution scheme, all 
property belonging to either spouse, whenever acquired, is 
susceptible to redistribution.149 Whilst the fact that property 
was acquired after the cessation of cohabitation150 or divorce 
will be relevant in determining to what extent such property 
should be shared, it is only one factor in the exercise of the 
discretion as a whole. Thus, domestic policy in relation to 
sharing of post-decree assets is part of the overall policy in 
relation to financial provision on divorce.
The search for such policy must start with a brief examination 
of the statutory guidelines, provided in the Matrimonial Causes 
Act 1973 as amended by the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act
149 Moreover, the Courts take into account resources which 
the parties are likely to have available in the future. (M.C.A. 
1973 s.25(2) (a) as amended).
150 In Krystman v Krystman [1973] 3 All ER 247, no order was 
made in respect of a marriage of 26 years during which the 
parties had only cohabited for the first two weeks. See Deech, 
(1982) 98 LQR 621, 630 - 632.
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1984. It should be borne in mind that whilst the 1984 reform 
seems to have been primarily concerned with redistribution of 
income, in the form of maintenance, the same principles apply to 
property adjustment.151
(a) The statutory guidelines152
The Court is mandated to take into account all the criteria set 
out in Matrimonial Causes Act ss.25(2), with first consideration 
being given to the welfare of any children of the family.153 The 
Court must also consider whether it is possible to make an order 
which will terminate any further support obligations between the 
parties or alternatively to make a fixed period maintenance order 
after which there would be such termination of support.154
(b) The policy objectives
Little help can be gleaned from caselaw because, as empirical 
evidence shows,155 the discretion is still largely unstructured 
and there is inconsistency in the application of the criteria. 
Thus, the policy objectives must be deduced from the statutory 
provisions themselves, viewed in the light of their legislative
151 Dewar, Law and the Family (2nd. edn. 1992) at p. 297, 
Hoggett and Pearl, The Family Law and Society Cases and Materials 
(3rd. edn., 1991) pp.254-255.
152 For detailed discussion of the guidelines and their 
application, see Bromley and Lowe (chapter 7 n.98 supra) at 
chapter 21 and Dewar ibid at chapter 8.
153 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 s.25(1) (as substituted by
the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984).
154 s. 25A of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (introduced 
by the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984).
155 Eekelaar (n. 93 supra) at pp. 60 et seq.
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history.
It is suggested that the three main objectives are:-
(i) To Guarentee that Needs Are Met156.
Property adjustment should, so far as possible, provide for the 
present and future reasonable needs of the children of the 
family157 and the parties.
(ii) To Facilitate a Clean break.158
Property adjustment should, so far as possible, ensure that the 
parties can be self-sufficient following divorce and there should 
not be any further financial interdependence between them.159
(iii) To reflect contributions.160
Property adjustment should enable non-economic contributions and 
the concept of the matrimonial partnership to be recognised in
See Law Com. No. 103 at para. 70 et. seq., Law Com. No. 
112 at paras. 24- 25 and Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 s.25 (2) (b) 
(as substituted by Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984)
157 See n. 152 supra.
158 See n. 153 supra, Law Com. No. 103 paras. 73 to 79 and
Law Com. No. 112 paras. 28 - 30.
159 For analysis of the application of the clean break
principle in practice see Wright [1991] Fam. Law 76.
160 See Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 s.25 (2) (f) (as
substituted by Matrimonial Causes Act). Whilst reflecting 
contributions is not specified as a separate model in the Law 
Commission's 1980 Discussion paper (Law Com. No. 103), it is 
clear that this was one of the main motivations behind the 1970 
Matrimonial and Property Proceedings Act, which was consolidated 
in the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (see Law Com. No. 25 para. 69 
and, for example, 305 H.L. Debs at col. 862, 18th. November 
1969 (per Baroness Summerskill) and 794 H.C. Debs 28.1.70 (2nd. 
reading) at col. 1559 (per the Solicitor- General)). In 
particular, the need for the equitable distribution scheme became 
more acute after the House of Lords rejected judicial attempts 
(largely by Lord Denning) to introduce a 'contribution' approach 
to determine beneficial ownership in Pettit v Pettit [1970] AC 
777 and Gissing v Gissing [1971] AC 886.
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money's worth.
Where the above objectives conflict161, the needs approach takes 
precedence162. Thus, where needs cannot be guaranteed by 
property adjustment,163 there will not be a clean break.164
2. Realisation
In English law, a party can take proceedings at any time during 
the marriage to claim ownership of their property.165 The sale 
of jointly owned property will be ordered166 once the underlying 
purpose of the trust for sale167 no longer exists.168 However,
161 The 1984 reform has been widely criticised because of its 
introduction of contradictory objectives (see e.g. Symes (1985) 
48 MLR 44 and Dewar (1986) Conv. 96.
162 Bromley and Lowe (chapter 7 n.100 supra) at p. 766 say 
"It is obvious however that the court's primary concern must be 
for the needs of all the members of the family with priority 
having to be given to the needs of any child of the family." The 
Child Support Act 1991 will prevent the Courts from 'throwing the 
wife and children onto the State' as they seemed prepared to do 
in Ashley v Blackman [1988] Fam. 85 and Delaney v Delaney [1990] 
2 FLR 457.
163 Conversely, one party may not receive the full value of 
their contributions if the other party's needs are greater.
164 Maintenance may be ordered immediately or a nominal order 
made to allow for the possibility of maintenance in the future, 
should the need arise. See, for example, Suter v Suter [1987] 
2 FLR, Whiting v Whiting [1988] 2 All ER 275; Hepburn v Hepburn 
[1989] 1 FLR 373 and Waterman v Waterman [1989] 1 FLR 373.
165 Married Woman's Property Act 1882.
166 Under s.30 Law of Property Act 1925.
167 A trust for sale is imposed by law in the case of all
jointly owned property, Law of Property Act 1925, ss.34 and 36.
168 Jones v Challenger [1961] 1 QB 176. The purpose may be
to provide a home for the children, in which case it will 
continue after the breakdown of the marriage. See Re Evers Trust 
[1980] 3 All ER 399 and Schuz (1982) 12 Fam. Law 108.
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an order under the discretionary distribution scheme can only be 
made once a decree of divorce, nullity or judicial separation has 
been granted. Under the Law Commission's proposals on the Ground 
of Divorce,169 a Court would be able to make a property 
adjustment order at any time after the proceedings have been 
started, although it would seem that the order would not actually 
take effect until the decree is granted. The idea is that once 
the marriage has broken down, the parties should be encouraged 
to concentrate on resolving all the practical matters such as 
property adjustment so that the whole process can be completed
by the time the decree is granted at the end of the one year
'waiting period'.
In the light of the above, it may be argued that the policy of 
English law is not to allow realisation until a decree has been 
granted. It is suggested, however, that the English rule does not 
reflect any particular policy about realisation but rather 
pragmatic considerations170. Therefore, the search for the 
policy of English law in relation to the issue of realisation 
should be undertaken in the wider context of the policy behind 
divorce law generally. We have already seen that one of the most 
fundamental objectives of modern divorce law is to enable dead 
marriages to be buried.171 The sooner the property issues 
between the parties can be sorted out, the sooner the marriage
169 Law Com. No. 192, discussed at chapter 6, II 2 supra.
170 For example, if property adjustment took effect on
separation, what would happen in the event that the parties 
became reconciled.
171 At chapter 6, III supra.
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can be buried.
Thus, it is suggested that it is the policy of English law to 
allow realisation of matrimonial property rights as soon as 
practicable after a marriage has broken down. In English domestic 
law, it is not practicable to allow realisation before the 
decree, but if it is practicable under other systems then this 
should be encouraged.
IV APPLICATION OF POLICY
A. SHARING OF POST-DECREE ACQUISITIONS
What are the implications of the objectives identified above172 
for the sharing of post decree acquisitions? The contribution 
principle would tend towards non-sharing because the non-owning 
spouse cannot normally be said to have made a contribution to any 
post-separation acquisitions. The clean break doctrine would also 
seem to favour non-sharing. The needs principle would involve 
sharing of post-decree acquisitions where there are insufficient 
pre-decree acquisitions to satisfy reasonable needs. We saw that 
in English domestic law, where the objectives conflicts, the 
needs approach takes precedence. By analogy, in the 'conflict of 
rules' situation, where needs cannot be guaranteed without 
recourse to post decree acquisitions,173 the latter should be 
included.
172 At III B 1 (b) supra.
173 Where the foreign scheme provides for a discretion to 
vary the shares, reasonable needs can be met by increasing the 
share in the pre-decree acquisitions.
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How can such a result be obtained by use of a preference rule? 
Under a discretionary scheme, it is possible to provide for 
distribution of the appropriate proportion of the post-decree 
acquisitions. In contrast, a rule-based system can only produce 
an 'all or nothing' situation. If we adopt the rule which does 
not recognise the decree, all the post-decree acquisitions must 
be shared. If we adopt the rule which recognises the decree, none 
of the post-decree acquisitions can be shared.
It is suggested that the desired policy can be implemented by 
adoption of the 'differential rule' , which always results in non­
sharing of post-decree acquisitions, subject to an exception 
where reasonable needs cannot be met without recourse to such 
acquisitions.
Such an exception can be achieved by use of the doctrine of 
preclusion, as defined for our purposes above.174 In other 
words, the owner spouse is precluded from relying on the decree 
in order to claim the pecuniary advantage of not providing for 
the reasonable needs175 of the other out of his post-decree 
acquisitions. There are two possible methods of dealing with the 
'all or nothing' problem. The first is to define pecuniary
14 At chapter 7, II A 4 supra.
175 It does not matter if the applicable matrimonial property
regime does not have a reasonable needs principle because the 
doctrine of preclusion is a rule of English law being used to 
help solve the 'conflict of rules' problem. It determines to what 
extent post-decree acquisitions, which are not normally included 
within the relevant matrimonial property regime, should be 
included in a situation where there is a dispute about the 
recognition of the decree.
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advantage as being the advantage of not providing for the 
reasonable needs of the non-owner spouse, rather than as the 
advantage of not sharing the post-decree property.176 Only in 
relation to that part of the post-decree acquisitions required 
to satisfy reasonable needs is the owner precluded from relying 
on the decree. Alternatively, if the preclusion doctrine is 
treated as discretionary, as suggested above, the Court can 
simply apply it to such part of the post-decree acquisitions as 
it sees fit.
B. REALISATION
The domestic policy in relation to realisation deduced above 
would require the application of whichever rule would allow 
realisation. We saw above177 that this result can be achieved by 
application of the differential rule, which ensures recognition 
of the decree.
V RECOMMENDATION
In relation to matrimonial property, the appropriate preference 
rule is the differential rule, subject to the doctrine of 
preclusion, in the situation where sharing of post-decree assets 
is required in order to meet reasonable needs.
176 In other words, the pecuniary benefit is only the
illegitimate pecuniary advantage.
177 Supra at II C.
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CHAPTER 9 : TORTS
I THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM 
A INTRODUCTION
There are two issues in torts1 in which marital status may be 
relevant: inter-spousal immunity and wrongful death claims. At 
first sight it might be thought that no question of the conflict 
of rules could arise because the lex fori is part of the choice 
of law rule in tort. However, under the double-barrelled choice 
of law rule, the effective branch of the rule is that which 
denies liability. Thus, where under the second branch liability 
is denied, the lex loci delicti is the effective choice of law 
rule. This means that where there is a dispute as to the 
recognition of a decree as between the lex fori and the lex loci 
delicti, the 'conflict of rules' may arise.
Moreover, if the exception to the rule in Philips v Eyre2 
formulated in Boys v Chaplin3 can displace the first as well as 
the second limb of the rule4, there would be further scope for 
a conflict between the choice and recognition rules.
1 A spouse's claim for loss of consortium was abolished by
the Administration of Justice Act 1982. Under the rule in Philips 
v Eyre (see at B. infra) even if such a cause of action was 
recognised under the lex loci delicti, it could not be given 
effect to because there would not be actionability in England.
2 (1870) L.R. 6 Q.B. 1, 28-29.
3 [1971] A.C. 356.
4 See discussion at B. infra.
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B. THE CHOICE OF LAW RULE
The House of Lords in Boys v Chaplin5 upheld the choice of law
rule in tort enunciated by Wills J. in Phillips v Eyre6:-
"As a general rule, in order to found a suit in England for 
a wrong alleged to have been committed abroad, two 
conditions must be fulfilled. First, the wrong must be of 
such a character that it would have been actionable if
committed in England;.... Secondly, the act must not have
been justifiable by the law of the place where it was
done.1
However, caselaw has shown that a number of different
interpretations may be placed on these words. In Boys v Chaplin 
itself, their Lordships arrived at the unanimous decision in 
favour of the Plaintiffs by a number of different routes and the 
ratio decidendi of the case is far from clear7. Subsequent
English caselaw8 supports the view that the Philips v Eyre test
requires civil actionability between the parties under both the 
lex fori and the lex loci delicti, but that this general rule may 
be departed from in appropriate circumstances.
Caselaw provides us with little guidance on the scope of the 
exception. In Boys v Chaplin itself and in the recent case of 
Johnson v Coventry Churchill9, the lex loci delicti was
displaced in favour of the lex fori on the basis that England had
5 [1971] A.C. 356.
6 (1870) L.R. 6 Q.B. 1, 28-29.
7 See, for example, Briggs (1984) 12 Anglo-Am. L.R. 237;
Collins (1977) 26 ICLQ 480; Karsten (1970) 19 ICLQ 35; McGregor 
(1970) 33 MLR 1.
8 For example, Coupland v Arabian Gulf Co. [1983] 1 WLR
1136, 1146-48 and Johnson v Coventry Churchill [1992] 3 All ER
14. See also Law Com. W.P. 87 at para. 2.17.
9 [1992] 3 All ER 14.
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the closest and most real connection to the particular issue in 
question and that the policy behind the particular foreign rule 
did not apply to a case where both parties were English10.
Two important questions remain unanswered. Firstly, can the lex 
loci delicti be displaced in favour of a third law? Most 
commentators answer this question affirmatively. Secondly, can 
the first limb of the rule in Philips v Eyre be displaced where 
it is found that a foreign law, which would usually be the lex 
loci delicti or the law displacing it, is much more closely 
connected to the issue in question? Support can be found in the 
judgments in Boys v Chaplin for both affirmative and negative 
answers to this question. On the one hand, the affirmation of the 
decision in The Hailey11 may be said to make it clear that there 
must be actionability according to the lex fori in every case. 
On the other hand, it may be argued that the words "as a general 
rule", used by Wills J to preface his test and on which Lords 
Hodson and Wilberforce based their exception, clearly qualify 
both limbs of the test.
It is suggested that, given the equivocal nature of Boys v 
Chaplin on this issue and the trenchant cricitism by academic 
writers of the first limb of the test12, a Court would be free
In Warren v Warren [1971] Qd.R. 386 and Corcoran v 
Corcoran [1974] V.R. 164, the displacement of the lex loci 
delicti was also in favour of the lex fori.
11 (1868) LR 2 PC 193.
12 e.g. The Law Commission (in Rept. No. 193) has
recommended abolishing the first limb of the test.
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to displace the lex fori in an appropriate case.
The Law Commission have made detailed recommendations13 for 
reform of the choice of law rule in tort, which are incorporated 
in a draft bill, appended to their report. This effectively 
introduces the lex loci delicti14 as the choice of law rule 
subject to an exception where there is another law according to 
which "it would be substantially more appropriate for the 
questions to which those proceedings give rise to be determined."
C. INTER-SPOUSAL IMMUNITY
Inter-spousal immunity in tort was virtually abolished in England 
by the Law Reform (Husband and Wife) Act 1962. A Court may still 
stay an action in tort between a married couple where no 
substantial benefit would accrue to either party or it could be 
more conveniently disposed of under Section 17 of the Married 
Womens's Property Act 1882. However, inter-spousal immunity still 
exists in other jurisdictions.15
1 For commentary see Carter (1991) 107 LQR 405 and North
(chapter 5, n.58 supra).
14 This is defined as follows:-(l) In actions in respect of
personal injury or death, the place where the injury was 
sustained. (2) In actions in resepct of damage to property the 
situs of the property when it was damaged. (3) In all other 
cases, the law of the country where "the most significant 
elements of the events constituting the subject-matter os the 
proceedings" took place.
15 For example, in the USA inter-spousal immunity has only
been fully abolished in 35 jurisdictions. In a further 5, the 
immunity has only been removed for intentional torts (See Clark, 
chapter 6, n. 73 supra at 11.1.).
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There are no English conflicts cases involving inter-spousal 
immunity. Authority can be found in U.S. and Australian16 
caselaw for classifying the question of whether one spouse can 
sue the other in tort as a question of procedure17; of tort18 
or of domestic relations because it requires determination of the 
incidents of the marital relationship.19
If the issue is procedural, immunity could never be claimed in 
an English Court. If the issue is one of domestic relations, it 
will be governed by the lex domicilii.20 If the issue is treated 
as one of tort, then under the rule in Philips v Eyre if the law 
applicable under the second limb provides immunity there will not 
be sufficient actionability21 by that law and the action will 
fail. However, the Boys v Chaplin exception may be invoked in
16 Since the Australia cases, federal legislation (s.119 
Family Law Act 1975) has been enacted stating that spouses can 
sue each other in tort. However, the constitutional validity of 
this provision has not yet been determined.
17 As, for example, in Mertz v Mertz 3 N.E. 597 (1936) ,
where it was held that since there was no remedy for a wife 
against a husband under the law of the New York forum, she could 
not succeed even though there was actionability under the loci 
delicti.
18 See Gray v Gray 174 A. 508 (1934) and Dawson v Dawson 138
So. 414 (1931) and other cases cited in Clark (chapter 6, n. 73
supra) at 11.1 n. 40).
19 Warren v Warren [1972] Qd.R. 386 Haumschild v 
Continental Casualty Co. 95 W 2d 814 (Wisconsin 1959) and other 
cases cited in Clark (chapter 6, n. 73 supra) at 11.1 n. 41.
20 See cases at n. 20 supra.
21 Corcoran v Corcoran [1974] V.R. 386 cf. In some 
Australian cases it was held that it was sufficient if the 
conduct was civilly actionable but this approach is 
irreconcilable with the judgments in Boys v Chaplin in which it 
was made explicit that there must be actionablity between the 
same parties under the lex loci delicti.
324
order to displace the lex loci delicti in favour of the lex 
domicilii.22 None of the cases consider the situation where the 
spouses have different domiciles. It is suggested that the best 
solution is to apply the lex loci delicti unless the spouses have 
the same domicile or the laws in their respective domiciles are 
the same (and different from the lex loci delicti).
To avoid confusion, in the ensuing discussion we will simply 
refer to the lex causae.
The 'conflict of rules' situation can be seen from example Tl.23 
Here, there is actionability under English law. Whether or not 
there is actionability under the law of Florida, the lex causae, 
depends on whether the parties are considered to be still married 
or not. If this issue is governed by the choice rule, then the 
law of Florida will hold that the parties are still married and 
thus there will be no actionability under the second limb of the 
rule. On the other hand, if the recognition rule is applied, the 
lex fori will decide that they are not married and that there can 
be no immunity.
It is less clear whether the conflict can arise in the reverse 
situation, i.e. if the decree is recognised by the lex loci 
delicti and not by the lex fori.24 It may be argued that if the
22 Corcoran v Corcoran [1974] V.R. 164; Warren v Warren 
[1972] Qd. R. 386.
23 At chapter 1, III supra.
24 If, for example, the decree in Haiti was inter partes, 
but neither party was a national of that country.
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law of Florida recognises the decree, then there is no immunity 
under Florida law and thus there is actionability. On the other 
hand, it may be argued that the issue of actionability under 
Florida law has to be decided without determining the status of 
the parties. Thus, on the basis of the immunity there would be 
no liability if these parties are still married. We then have to 
decide which rule should answer the question of whether the 
parties are to be considered as still married.
The first approach may seem to be more consistent with the double 
actionability rule as defined in Boys v Chaplin. Thus, what is 
required is real actionability between these parties. Whether 
this exists can only be determined after ascertaining whether the 
parties are in fact still married. But this approach produces a 
fait accompli in favour of the choice of law rule. It is 
suggested that this choice should not be made without proper 
consideration as to whether it is the appropriate preference 
rule.
Under the second approach, the issue of status is first decided 
according to the rule indicated by the preference rule. Then it 
is possible to determine whether there is in fact actionability 
under both limbs. It is suggested that this approach is to be 
preferred.
The Law Commission's draft bill does not deal with the topic of 
inter-spousal immunity. In their Report, the Law Commission 
recommend keeping silent because neither the law of the domicile
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nor the applicable law in tort have strong credentials to apply. 
The removal of the lex fori from the choice of law test would not 
in fact have any impact here since we have seen that the issue 
can only arise where there is immunity according to the lex loci 
delicti or displacing law.
D. WRONGFUL DEATH CLAIMS
Under many systems of law, a tortfeasor who wrongfully causes 
death is liable in damages25 to certain dependants or relatives 
of the deceased, including a surviving spouse.26 In England, 
such liability is governed by the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 as 
amended. Originally, divorced spouses27 were not included in 
the list of eligible dependents. However, following the 
recommendations of the Law Commission, a "former wife or 
husband28 of the deceased" was added to the list of dependents29 
by the Administration of Justice Act 1982.
Thus, where there has been a disputed decree the 'spouse' will 
be able to claim under English law without determining whether
25 Usually, there is a requirement that the deceased himself 
could have sued if he had been injured rather than killed by the 
tort.
26 The better view is that all the surviving wives of a 
valid polygamous marriage would be able to claim, although there 
is no English authority on the point. See, for example, Morris 
(chapter 1, n.142 supra) at p. 178.
27 Payne-Collins v Taylor Woodrow Construction Ltd. [1975] 
1 QB 300.
28 Defined to included persons whose marriage had been 
annulled or declared void, s.1(4).
29 Cohabitees who had lived with the deceased as husband and 
wife for at least two years were also added to the list.
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tlie decree is recognised or not. However, most other 
jurisdictions still limit wrongful death claims to the present 
spouse of the deceased.
There are no English conflicts cases dealing with wrongful death 
claims. The better view would seem to be that under the rule in 
Philips v Eyre, the dependant can only claim where he has a right 
to do so both under English law and under the lex loci delicti. 
Assuming that all the other criteria are fulfilled, the 'spouse' 
will be able to claim under English law either as a current 
spouse or as an ex-spouse and thus again the effective choice 
rule is the lex loci delicti or the law displacing it. This will 
be referred to as the lex causae.
As we saw above in relation to inter-spousal immunity, the 
preferable analysis is that whilst the lex causae determines 
whether a spouse can claim it does not necessarily determine 
whether a claimant is a spouse. This is an issue to be determined
by the law chosen by the preference rule. Thus, the conflict of
rules can arise whenever the decree is recognised by the lex 
causae and not the lex fori, as in example T2 above30, or vice 
versa31.
We might add that implementation of the Law Commission's
30 At chapter 1, III supra.
31 Prior to 1982, the conflict could not arise where the
decree was recognised by the lex fori because the claimant could 
not be a 'spouse' under either the recognition rule or the choice 
rule (because the lex fori is part of the choice rule) unless the 
lex fori was displaced under the exception in Boys v Chaplin.
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proposals would not affect the present issue. Since there is 
actionability under English law whether or not the decree is 
recognised, removing the requirement of actionability under the 
lex fori would not make any difference.
II POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS32 
A. PREFER THE CHOICE RULE
1. Theoretical Basis
The rationale will depend on what the choice of law rule is. To 
the extent that the rule is the lex loci delicti , we might rely 
on the words of Hancock quoted by Cheshire and North,33 to the 
effect that the commission of a tort abroad is "of more acute 
concern to the foreign community than to the community of the 
forum." Thus, it may be argued that the foreign community should 
decide the extent of the tortfeasor's liability including whether 
a particular person is to be treated as a 'spouse' either for the 
purposes of claiming for wrongful death or for claiming immunity 
in tort.
To the extent that any other law is applicable under the Boys v 
Chaplin exception, the close connection which justifies its 
applicability in place of the lex loci delicti would provide 
support for applying it to determine whether the party in 
question is to be treated as a 'spouse' in connection with this 
tort. Where the displacing law is the law of the domicile, the
32 For tabular illustration of results of applying the
different preference rules, see Tables 6A and 6B in the Appendix.
33 Op. cit., chapter 1, n.l supra at p. 546.
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status theory34 may also be used to justify preferring the 
choice rule here.
Whatever law is applicable, it may be argued that if the lex 
causae gives a particular immunity or right to a spouse, it only 
envisages their application to persons who are considered to be 
spouses according to its law.
2. Authority
There are no reported tort cases where the conflict between 
recognition rules and choice of law rules has arisen. Indirect 
support for application of the choice rule may be provided by the 
U.S. case of Meisenholder v Chicago N.W. Ry.35 This involved a 
claim under the Workman's Compensation Acts by a 'widow' . It was 
held that the claim failed because the marriage was not 
recognised by the law of Illinois where the accident happened, 
although the marriage was valid under the conflicts rules of the 
Minnesota forum36 because it was valid according to the law of 
Kentucky where it was contracted. Harper37 hypothesises about 
the result in this case if the doubt about the status of the 
widow arose because of a Mexican divorce which was not recognised 
in some fora. He concludes that the validity of the divorce 
should be determined by the place of the wrong because the 
reference to 'widow' in the wrongful death statute of the loci
34 See chapter 6, II A 1 supra.
35 2 1 3 N.W. 32 (1927) .
36 See Harper, (1959) 59 Col.L.R. 440.
delicti is assumed to mean a 'widow' as understand by that law 
and not as understood by the domestic or conflicts rules of the 
forum.
3. Results in relation to Inter-Spousal Immunity
(a) Where the lex causae does recognise the decree.
The effect of preferring the choice rule is to deny immunity.
(b) Where the lex causae does not recognise the decree.
The effect of preferring the choice rule will be to uphold the 
immunity. In cases where the tortfeasor 'spouse' is 
unmeritorious, the doctrine of preclusion could be applied to 
prevent him/her obtaining a pecuniary benefit from denying the 
validity of the decree.
4. Results in relation to Wrongful Death
(a) Where the lex causae recognises the decree.
Application of the choice rule here would lead to denial of the 
'wrongful death' claim because the claimant is not considered to 
be a spouse by the lex causae.
(b) Where the lex causae does not recognise the decree.
Since an ex-spouse can claim in English law, there is 
actionability under the lex fori. The claimant is still 
considered to be a spouse by the lex causae and can claim.
331
B. PREFER THE RECOGNITION RULE
1. Theoretical Basis
The only rationale here would seem to be the familiar 'full 
effect7 argument. It might be noted that this argument would seem 
to have less effect in the wrongful death situation where we are 
concerned with a third party. It hardly lies in the tortfeasor7s 
mouth to insist upon the strict logic of giving full effect to 
a matrimonial decree.
2. Authority
The American case of In Re Degramo7s Estate38 may be seen as
providing authority for the use of the recognition rule in a
wrongful death claim. The facts were as follows
The deceased, who was resident in Michigan at the date of 
her death, was killed negligently in a railroad accident in 
Ohio. The issue arose in a New York case as to how the 
damages received from the railroad company should be 
distributed. The deceased had obtained a divorce from her 
husband in Michigan, but this was not recognised in New 
York because the husband was not served and did not appear 
in the action.
The New York Court held that the distribution of the 
damages was governed by the law of Ohio where the accident 
took place. Since the divorce was not valid, apart from in 
Michigan, the husband was entitled to the damages.
Thus, it appears that the Court applied the recognition rules of
the forum. However, the Court found that the husband remained the
husband of the deceased "except as to his status in the state of
Michigan". Two possible interpretations might be given to this
finding. Firstly, it might seem to be a finding that the divorce
was not valid under the law of Ohio. But, it is difficult to see
how the Court could make such a finding when no evidence was
33 New York Supplement (1895) 502.
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brought as to whether the divorce would have been recognised in 
Ohio.39 The second is that it is simply a statement of New York 
law. Thus, a New York Court will not give effect to any incidents 
of the divorce decree other than those which are governed by the 
law of Michigan.
If the latter interpretation is correct, then the case would seem 
to support the application of the lex fori where the decree is 
not recognised. However, since there is no evidence that the 
result would have been any different if the lex causae had been 
applied, it is relatively weak authority.
3. Results in Relation to Inter-Spousal Immunity
(a) The decree is recognised.
The application of the recognition rule would result in denial
of immunity.
(b) The decree is not recognised.
Here, application of the recognition rule would result in
upholding the immunity. This result would seem absurd because 
neither system would in fact allow immunity. The lex causae would 
not allow immunity because it considers the parties are no longer 
married. The lex fori would not allow immunity because no such 
immunity exists under its law.
39 The husband did not apppear and was not served with
process.
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4. Results in Relation to Wrongful Death
(a) Where the decree is recognised.
The application of the recognition rule would result in denial 
of the claim because the lex causae does not allow claims by 
divorced spouses. Again this result is absurd because neither 
system would have denied the claim. The lex fori would have 
allowed it because it allows claims by ex-spouses. The lex causae 
would have allowed it because it considers the parties are still 
married.
(b) Where the decree is not recognised.
The application of the recognition rule would result in upholding 
of the claim because the parties are treated as still married for 
the purpose of applying both limbs. This result is in accordance 
with the lex fori but not the lex causae.
C. THE 'DIFFERENTIAL RULE7 40
1. Inter-Spousal Immunity
The differential rule will lead to denial of immunity in all 
situations.
2. Wrongful Death
The differential rule will lead to denial of the claim in all 
situations.
D. UPHOLDING TORT CLAIMS
It may be argued that the fundamental policy of the law of tort
40 See chapter 6, II C 3 supra.
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is to provide compensation for the Plaintiff. Only where some 
other policy objective overrides this basic principle, should 
there be a valid defence or exception to liability.
This argument would militate in favour of a result which upheld 
the claims. In relation to inter-spousal immunity, this would 
achieve the same result as the 'differential rule'. In relation 
to wrongful death, the 'differential rule7 does not produce the 
correct result and thus we would have to rely on the express 
result-selecting rule, which can conveniently be referred to as 
the presumption in favour of upholding tort claims.
Ill POLICY
A. INTER-SPOUSAL IMMUNITY
There was considerable debate about the nature of the inter- 
spousal immunity at common law. In particular, it was unclear 
whether it negatived liability or enforcability. Whilst it seems 
to have originated from the theory of unity between spouses,41 
in more recent years42 it was justified on the basis that it was 
unseemly for one spouse to litigate against the other and that 
to tempt one spouse to claim compensation from the other might 
endanger the stability of the marriage.43
41 This has now been said to be fully dead and buried,
Midland Bank v Green (No. 3) [1982] Ch. 529.
42 See per McCardie J. in Gotliffe v Edelston [1930] 2 K.B.
378, 392.
43 Law Reform Committee, 9th. Report Cmnd. 1268 (1961) ,
paras. 7 - 1 0 .  See also, Clark (chapter 6, n.73 supra) at para. 
11.1 .
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These rationales were undermined by the advent of widespread, 
frequently compulsory, use of liability insurance. Where the 
tortfeasor was insured, then a tort claim by his/her spouse was 
effectively a claim against the insurance company.44 Thus, there 
would generally be a common interest rather than a conflict of 
interest between the parties.
Furthermore, it seemed unjust that the Insurance Company should 
benefit from the fact that the victim was married to the 
tortfeasor. In addition, if one spouse was jointly liable with 
a third party, the third party would have to bear the full 
liability and could not claim a contribution from the tortfeasor 
spouse. These concerns about justice as between the spouses and 
third parties outweighed any residual reluctance to sanction 
litigation between spouses and the immunity was abolished45 by 
the Law Reform (Husband and Wife) Act 1962. The only trace of the 
former immunity lies in the Court's power46 to stay a case where 
it considers that there would be no benefit to either party.
44 In some Australian jurisdictions, the exception was at 
first expressly limited to cases where the cause of action arose 
from the driving of a motor vehicle registered in that State. As 
in such cases insurance was mandatory, no non-insurance cases 
could arise. Difficulties arose where accidents took place 
involving vehicles registered in other States. See Schmidt [1973] 
1 NSWLR 59, Warren v Warren [1972] Qd. Rev. 386 and Corcoran v 
Corcoran [1974] VR 164.
45 Following the report by the Law Reform Committee (n. 44
supra) See comments by Stone (1961) 24 MLR 481; Khan Freund
(1963) 25 MLR 695.
46 See Law Reform Committee Report (n. 44 supra) at para.
11. There is no reported case in which this has been exercised.
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B. WRONGFUL DEATH
The common law rule forbidding claims arising out of wrongful 
death has been changed by statute throughout the common law 
world. The English Fatal Accidents Acts are typical of the 
legislation, which generally allows particular classes of
dependents to claim sums which are quantified on the basis of the
level of their dependency on the deceased.47.
The policy behind the legislation is clear. The tortfeasor should 
not benefit from the fact that he has killed the deceased rather 
than severely maimed him/her. Whilst the deceased him/herself can 
no longer suffer any loss as a result of the tort, those who were 
dependent on him/her may suffer substantial loss as a result
thereof. The limitation on the class of claimants seems to
reflect the requirement of foreseeability in relation to tort 
damages. Thus, the tortfeasor can only be expected to compensate 
the sorts of people whom (s)he might reasonably have foreseen 
would have been dependent on the deceased. Furthermore, requiring 
a particular relationship may prevent bogus claims, although it 
may also exclude meritorious beneficiaries.48
IV APPLICATION OF POLICY
A. INTER-SPOUSAL IMMUNITY
It seems clear that the policy of English law would militate
47 Some U.S. jurisdictions base quantum on loss to the
estate. See Speiser, Recovery for Wrongful Death, 2nd. end. 
(1975) Vol. I.
48 Prior to the Administration of Justice Act 1982 
cohabitees, even of many years standing, could not sue. The only 
remedy to this injustice was through legislation.
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against upholding the immunity in the 'conflict of rules' 
situation. Where there is liability insurance, then there is no 
basis for the immunity. Where there is no such insurance, the 
very fact that a matrimonial decree has already been pronounced 
between the parties would seem to remove any argument based on 
'seemliness' or stability of marriage. However, the Law Reform 
Committee49 specifically stated that the power to stay should 
apply even after the spouses had ceased to cohabit so long as 
they were still married because
"there may even in these circumstances be some possibility 
of reconciliation between them or, where there is not, 
litigation may serve only as an excuse for the airing of 
matrimonial grievances and bitterness."
In any event, as the power to stay is a procedural provision,50
the Court could stay the proceedings provided that the decree was
not recognised by the lex fori, irrespective of the position
under the lex causae. This does not affect the conclusion that
domestic policy requires a result which denies effect to the
foreign immunity.
The desired result can be achieved by the differential rule. As 
we have already seen, this rule has the advantage of consistency 
with the 'full effect' principle where recognition is granted and 
otherwise giving precedence to the law governing the issue. This 
rule avoids the need to rely on the doctrine of preclusion and 
avoids the absurdity of allowing immunity which would not be 
allowed by either system alone.
Op. cit. (n. 44 supra) para. 13.
Ibid para. 16.
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B. WRONGFUL DEATH
Until 1982 ex-spouses could not claim. If we had been considering 
this issue before 1982, we might have had difficulty in 
determining how to apply English policy to the 'conflict of 
rules' situation. On the one hand, it might have been argued that 
if the 'spouse' could prove dependency, (s)he should have been 
able to claim. There is no reason why the tortfeasor should 
benefit from the fact that a decree has been obtained, if there 
is a dispute as to whether it should be recognised. In other 
words, the policy of compensation requires that the claimant 
should be given the benefit of the doubt about the decree. On the 
other hand, it might have been argued that to allow a claim where 
there has been an attempt to obtain a divorce decree even though 
this the decree is not universally recognised would be against 
the intention of the legislation which did not cover former 
spouses and could give rise to abuse. It is suggested that the 
former argument is more convincing.51 It was reasonably 
foreseeable that the 'spouse' in the disputed decree situation 
might suffer loss of dependency. (S)he should not be in a worse
51 It might be argued that both positions are too simplistic
and that everything depends on the circumstances surrounding the 
decree. If the 'spouse' had not obtained financial provision 
because of the doubt surrounding the decree, (s)he should be 
entitled to claim. His/her dependency would reflect what 
financial provision (s)he would be able to claim in the future. 
If the 'spouse' had obtained financial provision in connection 
with the divorce/nullity decree, then arguably (s)he is in the 
same position as any other ex-spouse and should not have been 
able to benefit because there is a dispute as to whether the 
decree should be recognised.
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position than a separated spouse52 simply because there had been 
an attempt at divorce, the outcome of which was disputed. Abuse 
would have been unlikely because of the requirement of dependency 
and in any event could have been prevented by the doctrine of 
preclusion.
Since the extension of the class of dependents to cover former 
spouses, the position is much clearer. The reason for the reform 
was53 that former spouses might have lost valuable rights of 
maintenance54 as a result of the death of the deceased.55 Since 
an award will only be made on proof of dependency, an ex-spouse 
who has already received financial provision in a lump sum in
52 There do not seem to be any English decisions on the
position of the separated spouse under the Fatal Accidents Act, 
but there is a significant amount of American caselaw. The 
majority view seems to be that separation does not affect 
eligibility (see, for example, Schilling v Gall 33 Wis. 2d 14, 
146 N.W. 2d 390 (1966) and cases quoted therein and at 18 A.L.R. 
1409 supplemented by 90 A.L.R. 920), although there is some 
authority that a deserting spouse cannot claim (see Speiser, n. 
supra at para 6.2.). Claims have been allowed where a divorce 
suit was pending (Wright v Dilbeck (1970) 122a Ga App 214, 176 
SE 2d 175) and where an interlocutory divorce order entitling the 
claimant to a final decree in six months had been made (Piland 
v Yakima Motor Coach Co. (1931) 162 Wash 456, 298 P 419) .
However, the state of the marriage at the time of the death will 
usually be relevant in quantifying the amount of dependency (see 
Speiser op. cit. at para. 6.6) . The Royal Commission on Liability 
and Compensation for Personal Injury (the Pearson Commission) 
(1978, Cmnd 7054-1 at para. 417) recommended that the possibility 
of divorce should not be taken into account in assessing damages 
for lost dependency where it would be detrimental to the 
plaintiff to do so.
53 Law Com. 56 para. 259.
54 Maintenance payments cease on the death of the payer
unless they are secured.
55 This extension is consistent with the theory suggested
above because it is reasonably foreseeable that an ex-spouse will 
suffer loss.
340
lieu of maintenance should not be able to get a 'second bite of 
the cherry'.
Thus, the policy of English law requires that the 'spouse' should 
be able to claim in all situations. This result can be achieved 
by applying the presumption in favour of upholding tort claims.
V RECOMMENDATIONS
1. In relation to inter-spousal immunity, the 'differential rule' 
is the appropriate preference rule.
2. In relation to wrongful death, the presumption of upholding 
tort claims should apply to determine which rule prevails.
341
CHAPTER 10: ADOPTION
I. THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM
A. INTRODUCTION
The conflict of rules can potentially arise following a foreign 
adoption wherever it is necessary to determine the status of the 
child in a case governed by a foreign law. The conflict will in 
fact arise where the foreign adoption order is recognised by the 
law of the forum and not by the lex causae or vice versa. An 
analogous problem may arise where an English adoption is not 
recognised by the lex causae. As we saw in relation to divorce, 
here the conflict is between a rule of domestic law and the 
choice of law rule, but some of the applicable policy 
considerations will be the same.
A child's status is most commonly questioned in relation to 
succession and custody/guardianship. However, there are other 
possible situations such as in relation to wrongful death claims, 
immigration, taxation, social security and rights under pension 
or life insurance schemes. It may also be relevant to determine 
a child's status in relation to the prohibited degrees of 
marriage and the requirement of parental consent to marriage. In 
English private international law, custody/guardianship, 
immigration, social security and taxation are governed by the law 
of the forum and thus the 'conflict of rules' cannot arise. In 
this chapter, we will be concentrating on the issues of 
succession and wrongful death claims.
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It is important to appreciate that such cases may arise out of 
the death of either the child, the adoptive parents or the 
natural parents. The likelihood of the child claiming following 
the death of the natural parents has been increased by the right 
of adopted children to see their original birth certificate1 as 
well as by the increase in 'older children' adoptions2.
The choice of law rules in relation to succession and wrongful 
death claims have been set out above. In order to understand when 
the conflict is likely to arise we will need to explain the rules 
for recognising foreign adoptions, which are materially different 
from and more complicated than those for recognising foreign 
matrimonial decrees.
In the past there has been much debate about which law governs 
the incidents of a foreign adoption. Some cases3 suggested that 
the law of the place where the adoption was granted determined 
what was meant by the phrase 'adopted child' and thus what 
incidents were attached to the adoption. Academic writers4 were 
critical of this approach and claimed that it was inconsistent
1 Adoption Act 1976 s.51.
2 For example, the proportion of non-parental adoptions
where the child was aged over 10 increased from 8% in 1975 to 27% 
in 1986, Bromley and Lowe (chapter 7, n. 100 supra) at p. 411 
n. 3 .
3 e.g. Re Marshall [1957] Ch. 507. For discussion of
Commonwealth cases, see Kennedy (1956) 34 Can. B.Rev. 507, 547 
et. seer.
4 See Kennedy ibid and Taintor (1954) 15 U. of Pitts. L. 
Rev. 222 at 243 et. seq.
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with the approach taken in other areas, such as legitimation5. 
It now seems to be established6 that the law governing the 
succession or other 'main' issue must determine what incidents 
attach to adoption. What has not been decided is which law should 
determine whether the child in question has been successfully- 
adopted7. It is to this question that this chapter is directed.
B. RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN ADOPTIONS UNDER ENGLISH LAW.
There are now four different sets of recognition rules, three of 
which are statutory. A new Hague Convention on Inter-Country 
Adoptions was concluded in 1993, but is not yet in force. We will 
consider each of the sets of rules in turn:-
1. Adoptions in the British Isles
All adoption orders made in Northern Ireland, the Channel Islands 
and the Isle of Man are automatically recognised8.
2. "Overseas Adoptions"
Adoption orders made in any country listed in a Statutory 
Instrument9 made by the Secretary of State under powers granted 
to him under the Adoption Act 1976 are entitled to automatic
5 Although no cases are cited which raise this issue 
squarely.
6 Re Valentine's Settlement [1965] Ch. 831, 843-5. See
Cheshire and North (chapter 1, n.l supra) p. 770.
7 Dicey and Morris (chapter 1, n.l supra) at p. 901 suggest
that an English Court might refer the whole question to the lex 
successionis.
8 Adoption Act 1976 ss.38(l) (c) .
9 The relevant Order is S.I. 1973 No. 19.
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recognition10 subject to the following limitations:-
(i) The adoption was made under the statutory law and not 
common or customary law of the foreign country11.
(ii) The adopted person is under 18 and has not been 
married12.
(iii) The authority which purported to authorise the 
adoption was competent to do so13.
(iv) Recognition is not contrary to public policy.
The most salient features of these provisions are that no 
reciprocity of treatment of English adoptions is required and 
that no connecting factor is required between the adopters or the 
adopted person and the foreign country. The latter may not be so 
surprising since countries will only be included in the Order 
where the Secretary of State is satisfied with the arrangements 
for adoption there. His primary considerations will presumably 
be the methods of safeguarding the interests of the child and 
preventing abuse. The latter should include the requirement of 
some connection with the foreign Court.
It should be remembered that whilst a large number of 
countries14 are included in the Order, there are still many
10 Either on a request for a declaration or where the issue
arises in other proceedings, Adoption Act 1976 s.53(2) (3).
11 S.I. 1973/19, para 3(3).
12 Ibid.
13 Adoption Act 1976 s.53 (2) (a) .
14 See SI 1973/19. The list includes most of the
Commonwealth and U.K. Dependant Territories, all Western European 
countries, Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey, South Africa and the USA.
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which are not.
3. Convention Adoptions
The Adoption Act 1976 provides that adoptions made under The 
Hague Convention on Adoptions 1965 and known as "regulated 
adoptions" are to be recognised as "overseas adoptions". The 
rules providing when adoptions may be made under the Convention 
are complex, but in practice they are of little significance 
since the Convention is only in force with Austria and 
Switzerland15 and both of these countries are designated under 
the 1973 Order.
4. Other Adoptions
Any adoptions which are not recognised under the above headings 
may be recognised at common law. There has been much academic 
debate over the common law rules. The leading case is the Court 
of Appeal decision in Re Valentine's Settlement.16 The majority 
stated that foreign adoptions will only be recognised where the 
adopters are domiciled in the country where the order is made and 
the child is ordinarily resident there. Danckwerts L.J. was "not 
sure" whether the latter requirement was in fact necessary.17 
There are some indications in the judgment that the South African 
order would have been recognised if it had been recognised by the 
law of the domicile, which was Southern Rhodesia. Thus, it has
SI 1978/1431.
[1965] Ch. 831.
Ibid at p. 846.
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been suggested18, by analogy with the rule in Armitage v A-G19, 
that an adoption order should be recognised if it would be 
recognised by the law of the domicile of the adopters.
Other writers20 have gone further and suggested that the rules 
in Travers v Holley21 and Indyka v Indyka22 might apply to 
adoptions. Under the former, a foreign adoption would be 
recognised where there was a connection with the foreign Court 
which would mutatis mutandis have given the English Court 
jurisdiction. Under the Adoption Act 197623, the English Court 
may grant an adoption order where one of the applicants is 
domiciled in the United Kingdom, the Channel Islands or the Isle 
of Man and the child is in England when the application is 
made24. Thus, the recognition rule is substantially similar25
18 Morris (chapter 1, n. 142 supra) at p. 249.
19 [1906] P. 135.
20 Cheshire and North (chapter 1, n.l) at p. 769; Khan 
Freund, The Growth of Internationalism in English Private 
International Law pp. 82-88. Kennedy (1956) 34 Can. B.Rev. 507, 
although writing before Indyka, would clearly have advocated the 
applicability of that decision to adoptions.
21 [1953] P 246.
22 [1969] 1 AC 33.
24 In practice the applicants and the child have to be
resident in England because otherwise it is not possible for the 
relevant authorities to carry out the assessment during the trial 
period. See Re Y Minors [1985] Fam. 136.
25 The recognition rule refers to the domicile of both
parties. This is no doubt because at that time the domicile of 
a married woman was dependent on that of her husband. The
jurisdiction rule does not formally require ordinary residence 
of the child, but see fn. 24 supra.
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to the jurisdictional rule and application of the Travers v 
Holley rule would not lead to any significant widening of the 
former. By contrast, application of the rule in Indyka v Indyka 
would allow all adoptions to be recognised provided that there 
was a "real and substantial connection" with the granting Court. 
Thus, for example, the habitual residence or nationality of the 
adopters and maybe even of the child26 would probably be 
sufficient.
It has also been suggested27 that since the requirement for the 
child to be resident has been removed from the English 
jurisdiction rule, it should also be dropped from the recognition 
rule if it is part of the latter.
Finally, it should be mentioned that, as with "overseas 
adoptions", recognition may be refused at common law where it 
would be contrary to public policy. No doubt this power would 
only be invoked in extreme circumstances.
5. The Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Cooperation 
in Respect of Intercountry Adoptions
This Convention primarily seeks to regulate the procedures for 
inter-country adoptions to ensure that such adoptions are made 
in the best interests of the child and in particular to prevent
26 The US Restatement (Conflict of Laws) para. 78 provides 
for jurisdiction where either the child or the adopters is 
domiciled or resident in the forum.
27 Cheshire and North (chapter 1, n. 1 supra) p. 769.
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international trafficking in children28. Article 23 provides 
that an adoption certified by the competent authority of the 
State of the adoption as having been made in accordance with the 
Convention shall be recognised by operation of law in the other 
Contracting States.
C. RECOGNITION OP FOREIGN ADOPTIONS IN OTHER COUNTRIES
It is not practicable here to undertake a survey of recognition 
provisions worldwide29, which seem to vary more than conflicts 
rules in other areas of family law.30 All that is required is 
sufficient information to show that there is a real likelihood 
of a situation arising in which an adoption order will be 
recognised in England and not by the lex causae of the succession 
or tort claim or vice versa.
In the common law world, many jurisdictions31 still require a
28 See art. 1 and the Preamble.
29 Lipstein (1963) 12 ICLQ 835 seems to be the most
comprehensive work, but there have been significant changes in 
the last 30 years.
30 This may explain the limited success of the Hague
Convention on Adoption. See Lipstein ibid, Scoles and Hay 
(chapter 6 n. 18 supra) at pp. 546-9 conclude that the Convention 
"is of limited usefulness in addressing the problems raised by 
international adoption cases."
31 For example, the Australian uniform legislation requires 
inter alia that the applicant (s) be resident or domiciled in the 
foreign country where the order is made (although there is a 
presumption that this requirement is met) , but some of the states 
have abolished this requirement (see Sykes and Pryles, chapter 
5, n.22 supra, at p. 524) . Newfoundland and Nova Scotia have 
similar jurisdictional requirements (see Castel, chapter 6 n. 17
supra, at p. 387) . Most American States will recognise an
adoption granted in the court of the adopter's or the child's 
nationality or residence (see Scoles and Hay, chapter 6 n.18 
supra, at p. 548) .
349
jurisdictional link between the adopters and the jurisdiction in 
which the order is granted. At the other extreme, some 
jurisdictions recognise all adoptions32 effected according to 
the law of another jurisdiction. There are a variety of positions 
in between. Some states adopt the approach of the English 
adoption and prescribe which countries' adoptions should be 
recognised.33 Others specify that foreign adoptions will only 
be recognised where certain incidents attach to them under the 
lex adoptionis ,34
The position in the civil law world is more complicated because 
generally adoption is governed by the personal law35 of the 
parties. Foreign adoptions will only be recognised where they 
are in accordance with the personal law.
The Hague Convention on Adoption 1965 was only ratified by three
32 For example, Alberta, British Columbia, Saskatchewan and 
Ontario (see Castel, chapter 6, n.17 supra, p. 389).
33 e.g. New Brunswick. In some Australian States, there is 
provision for a proclamation to be made declaring that adoptions 
made in a particular country are conclusively presumed to comply 
with the recognition requirements. See Sykes and Pryles (chapter 
5, n.22 supra) at p. 525.
34 For example, Manitoba, New Zealand. Under the Australian 
uniform legislation, the adoptive parents must have a right of 
custody superior to that of the natural parents and must be 
placed generally in relation to the adopted person in the 
position of parent(s). However, there is a presumption that such 
requirements are satisfied. See Sykes and Pryles (chapter 5, n.22 
supra) pp. 524-5.
35 The prerequisites for adoption will usually be governed 
by the personal law of the adopters, but some aspects, such as 
the need for the consent of the natural parents and the child, 
will be governed by the personal law of the child. See Lipstein 
(1963) 12 ICLQ 835.
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countries. If the recent Convention on inter-country adoption 
enjoys more success, the potential for the conflict of rules 
arising in relation to inter-country adoptions will be 
substantially reduced.
In summary, a number of situations in which the conflict of rules 
may arise can be identified:-
1. 'Overseas adoptions' recognised in England may not be 
recognised by common law countries requiring a jurisdictional 
link.
2.'Overseas adoptions' recognised in England may not be 
recognised in civil law countries if the adoption was not in 
accordance with the personal law of the parties.
3. Adoptions recognised under English common law may not be 
recognised in civil law countries if the adoption is not in 
accordance with the national law of the parties, even though it 
is in accordance with their domiciliary law.
4. Adoptions recognised in 'liberal' common law countries may not 
be recognised in England if they are not 'overseas adoptions' and 
the adoption is not granted or recognised in the country of the 
adopters' domicile.
5. Adoptions recognised by civil law countries, which are not 
'overseas adoptions', may not be recognised in England if they 
are not granted or recognised in the country of the adopters' 
domicile.
The application of the Indyka rule would reduce the likelihood 
of conflicts arising under category 4 and 5 above. However, to
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the extent that it increased recognition of adoptions made in the 
place of residence, as opposed to nationality, it might increase 
the likelihood of conflicts under category 3.
II. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
Most of the analysis of the possible rules in Chapters 7 and 9 
in relation to succession and wrongful death claims by spouses 
will be relevant here. For example, the rationale for applying 
the choice of law rule would not seem to be any different since 
we are concerned with exactly the same choice rules. However, 
there may be some material differences in respect of the 
rationale behind application of the recognition rule because we 
are concerned with a different type of foreign judgment.
A. RATIONALE FOR APPLYING THE RECOGNITION RULE.
1. Where the Foreign Order is Recognised.
The 'full effect' doctrine would in the present context seem to 
require that in order to give full effect to a foreign adoption, 
it is necessary to treat the adopted child as the natural born 
child of the adoptive parents for the purposes of succession36 
and wrongful death claims. In other words, it is logically 
inconsistent to recognise such adoptions without according them 
the incidents which we accord to English adoptions.
It is submitted that there are two problems in applying the full 
effect doctrine to adoptions. Firstly, it is far from clear what
36 Apart from the hereditary titles, see Adoption Act 1976
s.44(1) .
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is meant by giving full effect to an adoption. It will be 
remembered that the 'full effect' theory was propounded in 
relation to capacity to remarry.37 It was seen as logically 
inconsistent to recognise a divorce and not allow remarriage 
because the right to remarry is universally seen as the main 
purpose and essential effect of divorce.38 By contrast, there 
would not seem to be international agreement about the essential 
effect of adoption and, if this could be determined,39 it would 
most probably not include full rights of succession.40
Secondly, it is arguable that the institution of 'adoption' is 
not universal in the same way as marriage and divorce. Thus, 
whilst the relationship created by the foreign court may be 
called an adoption it should not necessarily be assimilated to 
the English status of the same name.41 Thus, recognition of the
37 We saw above (in sections II B 1 of Chapters 7, 8 and 9 
respectively) that the theory is less persuasive in relation to 
other issues.
38 A form of dissolution which relieves the parties of 
matrimonial obligations but does not in principle allow the right 
to remarriage (although sometimes the right may be delayed), is 
a 'divorce a menso et thoro' and not a divorce 'a vinculo 
matrimonii'. In modern usage only the latter is referred to as 
a divorce.
39 The lowest common denominator would be that the adoptive 
parents acquire parental authority and a duty of support in 
respect of the child during his minority. See Krause, Creation 
of Relationships of Kinship, International Encyclopedia of 
Comparative Law Vol. IV chapter 6 (1976) at para. 6-185.
40 Krause ibid. para. 6-186 shows that the effect of 
adoption on inheritance rights varies greatly from system to 
system.
41 Krause (n. 39 supra) at para. 6-1767 et. seq. shows that 
in some systems adoption is much more limited and that in some 
countries there are two types of adoption available - full 
adoption and limited adoption.
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foreign adoption simply requires giving effect to the status 
which has been created. This argument would favour determining 
the effect of the adoption by the lex adoptionis42 rather than 
the lex fori. Thus, it is suggested that the full effect doctrine 
is a weak rationale for preferring the recognition rule in 
respect of succession and wrongful death claims following foreign 
adoptions.
2. Where the Foreign Order is not Recognised
Does the policy of the non recognition rules require that they 
be given precedence to ensure that all effects of adoption be 
witheld from the parties to a non-recognised adoption?43 In 
order to answer this question we need to examine the various 
'non-recognition' rules.
(a) Lack of Jurisdictional Link
We saw above that there has been a general trend44 liberalising 
the jurisdictional45 bases for adoption. In England, no 
jurisdictional link is required in respect of 'overseas 
adoptions'. However, the common law recognition rules still 
depend on domicile, although it has been suggested that these
42 cf. Discussion at text accompanying nn. 3 - 5 supra.
43 We saw above (chapter 3, III C) that the policy of non­
recognition of a divorce did not necessarily require invalidation 
of the second marriage.
44 cf. The 1965 Hague Convention on Adoption. The
complicated jurisdictional rules probably explain why the 
Convention has not been successful.
45 See McClean and Patchett in (1970) 19 ICLQ 1.
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rule be widened46. Thus, it is feasible that a Situation like Re 
Valentine47 could arise where the adoption was not an 'overseas 
adoption' ,48
The purpose of jurisdictional rules is to prevent forum shopping 
and consequent prejudice to the defendant. In the case of 
adoption, whilst it is clearly preferable ab initio that the 
adoption takes place in an appropriate forum, it is difficult to 
see why ex post facto, after the child has been treated as an 
adopted child, incidents of adoption should be witheld because 
of lack of jurisdictional link49 even where English law is the 
lex causae. A fortiori, where the adoption is recognised by the 
lex successionis, the lack of jurisdictional link should not 
prejudice the parties' rights.
(b) Public Policy
Pubic policy restrictions on recognition of foreign adoptions 
will usually be designed to protect the child. For example, it 
would seem to be against public policy to recognise an adoption 
where the child had effectively been bought by the parents for 
the purposes of providing services for them and no doubt in this 
situation a Court would refuse to give custody of the child to
See nn. 18 and 20 supra.
47 [1965] Ch. 831.
48 Today Re Valentine would be decided differently because
South Africa is one of the countries listed in S.I. 1973/19.
49 If the lack of a jurisdictional link is evidence of lack 
of bona fides, the adoption should also be refused recognition 
on public policy grounds.
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the parents. However, if the issue of recognition arose in 
relation to succession to one of the parent's estates, there 
would seem to be no reason to prevent the child from succeeding. 
On the contrary, the child would be better protected by 
recognition of the order.
Where the adopted person was an adult, it may be more likely that 
public policy would require that the parties should not benefit 
from an adoption, where the parties intention was not bona 
fide.50 Morris51 suggests that the "facts would have to be 
extreme before public policy demanded the total non-recognition 
of a foreign adoption for all purposes." (my emphasis).
Thus, whether the non-recognition is based on lack of 
jurisdiction or on public policy, there is no justification for 
giving it automatic precedence. In any event, whichever 
preference rule is chosen, the residual public policy defence 
will always be available.
B. AUTHORITY
There are no English decisions in which the conflict of rules has 
arisen in relation to adoption and the literature on the 
incidental question generally tends52 to refer to problems
50 For example, where the motive was to evade immigration 
rules or to exclude another person from their legitimate share 
of an inheritance, recognition would be against public policy.
51 Op. cit. (chapter 1, n.142 supra) pp. 249 - 250.
52 While in his discussion Gottlieb (1977) 26 ICLQ 734 at 
762 assimilates adoption with succession, one of his model 
problems (no. 8 at p. 788) does specifically refer to adoption.
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arising out of legitimacy or legitimation rather than adoption. 
However, there are two types of case which may provide us with 
some guidance.
1. Legitimacy/Legitimation Cases
As we mentioned earlier53, the conflict of rules with which we 
are concerned does not strictly arise in relation to legitimacy, 
legitimation, or for that matter non-judicial adoptions, because 
there is no issue of recognition of a foreign judgment. However, 
a similar54 conflict arises between the recognition of status 
rules of the forum and its choice of law rules on the 'main7 
issue.
The legitimacy cases are all consistent with the view that the 
law governing the succession should apply its rules to determine 
whether the claimant is legitimate, but the cases are of weak 
precedent value because no actual conflict arose. For example, 
in Re Stirling55, the claimant was illegitimate by all relevant 
laws. However, the Court referred to Scottish law56 as the lex
53 Chapter 1, I C supra.
54 It has been suggested that the legitimacy/legitimation
question is a 'black and white7 one; whereas in adoption there 
may be a 'grey area because adoption orders may not give a child 
full rights in respect of adoptive parents (Sykes and Pryles, 
chapter 5 n.22 supra, at p.526).
55 [1908] 2 Ch. 344.
56 Under Scottish law, there was an issue as to whether the 
claimant should be treated as legitimate under the putative 
marriage doctrine. It should be noted that in Shaw v Gould (1868) 
L.R. 3 H.L. 55 English law was the lex successionis and thus 
determined the question of legitimacy. Thus, the Scottish 
doctrine was not relevant unless the English choice of law rules 
on legitimacy referred to Scottish law as the law of the
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successionis, which would not have been necessary if the question 
of legitimacy was determined by the lex fori57.
2. 'Effect of foreign adoption' cases
After much debate, it now seems to be established58 that in 
adoption cases it is the lex successionis which determines the 
extent of succession rights to and from adopted persons and not 
the lex adoptionis or for that matter the lex fori59. It can 
perhaps be logically inferred from this that the lex sucessionis 
should also determine whether the 'adopted person' in question 
should in fact be treated as an adopted person for the purposes 
of succession.
C. RESULTS60
The results will have to be analysed according to four possible 
types of cases which might arise
1. Child claims after death of adopted parent or other adopted
domicile.
57 Gottlieb (1955) 33 Can. Bar. Rev. 523 at p. 539 and fn.
59. Gottlieb also refers to the old Kentucky case of Sneed v 
Ewing (1831) 5 J.J. Marsh 460. Again, the claimant was
illegitimate both by the lex fori and the lex successionis but 
the Court expressly applied the latter.
58 Re Valentine's Settlement [1965] Ch. 831 in which earlier
caselaw to the contrary was stated to be wrong. See also U.S. 
case of Anderson v French (1915) 77 N.H.
59 Although the lex successionis seems to have been the lex
fori in all the decided cases.
60 For tabular illustration of the results of applying the 
different preference rules, see tables 7A and 7B in the Appendix.
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relative.
2. Adopted parent or other adopted relative claims after death 
of child.
3. Child claims after death of natural parents or other natural 
relative.
4. Natural parent or other natural relative claims after death 
of child.
1. Child claims after death of adoptive parent/relative
Here, it will be helpful to refer to examples A1 and A261 which 
are based on the facts of Re Valentine's Settlement. The results 
of the application of the various rules may be summarised as 
follows.
(a) Preference for the choice rule
Where the order is recognised by the lex causae but not the lex 
fori, as in example A2 where South Africa is the lex 
successionis, the claimant will succeed. On the other hand, where 
the order is recognised by the lex fori but not the lex causae, 
as in example A1 where Rhodesia is the lex successionis, the 
claimant will not succeed.
(b) Preference for the recognition rule.
The opposite results will be achieved. Thus the claim will be 
successful where the order is recognised by the lex fori and not 
the lex causae (as in example Al) , but not in the opposite 
situation (as in example A2).
61 At chapter 1, III supra.
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(c) The 'differential rule'
Application of the 'differential rule'62 will result in 
successful claims in every case.
(d) Presumption of upholding succession rights or tort claims 
This would produce the same result as the differential rule.
2. Adoptive Parent/Relative Claims After Death of the Child
The results will be the same as under 1. above.
3. Child Claims after Death of Natural Parent/Relative
This type of case can only arise where under the relevant law, 
the adoption extinguishes rights of succession between child and 
natural parent. Assume in examples A1 and A2, that the child 
wishes to claim against his natural parents whose domicile at 
death is the same as Dorothy's in each case.
(a) Prefer Choice Rule
The child can only claim if the adoption is not recognised by the 
lex successionis. This is the situation in example Al, but not 
A2
(b) Prefer the Recognition Rule
Here the child can claim where the adoption is not recognised by 
the lex fori, as in example A2, but not Al.
(c) The 'Differential Rule'
The child would not be able to claim in any situation.
See chapter 6, II C 3 supra.
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(d) Presumption of Upholding Succession Rights/Tort Claims
This would ensure that the child could succeed against the 
natural parents where the adoption was not recognised by one of 
the relevant laws.
4. Natural Parents/Relative Claims After Death of Child
The conflict can only arise in this situation where under the 
relevant law the adoption order extinguishes the natural parent's 
succession rights and/or rights to claim for wrongful death in 
respect of the child. It may be noted that in some domestic laws 
there may not be reciprocity of treatment. Thus, a child may 
retain succession rights in respect of the natural parent, whilst 
the natural parent loses his/her rights in relation to the child 
on adoption63. Where the conflict arises, the results will be 
the same as in 3. above.
III. POLICY
A. THE LAW
Adopted children are treated as the children of their adopted 
parents and no longer as the children of their birth parents from 
the date of the adoption64, for nearly all purposes.65 Thus, 
the child may succeed under a will or on intestacy as a child of
63 For example, in Israel under the Adoption Law 1981
s.16 (3) .
64 Adoption Act 1976 s.39
65 The main exception relates to descent of peerages and
there are particular rules relating to the adoption of an 
illegitimate child by one of his parents as the sole adoptive 
parent.
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the adoptive parent, but not as a child of the birth parents66. 
The adoptive parents will have reciprocal rights on the death of 
the child, whereas the natural parents will not have any rights 
arising from the death of the child after the making of the 
adoption order. Similarly, for the purposes of discretionary 
family provision67 and wrongful death claims it is the adoptive 
relationship and not the natural relationship which is relevant.
The recent Adoption Law Review68 has affirmed that despite 
certain trends towards 'open adoption69' adoption orders should 
continue to effect a complete legal transplant of the child from 
the natural family to the adoptive family.70 However, we may 
still need to bear in mind that changes in adoption practice may 
increase the chance that there is a continuing relationship 
between the child and the natural parent and this may be relevant 
in application of policy.
In order to consider how we should deal with the 'conflict of 
rules' situation where there is a dispute as to whether an 
adoption order should be recognised, we need to consider the
66 Although he will not lose "any interest already vested in 
possession or interest expectant (whether immediately or not) 
upon an interest so vested at the date of the adoption." 
(Adoption Act 1976 s.42(4)).
67 It has been held that a child who has been adopted after
the deceased's death cannot apply for an order in relation to 
his/her natural parents, Re Collins [1990] Fam. 56.
68 Department of Health, Consultative Document on Adoption
Law (1992).
69 Ibid para 4.1.
70 Ibid para 2 (Rl) .
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policy of inheritance and tort law respectively in relation to 
succession and wrongful death claims arising out of the parent- 
child relationship as well as the policy of the adoption law rule 
explained above.
B. WILLS
We saw above71 that the prime policy objective in relation to 
wills is to give effect to the wishes of the testator72. This 
policy is equally pertinent in relation to bequests to and by 
doubtfully adopted children.
C. PROVISION FOR DEPENDANTS
The Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975, 
provides that 'any other person whom the deceased has treated as 
a child of the family in relation to any marriage to which he had 
any time been a party'73 is entitled to claim.74 Thus, where an 
adoption order is not recognised, but the child has been treated
At chapter 7, III A.
72 The principle of treating references to relatives in
wills as including adoptive relatives is consistent with this 
objective. In particular, it should be remembered that this 
principle will not apply if contrary intention can be shown from 
the will.
73 Hereinafter such a child shall be referred to as a de 
facto child and the parents as de facto parents.
74 s. 1(1) (d) . This may be seen as an extension of the
provision of support rights in favour of minor children who are 
treated as a child of the family during a marriage (Domestic 
Proceedings and Magistrates Court Act 1978 s.2 and on divorce, 
see Matrimonial Causes Act ss. 23, 24 and 52 (as amended by
Children Act 1989, Schedule 12 para. 33) . However, the category 
here is wider as can be seen from the decisions in Re Leach 
[1986] Ch. 226 and Re Callaghan [1985] Fam.l.
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as if he were adopted, the child will be eligible to claim 
without having to meet the additional requirement of proving that 
(s)he has been maintained by the deceased immediately before his 
death.75
We may conclude that the policy of ensuring that proper provision 
is made for dependents of the deceased includes both de jure and 
de facto children.76 Of course, in relation to both categories, 
whether the child succeeds will depend on all the circumstances 
of the relationship between the parties.77
D . INTESTACY
1. On Death of parents
Where there is no surviving spouse, the children of the intestate 
take the whole of the estate. Where there is a surviving spouse, 
the issue take half of the residue of the estate (after the 
statutory legacy) absolutely and the remainder (following the 
surviving spouses's life interest) in the other half.
5 See s. 1(1) (e) and s. 1(3) . Presumably the child could also
claim under the estate of the natural parents. However, where all 
the parties had acted on the reasonable assumption that the 
adoption order was valid it seems unlikely that an award would 
be made.
76 It may be noted that parents are not listed as a separate
category of claimants in section 1 of the Act. Thus, natural and 
adoptive parents can only claim if they can show that they were 
being maintained by the deceased immediately before his/her death 
under s.1(1) (e).
77 Thus, for example, where an adoption order is invalid the
child could claim against the natural parents. However, unless 
there has been a continuing relationship between them, it seems 
unlikely that an award would be made.
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It is suggested that the two78 most persuasive rationales for 
the intestacy rights of children are:-
(a) The presumed wishes of the intestate.79
The intestate is presumed to wish his/her property to be divided 
in the same way as the average testator bequeaths his/her 
property. The present intestacy laws are based on an analysis of 
wills in the 1950s.80 It is not surprising to find that after 
providing for a remaining spouse, the average testator makes 
provision for his/her children.
(b) The moral obligation of the intestate.
Whilst the legal obligation of parents to support their children 
ends when the children reach the age of 18, there is a continuing 
moral obligation of support, arising from the parent's 
responsibility for bringing the child into the world. Clearly the 
extent if any of this obligation depends on the respective 
financial position of the parents and children. On death, the 
parent no longer has any further personal need of his/her assets 
and therefore, subject to making provision for any other more 
needy dependants,81 the children can be considered to have
78 The rationales of need and desert, mentioned in the Law
Commission's Working Paper No. 108, are less useful because they 
depend more on the behaviour and financial circumstances of the 
particular child. In any event, the moral obligation rationale 
clearly reflects need and desert.
79 See Law Commission W.P. No. 108 paras. 4.2 to 4.3.
80 Report of Committee on the Law of Intestate Succession
(Morton Committee) Cmnd. 8310 para. 3.
81 The moral obligation could be enforced under the 
Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975.
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first82 claim on those assets.
The Law Commission mooted the possibility of extending intestacy 
rights to de facto children.83 Their main reason for not 
recommending such a reform was that one of the main requirements 
of intestacy law is that it should be simple and to include de 
facto children would mean that "administrators would have to make 
complex decisions of fact".84 They were also concerned that it 
would be unfair to allow such children to share both in the 
estate of their de facto parents and their de jure parents and 
that it would be complicated to prevent the latter. However, it 
may be noted that they did not suggest that de facto children did 
not come within the policy of intestacy provision.
2. On Death Of Children
If there is a surviving spouse and no issue, the parents of the 
deceased take half of the residue of the estate after the 
statutory legacy. If there is no surviving spouse and no issue, 
the parents of the deceased take the whole estate. In both cases, 
where the deceased has been validly adopted, the adoptive parents 
take to the exclusion of the natural parents.
It is suggested that the rights of parents to take on the
82 This hypothesis does not take into account the moral
obligation to give charity because the law of intestacy cannot 
make charitable donations where the deceased himself failed to 
do so by testamentary bequest.
83 For definition, see text accompanying n. 73 supra.
84 Law Com. No. 187 para. 49.
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intestacy of their children can also be explained on the basis 
of presumed wishes85 and moral obligation.
3. On Death Of More Distant Relatives.
It is more difficult to explain the basis for the order in which 
more distant relatives may claim on intestacy86. The list seems 
to be based on the closeness of the blood tie. Although rather 
speculative, the intestate might be presumed to wish closer 
relatives to take in preference to more distant ones. It is more 
difficult to base succession by more distant relatives on moral 
obligation, although it has been suggested that the notion of 
family property would provide more distant relatives with a moral 
claim87.
E. WRONGFUL DEATH
In 1982, the category of eligible dependents under the Fatal 
Accidents Act was expanded88 to include inter alia
(i) a person who has been treated as a child of the family by the 
deceased victim and
(ii) a person who was treated by the deceased as his parent. 
Thus, it can be seen that the policy behind wrongful death
85 Although it may be argued that the deceased may have 
preferred to benefit his/her siblings as in the long-term this 
would be tax advantagous. The Law Commission did not think that 
tax considerations should be relevant, see Law Com. No. 187 at 
para. 50-51.
86 See Law Com. W.P. 108 para. 4.11.
87 Ibid.
88 See Fatal Accidents Act 1976 s.1(3), substituted by 
Administration of Justice Act 1982 s.3.
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provision is to compensate de facto89 as well as de jure 
children and parents for the loss of dependency arising from the 
defendant's tortious actions.
F. ADOPTION LAW
Finally, we should consider the policy of the domestic rule, 
which will be referred to as a rule of adoption law, that adopted 
children are treated90 for nearly all purposes as the natural 
born legitimate children of the adopters. Perusal of the 
legislative history of the provision shows that the main 
rationale behind this principle91 is to facilitate the full 
integration92 of the child into the adoptive family because this 
is believed93 to be in the best interests of the child.94
Since the very questions is whether the child should be treated
89 For definition, see text accompanying n. 73 supra.
90 Full assimilation of treatment was only achieved by the 
Children Act 1975.
91 See Hougton Committee Report (1972) at, for example, 
para. 326.
92 Full integration is seen by the judiciary as the main 
advantage of adoption over other methods of disposal, principally 
because of the security and stability it provides for the child 
and the adoptive family. See, for example, Re S [1987] Fam. 98 
at p. 107, Re B (MF)(an infant) Re (SL) (an infant) [1972] 1 All 
ER 898 at pp. 899 - 900, Re L ( A Minor) [1987] 1 FLR 400 at p. 
403 and Re A (A Minor) [1987] 2 FLR 184, 189.
93 On the basis of empirical research showing that children 
who are adopted fare better than children who remain in long term 
foster care. See, Tizard, Adoption: A Second Chance (1977) and 
Seaglow et al, Growing Up Adopted (1972).
94 It is clear that the promotion of the welfare of the
child is the main, although not the sole, policy objective in 
modern adoption legislation. See Adoption Law Review (n. 68
supra) para 7.1 et seq.
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as an adopted child, it is not clear how much weight should be 
attached to the policy of adoption law. However, it is suggested 
that in the situation where there is some doubt as to the policy 
of succession or tort law, this may be resolved by application 
of the 'full integration' principle.
IV APPLICATION OF POLICY
We now need to examine how the policy we have identified applies 
in relation to cases which have a foreign element and where there 
is a dispute about the validity of the adoption order between the 
forum and the lex causae.
A. WILLS
1. 'Adoptive7 Parent as Testator
It is suggested that the 'adoptive7 parent would normally intend 
the word 'child7 in his will to include a child whom he had 
adopted, even though there was a dispute about the validity of 
the adoption order. If (s)he was not aware that the decree would 
not be recognised in some countries, then (s)he would clearly 
intend the child to be treated as a legally adopted child. If 
(s)he was aware of the doubt and did not want the child to 
succeed, this would surely be stated specifically in the will.
2. Natural Parent as Testator95
Similarly, the natural parent will not usually intend a reference
95 Assuming that under the relevant law, a valid adoption
extinguishes all succession rights between the child and the 
natural parent. Thee are a number of legal systems where this is 
not the case. See Krause, n.39 supra para. 6-184.
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to a child to include his/her child who has been adopted even if 
(s)he believes the adoption order to be invalid. If (s)he wishes 
to include such a child, (s)he would surely make a specific 
bequest in order to avoid any doubt.
3. Third Party Testator
The position is perhaps less clear in relation to third parties 
who are not themselves involved in the adoption process. By 
analogy with the reasoning adopted above in relation to 'former' 
spouses,96 it could be assumed that the testator intended to 
benefit a child whose adoption is recognised by the law governing 
the interpretation of his/her will.
However, it might be argued that the analogy is false since the 
fact that the adoption is not recognised will not usually affect 
the de facto relationship97 between the adoptive parent and the 
child or between the testator and the child. Thus, the testator 
would intend to benefit the child irrespective of the validity 
of the adoption.
It is suggested that the latter approach should be preferred 
because it is more consistent with the adoption law policy of 
'full integration'.
not the case. See Krause, n.39 supra para. .6-184.
96 At chapter 7, IV A 2 supra.
97 We saw above (ibid) that the position is more speculative 
where third parties have made provision for 'spouses'.
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4. Adoptive Child as Testator
By analogy with the reasoning in 1. above, where the 'adopted' 
child has made testamentary provision for his/her parent, it 
should be assumed that (s)he intended to refer to the 'adoptive' 
parents, unless contrary intention can be seen from the will.
Again the situation is less clear where the 'adopted' child makes 
testamentary provision for other relatives. However, unless (s)he 
actually has a continuing relationship with his/her natural 
relatives it would seem clear that the intention must be to refer 
to the 'adoptive' relatives.
The desired results98 in each of the four situations can be 
achieved by use of the differential rule under which the rule 
which recognises the adoption will be applied.
B. PROVISION FOR DEPENDENTS
1. Discretionary Provision
It will be remembered that in fact the 'conflict of rules'
situation will only arise if an English Court is prepared to 
apply a foreign discretionary provision statute.99 It is
assumed that the foreign statute only allows claims by adopted
children if there is a recognised order and does not allow
validly adopted children to claim against the estate of the 
natural parents.
98 It may be noted that these are all consistent with the 
'full integration' principle.
99 See Chapter 7 I C supra.
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We saw above that the policy of the English discretionary 
provision statute is to ensure that proper provision is made on 
death for the de facto children100 of the deceased. Thus, it is 
clear that the preference rule should ensure that the 'adopted' 
child can claim against the 'adoptive' parents.
Should the 'adopted' child be able to claim against his/her 
natural parents? Under English domestic law, where the adoption 
order is invalid the child would be eligible to claim but would 
be unlikely to succeed unless there had in fact been a continuing 
relationship between the parties. It would seem inappropriate to 
allow the child to claim against his/her natural parents where 
the lex causae itself recognises the adoption. However, where the 
lex causae does not recognise the adoption, there would not seem 
to be any good reason101 not to apply the choice rule and allow 
the child to claim, even though his chances of success are slim. 
Since such a right would not affect that child's position in the 
adoptive family, allowing a claim is not inconsistent with the 
'full integration' principle.
The above results could be achieved by applying the differential 
rule in the case of a claim against the estate of an adoptive 
parent and the choice rule in a claim against the estate of a
100 For definition, see text accompanying n. 73 supra.
101 There can be no concern about an unfair result since an 
award will only be made in a deserving case and the Court will 
take into account inter alia the possibility of the child having 
a claim against both parents' estates (which was of concern to 
the Law Commission, n.84 supra ). Allowing the child to claim in 
this very specific situation will not lead to a proliferation of 
bogus claims.
372
natural parent.
2. Fixed Shares
An English Court may be faced with the situation where the lex 
successionis provides a fixed share for a child,102 including an 
adopted child, but there is a dispute as to the validity of the 
adoption. It was argued above103 that the policy of English law 
in relation to discretionary provision should in principle be 
equally applicable in relation to fixed shares since the two 
'systems7 are simply different methods of achieving the same 
purpose.
Thus, in the present context, the policy of allowing a claim 
against the adopted parents should apply equally in fixed share 
cases. This result is supported by the 'full integration7 
principle.
However, it is more problematic to apply the policy of allowing 
claims against the natural parents where the lex causae does not 
recognise the adoption,104 to 'fixed share7 cases. One of the 
reasons that we gave in favour of allowing a claim against 
natural parents was that under the discretionary system 
unmeritorious cases would be rejected. However, in 'fixed share7
102 This is analogous to the position in relation to spouses. 
See chapter 7, III B 4 supra.
103 Ibid.
104 There will not be any problem where the lex causae 
allows adopted children to take fixed shares in both their 
adoptive parents and natural parents7 estates, see Krause, supra 
n.39 at para. 6-183.
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systems there is no such filter mechanism.105 The result of 
allowing a claim against the natural parents would be to entitle 
the child to a full 'fixed share7 in the estate of both sets of 
parents, irrespective of his/her relationship with them.
It is suggested that such 'double succession7 is against the 
policy of English law.106 Thus, the corollary of allowing a 
claim against the 'adoptive7 parents is to disallow a claim 
against the natural parents.
The suggested desired results of allowing claims against 
'adoptive7 but not natural parents can be achieved by use of the 
differential rule, under which the recognition rule is applied 
where it recognises the adoption and otherwise the choice rule.
C. INTESTACY
It is assumed throughout the following discussion that under the 
lex successionis where there is a valid adoption this 
extinguishes the succession rights between natural parents and 
children. Where this is not the case, there will be succession
105 It will be remembered that in relation to spouses, the
difficulty caused by the lack of flexibility of the fixed share 
system was to a large extent solved by the use of the doctrine 
of preclusion (see chapter 7, IV B 2) . This doctrine is 
inappropriate in the case of a claim by an adopted child because 
the child was not a party to the adoption order.
106 See Law Com. No. 187 at para. 49. The Adoption Law
Review7s (n. 68 supra) recommendation that a child whose natural 
parents have died intestate should not lose his contingent 
interest under the statutory trusts by virtue of adoption might 
seem to contradict this. However, this situation is different 
because the succession rights against the two sets of parents are 
successive rather than concurrent.
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between the natural relatives whether or not the adoption is 
recognised. The only issue will be whether the 'adopted child' 
and the 'adoptive' relatives can claim inter se.
1. On Death Of the 'Adoptive' Parents
On the assumption that intestate provision for children is based 
on the presumed wishes and moral obligations of the intestate, 
should the 'adopted' child be able to claim against the estate 
of either his 'adoptive' or natural parents?
It is suggested that the average testator would wish his/her 
'adopted' children to take whether or not the adoption is legally 
recognised by either the lex successionis or the lex fori. 
Failure to make a will may reflect the intestate's belief that 
the adoption is legally effective in the relevant 
jurisdiction(s).
To the extent that intestacy rights are based on a moral 
obligation does that obligation extend to 'adopted' children? It 
was suggested earlier that the moral obligation to provide for 
children on death is a continuation of the legal obligation of 
support in respect of minor children.107 Since de facto parents 
have support duties in respect of children who have been treated 
as children of the family,108 such children should be included 
within the scope of the moral obligation on death.
107
108
See III C 1 (b) supra.
See supra n. 74.
We saw above that the Law Commission rejected the idea of giving 
intestacy rights to de facto children because of the complexity 
this would cause. It is suggested that their reasoning is 
inapplicable in the present context. Firstly, the situation where 
the decree is recognised in one jurisdiction and not in another 
is unusual and complexity is unavoidable. Secondly, it will 
usually be beyond doubt that the 'adopted' child has been treated 
as the child of the family. Thirdly, if the preference rule 
prevents succession to the estate of the natural parent,109 
there is no danger of a double portion.
Thus, it is submitted that on intestacy of the adoptive parent 
the doubtfully adopted child should succeed, without having to 
rely on discretionary family provision legislation.110
2. On Death Of 'Adopted' Children
The presumed wishes and moral obligation principles would seem 
to require that the 'adoptive' parents should be able to take on 
the intestacy of their 'adopted' child. If the child did indeed 
wish to benefit his natural parents, surely he would make 
specific testamentary provision for them.
If the 'adoptive' parents are no longer living, the child may 
also be assumed to prefer that his/her adoptive relatives should
109 See infra at p. 391.
110 The Law Commission (Rept. No. 187 at para. 50) suggested 
that the de facto child was adequately protected by the 
Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975. 
However, as this only provides for maintenance, it is difficult 
to see how it can be equated to intestacy rights.
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succeed in preference to the natural family which has rejected 
him/her.
3. On Death Of Other Adoptive Relatives
It is not so clear that other relatives can be presumed to wish
the doubtfully adopted child to succeed on the same basis as if 
the adoption order is valid. In particular, there may be a 
situation where the question is whether the doubtfully adopted 
child or a more distantly related blood relative succeeds to the 
whole estate. Thus, it might be more appropriate to presume that 
the deceased wishes to benefit only children whose adoption is 
recognised in his own country, the law of his domicile. Indeed 
if moral obligation here is seen as reflecting the notion of 
family property, it may be argued that a person with a doubtful 
legal relationship has a weaker claim than a more distant 
relative, whose relationship is not in doubt.
In relation to movables, the lex domicilii will also be the lex 
successionis. Thus, application of the choice rule would produce 
the desired result. However, intestate succession to immovables 
is governed entirely by the lex situs.111 None of the existing 
preference rules would enable the domicile to determine whether 
the adopted child could take. Whilst it is possible to create a
new rule to the effect that in relation to intestacy by distant
relatives, the domicile of the deceased at the time of his death
111 It is unlikely that the intestate would expect the situs
to determine the validity of the adoption. Moreover, since the 
use of the lex situs to govern intestate succession to immovables 
is widely criticised (see chapter 7, n.8 supra) it would seem 
inappropriate to extend its function.
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determines whether the adoption order is valid, this is difficult 
to fit within the existing conflict of laws framework. A 
speculative assumption about the wishes of the deceased would not 
seem to justify such an innovation.
Since none of the approaches based on intestacy policy are 
satisfactory, we should consider the application of the 'full 
integration" policy of adoption law. It is suggested that in this 
context this policy would seem to require that an 'adopted' child 
be able to claim from distant adopted relatives.
4. On Death Of Natural Parents/Relatives
What is the position in relation to birth relatives?
By analogy with the will situation, the intestate will be 
presumed not to wish to benefit a natural child/relative who has 
been adopted. Arguably, any moral obligation is extinguished by 
the adoption order112 whether it be legally recognised or 
not.113
Thus we may conclude that the policy of intestacy law would be 
to allow claims between 'adopted' children and 'adoptive' 
parents/relatives. However, claims by and against the estates of 
natural relatives should not be allowed.
112 Although in a number of countries the natural parents' 
support obligation is retained, although it is subsidiary to that 
of the adoptive parents', Krause (n. 39 supra) para. 6-184.
113 If the natural parent has in fact been maintaining the 
child before his/her death, there will be a claim under 
discretionary family provision.
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Thus, again the desired results can be achieved by the 
'differential rule', which will apply whichever rule results in 
recognition of the adoption order.
D. WRONGFUL DEATH
Since the policy of English law is to allow claims by de facto 
children and parents, it seems clear that the 'adopted child' and 
'adoptive parent' should be able to claim in respect of the 
wrongful death of the adoptive parent in the conflict of rules 
situation.
The more difficult question is whether the 'adopted' child be 
allowed to claim in relation to the death of the natural parent 
if he can show dependency and vice versa.
It is suggested that since the purpose of the Fatal Accidents Act 
legislation is to compensate de facto and de jure children to the 
extent of their dependence, the 'adopted' child should be able 
to claim in respect of the wrongful death of his/her natural as 
well as adoptive parents.114 The claim will only succeed in 
respect of the natural parent, if the child can show loss of 
dependency which will be rare. Since the award is in relation to 
the extent of the dependency proved, the child would not be 
doubly compensated in unlikely the event that both sets of 
parents are wrongfully killed.
114 It may be noted that in some countries adopted children
can inherit from both adoptive and natural parents. See Krause, 
(n. 39 supra), at para. 6-183.
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What about the natural parent? Usually the natural parent will 
not be able to show any dependency and thus a claim would fail. 
It is suggested, however, that given the limited number of cases 
in which there is a dispute about the adoption decree, no real 
difficulty would be caused by allowing natural parents to claim 
in order to provide justice in the rare situation that dependency 
can be shown. The tortfeasor is not unfairly prejudiced by 
allowing both sets of parents to claim because the size of the 
awards are based on the value of the prospective dependency. 
Thus, there can be no more overlap between the two claims than 
there is between the claim of a widow(er) and the children of a 
victim.
The desired results can be achieved by applying the presumption 
in favour of tort claims.
V RECOMMENDATIONS
1. In relation to testate succession, the 'differential rule" 
is the most appropriate preference rule.
2. In relation to discretionary family provision:-
(a) Where the deceased is the 'adoptive" parent, the 
'differential" rule should be applied.
(b) Where the deceased is the natural parent, the choice of 
law rule should prevail.
3. In relation to fixed shares, the 'differential rule" should 
be applied.
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4. On intestacy, the 'differential rule' is also the most 
appropriate rule.
5. On a claim for wrongful death, the presumption in favour of 
tort claims is the appropriate preference rule.
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TABLE Is. CONFLICTS RULES IN STATUTORY FORM IN ENGLAND
A. RECOGNITION RULES (excluding bi-lateral treaties)
1. Administration of Justice Act 1920 (recognition of certain 
Commonwealth judgments by registration).
2. Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933. 
(recognition of judgments of specified countries by 
registration).
3. Arbitration Act 1950 Part II ( recognition and enforcement of 
arbitration awards coming within the Geneva Convention).
4. Arbitration Act 1975 (recognition and enforcement of 
arbitration awards coming within the New York Convention).
5. Adoption Act 1976 (recognition of certain adoption orders).
6. Child Abduction and Custody Act 1985 (recognition of foreign 
custody decisions - gives effect to Council of Europe 
Convention).
7. Family Law Act 1986 Part I (recognition of United Kingdom 
custody orders).
8. Family Law Act 1986 Part II (recognition of British Isles and 
overseas matrimonial decrees).
9. Civil Jurisdiction of Judgments Act 1982 (recognition by 
registration of judgments of EC member countries- gives effect 
to Brussels Convention).
10. Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1991 (recognition by 
registration of judgments of EFTA States - gives effect to Lugano 
Convention).
B: CHOICE RULES
1. Foreign Marriages Act 1892 (as amended) (Formal validity of 
Consular Marriages abroad and Marriages of British forces serving 
abroad).
2. Wills Act 1964 (Formal validity of wills).
3. Legitimacy Act 1976 s.3 (Legitimation by subsequent marriage) .
4. Recognition of Trusts Act 1987 (choice of law rules for 
trusts - gives effect to Hague Convention on Law Applicable to 
Trusts and on.their Recognition).
5. Contract (Applicable Law) Act 1991 (choice of law rules for 
all contracts to which the Act applies - gives effect to Rome 
Convention).
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TABLE 2: CONFLICTS RULES IN STATUTORY FORM IN ISRAEL.
A. RECOGNITION RULES
1. Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Law 1958.
2. Regulations to Give Effect to New York Convention (Recognition 
of Foreign Arbitrations) 1978.
B. CHOICE RULES
1. Palestine Order in Council 1922 art. 64(2) (validity of 
marriage)
2. Family Law Amendment (Maintenance) Law 1959 s. 17
(maintenance).
3. Legal Capacity and Custody Law 1962 s. 77 (capacity of 
persons) .
4. Succession Law 1965 ss.137-144.
5. Dissolution of Marriages (Special Cases) Law 1969 (divorce in 
civil Court).
6. Spouses' Property Relations Law 1973 s. 15 (matrimonial 
property).
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TABLE 3: RESULTS OF APPLYING THE POSSIBLE PREFERENCE RULES TO
VALIDITY OF REMARRIAGE
A
English lex fori 
does not recognise, 
lex causae does 
recognise decree.
B
English lex fori 
does recognise, 
lex causae does not 
recognise decree
1. Apply choice 
Rule
V X
2. Apply Recognition 
Rule
X V
3. Apply Differential 
Rule
V V
4. Presumption in
favour of upholding 
validity of marriage.
V V
v = remarriage is valid 
x = remarriage is invalid
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TABLE 4: RESULTS OF APPLYING THE POSSIBLE PREFERENCE RULES TO THE
FIRST SPOUSE'S RIGHT TO INHERIT.
A
English lex fori 
does not recognise, 
lex causae does 
recognise decree.
B
English lex fori 
does recognise, 
lex causae does not 
recognise decree
1. Apply choice 
Rule
X V
2. Apply Recognition 
Rule
V X
3. Apply Differential 
Rule
X X
4. Presumption in
favour of upholding 
succession rights.
V V
v = 'spouse' can inherit 
x = 'spouse' cannot inherit
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TABLE 5A: RESULTS OF APPLYING THE POSSIBLE PREFERENCE RULES TO THE
FIRST SPOUSE'S RIGHT TO SHARE IN POST-DECREE ACQUISITIONS UNDER
IMMEDIATE/DEFERRED COMMUNITY SCHEME.1
A
English lex fori 
does not recognise, 
lex causae does 
recognise decree.
B
English lex fori 
does recognise, 
lex causae does not 
recognise decree
1. Apply choice 
Rule
X V
2. Apply Recognition 
Rule
V X
3. Apply Differential 
Rule
X X
v = 'spouse' can share 
x = 'spouse' cannot share
TABLE 5B: RESULTS FROM APPLYING THE POSSIBLE PREFERENCE RULES TO THE
FIRST SPOUSE'S RIGHT TO IMMEDIATE REALISATION OF SHARE UNDER
IMMEDIATE/DEFERRED COMMUNITY SCHEME.*
A
English lex fori 
does not recognise, 
lex causae does 
recognise decree.
B
English lex fori 
does recognise, 
lex causae does not 
recognise decree
1. Apply choice 
Rule
V X
2. Apply Recognition 
Rule
X V
3. Apply Differential 
Rule
V V
v = 'spouse' entitled to immediate realisation 
x = 'spouse' not entitled to immediate realisation
1 On the assumption that there is entitlement to share in
post-separation assets.
2 On the assumption that realisation is only available on
termination of the marriage.
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TABLE 6A: RESULTS OF APPLYING THE POSSIBLE PREFERENCE RULES TO
DEFENCE OF INTER-SPOUSAL IMMUNITY
A
Enqlish lex fori 
does not recognise, 
lex causae does 
recognise decree.
B
English lex fori 
does recognise, 
lex causae does not 
recognise decree
1. Apply choice 
Rule V X
2. Apply Recognition 
Rule
X V
3. Apply Differential 
Rule
V V
4. Presumption in
favour of upholding 
tort claims.
V V
v = P. can claim (i.e. no immunity) 
x = P. cannot claim (i.e. is immunity)
TABLE 6B: RESULTS OF APPLYING THE POSSIBLE PREFERENCE RULES TO
WRONGFUL DEATH CLAIMS BY FIRST SPOUSES
A
English lex fori 
does not recognise, 
lex causae does 
recognise decree.
B
English lex fori 
does recognise, 
lex causae does not 
recognise decree
1. Apply choice 
Rule
X V
2. Apply Recognition 
Rule
V X
3. Apply Differential 
Rule
X X
4. Presumption in
favour of upholding 
tort claims.
V V
v = P. can claim 
x = P. cannot claim
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TABLE 7A: RESULTS OF APPLYING THE POSSIBLE PREFERENCE RULES TO 
SUCCESSION AND WRONGFUL DEATH CLAIMS BETWEEN CHILD AND ADOPTIVE
PARENTS.
A
English lex fori 
does not recognise, 
lex causae does 
recognise decree.
B
English lex fori 
does recognise, 
lex causae does not 
recognise decree
1. Apply choice 
Rule
V X
2. Apply Recognition 
Rule
X V
3. Apply Differential 
Rule
V V
4. Presumption in
favour of upholding 
succession and tort 
claims
V V
v = child/adoptive parent can claim 
x = child/adoptive parent cannot claim
TABLE 7B: RESULTS OF APPLYING THE POSSIBLE PREFERENCE RULES TO 
SUCCESSION AND WRONGFUL DEATH CLAIMS BETWEEN CHILD AND NATURAL 
PARENTS
English lex fori 
does not recognise, 
lex causae does 
recognise decree.
B
English lex fori 
does recognise, 
lex causae does not 
recognise decree
1. Apply choice 
Rule
X V
2. Apply Recognition 
Rule
V X
3. Apply Differential 
Rule
X X
4. Presumption in
favour of upholding 
succession rights.
V V
v = child/natural 
x = child/natural
parent can claim 
parent cannot claim
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